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ABSTRACT
GUIDED BY GOD: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND POLITICAL
LEGITIMACY IN THE PHILIPPINES
Steven B. Shirley
Old Dominion University, 2003
Director: Dr. Qiu Jin

The developing world is witnessing a growing (some may say disturbing)
trend towards "de-secularization" o f national governments. This trend has been
understudied and misunderstood over the past decade. Government experts and scholars
alike too often view this trend through the lens o f "threat" analysis and in so doing
miss key cultural, historical, and political factors at work. This study attempts to redress
this problem. By looking at political legitimacy and the role religious organizations such
as the Catholic Church may play, a new understanding o f how religious institutions can
shape and mold governments and policies emerges.
This study focuses specifically on the Republic o f the Philippines and the Catholic
Church. The rationale is that Philippines is one o f the most interesting and intriguing
nation-states in which to study the dynamics between the Church and State. In no other
Southeast Asian nation-state can one find a relationship with both the historical and
cultural gravitas that exists between the Philippine Catholic Church and secular
government. It is a relationship that spans almost five hundred years. Indeed,
understanding how the Church uses its power to legitimize and make illegitimate
politicians and regimes is a study in power, politics, and religion, all couched in the
context o f a Southeast Asian nation with its own unique cultural attributes.
Through the use o f historical analysis and contemporary case studies this study
details for the reader the evolution o f Church power and influence and its effects on the
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legitimacy o f Philippine governments. Built on the foundation o f Weberian legitimacy
and the Eastonian idea o f support, the study includes a look at the personalities behind
the Church’s power, the methods that led to two People Power revolutions, and the
consequences o f the de-secularization on the Philippines.
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This work is dedicated to the people o f the Philippines and o f Asia, whose culture
and arts I have studied for so many years.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2001, television sets across Manila beamed images o f hundreds o f
thousands o f protestors converging in and around Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA)
in metropolitan Manila. Those protestors gathered in the shadow o f the EDSA shrine— a
statue o f the Virgin Mary located at the intersection o f EDSA that had come to represent
the power o f democracy and the victory over the totalitarianism o f Ferdinand E. Marcos
in the first People Power Revolution o f 1986. Yet this was not 1986 and Marcos had
long since passed into history. On this day the Church had a new target: the allegedly
corrupt President Joseph “Erap” Estrada.
At 3:30 p.m. the Archbishop o f Manila and de facto head o f the Philippine
Catholic Church, Jaime Cardinal Sin, announced through a loudspeaker and the Churchowned radio station Veritas that several top government officials who had in previous
days supported Estrada had defected. Sin, a familiar face o f the opposition both against
martial law and Marcos, once again came to the defense o f political morality in the
Philippines and called for Estrada’s resignation. Sin and the thousands gathered at EDSA
knew that Estrada’s own departure was imminent. It was a poignant scene, the hierarchy
o f the Catholic Church leading the protests and joined in hand with secular personalities.
Both were being supported and cheered by the masses assembled at the feet o f the Virgin
Mary. Sin and the others came to worship, to pray, and to depose a constitutionally
elected president.
In the days leading up to the mass protests at EDSA, threats o f nonviolent action
made politicians apprehensive. Word came to their offices that the average citizen and
organized political groups were rallying their forces against the president. Included in
This thesis follows the style and format o f A Manual fo r Writers o f Term Papers, Theses,
and Dissertations by Kate Turabian.
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these groups were the Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilino (Kompil), the Bagong

Alyansang Makabayan, the Estrada Resign Movement, and most importantly, the
Philippine Catholic Church. The Church’s history in toppling regimes and the fact that its
membership was spread throughout each o f the other anti-Estrada organizations made it
particularly relevant and an authentic threat to Estrada.1
The Catholic Church flexed its political muscle when its leadership called on the
faithful to come to the EDSA shrine in a show o f solidarity, and hundreds o f thousands
poured into the streets in response. Once there, they were treated to speeches and
pronouncements made by the Church hierarchy, including Cardinal Sin, that were
intended to encourage and prepare the crowds for a long vigil. That vigil would not end
until Estrada was convicted by the Philippine Senate and ejected from office; or he
voluntarily agreed to step down and hand power to the Church’s hand-picked successor,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
If Estrada was unwilling or the Philippine Senate did not have the courage to
convict Estrada on the impeachment charges brought against him, then the Church was
prepared for action. These preparations included calls for mass protests at EDSA,
coupled with efforts to build coalitions between business leaders, Church officials, and
politicians sympathetic to their cause. Plans were made to ensure that both Estrada and
his regime would be rendered illegitimate and that the protestors assembled would be
protected from possible military reprisals ordered by Estrada, who prior to January 20,
2001, still held the Philippine military’s loyalty.
Estrada had powerful political allies and there was little hope that the Senate
would convict him. The fear o f a rigged trial in the Senate prompted the Catholic
Bishops Conference o f the Philippines (CBCP) to call for “a miracle” and “prayer” in

1Norman Boradador and Pablo Carlito, “Anti-Erap Groups Plan for People Power
II,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (January 16,
2001; accessed 1 September2001).
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hopes o f influencing the Senator-judges to abandon their political allegiances and vote
Estrada out. In the past the CBCP, organized in 1945 to give voice to catholic concerns,
had played a role in furthering national unity, coordinating and organizing Filipino
Catholics in education, promoting social welfare, and initiating political action.
Orlando Quevedo, Archbishop o f Nueva Segovia and member o f the CBCP,
summed up the concerns about Estrada’s likely impeachment: “God’s grace works
quietly in the depths o f conscience. Still, the door o f conscience must be open to God’s
grace."2 The Church left no doubt that in their minds that Estrada had lost the moral
basis to govern and the legitimacy he once enjoyed. Estrada may have cowed the Senate,
but the Church held the street. The Church’s leaders promised to fight his corrupt
presidency with more than prayers if he was allowed to stay. They were prepared to use
extended and massive “extralegal. . . civil disobedience."3
In the end the Senate did not convict, failing by one vote to move forward with
the impeachment charges. The Church made good on its warning.4 The crowds at the
EDSA shrine swelled and became so massive they spilled into surrounding areas, filling
up nearby Ortigas Avenue, the parking lots o f the SM Megamall, and places as far away
as Camp Aguinaldo. Those individuals who answered the Church’s call represented a
cross-section o f Philippine society and industry, from labor to the federal bureaucracy,
militant groups, religious organizations, and even university students who walked out o f
their classes to make their voices heard. Those voices were not just heard in Manila.

2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4On the twenty-third day o f the impeachment trial, the Senate voted on whether or
not to open second envelope, which purportedly held concrete evidence o f Estrada’s
crimes. By a margin o f only one vote, the senators supporting Estrada successfully
blocked the opening o f the documents. The 11-10 margin was decried in the press, and in
the Senate, Estrada’s victory was short lived. In just more than 48 hours he was forced
from office.
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Throughout the Philippines, from Zamboanga in the south to Cebu in the Yisayas, tens o f
thousands o f demonstrators engaged in anti-Estrada rallies.
Many military and police personnel were overwhelmed and unprepared for the
number o f protestors. At first they tried to control the crowds and maintain the
barricades, but in a matter o f days they too were overcome by the spirit o f the movement.
Media on the scene captured images o f the military and police sent to contain the rallies
extending their hands in solidarity with the protestors.
Efforts by the Church to build a visible coalition paid off. Powerful and
charismatic politicians united themselves with the Church. Former president Corazon
Aquino, a longtime supporter and beneficiary o f the first People Power revolution whose
story and connection to the Church is told in chapters 4 and 5, stood with her longtime
friend and advisor Cardinal Sin. Fidel Ramos, a Protestant, former president, one-time
antagonist o f the Catholic Church, and target o f EDSA rallies in the past, was also in
attendance. All o f them were there to show the world the power and solidarity o f the
Philippine people who refused to tolerate corruption in their midst.
The Church’s coalition also spanned political and religious lines, winning the
support o f business and industry both in Manila and throughout the Philippines. These
businesses allowed their workers to take the days off and answer the Catholic Church’s
call for a People Power II. Many businesses also supplied food and water to the
thousands who were at EDSA.
Viewing the masses assembled against him, Estrada and his few remaining allies
realized that salvaging his presidency was politically hopeless. The crowd at EDSA
signified outrage and shame directed toward his administration. The protestors
represented a society that was fed up with corruption and tired o f turning a blind eye to
the president’s peccadilloes. Estrada was out o f time and out o f options.
On Saturday, January 20,2001, Estrada left Malacanang, the home o f the
president, by boat. That same day, the Supreme Court o f the Philippines declared the
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presidency vacant. Through the force o f People Power II, the Philippine Catholic Church
proved to the world that it remained a political force to be reckoned with.
The first days o f the new century witnessed the end o f the brief Estrada
presidency and the emergence of the Philippine Catholic Church’s potent political power.
People Power II, recounted in further detail in chapter 6, was a potent and concrete
example o f how the Catholic Church remained a force o f political change. As it had done
on many occasions in the past, the Church challenged the legitimacy o f a constitutionally
elected government and was successful in enforcing its political will.
The Philippine Catholic Church remains today one o f the few institutions with the
organization, the leadership, and the moral substance to launch a crusade against a
corrupt president. It is the only institution in the Philippines with the power to declare a
president legitimate or illegitimate and do so through peaceful means. The Church
certainly did not act alone, but it succeeded where the Senate failed and politicians were
powerless. Even when public opinion was running against the Catholic Church’s
pressure, it proved invaluable and influential in forcing the removal o f President Estrada
and the coronation o f his successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
People Power II and the Church’s work in bringing down Estrada are the latest in
a series o f events that illustrate the role the Church historically played in the Philippines
as a force o f governmental legitimacy. It is a role overlooked in traditional international
relations literature, comparative political studies, and writings on legitimacy. This study
is one step in helping highlight the Church’s role, not merely as a social or political force,
but as one o f the key mediating factors in legitimating governments in the Philippines.
Studying governmental legitimacy is important because legitimacy shapes the
effectiveness o f governance, the scope, pace, and method o f political change, and the
international conduct o f the state. By maximizing political obligation, legitimacy greatly
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enhances the viability o f rulership.5 The Church, playing the key role in this legitimacy,
is therefore an important unit o f study with consequences that stem well beyond simple
unit level analysis.
If substantial studies existed recounting the happenings o f People Power II and
the influence o f the Church within this movement, then the need for this study would be
less urgent. The same would be true if current legitimacy theory dealt adequately with
religious organizations like the Church. If less developed countries were utilized as case
studies when Church-State issues were researched, then this study o f the Philippine
Catholic Church and its role as the force o f legitimacy would be less intriguing.
Unfortunately, these studies do not exist. No current research examines the
specific role o f the Catholic Church as a legitimizing force in the Philippines, and no
literature addresses the corollary between legitimacy and the Catholic Church in the
context of People Power II. All o f this makes this particular study timely, relevant, and
important to international relations literature.
This study also has two great advantages over previous studies. For one, it serves
as an excellent source o f information on the role o f the Church in the Philippines. No
single study has ever highlighted the dynamic relationship that exists between the Church
and State in the Philippines, nor looked at it with a historian’s eye and a political
scientist’s analysis. It is at the same time applicable to the larger trends such as de
secularization taking place in world politics today. Indeed, throughout Southeast Asia,
the Middle East, and other areas, governments are coming to grips with new political
realities, among them the fresh injection o f religion into the political dialogue and affairs
o f secular governments.
Politicians and citizens around the world are waking everyday to the reality that
religious-based governments such as the Taliban are not the political anathema that one
5Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest fo r
Moral Authority (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 3-4.
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might think, and in fact such diverse locations as the Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey,
Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, Egypt, and a host o f others, secular
governments are clashing head to head with the religious hard liners in their own
countries.
In some countries they are able to deal with them and work together relatively
peacefully, but in each o f these examples there have been times when violence ruled the
day, and it was a violence often precipitated by the religious leadership. By examining
the Philippines, and the Catholic Church’s role in political legitimacy, a model is given
through which the role o f other religious institutions can be dissected, laid open, studied,
and understood within the context o f political legitimacy. It is the author’s hope that the
study can be a guide for others who wish to take up the understanding o f religious groups
in other less studied areas o f the world, and in the process add to the greater
understanding o f the world in which we all share.
To begin a study o f this nature, one must have a basis from which to understand
how the Church can “fit” into a society like the Philippines. Simply stating that the
Church is influential is not sufficient. An intellectual framework or theory is needed so
that the correlation and causation between the variables can be determined. Until now,
studies o f legitimacy and legitimacy theory have not offered sufficient explanations o f the
substantive role for an organization like the Catholic Church. Moreover, few
contemporary studies address the role o f religion in the legitimacy o f lesser-developed
nation-states, and classical studies o f state legitimacy do not adequately address the
theoretical contemporary role religious organizations like the Church play in twenty-firstcentury politics.
The absence o f this material creates a sizable gap in the intellectual framework o f
comparative politics, Philippine studies, international relations, and especially legitimacy
studies. This is an unacceptable situation, because understanding legitimacy as a
dependent variable requires understanding the independent variables that impact it.
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Evidence uncovered in this study will testify to the role o f the Catholic Church as a
legitimizing force in the Philippines. Whether it is the main independent variable or
merely a mediating factor will be discussed in detail later in the chapter.
This study begins by posing and attempting to answer several important questions
and challenges to current legitimacy theory: (1) What is legitimacy and how, if at all,
does it deal with the role o f a social institution such as the Catholic Church? (2) What do
the major theoretical texts in legitimacy theory have to say about how legitimacy is
established, and what, if any, intellectual space do they set aside for a body such as the
Catholic Church to operate within? (3) Is legitimacy theory incomplete and
consequently, can it allow for a religious institution like the Catholic Church to be an
important variable in legitimacy? (4) Is a rethinking o f the legitimacy paradigm needed?
(5) Can the function o f the Catholic Church in legitimacy transcend a singular theory?
(6) Historically, how did the Catholic Church become the force o f legitimacy in the
Philippines? (5) What do the events o f People Power II tell us about the Church’s
responsibility in legitimating today’s Philippine government and its continued role in the
future?
We must first address the ways scholars from a variety o f fields, including
political science, international relations, cultural anthropology, and sociology, have all
contributed to the development o f legitimacy theory. Those scholars’ differing
intellectual backgrounds have not resulted in radically different ideas about legitimacy. In
fact, from the works o f classical philosophers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau to modem
theorists like Seymour Martin Lipset, the elements o f legitimacy remain relatively
constant. Variety is found in the ways these elements are operationalized and the
language used to define them, not in the essence o f their meaning.
As a theory, legitimacy is unlike the Realist, Marxist, or Dependency schools o f
thought in which the boundaries, variables, and causational pathways are clearly marked.
The independent variables in legitimacy can be many things, depending on the author’s
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worldview. A few things are constant, such as all definitions including nods to power
and authority, but the ways these variables are constituted is subject to debate. For
example, Rodney Barker offers this concise definition o f legitimacy: “The belief in the
rightfulness o f a state in its authority to issue commands so that the command be obeyed
not simply out o f fear or self interest, but because they are believed to have moral
authority, because subjects believe that they ought to obey.”6
Barker’s definition of legitimacy is well delineated, but it does not explain how
the state issuing the commands received the mandate to do so, nor does it identify the
actions the state takes to remain legitimate. Where does this “moral authority” come
from? How does any individual, regime, or government in Barker’s definition gain and
keep its power and authority? The answer to these questions is contentious and subject to
debate among scholars, and no common agreement exists across all schools o f thought.
A more common source, such as Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary,
says simply that legitimacy is “the quality or state o f being legitimate . . . in accordance
with law or with established legal forms or requirements . . . conforming to recognized
principles or accepted rules and standards . . . .”7 Again, like Barker, this definition
clearly identifies what a legitimate authority might look like, but not how the authority
gains its legitimate status. Moreover, what individual or group sets the “accepted rules
and standards”?
A graphic visualization o f the legitimacy process may help simplify the variety o f
definitions. Fortunately, in the majority o f studies the conceptualization o f legitimacy is
simplified into an easily discemable binary model: Legitimacy (dependent variable or
Yi) and Forces Imparting Legitimacy (independent variable or Xi). This idea is
graphically illustrated in figure 1.
6Rodney S. Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 11.
n

Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1969), s.v. “legitimacy.”
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What complicates the issue is determining what Xi may be, and it is on this point
that the disagreement among scholars arises. While these same scholars work to identify
the ways and means by which governments become legitimate, none o f them give
adequate attention to social organizations such as the Catholic Church. Therein lies the
incongruence and incompleteness o f legitimacy studies.

Xi

Fig. 1. Graphical Representation o f Legitimacy: Legitimacy (Dependent Variable or Yi)
and Forces Imparting Legitimacy (Independent Variable or Xi).
Using a standard quantitative model to illustrate the causal pathway for legitimacy
is not part of this study. Analyzing the Church-State relationship in legitimacy is not a
mathematical undertaking. Quite the contrary, it is a qualitative relationship that requires
qualitative types o f research. The closest this study comes to using quantitative methods
is drawing on public opinion data to show the level and strength o f support for certain
institutions and individuals in Philippine political and social culture. However, in this
instance and later in the chapter, use o f the quantitative-type graphical model to visualize
the relationship between variables is ideal for helping illustrate legitimacy in nation
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states. It is particularly helpful in explaining how the Catholic Church influences the
process.
In addition to lacking definitional succinctness, the concept o f the Church’s role
in legitimacy has been understudied and lacks a substantial amount o f case studies to
guide current research. This is particularly evident in relation to emerging nation-states
such as the Philippines, a fact made clear in Muthia Alagappa’s 1995 pivotal work,
Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest fo r Moral Authority. Alagappa’s study
highlights two reasons why this may be the case. The first is a lack o f interest from Third
World specialists in the state-society relationship, which includes the role o f a religious
institution such as the Catholic Church. Instead, these specialists, most often from one o f
three dominant theoretical fields (Marxist, Political Development, and Dependency
Theory), are concerned with other areas in their intellectual inquiry.8
Marxists view the state as an instrument o f class rule, a guarantor o f production
relations, or an arena for class struggle. They advocate the overthrow o f the sociopolitical
order and its replacement with more egalitarian socialist systems. Social relationships,
particularly those that include cultural variables in developing nations, are o f little
importance to Marxist theorists in their paradigmatic view. Because o f this, Marxism is
less concerned with the social dynamics behind why non-Marxist governments remain
legitimate. Ideally, a Marxist government is legitimate because it exists at the behest o f
the proletariat—who serve as both the citizenry and the government—and on the orthodox
Marxist ideology that seeks to neither exploit nor depress the masses. In simplified terms,
legitimacy in Marxism has two independent variables at play, Xi and X 2 (see figure 2).
To Marxists, there is simply no general need to study the social dynamics unique
to the culture o f a nation-state, because the principles o f Marxism will emerge supreme in
the end no matter which culture one is from. Moreover, any role a social-spiritual

g

Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, 4-5.
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organization such as the Catholic Church may play is irrelevant. As a representative o f
the “opiate o f the masses,” the Church and all it represents will pass with the rise o f the
state.

Xi -Proletariat

X2 -Ideology

Fig. 2. Graphical Representation o f Marxist Legitimacy
Political Development theorists tend to be concerned with the goals o f economic
growth and distribution, as well as the preconditions and transitions o f democracy,
political order, and stability. If a religious organization can be used to further the cause
o f economic growth and distribution it is an added bonus, but the organization itself is
still o f little consequence. They also posit a linear model in which traditional societies
develop into modem ones with no deviation. Economic growth is the primary means o f
achieving modernization and democracy, but until the model is mature, proponents
advocate a strong autonomous center with domination based on power.
Modeling Political Development for legitimacy is simple, because Political
Development theorists really only have one independent variable: economic growth (see
figure 3). Within that variable itself there are many fine points, such as equity of
distribution, sustainability, and other factors. However, those factors are less pertinent to
a legitimacy model. It seems that if economic growth can be sustained, then a
government has a high probability o f maintaining its legitimacy.
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I

Xi-Economic Growth

Fie. 3. Political Development’s Legitimacy

Evidence o f this approach is seen in studies o f East Asian nations, such as Japan’s
strong state-controlled industrial sector, South Korea’s planned economy, and the neoMarxist-capitalist blend emerging out o f the People’s Republic o f China. Each case
represents a strong autonomous government moving towards a Western style o f
government. Japan has matured and reached the end o f the linear spectrum. South Korea
has progressed more recently with its new democratic constitution in 1988 and the
election o f Kim Dae-Jung in 1998. China has just begun this transition following the
reforms o f Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s.
Interaction between the dominant power base and social institutions is not
highlighted or emphasized. It seems a church or group can help move the traditional
society along its path to modernity, but just how that would happen and what effects it
would have on modernization remains unclear. Based on the case studies used to prove
political development hypotheses, it appears that what is important is not religious
institutions, but secular state controls o f economies and unified cultures. The Church
may be able to find a role in this theory, but it would be minimal at best.
The Dependency schools try to combine Marxism and nationalism, emphasizing
the dependent character o f lesser-developed countries’ economies and the need to break
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bonds with the capitalist order. According to Alagappa, the Dependency school believes
the solution to the social ills created by capitalism requires the overthrow and
replacement o f capitalism by socialism and breaking the bonds o f internationalism.9
Illustrating the Dependency view o f legitimacy requires at least three independent
variables: unified nationalism, socialist economy, and internal focus (see figure 4). If a
government can help foster or achieve all three—or at least appear to endorse all threethen it is likely to be legitimate in the eyes o f a Dependency theorist. Consequently,
Dependency-based studies o f nation-states such as the Philippines would overlook
inherent cultural variables and social institutions like the Catholic Church and their role
in legitimacy, discounting their importance in favor o f finding a nationalist trend within
the political milieu. That environment favors the rejection o f internationalism and any
extraterritorial forces meddling in the internal affairs o f the state.

Xi-Nationalism

Xu-Internal Focus

Fig. 4. The Dependency School’s View o f Legitimacy
Arguing for the inclusion rather than against the omission o f the Catholic Church
in these disciplines begins by addressing the universality o f the statements found in
Marxism, Political Development, and Dependency Theory. The same could be done for
any o f the major theories that overlook the role o f religious institutions in legitimacy.

9Ibid., 5.
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Logically, a universal statement may be invalidated if one example can be produced
contradicting the contention’s universality. Furthermore, just because it is difficult to
establish a cause and effect relationship does not mean that these relationships do not
exist. Issues should not be abandoned and considered useless because o f difficulty.
Legitimacy studies that include a Church-State relationship should not be sacrificed on
the altar o f parsimony.
The second reason Alagappa suggests for the Church’s omission from legitimacy
studies is the belief among social scientists that legitimacy itself is a weak social science
concept.10 The weakness stems from legitimacy’s perceived limited explanatory power
as a concept and the difficulty o f operationalizing the term. Alagappa highlights the
Marxist, Political Development, and Dependency schools, all o f which look for other
ways o f explaining the state’s legitimacy while shying away from religious variables, for
which it may be difficult to find evidence o f cause and effect relationships.11 However,
further examination o f legitimacy shows that it is no less valuable as a concept than
others, and indeed may offer certain inherent strengths to help understand nation-states.
Even legitimacy’s harshest critics admit that “while legitimacy [theories] cannot
predict precisely when a regime change will occur, [they are] nevertheless useful in
drawing attention to trends in the degree o f support enjoyed by particular governments
and regimes.”12 Legitimacy may be complex and difficult to grasp, but such is the case
with most o f social science. Even calling the study o f societies a “science” can lead to
trouble, given that science is an exact discipline. Including a variable such as the
Catholic Church in these studies can only give the researcher another tool and another
way o f understanding the social dynamics behind certain populations and governments.

10Ibid., 6.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
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Social science’s inexact nature also supports the supposition that to fully
understand legitimacy requires space for social or religious institutions like the Catholic
Church. The definitional fluidity and intellectual openness makes these types o f
legitimacy studies exciting and engaging. Indeed, this is why studies like this
examination o f the Philippine Catholic Church’s role can take on wider significance.
These studies are relevant not only as legitimacy studies, but also as illustrations o f the
growing political power o f religious groups, charismatic leadership, and the reemergence
o f old institutions in the new realities o f power politics.
Before we examine the new realities o f power politics, we need to look at how the
idea of governmental legitimacy developed. One o f the first times the modem question
o f legitimacy was critically addressed was in the Hobbesian doctrine o f liberalism, or
more precisely, with the reconciliation o f the problem o f state power and individual
rights.13 Although Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) did not coin the word “legitimacy,” nor
was he the first to delve into how humanity can create a sovereign governmental regime
with the power to command and be obeyed, his theoretical concern for how a government
or “leviathan” could be created by popular consent was vital to Western political thought
and the notion o f a mling regime needing the consent o f the governed.
In Western political theory the individual, tribe, or clan gives up a certain level o f
personal freedom to a larger governmental order in exchange for security. This exchange
o f personal freedom for group sovereignty is seen as a small price to pay for a measure o f
personal security that would not otherwise be possible in the state o f nature. Just as JeanJacques Rousseau’s stag hunt analogy illustrated, members o f a group working together
are more likely to achieve a substantive goal than individuals working alone.14

13Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1965), passim.
14Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, trans. Maurice Cranston
(New York: Penguin Books, 1984), passim.
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Hobbes’s leviathan represents the government; o f a nation-state that is invested
with a level o f authority and thus power from the members o f the leviathan’s group. As
such, it acts according to the leviathan’s mandates but also has the freedom to dictate
behaviors circumscribed by the group and authorized to it through voluntary acquisition
by its members.
The Eastern tradition o f legitimacy is quite different. Acting on a more
supernatural basis, Asian societies tend to view man’s natural state in different terms.
Man is not inherently bad, his life is not necessarily brutish or short, and he does not have
inherent freedoms fully enjoyed in the state o f nature. Man instead operates in a
hierarchical world, whether he submits to this order or not. The doctrines o f Confucius,
Mencius, Lao Zi, Zhuang Zi, and others point to this phenomenon. The ruler is invested
with power and legitimacy, not from the people, but from “heaven” or some other
intangible origin that he may answer to directly. He is given a mandate. If he is a just
ruler, then he retains the mandate. If he is an unjust ruler, then he is in danger o f losing
this mandate.
In Southeast Asia, rulers went a step further in identifying themselves and even
their governmental structures with the supernatural world. In the ancient Khmer Empire,
entire cities were built to represent Hindu cosmology.15 By constructing these structures,
the ruler himself gained legitimacy from inhabiting its corridors and being God’s
representative on earth. People obeyed the leader and his government as any human
would obey a god.

15Angkor Thom and Angkor Wat, both in Cambodia, are prime examples. Both
the city and the temple complex were built to represent the Hindu view o f the universe.
By building such monumental architecture, the Khmer kings hoped to foster a belief that
they and the gods they sought to honor were one and the same. They were seen as godkings, and their legitimacy was realized in this fact and in the very buildings they
constructed.
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By the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the traditional elements o f
legitimacy found in East and Southeast Asian societies began to fall into disuse, replaced
by the more Western idea o f the social contract. For example, by 1911, the last emperor
o f China abdicated and the “mandate o f heaven” was replaced by a modem republic. Yet
not all elements o f the supernatural have been eliminated in every sector. Chinese
thought may still revolve around the idea o f a “mandate,” even in its communist-based
society. South Korea is still very much a Confucian society, Japan retains ascetic
elements that continue the code o f bushido, and in societies such as the Philippines,
charismatic leaders and organizations still hold considerable influence over the
populations. Moreover, although the vote may decide the ruler today instead o f a “god”
or any other source, the religious organizations operating within these societies have a
direct impact on the voting behavior o f a sizable segment o f the population.
In contrast to these Asian ideas, Hobbes’s strength rested in how he clearly raised
the idea o f the necessity of a government to have consent, active or passive, if it was to
work at all. Hobbes, however, did not address the question o f governmental effectiveness,
or whether the particular government was effective in delivering on promises it made to
the people. Moreover, he did not effectively address the role o f social institutions like the
Catholic Church in helping to form or maintain the Leviathan. In the modem world,
with its ever-expanding layers o f government, institutions play an increasing role as
power brokers between the people and their governments.
While Hobbes had the idea in theory, Charles Maurice Talleyrand (1754-1838)
was one o f the first people to use and define legitimacy in practice. His use and
definition o f the word centered on the description o f the political situation o f European
nation-states in relation to one another in the post-Napoleonic world, providing a clear
demarcation as to what types o f governments were considered legally legitimate and what
types were not acceptable. Talleyrand himself was an ordained priest, becoming bishop
o f Autun in 1789 before rising to secular political power in nineteenth-century France.
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For much o f his career, Talleyrand exemplified the marriage between the Church and the
State. With such a religious pedigree, could Talleyrand ignore the Church in legitimizing
governments? Yes, he could and he did.
Talleyrand’s ideas o f legitimacy, at least those he espoused while he was France’s
foreign minister, left little place for the role o f the Catholic Church in government.
While he himself enjoyed the power o f his position due in large part to the opportunities
afforded by his involvement in a very political Catholic Church, he did not extend these
powers when he was in a position to do so.16 Instead, Talleyrand believed legitimate
states included those with elected and parliamentary governments, such as Great Britain
and the hereditary governments o f Spain, Austria, and Russia. Those states that were not
legitimate in Talleyrand’s eyes included the Napoleonic regime, which gained its political
power through violence, aggression, and subversion, rather than from legal, popular
consent or through descent, lineage, or tradition.17
Consideration for the role o f the Church was miniscule. It was still powerful,
particularly among the monarchy o f Spain, but the religious ceremony and the trappings
o f a kingly coronation were all that really remained in most European states. Real power
now rested in the hands o f the strongest military, the greatest navy, the ability to keep the
treasury full, and a standard o f living for the population that prevented the sorts o f
revolutions that Europe witnessed in France and in its American colonies. Indeed, this

16 Philip G. Dwyer, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, 1754-1838: A Bibliography
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), passim; J. F. Bernard, Talleyrand: A Biography
(New York: Putnam, 1973); Louis S. Greenbaum, Talleyrand, Statesman-Priest: The
Agent-General o f the Clergy and the Church o f France at the End o f the Old Regime
(Washington: Catholic University o f America Press, 1970), passim.
17Joseph Bensman, “Max Weber’s Concept o f Legitimacy: An Evaluation,” in
Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy o f Modern Governments, ed. Arthur J.
Vidich and Ronald M. Glassman (London: Sage Publications, 1979), 18.
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time period may be the beginning o f the myopic view held by Western intellectuals that
the Church no longer mattered.
Writing a century earlier and most certainly influencing Talleyrand was French
deistic philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who combined the ideas o f the social contract
with the need for other elements to legitimize the regime it formed.18 His thoughts, while
deep and substantive, are responsible for the simplified modeling o f legitimacy.
At the core o f Rousseau’s belief was that legitimacy is nation-bound and
parochially circumscribed.19 This did not initially preclude involvement o f religious
institutions, but it did limit the kinds o f organizations that may play a role in Rousseau’s
society. Moreover, the validity o f this belief poses a particularly interesting set of
questions for those who study legitimacy as a part o f the anarchical nation-state system or
have hope o f building an effective international government, for how can anything
international be parochial?
Rousseau’s ideas did contain flaws as they relate to the Catholic Church. Just as
Hobbes had done before him and Talleyrand would do later, Rousseau neglected and did
not provide a role for extra-territorial institutions such as the Church, institutions that
exist both within the nation-state’s borders and without as part o f a larger global
organization. His idea o f parochialism notwithstanding, Rousseau did offer intriguing
views on what constitutes legitimacy. Rousseau’s two distinct bases for legitimacy
consisted o f “procedural rightness” and the “general will.”20 Both serve as independent
variables in the formation o f legitimacy (see figure 5).
18

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H.
Cole (New York: Dutton, 1950), passim; John H. Mason, ed., The Indispensable
Rousseau (New YorkiHorizon Press, 1979), passim.
19F. M. Barnard, Self-Direction and Political Legitimacy: Rousseau and Herder
(Oxford: Calredon Press, 1988), 20.
20

Ibid., 67; J. G. Merquior, Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory o f
Legitimacy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), passim.
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Xi-Procedural Rightness
Fig. 5. Rousseau’s Legitimacy Variables

Procedural rightness refers not to the substantive content o f a particular decision,
but to the manner in which it was arrived at as part o f a process in which the public
participates. The public’s participation in any decision imbues it with validity. This
statement clearly opens the door for Church involvement. The general will is something
prior to and independent o f processes o f political mediation. The general will may be
thought o f as society’s boundaries, the limits it sets for itself and how far it is willing to
go to accomplish a task or policy. In order to have a general will, there needs to be a
general consensus across society and class. This consensus can come only from the
culture o f the people. Culture is shaped by mutually shared experiences, powerful elites,
and social institutions, again opening up an area where the Church may be involved.
Rousseau’s writings make it clear that both the general will and the procedural
rightness include a religious element, but here Rousseau’s idea o f religion should not be
confused with the supernatural aspect that is most commonly thought o f when religion is
mentioned. Although Rousseau rejected involvement o f an organized religion claiming
to represent a system o f beliefs stemming from supernatural origins, such as the Catholic
Church, he did believe that his brand o f legitimacy and its procedural mechanism
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required a foundation o f intrinsic rightness that can come only from what he termed a
“civil religion.”21
Rousseau’s civil religion was a collection o f secular ideas, norms, values, and
ceremonies that grew out o f the general will. It was also a fusion o f both utility and
justice. Theoretically, civil religion was to act as the glue to ensure that societal norms
remained constant and were not subject to persistent debate.

99

Some people argue that

Rousseau’s civil religion is the only way to create the degree o f “creedal consensus”
necessary for a general acceptance o f moral standards and for “the injection o f civic
virtue into social life.”23
Rousseau’s concepts o f civil religion were not unique. Others, such as Alexis de
Tocqueville, believed in much the same thing and saw evidence o f it taking shape in early
America. Tilo Shabert points out that de Tocqueville believed in two sources o f
legitimacy: majority rule and moeurs and les croyance communes.24 Loosely translated,
these are the general habits and civil virtues stemming from the common political culture,
a different way o f expressing Rousseau’s general will and civil religion. Both are the
generally accepted principles and attitudes.

21Barnard, Self-Direction, 83-96.
99

The United States can be said to have a civil religion. One aspect is found in the
rituals surrounding the fostering o f patriotism from a very early age. Both the Pledge o f
Allegiance and the National Anthem are aspects o f this religion o f the American state.
Very few o f the 270 million Americans disagree or somehow object to these ceremonies
being repeated and practiced in public and private life, and the act forms a common bond
between a citizenry that might otherwise not share much in common.
90

Barnard, Self-Direction, 83-96; Patrick Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy: A
Critical Exposition o f Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and
Hegel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), passim.
24Tilo Shabert, “Power, Legitimacy and Truth: Reflections on the Impossibility to
Legitimise Legitimations o f Political Order,” in Legitimacy/Legitimite: Proceedings o f
the Conference Held in Florence 3-4 June 1982, ed. Athanasios Moulakis (New York:
Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 101.
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One can immediately notice the correlation between de Tocqueville’s “accepted
attitudes” and “virtues” and Rousseau’s “creedal consensus.” Rousseau and de
Tocqueville realized that in legitimacy, what is right in society or politically right, in
other words, cannot be divorced from what people acting together consider right and
proper under particular circumstances o f time and place.
Did this civil religion develop? The answer depends on how succinctly one
interprets the evidence. Most, if not all nation-states, particularly those that claim a
separation o f Church and State, create the trappings o f a civil religion to foster unity and
a melting pot mentality that fuses their society. Yet an unexpected result o f this civil
religion is that supernatural religions are protected and in some cases promoted under
secular rule o f law, thus gaining greater influence over members o f the society who are
the authors o f the law. The United States is an obvious example o f this phenomenon.
American society is a potent mix o f almost every major culture and religion on
earth, yet it operates under the common ideas o f a civil religion that are embodied in its
“holy” text, the U.S. Constitution. Coupled with the Constitution are other “canonical”
works, including the Bill o f Rights, Declaration o f Independence, and Federalist Papers.
Lesser works have also been added over the years in the form o f Supreme Court
rulings and landmark legislation that have helped shape attitudes and the very nature o f
society. A few examples from American history include Brown v. Board o f Education
(1954), which effectively ended the separate but equal statutes in many states and
chipped away at the legality o f segregation. Another would be Roe v. Wade (1972),
which legally protected certain forms o f abortion by using the right o f privacy found in
the U.S. Constitution.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act is another example o f an attempt at implementing
sweeping legislation to right previous injustices against the African American population
through Affirmative Action, as well as racial quotas and fundamentally altered race
relations in the United States. It proved a turning point for African Americans, offering
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them access to the mainstream o f American society that had previously been denied to
them. Alongside these civil religious treatises is a tacit promotion o f the biblical Ten
Commandments and other Judeo-Christian doctrines. Evidence o f this is found in
numerous places, from the mottos on U.S. currency to the writings etched in national
monuments.
The writings o f Hobbes and Rousseau are well thought out treatises on
government and legitimacy, and they are prime places to start if one wishes to understand
the current meanings and context o f legitimacy. However, both fail to give a complete
picture. Likewise, case studies based purely on their writings cannot be fully delineated
without a further maturing and evolution o f legitimacy theory. Shoring up some o f the
weaknesses and giving legitimacy one o f its best definitional treatments was the
influential sociologist, political theorist, and historian Max Weber and the writings o f
twentieth century political scientist David Easton who investigates the connection
between support and political systems.
Theoretically modem legitimacy studies are guided more or less by two important
foundations. The first is the Weberian model o f legitimacy and the second is the
Eastonian model o f political support. Both theories supply a credible framework in
which the Philippine Catholic Church can be analyzed. Yet both theories are also lacking
in their explanatory power, and must be supplemented by historical analysis to prove and
validate the relationship between theory and practice.
Max Weber was a product o f both his own religious upbringing and the humanist
movements of the late nineteenth century. As a sociologist and political economist, he is
best known for his writings on the “Protestant Ethic.” But Weber’s contributions to the
social science field go well beyond his initial writings. Weber believed that a historical
phenomenon was determined by the viewpoint o f the investigator rather than by any
objective significance. This led him to develop the concept o f “ideal types” as a tool for
isolating sociological phenomena. These ideal types are particularly useful in legitimacy
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studies, where isolating independent variables to determine the dependent variable o f
legitimacy is difficult to do. Another strength o f Weber’s work was his promotion o f the
idea o f a plurality o f historical factors, meaning one should not focus exclusively on one
phenomenon to determine all results.
Weber delineated legitimacy as concisely as anyone before or after him did. To
begin with, his concept of legitimacy contained the idea o f “authority.” To have true
authority and for it to be valid and thus legitimate, it must be more than simply a standard
o f social conduct determined by custom or self-interest.25 Authority must be oriented
around certain recognizable and practicable axioms. There are many types o f axioms that
can reinforce authority. The legitimacy o f authority can be guaranteed on a purely
affectual basis, derived from rational belief, originate in religious attitudes, or even be
guaranteed by self-interests.26 However, two things must be present for legitimacy to
function. There must be a belief (vorstellung) shared by those within the order that the
order itself is valid (geltung).

77

Weber wrote in his landmark text, The Theory o f Social and Economic
Organization, that this system o f legitimate order is called a “convention.” Its validity is
externally guaranteed by the probability that deviation from the convention from within a
given social group will result in a general and significant negative reaction from others
under the same convention.28 He termed such an order “law” when lack o f conformity
with it is met with physical or psychological sanctions aimed at compelling conformity
25Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, trans. H. P. Secher (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1962), 71.
26Ibid., 75.
27

Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, trans. S. N. Esienstandt
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1968), 11.
28

Max Weber, The Theory o f Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M.
Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1947), 127.
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and punishing disobedience. Law is also a basis for one o f Weber’s ideal types o f
legitimacy.
In general, Weber’s simplest idea o f what legitimacy is and ought to be is
contained in the following idea: Legitimacy is best understood as “the basis o f every
system o f authority, and corresponding o f every kind o f willingness to obey, is a belief, a
belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”

Though

simple, ideas such as “belief’ and “prestige” are general enough to be open to wide
interpretation. Thus, the ideal types o f legitimacy need to be defined, as well the sort o f
conditions needed for an order to be considered legitimate.
According to Weber, legitimacy may be ascribed to an order by those acting
subject to it in several different ways. The first is by tradition or, in other words, a belief
in the legitimacy o f what has always existed. The second is by affectual attitudes,
especially emotions, legitimating the validity o f what is newly revealed or a model to
imitate. The third is by a rational belief in its absolution value ( Wertrational), thus
lending it the validity o f an absolute and final commitment. The final way is because it
has been established in a manner which is recognized to be legal. This legitimacy o f the
legality is derived from a voluntary agreement o f the interested parties or imposed on the
basis o f what is held to be a legitimate authority over the relevant person and a
corresponding claim to their obedience.30
These ideas express, in general terms, the basis for legitimate order. Although
Weber’s structure does not specifically account for a role o f religious organizations, it
nonetheless provides a valuable intellectual framework on which to build a legitimacy
study that exposes the important role o f a religious institution like the Catholic Church in
helping foster an order. It does so both at the level of the basis o f legitimate order, and
Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New
York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 263.
30

Weber, Theory o f Social and Economic Organization, 130-131.
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also as Weber expanded and focused his idea on the “ideal” types o f legitimacy he
believed existed in the real world. These ideal types, discussed next, provide a useful
framework in understanding the role o f the Catholic Church in Philippine politics
generally and the specific events and consequences o f People Power II.
In Theory o f Social and Economic Organization, Weber utilized ideal types o f
legitimacy in his quest to answer the basic question o f how one can become a leader,
issue commands, and have their actions carried out. In effect, he was trying to find out
how an individual or regime can be legitimate. Weber attempted to show both the nature
and constitution o f legitimacy. His theory, by using a triad o f categories, attempted to
address the kinds o f substantive issues Hobbes, Rousseau and others neglected to cover in
their writings. Weber’s talent and his value to legitimacy studies lies in his simplification
o f legitimacy into three main types, which also serve as ideal independent variables:
rational (legal)-Xl, traditional-X?, and charismatic-X? (see figure 6).
While Weber used the term “rational,” this particular type o f legitimacy can best
be described as legal. It rests on belief in the legality o f patterns o f normative rules and
the rights o f those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. In the case
o f legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It
extends up to the person or regime exercising the authority of office only by virtue o f the
formal legality of their commands and only within the scope o f the office’s authority.
The effectiveness o f legal authority rests, according to Weber, on accepting the
validity o f a few mutually interdependent ideas. The first is that any given legal norm
may be established by agreement or by imposition on grounds o f expediency or rational
values or both, with a claim to obedience made by at least some o f the corporate group’s
members.

31

•

In the case o f states, this usually includes all people living in that territory

31Ibid., 329.
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who stand in certain social relationships or carry out forms of social action that have been
declared relevant in the order governing the group.

Xt -Rational Legal

X2 -Traditional

X3 - Charismatic

Fig. 6. Weberian Model o f Legitimacy

The second idea is that every body o f law essentially consists o f a consistent
system o f abstract rules. These rules are typically established intentionally.

32

Furthermore, administration o f law is held to consist o f the application o f these rules to
particular cases, and the administrative process in the rational pursuit o f the interests
specified in the order governing the corporate group. This is done within the limits laid
down by legal precepts and following principles that are capable o f generalized
formulation and are approved in the order governing the group, or at least not
disapproved by it.33
The third idea is that the person in authority occupies a legally established office.
In the actions associated with his status, including the commands he issues to others, he is
subject to an impersonal order to which his actions are oriented.34 This is true for all

32Ibid„ 330.
33Ibid.
34Ibid.
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people in positions o f power, not only for the ones exercising legal authority as the
elected president o f the state.
The person who obeys this authority does so only in his capacity as a member o f
the group, and the authority he obeys is the law. He may also be part o f an association, a
territorial commune, or a church, or he may be a citizen o f a state. His submission is to
the law, not to the person who occupies the office. Hence, it follows that there is an
obligation to obey only within the sphere o f the rationally delimited authority that, in
terms o f the order, has been conferred upon the officeholder. Obedience does not extend
beyond the scope o f the law.
Margherita Ciacci embraces Weber’s paradigm, arguing in her writings that
legitimacy can be the outgrowth o f a legality o f patterns o f normative rules and the right
o f those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.

The loyalty Ciacci

described is the citizenry’s loyalty to the rule o f law and the organizations the law
establishes. It is not loyalty to personalities. The loyalty to both the law and the
impersonal order that exists is extended to the person exercising the authority o f the
office under them. For example, citizens’ loyalty to the office o f president is extended to
the individual who occupies that office, whether or not one has a favorable opinion o f or
initially supported the person in the electoral process.
This rational-legal form o f legitimacy Weber recognized might be a de facto
agreement, but it is most often an assumptive consensus among the populace to elect a
body of officials from their ranks and to abide by the rule o f law. Indeed, as the
discussion thus far has illustrated, there is near universal agreement that legitimacy itself
is a social practice, an outcome o f the interaction between the ruler and the ruled. Hence,

35
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Margherita Ciacci, “Legitimacy and the Problems of Governance,” in
Legitimacy/Legitimite: Proceedings o f the Conference Held in Florence 3-4 June 1982,
ed. Athanasios Moulakis (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

it must be framed in the sociopolitical and economic context o f a specific society at a
specific time, taking into account actors within the society that play significant roles.
Supporting this statement are the earliest writings addressing legitimacy,
including those o f Hobbes, who laid bare the harsh realities o f the leviathan and the need
for people to give up certain individual rights and freedoms to enjoy the safety and
stability o f a state monolith. They freely and voluntarily give their legitimacy in return
for receiving a desired social and political situation that is acceptable to the majority, or
at the very least the majority of the politically relevant within that particular body. This is
true whether it is at the village level or nation-state level.
Earlier, more grandiose works such as Dante Alighieri’s De Monarchia (1310)
argued that humankind’s development o f intellect and culture could create a social
contract resulting in a strong world government that would ensure peace and world
stability. Indeed, his was the first call for legitimation o f a world government, at least a
government o f the known world.36 Others followed him, including Emeric Cruce in
1623, Hugo Grotius in 1625, and Abbe de Saint-Pierre in 1712. Each illustrated in their
own way how the legally based social contract between the populace and the prince could
be made workable, legitimizing a regime meant to bring about the collective good o f the
known world.37
The ideas and concepts behind this legally based legitimacy have remained
appealing for contemporary scholars as well. Peter T. Manicas expresses a similar line o f
thought, albeit more developed, in his book The Death o f the State. To Manicas, the idea
36
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Dante Alighieri, Monarchia, trans. Prue Shaw (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), passim.
Emeric Cruce, The New Cineas, trans. C. Frederick Farrell Jr. and Edith R.
Farrell (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972), passim; James Bohman and Matthias
Lutz-Bachmann, eds., Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal
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o f a legitimate government rests on the supposition that in order to be legitimate, the
government must be invested with the right to command and to act in the name o f the
governed. The laws conceived in this arrangement are considered “morally obligatory,”
10

and citizens have a duty to obey, whether they personally approve or not.
In the real world, o f course, the system is not as “obligatory” as one might expect,
and just how the citizens can get out o f this arrangement is unclear. However, following
the logic, personal approval, or disapproval o f individual citizens is not enough to effect
change. Instead, an organized effort and mass movement are required. How large the
movement would need to be may be a function o f the population or be based on the
percentage o f those active in politics. In the United States, for example, it certainly does
not take tens o f millions to affect policies or the makeup o f the national government.
Such effects can be brought about by a relatively few powerful interest groups and
elites.39
If the world were neatly packaged under the rule o f law and officials were elected
without the necessity o f personal influence and charismatic appeal, then Weber’s first
category would be sufficient to explain all forms o f legitimate authority. However, the
world is not that way. Weber realized as much and provided two other categories of
legitimate authority, traditional and charismatic, to help explain these variations.
According to Weber, traditional legitimacy rests on the established belief in the
sanctity o f immemorial traditions and the legitimacy o f the status o f those exercising

38Peter T. Manicas, The Death o f the State (New York: Capricorn Books, 1974),
38.
39

Another element that is tacit, although not explicitly mentioned, is the idea o f
fair play. If someone has received benefits under the standing body o f laws and political
organization then he has an obligation to bear the burdens o f that organization as well,
including an obligation to accept its political decisions, whether or not he has solicited
these benefits or has in any more active way consented to the burdens o f the order.
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authority under them.40 In traditional authority, obedience is not owed to enacted rules or
laws but to the person or the chief who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position o f
authority and who is bound by tradition. In this category the obligation o f obedience is
not based on the impersonal order, but is a matter o f personal loyalty within the area o f
accustomed obligations.41
The commands o f the traditionally legitimate government or individual are
formulated in one of two ways. The first is in terms o f traditions, which themselves
directly determine the content of the command and the objects and extent o f authority.42
In so far as this is true, to overstep the traditional limitations would endanger the
traditional status by undermining acceptance o f the legitimacy. The second is a matter o f
the head o f state’s free personal decision, for there are no formal principles as there are
under legal authority.
Examples o f the traditional type o f legitimacy in a “pure” form are found in the
feudal kingdoms o f China, Egypt, and Africa, and later in the monarchies o f Europe. The
danger o f this sort o f authority is that it can be exercised arbitrarily. The office is held by
virtue o f traditional status, by recruiting favorites, or by patrimony. Promotion is by the
ruler’s arbitrary grace. A meritocracy does not usually exist and the best and brightest
are not recruited to fill positions.
Obedience from the population is based on personal loyalty, and the traditional
exercise o f authority is only limited by resistance aroused in the subjects or by a failure to
act according to traditions. Natural societal evolution is retarded, and the development o f
capitalism is obstructed.43 Functions within the government are defined in terms o f

40Weber, Theory o f Social and Economic Organization, 328.
41Ibid.
42Ibid„ 341.
43Ibid.
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competition among the interests o f those seeking favors, income, and other advantages.
Because fees and gifts are given to win the ruler’s favor, bribery and corruption are
rampant.

44

Weber’s final category o f legitimacy is charismatic authority. It is based on
devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character o f an
individual person, and o f the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.45
In the case o f charismatic authority, the charismatically qualified leader is obeyed by
virtue o f personal trust in him and his revelation, his heroism, or his exemplary qualities
so far as they fall within the scope o f the individuals’ belief in his charisma.
Ciacci’s writings on charisma again echo and support Weber’s on this point.
According to Ciacci, charismatic legitimacy is built upon the devotion to a specific and
exceptional character, to a person, and on the normative patterns revealed by that
person.46 The leadership or leader seeks to maintain a sense o f self-confidence and
legitimacy by continually trying to gain the support o f other individuals and groups
wherever they may be found, inside or outside the territorial limits or the supposed
consensus-oriented jurisdiction o f the nation-state.
Ciacci believes that the charismatic ideal o f legitimacy is almost always embodied
in a single individual, but that individual is not necessarily the head o f state. He or she
may also be a religious leader, spiritual advisor, or trusted spokesman o f the people, a
role that will prove particularly relevant during the discussion o f the Philippine Catholic
Church and its leadership.

44Ibid.
45Ibid., 328.
46Ciacci, “Legitimacy and the Problems o f Governance,” 22.
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With the rational, traditional, and charismatic categories o f legitimacy, one has a
large piece o f the legitimacy theory puzzle. However, there are still some pieces missing.
Weber realized that his classifications were an ideal, not reality, and that his models were
dynamic, meaning one form of legitimacy could change and morph into another and then
even revert. No one form was capable o f acting alone in the real world, and all needed to
be propped up by elements of the others.47 Weber’s model may also be cyclical, with
some classifications being more unstable than others and turning into hybrids.
Since it can be argued that the three categories Weber expounded do not include
all possible types o f legitimacy and that the obligatory nature o f the social contract does
not exist in the real world, then something else must exist to fill the gap. There must be
another piece o f the puzzle. The missing piece is not a radical departure from Weber or
any other legitimacy theory, nor is it likely that Weber would disagree with including it
alongside his three classifications. This is because in all three o f his legitimacy
categories, power lies at the bottom o f the relationship. While society’s dynamics have
changed, power is still the most important component. The power has simply shifted in
form and shape.
Twentieth-century economies produced populations geared towards materialism
and the acquisition o f an ever-increasing standard o f living, the kind unknown to Weber,
Hobbes, Rousseau, and de Tocqueville. Power now came from the ability to meet these
needs. After World War II, populations looked to governments for more than just the
bare necessities o f survival. Instead, they wanted material goods and services and
assurances that they and their children would have increasing opportunity for success,
safety, and prosperity.
The United States led the charge and the industrial nation-states o f Western
Europe and Japan have followed in close order. Legitimacy o f their governments

47Weber, Theory o f Social and Economic Organization, 329.
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expanded beyond charisma and traditional ties, and even beyond the rule o f law. In this
new world, governments provided utility for their populations in return for their support.
This is a utilitarian form o f legitimacy. This same form o f legitimacy also dominates the
twenty-first century.
Under utilitarian legitimacy, the apparatus o f the state functions as a machine
churning out goods and services wanted, needed, and desired by the population. The
population in turn provides for the machine, keeping it in working order, and the fuel for
its operation comes in the form o f popular consent and legitimacy (see figure 7). This
utilitarianism can manifest itself in a variety o f ways, from the most grandiose to the
simplest. A utilitarian-based social contract could be something as complex as national
defense o f the population or as mundane as adequate sewers in a city.
Seymour Martin Lipset is one o f the key supporters o f utilitarian legitimacy. In
some o f his works, Lipset laid out the causational relationship between state capacity and
legitimacy.48 His studies centered on empirical analyses o f the state’s ability to produce
economic results. Lipset believed that in the short term, a government can substitute
economic growth for political legitimacy, and in the long run this same growth could
generate legitimacy itself49 Lipset made state effectiveness his independent variable and
legitimacy his dependent variable, thus producing a simple binary model o f legitimacy.
Lipset’s model has a positive correlation; as effectiveness goes up, so does the
level o f legitimacy a government enjoys, as it decreases so too does the government’s
legitimacy. Joseph Schumpter supports this contention, arguing that the fate o f modem
regimes hinges on their ability to trade off the deliver/ o f state services for political
48

Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases o f Politics (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); idem, Consensus and Conflict: Essays in
Political Sociology (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985), passim.
49Edward W. Lehman, The Viable Polity (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University
Press, 1992), 4.
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support. Moreover, faith in the incumbent’s ability to deliver results does not necessarily
mean a loss o f faith in a system. As with other models, legitimacy can be withdrawn
when governing elites are unable to deliver on specific claims.50 Easing the tensions
created by the government’s failure to deliver on its part o f the utilitarian equation may
be done by lowering citizen demands.

X j Rational Legal

X.?, Traditional

X j -Charismatic

X4- Utilitarian Legitimacy

Fig. 7. Weber + Utilitarianism
Ciacci hints at a utilitarian desire expressed between the ruler and the ruled in
her writings. Her idea o f utilitarian legitimacy is based on personal loyalty within the
area of obligations. These obligations are built, fostered, and sustained by an established
belief in the certainty o f immemorial tradition and o f the status o f those exercising
authority.51 This tradition can be anything, from expectations that the government
provide for the common defense, support the general welfare, and ensure equal protection

50

Ibid.

51

Ciacci, “Legitimacy and the Problems o f Governance,” 22.
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under the law, or an expectation that the government simply maintain roads and bridges.
The government in turn expects that the populace will respect its authority. The
government possesses legitimacy when a population values the government and the work
it undertakes. As such, individuals are willing to assume the disciplines and burdens that
membership in this society entails. Legitimacy declines when this willingness flags or
fails.
Procedural principles such as majority rule, unanimity, and theories o f consent
prescribe adherence to this kind o f rule. These principles also prescribe adherence to a
decision rule. Along these lines is the work o f Robert Nozick.

In Nozick’s worldview,

the only just state is the minimal state, and a person must never experience consequences
that would violate his rights within the society. The state should provide, not prevent, a
standard of living. Utilitarianism can be found in the state’s willingness to do “nothing”
to prevent a citizen from being satisfied.
Delivering on the utilitarian aspect requires power, which is imparted to the
government, regime, or individual by the people. Once in power, government’s use and
control o f the power it is entrusted with will affect its legitimacy. There are two aspects
to the proper use o f power. The first, according to Alagappa, is that governments
operating within the law or other tacitly accepted rules and procedures must be seen as
properly using the power they are given. Governments that abuse or otherwise misuse
their power risk alienating their own populations and losing their mandate.53 Future
elections can mean the end o f the government, but revolution can also result from abuse
o f governmental power in many parts o f the world. Failure to fulfill the utilitarian

52

James S. Fishkin, Tyranny and Legitimacy: A Critique o f Political Theories
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1979), 5; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and
Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), passim.
53

Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, 20.
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agreement between the ruler and the ruled is a failure o f duty and a form o f abuse o f
power.
The second aspect o f power, even more related to utility, is performance.
Performance is defined as the power used to promote the collective interest o f the
community.54 Classical definitions o f legitimacy tend to exclude performance as a
consideration. This is unfortunate, because effective governmental performance can be
used to generate political, social, and moral authority.
Measuring performance is becoming more sophisticated in most o f the developed
world. The Internet, tracking polls, and twenty-four-hour news and information networks
allow politicians to test the public perception and acceptability o f policies before they are
ever implemented into law. Floating “trial balloons” is the norm. Thus, when laws are
finally passed the people get what they want, further buttressing the government in
power.
It is when these institutions or individuals seem not as appropriate that a problem
with the government’s mandate o f legitimacy may occur. Removal o f the mandate can
occur if the government becomes unable or unwilling to meet the utilitarian responsibility
that has come to be expected of it. It may then be replaced by a regime that promises to
provide the utilitarian aspect the former government once did.
Currently, ideas o f utilitarian legitimacy are in vogue. They are perhaps the
easiest to validate through statistical methods. In social sciences the use o f statistics is
often seen as necessary if one’s study is to gain attention from peer-reviewed journals and
publishing houses. However, it is difficult to mathematically model what lies in people’s
hearts. One then must turn to expressions o f opinion, found in polls, which tell the
researcher the level o f satisfaction with a particular regime or official and measure the
mandate’s strength.

54Ibid., 22-23.
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Using public opinion polls alone to track how a society may feel about the
government also has its pitfalls. Polls may be too one-dimensional and may lead to an
analysis based on personal biases and opinions, because data can be manipulated in a
variety o f ways. The best solution is to analyze the words o f the actors involved, both in
written sources and interviews.
Utilitarian legitimacy is the missing piece o f the legitimacy paradigm. Alongside
rational, traditional, and charismatic authority, it provides a better picture o f how states
and rulers can become legitimate and maintain that legitimacy. However, like the other
concepts, it cannot stand alone. Utilitarianism is a valuable new way o f looking at
legitimacy, but it is no more powerful or convincing in its explanatory power than the
more classical ideas expressed by Weber and others. Therefore, it finds its place
alongside the other three pillars o f legitimacy as a useful but not wholly independent
form o f legitimacy theory.
Within each category the reader may have noticed the implied existence o f
intellectual space for the development o f norms and a moral order. In all three of
Weber’s categories and in the utilitarian model, there is implied if not directly stated the
existence o f a moral order. Indeed, it can be argued that the moral aspects, more
appropriately described as normative, are an underlying requirement for both the
traditional and the rational-legal categories.
If a set o f laws or a ruler is not backed by force o f arms, then its legitimacy must
rest upon some element o f trust and expectation that both sides will fulfill their duties.
This trust and expectation results from the shared norms o f the parties involved, both the
ruler and the ruled. Once established, legitimacy can reinforce and strengthen existing
norms and become a norm itself. Norms and values are essentially belief systems or
ideologies that specify how things ought to be.55 These shared norms and values

55Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, 15.
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determine the political system and structure o f domination within a nation-state and serve
as a normative regulation on society. In figure 8, one can now see the four types o f
legitimacy highlighted in the literature, as well as the role o f norms and political violence
that are ever-present in all aspects o f legitimacy.
Another way to look at norms is by focusing on their references to the grounds on
which those wielding power claim obedience.56 Indeed, this normative ground may differ
from state to state, and here again is where the role o f social institutions like the Catholic
Church comes into play. Left to its own devices, the moral aptitude o f the people may
never quite stimulate the moral aptitude o f the government, and vice versa.57 Both the
rulers and the ruled need molding, reinforcement, and validation from each other. The
government gets these things from the citizenry through the power o f legitimacy, and the
citizenry gets them by being ruled by a government that is respectful and responsive to
societal norms and values.
The likelihood of either side getting this type o f feedback and political satisfaction
from the other without a third party active in the political culture is small. The
government would lack real legitimacy and the people would most likely suffer at the
hands o f a less-responsive government. In fact, saying less-responsive is putting it
mildly, because in most cases a government that does not have this moral authority from
the people or organizations representing the people’s interests tends to not only become
dictatorial, but authoritarian and totalitarian. Citizens do not just suffer politically, but
they are often victims o f state-sponsored persecution and violence.

56Paschalis Kitromilides, “Enlightenment and Legitimacy,” in
Legitimacy/Legitimite: Proceedings o f the Conference Held in Florence 3-4 June 1982,
ed. Anthanosios Moulakis (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 61.
57Frederick Rosen, “Legitimacy: A Utilitarian View,” in Legitimacy/Legitimite:
Proceedings o f the Conference Held in Florence 3-4 June 1982, ed. Athanosios Moulakis
(New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 73.
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Fig. 8. The Inclusion o f “Norms”

Alagappa contends that the norms and values o f a society contribute to the
establishment o f regimes in which rules for the acquisition o f power are properly
established.58 In other words, they are a part o f every category o f authority previously
discussed and credited to Weber and the utilitarian model of legitimacy, as long as they
foster societal norms and reinforce existing morality. Governments acquiring power
through these channels are likely to be seen as legitimate.
History seems to support this contention. Just recently in the United States there
was a crisis o f sorts surrounding the election o f the president. In 2000, A1 Gore’s
challenge to the results in Florida spawned a mini Constitutional crisis, as the lawyers
from his and George W. Bush’s campaign sparred in front o f the partisan Florida
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court over the constitutionality of
“butterfly ballots,” recounts, and the electoral college system.

58

Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, 20.
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On many occasions, members o f Gore’s campaign and the media hinted and
blatantly questioned the legitimacy that either candidate would enjoy after the electoral
mess. Gore made an effort to mention his popular vote victory and hinted at the
illegitimacy o f a Bush victory, no matter how lawful it may have been. Several members
o f the U.S. Senate were quoted as wanting to amend the Constitution in order to do away
with the electoral college, which gave Bush the win.59
Interestingly, the poll numbers never swung dramatically either way. It seemed
that the American public took a wait-and-see attitude. When the United States Supreme
Court finally resolved the election and Gore conceded defeat, public opinion polls
showed that the majority o f the electorate believed that Bush was the legitimate winner.
In essence, Bush had obeyed the rules. He had followed the norms and stuck to the
electoral values that the country was founded upon, and no amount o f partisan wrangling
over the outcome and the intricacies o f the vote changed the feeling o f legitimacy. In the
end, both candidates conformed to the expected rules o f the game and were rewarded
with the public’s trust and support. This moral-normative dimension o f legitimacy that
was at work during the 2000 election may cause problems for scholars who dislike
studying normative values in a society and believe they are unscientific. But in any
political inquiry into legitimacy, one must consider both empirical connotations and basic
normative elements.
So far, the journey through the legitimacy literature leads to several conclusions.
The first is that although the variety o f scholars creates variety in definition, the basic
concept o f legitimacy remains a simple concept and an even simpler model, with
dependent and independent variables. Where agreement breaks down is on what exactly
should be an independent variable and the strength of the relationship between X and Y.
59After the 2000 election and the difficulties some Florida voters had in
determining who they had voted for, the editorial pages o f major newspapers and most
prominently Sen. Hillary Clinton called for a change, in Clinton’s case the elimination o f
the Electoral College system.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43

Some o f this confusion is natural, because mathematically modeling what is in the hearts
and minds o f individuals and organizations is extremely difficult, leading to subjective
studies using the qualitative approach to understand the relationship.
Some ideas, however, are more helpful at elucidating the causational relationships
than others. There are strengths and weaknesses in all approaches, with some containing
a good balance between theory and reality. For example, where Rousseau and others
may be too specific in their attempts to pinpoint the independent variables in the
legitimacy equation, Weber provides the right balance o f generality and parsimony.
When Weber comes up lacking, the inclusion o f a utilitarian category can help strengthen
his model. Yet even Weber’s idea with the inclusion o f the utilitarian model remains
insufficient. Including norms across the independent variables is also not enough.
Until now, there has been no single study that can accurately and fully account for
the role o f a religious institution like the Catholic Church in the legitimacy o f regimes.
The author believes the key missing from the model, and from all the studies discussed
thus far, is an emphasis on what can be termed a mediating variable. This variable,
couched between X and Y, acts as a lens to focus, shift, and even redirect the legitimate
authority vested by populations and coming from the independent variables. Use o f a
mediating variable also fills the incompleteness o f the conceptualization o f legitimacy,
addresses the inadequacy o f the models, and fulfills the potential o f the theory. The
mediating variable becomes the Z component o f the legitimacy equation.
The mediating variable will generally act as a lens to focus the many forces and
factors found in each o f the independent variables and help clear up the causational
relationship between the factors o f legitimacy and how they directly affect the legitimacy
o f a ruling regime. This does not mean, o f course, that the X variables cease to interact
with one another, for as Weber demonstrated in his earlier models, no one pure form o f
legitimacy exists. They all influence one another in a variety o f ways and levels o f
strength. What is different with the inclusion o f a mediating variable is that it can serve
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to filter, direct, and focus the political and social power emanating from the X variables.
In turn, it adds its own influences back upon the independent variables and upon the
dependent variable (legitimacy) as well.
In the real world, a mediating variable can be many things. It may be the military
establishment, a particular powerful personality, the media, the entertainment industry, or
a religious institution. Where there is a democracy, Z variables focus the people’s
energies, their will, their anger, their desires, and their authority towards the government.
In the Philippines, a host o f organizations, institutions, and even individuals serve as
mediating variables. It can get complicated (see figure 9). Social, political, and even
military organizations jockey for position to influence the vote and the nature and
character of the ruling regime. They may even field candidates, campaign, and attempt
coups, all in an effort to establish a ruling government favorable to their needs.
Including all of the possible mediating variables affecting legitimacy in the
Philippines would lead to a web o f arrows and boxes, creating a confusing labyrinth that
may be difficult to decipher and not particularly useful for understanding the most
important factor behind the legitimacy o f Philippine regimes. The military, business
interests, universities, popular politicians, economics, and public policy think tanks all
serve as mediating variables in determining the level o f the ruling regime’s legitimacy.
Yet what is evident in figure 9 is the existence o f one mediating variable that transcends
every independent variable. What is evident in figure 9 is the one organization that can
influence all variables.
In the Philippines, there is only one organization that has traditionally been and
remains the most influential mediating variable for all four of the legitimacy categories.
It is the only institution that serves as a lens to focus the forces o f legitimacy. This
organization is the Catholic Church. It is not an overstatement to say that all roads to
legitimacy lead through the Catholic Church. How and why this is the case will be
illustrated in subsequent chapters.
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Fig. 9. The Intricate Web o f Variables
With the inclusion o f utilitarianism and the mediating variable concept, the
Weberian model has been adapted into a valuable tool for understanding the role o f the
Church in the legitimacy o f the Philippine government, and indeed although altered just a
bit, it is the cornerstone in understanding legitimacy in the Philippines. Indeed, Weber’s
ideas are one o f the most useful tools to the historian. In the mid-twentieth century
another attempt to explain the interaction o f social and political forces was developed by
David Easton, and Easton’s theory also allows for a mediating variable like the Church to
influence the legitimacy o f governments.
Easton’s theory, while more in the genre o f political science, is still useful in
understanding the historical dynamics o f the Philippine Catholic Church in political
legitimacy. To understand the Eastonian theory, one must first think o f politics outside o f
a cultural milieu. Unlike Weber, the cultural dynamics that bring personality and life to
politics is left to the side. Easton makes no room for political culture and instead focuses
on a sterile political environment that he calls a system. Easton defines his political
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system as “a set o f interactions abstracted from the totality of social behavior, through
which values are authoritatively allocated for society.”60
Whereas Weber defines the state by its monopoly o f physical force used
legitimately, Easton’s is concerned more about the political system that includes the
nation-state and the international community.61 In other words the political system
represents a multitude o f interests. Moreover, Easton’s theory revolves around the
determination o f relationships within a system. These relationships are self-regulating,
and are never truly in equilibrium. Instead, forces are in constant competition, either
directly or indirectly with one side gaining and losing the advantage over another.
A key to the Eastonian system is the idea o f support. The government is made
legitimate through support within the system. According to Easton there are two types o f
support: diffuse and specific.62 The actors in Easton’s theory are much the same as
those found in Weber’s ideal types o f legitimacy. In this particular study o f political
legitimacy, the Philippine Catholic Church, the secular government, and individual
politicians account for the actors in these relationships. The actors involved deal with a
give and take reality. There are demands and there are supports, both o f which are
converted into decisions by the regime in power. The kind of decisions that are made
really depends on the types and level o f the input.
Diffuse support is support developed over a long period o f time. It is formed at
an early age and is not easily lost. Indeed, diffuse support is more like the traditional idea
o f legitimacy than any other. On the other hand, specific support is measured at any given
60 David Easton, A Framework fo r Political Analysis, (Chicago: University o f
Chicago Press, 1965), 57.
61 David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry into the State o f Political
Science (New York: Knopf, 1953), 23.
62
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time by public opinion data, and illustrates a persons or groups personal satisfaction with
a regime or individual politician’s policies and actions. Along with being easily
measurable it is also unstable. Policies and politicians can find themselves on a roller
coaster ride o f popularity among their constituents. As the study goes forward the role of
the Church in formulating diffuse and specific support will become clear. In the last
chapter, the level and measurability o f such support will also be outlined in relation to
Easton’s theory.
Easton is mentioned here at the end o f the Weberian discussion because Easton’s
theory is not without problems for a legitimacy study. He succeeds more in laying out a
study o f political systems rather than succeeding in producing a real general theory o f
legitimacy. Because his theory is removed from the real world, maybe a function o f his
political science training as compared to Weber’s cultural sociology, Easton does not
make room for the dynamics o f economics, gender, race, nor in-depth cultural analysis.
In his theory there are also no real interest groups or mediating variables, making little
room for institutions that have the size, scope, and power o f the Catholic Church.
Regardless o f these limitations the theory has value.
In its weakness lies strength. In the Eastonian system, all politics is simply
politics. There is no difference between national, local, or international. The truisms one
may find at any level may also work at others. It stands to reason, therefore, that if the
Church is found to be active in Weber’s ideal independent variables, as well as
utilitarianism, and active in the cultivation o f diffuse and specific support then according
to Easton its affects will be felt at both the domestic and international levels. Throughout
this study, this particular assertion will be backed by history and concrete facts.
In chapter 2, the historic role o f the Church will be examined, illustrating the
establishment o f the Church’s hold on the hearts, minds, and politics o f the island.
Chapter 2 will also explain the permeation o f the Church into the very fabric o f
Philippine society, from the first mass in 1521 to the most recent People Power
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revolution.

They ways the Church continues to change and adjust to new political

realities are also covered in chapter 2, and the story blends seamlessly into chapters 3 and
4, in which the Church’s relationship with Ferdinand Marcos, martial law, and the first
People Power Revolution are discussed.
In chapter 5, the Church’s cooperative effort to rebuild the Philippine polity
alongside their chosen president, Cory Aquino, is discussed. Finally, in chapters 6 and 7,
the Church’s antagonism and political struggle against Joseph Estrada and his
administration will be detailed, including the events leading to the culmination o f People
Power II and Estrada’s downfall. No more fitting case study can be found to illustrate the
powerful influence o f the Church on the legitimacy o f Philippine governments.
Throughout this study, the reader should pay close attention to the Catholic
Church’s resilience in its many political battles and its ability to influence elections,
governments, politicians, and peasants. These are all a testament to the power o f the
Church to affect legitimacy. No greater testament to the Church’s power can be found,
other than the fact that it entered the twenty-first century more powerful than it had ever
been since Spanish colonial times. The Church has proven its importance as a variable in
legitimacy because among all organizations, it has been able to survive, sustain, and
maintain its position as the premier force in Philippine politics.
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CHAPTER II
CONSTRUCTING FAITH & CREATING GOVERNMENT

The first chapter laid out an intellectual framework to explain the causes, creation,
and foundation o f a legitimate government, in particular the government o f the
Philippines. In the remaining chapters the point will be made again and again that in
order for a government in the Philippines to be legitimate it must work with, through, or,
to a lesser extent, around the Catholic Church. What is illustrated in figure 9 becomes
clear as the story o f the Philippine Catholic Church and its role in legitimating Philippine
governments is discussed at length. It is important to understand that although the other
mediating variables in figure 9, such as the military, play a role, no other institution or
organization in Philippine society has had such an important role for as long a time in
influencing policy and practice as the Philippine Catholic Church.
Legitimacy, as explained by Rousseau, Weber, and by the author o f this study, is
an idea that revolves around community. This community involves many attributes,
including common identities, norms, and laws all o f which create a unique political
culture. The political culture in this community sets the rules and procedures for
investing a government or institution with the power to govern or the power to represent
the political will o f the membership— the legitimacy or illegitimacy o f a government. It
is this community that also gives both a voice and power to organizations like the
Catholic Church.
In the Philippines, to understand how the Catholic Church behaves in the political
culture unique to the community and most importantly its role in determining the
legitimacy or illegitimacy o f a government first requires an understanding o f how it
helped form and shape the very underlying foundation o f Philippine political and social
identity. This requires an examination o f the Church’s history in the Philippines.
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Through this window into the past one can better understand the present and, with a little
luck, forecast the future.
A common national identity, the kind necessary to legitimacy studies, did not
exist in the Philippines prior to the arrival o f organized religion. Indeed, the idea o f what
it meant to be “Filipino” did not exist prior to the Spanish arrival in 1521 and the
introduction o f Catholicism. Based on the anthropological and cultural studies focused
on the pre-Spanish Philippines, it is believed that there was no singular “nation” in the
Philippines, and no concept o f being “Filipino.” This situation existed in part due to the
geographical layout o f the archipelago, and it also resulted from the lack o f commonality
in laws, norms, and values among the various tribal groups that were themselves the
result o f centuries o f human migrational waves into the islands.
Situated in the South China Sea, the Philippines are an archipelago o f more than
7,000 islands covering roughly 300,000 square kilometers. The three main island groups
are Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao. Luzon comprises the northern portion o f the
archipelago, the Visayas the middle region, and Mindanao the south. The sheer number
o f islands meant the creation o f a strong central authority was difficult and the islands
were left politically fragmented. The disparate origins o f each successive wave and the
inability o f any one group to absorb and dominate others meant that no singular power
developed around which a strong national identity could coalesce.
The first and oldest remains o f human culture date back to a pre-Mongoloid homo
sapien, who scientists believe lived around 250,000 years ago in the Palawan region. The
next to arrive were the Negritos (Aetos).1 Successive waves o f Malaysian, Indonesian-

1These Neolithic hunter-gatherers are believed to be part o f a wave o f humans
migrating from East Africa around 30,000 B.C. These groups share a common ethnicity
with Austrolnesians in the Andaman Islands and Aborigines o f Australia and are some o f
the most primitive peoples on earth, only recently emerging out o f a Neolithic existence.
Today, the Negritos number only in the thousands but can still be found only in the most
remote jungles o f the Philippines. At one time they were the dominant human presence
on the islands.
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Malay, and Chinese settlers pushed the Negritos out o f their dominant position. The
descendents o f waves o f aboriginal, Malay, Indo-Malay, and Indo-Chinese settlers lived
-2

in scattered coastal and riverside villages or further inland in the mountains. There were
small-scale contacts with Chinese, Indian, and Arab traders particularly in the Visayas
and Mindanao.
Possessing animist beliefs and practicing primitive forms o f ancestor worship, the
islands’ early inhabitants had very basic conceptions o f religion. As Hinduism trickled
into the islands from the Southeast Asian mainland and the maritime empire o f Sri Vijaya
early in the first millennium A.D., it mixed and mingled with other native beliefs.
Unfortunately, little if any o f this early Indie influence remained by the time the more
organized religions o f Islam and Christianity arrived, and the ideational elements o f these
early Indie faiths were not strong enough to imbue the Filipino with a common religion,
language, or culture.
Pre-Spanish populations, possessing the most rudimentary political organization,
identified with the tribal group. They lived in settlements called barangays. The
Tagalog word barangay comes from the Malay word balangay, the small boat used for
inter-island transport, fishing, and war. As the unit o f government, a barangay consisted
o f 30 to 100 families. At its head was the chieftain, known as the datu, and more often
than not each barangay was independent from other groups. Usually, several barangays
settled near each other to help in case o f war or emergency. The datu passed his authority
to his eldest son or, if he had no sons, to the eldest daughter. Later, any member o f the
barangay could be chieftain based on his talent and ability.

2

William Henry Scott, Prehispanic Source Materials fo r the Study o f the
Philippines History, rev. ed. (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1984).
James B. Goodno, The Philippines: Land o f Broken Promises (New Jersey: Zed
Books Ltd., 1991), 19.
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The barangay datu had the usual responsibilities o f leading and protecting the
members o f his barangay. In turn, members o f the tribe were expected to pay tribute to
the datu, help him till the land, and help him fight in case o f war. Traditionally, a council
o f elders advised a datu. Laws were agreed upon by the council and announced to the
entire barangay. Early barangay society was loosely based on four classes: the ruling
class {datu), the freemen and people o f skill (maharlika), the commoners {timawa), and
the dependents and slaves {alipiri). The alipin were o f two kinds, the aliping namamahay,
who were household servants, and the aliping saguiguilid, who were slave workers.
Small-scale domestic trade existed among the barangays and between the dozens,
sometimes hundreds, o f small tribes that shared an island or group o f islands. Traces exist
o f sporadic foreign trade with Ming China, Tokugawa Japan, Siam, Borneo, the Sri
Vijaya and Majapahit o f Java and Sumatra, the Khmer o f Cambodia, and the populations
o f Champa and Malaysia. The barter system was most likely used in business transactions
since there was no currency. Trade was neither heavy nor complex, and most often
consisted o f small contacts between barangay traders and middlemen who occasionally
ventured to the islands from the more advanced mercantile societies o f Indonesia and
coastal Vietnam.
Although ethnically similar, the familial or kinship group found in a barangay
was the largest community an individual would usually recognize. It was not uncommon
for tribes on the same island to be political foes and no closer in ties than tribes from one
end of the archipelago and the other. The fractured nature o f the geography and the
fractured beliefs adopted by the scattered groups led to deep and lasting divisions within
the Philippines. Even today there are several different ethnic groups and dozens o f
cultural minorities in the Philippines, many that speak their own dialects or languages.
Among the most well-known ethnic groups are the Tagalog, the Ilocano, the
Pangasinanian, the Pampangueno, the Bicolano, the Cebuano, the Ilongo, and the WarayWaray. Chinese and other groups also live in the Philippines. The Chinese currently
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comprise 1.5 percent o f the population and are active in business, controlling a large
segment o f the business capital in the Philippines.
Religion played a miniscule role in identity and community formation, and most
likely little if any role in legitimating whatever proto-governmental structure would have
existed in the pre-Spanish era. Only the arrival o f a unifying religion—Islam—with its
monotheistic doctrine and strong tendency to organize society around a moralistic body
of laws, began to change this. Tradition says that in 1380 an Arab teacher by the name o f
Mukdum arrived in Sulu from the Malay peninsula to preach Islam to the locals. He built
the first mosque in Sulu. Around 1390, Raja Baginda, a minor ruler o f Menangkabaw,
Sumatra, followed him. In 1450 Abu Bakr, a Muslim scholar, came to Sulu and married
Paramisuli, the daughter o f Raja Baginda, and after Baginda’s death, he established a
sultanate form o f government with himself as sultan. Islam then spread rapidly to all parts
o f Sulu.
Serif Kabungsuan is credited with spreading Islam in Mindanao. He led a force
that conquered the natives in what is now Cotabato and converted them to Islam. He also
married into an influential family and founded the first sultanate o f Mindanao. At the
same time, Muslim Malay traders from Borneo were spreading Islam to natives as far
north as Luzon. When the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines during the first half o f the
sixteenth century, many parts o f Luzon, including several large kingdoms o f Manila and
Tondo, had already been nominally Islamized. By the year 1515, Islam had gained a
permanent foothold in Mindanao, a foothold that almost 500 years o f Christian influence
and open warfare were unable to eradicate.
The arrival o f Islam is important and illustrative to this study for several reasons.
First, it shows how an organized and vigorous religion bent on proselytizing can have a
profound affect on a pre-modem tribal society that was essentially a tabula rasa. Second,
it illustrates how a religion can go beyond taking care o f the spiritual needs o f a people
and help organize an identity beyond the tribal community. Islam gave the small,
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fragmented tribal communities throughout the Philippines their first conception o f
“organized” civilization, coupled with a communal identity that went further than the
local barangay.
In Mindanao, the Muslim rulers espoused a common law, a common belief in a
single god, and gave the populations where Islamic influence was strong a sense o f
identity greater than that o f the tribe. After the introduction o f Islam one was still a
member o f a kinship group, but as followers o f Allah and Quranic law, one shared a
common bond with neighboring tribes and answered to a common chieftain or sultan in
matters o f social justice, warfare, trade, and moral issues.
Islam made great strides in organizing the populations where it was introduced.
Even today in the southern Philippines the Moros, or descendents, o f these first Muslim
converts retain a strong sense o f pride and identity with the past, their religion, and their
fellow Muslims. This causes the majority o f the Christian population a great deal o f
consternation in efforts at national unity and cohesion.
Islam deserves credit for what it was able to accomplish in the century after its
introduction. Indeed, had the Spanish not arrived it is very likely that the Philippines
would have become an Islamic nation much like neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia.
But the true development o f Philippine identity was shouldered by the Catholic Church,
which arrived in the Philippines as a result o f the Spanish push to find spices and
converts early in the sixteenth century. The Church, represented by the Spanish friars
and the conquistadors, was about to land on the shores o f the Cebu and change the history
o f the Philippines forever.
The Spanish arrived in 1521, led by Portuguese navigator Ferdinand Magellan.
The Spanish did not set out to discover these islands, but were instead looking for new
trading routes to Asia via circumnavigation o f the globe. However, upon discovering
these islands the opportunity for conquest and conversion o f its souls was too rich to pass
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up. Magellan planted a cross and the Spanish flag, and the first Catholic Mass was
celebrated on Limasawa on March 31, 1521.5
After landing in the Visayas, Magellan wasted little time in becoming involved in
local politics. He impressed himself upon the local datus (kings) on the island o f Cebu
and formed alliances with several o f the local chiefdoms. These alliances were followed,
in due course, by the conversion o f local datus and their followers to Catholicism.
Emboldened by his successes, Magellan tried to impress the Catholic faith and Spanish
rule upon the other surrounding datus. Some accepted but others, like datu Lapu-Lapu o f
Mactan, resisted. Magellan set out on a punitive expedition against Lapu-Lapu.
Unfortunately for Magellan, he was outnumbered and outfought, and he and fifteen o f his
men died after horrendous hand-to-hand combat. Only one ship o f the original five made
it back to Spain, and only 35 o f the original 265 men were left alive.6
Magellan’s defeat did not mean the end o f Spanish designs, and it was only the
beginning. Soon more Spanish ships would return, better equipped and better armed.
Both friars and soldiers filled the Spanish ships with the dual purpose o f subduing the
islands for Spain and converting as many inhabitants as possible to Christianity. By
1565, Miguel Lopez de Legaspi officially claimed the archipelago for Spain and the
conquista o f the Philippines then began in earnest. By 1571, Manila was established and

5Gegoria F. Zaide, Catholicism in the Philippines (Manila: University o f Santo
Thomas Press, 1937), 14.
6Today on Mactan Island one can visit the site o f Magellan’s defeat. Nearby there
are two statues, one o f Magellan and the other o f Lapu-Lapu. It seems strange to one
unfamiliar with the Filipino nature to honor both the slayer and the slain. On one end o f
the promenade stands the native chieftain, who viscously resisted the foreign invaders
armed with a sword and shield, and on the other is a statue honoring a man who made it
possible for the islands to be subdued by conquest. One answer to this confusing duality
lies in religion, for while it is true Magellan brought colonization to the islands, he also
brought Christianity. It was subsequently embraced by more than 80 percent o f the
population.
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the islands were under Spanish authority. Only the Muslim south remained a thorn in the
Spanish side.
While Spain used military and economic power to dominate the country
n

physically, to establish cultural and political hegemony it turned to the Catholic Church.
At the outset, the Spaniards placed a heavy emphasis on Christianization as the most
effective means o f incorporating the Filipinos into Spanish culture and colonial
government. This emphasis on Catholicism is a unique and striking feature o f Spanish
imperialism, as was the inseparable union o f the Church and the State— two institutions
inextricably interdependent.
In the early stages o f Spanish colonial rule, legitimacy did not extend from the
Church to the government, nor did the Church receive a popular mandate from the people
or act as an agent on their behalf. Quite the contrary, in the initial stages o f Spanish
colonization the Church and the government were the same. Legitimacy was inherent
because the government did not require Church’s the backing. The government was the
Church. When graphically illustrated (see figure 10) the reader will notice how the
Church not only acts as a mediating variable but also cuts across the government itself.
The very claim o f the Philippines by the Spanish was based on pontifical Law 29,
Title XXVII o f Partida III, which gave them a legal right over any newly discovered land
they inhabited first. However, little was said about the legality o f this claim if there were
indigenous people already inhabiting the land. This led to a dispute between Castilian
monarchists and Spanish friars in the Philippines. Initially, some in the Catholic Church
resisted Spanish conquest and subjugation o f the islands even if it meant new Christian

7Goodno, The Philippines: Land o f Broken Promises, 20.
g

John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization o f the Philippines: Spanish Aims and
Filipino Response 1565-1700 (Madison, WI: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1959), 6.
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lands under Papal authority and the Spanish crown.9 Their argument was that Spain
could not rightfully claim and take over territory where people were already settled.

Spanish Colonial
Government

Zl-Catholic
Church

\ 2 - 1 rudiiionul

Fig. 10. Legitimacy Model o f Philippines during the Spanish Colonial Era
Traditionally, Spain could acquire sovereignly over new territories in four ways:
heredity, voluntary choice o f the inhabitants, marriage to an heiress o f the realm, or
pontifical or imperial grant.10 It was obvious that Spain could not meet the requirements
o f the first and third items. The second and fourth justifications were more readily open
to manipulation, because the Catholic Church was used to help ensure that the native

9Ibid„ 7.
10J. Gayo Aragon, O.P, “The Controversy over Justification o f Spanish Rule in the
Philippines,” in Studies in Philippine Church History, ed. Gerald H. Anderson (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 3.
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Filipinos made a “voluntary” choice. The Pope, as the de facto “ruler” o f all the world’s
domains, could then grant them the right to the Philippines.
Out o f this controversy came more power for the Church, for as the religious
debated with the secular authorities they were at the same time positioning themselves as
the power o f legitimacy for colonial rule. They did so through an elaborate but curiously
Catholic logic. A case in point is declaration o f Monsignor Domingo de Salazar, the first
bishop o f the Philippines, who argued that the secular authority had no power except that
granted by Christ. Therefore, Spain could not claim siny legal right to the Philippines
except that part which was a consequence o f steady Christian conversion.11 From the very
beginning, the Church positioned itself to be needed by the crown. Indeed, it argued that
no soldiers or administrators were required unless converts were made, because the
Church first had to produce a population o f Christians before Spanish soldiers, Spanish
law, and Spanish government were necessary or legally justified.
The king o f Spain, Philip II, supported the Church’s position that preaching the
gospel had to be assured first. Once conversions were made they, had to be protected,
organized, and governed. Philip II, a staunch Catholic, made a habit o f intently listening
and studying the writings and arguments o f the Catholic bishops in his realm. He rarely
acted without their consent and never did so without their advice. Even after decades o f
Spanish control, he called upon the authorities o f the islands, including all the clergy, to
ask for voluntary submission o f the indigenous population to the Spanish crown. The
results, thanks to the hard work o f the Spanish friars, were positive. Most indigenous
Filipinos brought under Spanish authority assented peacefully and “voluntarily” to the
friars’ requests.12

nIbid., 10.
12Ibid., 18-22.
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Producing a population o f “converts” is itself an interesting story about Church
power and influence. It was not enough for the friars to get a verbal commitment o f
conversion from the Filipinos. Instead, conversion required acts o f faith and participation
in the sacraments. One o f the most important o f these sacraments was baptism. The
proper administration o f baptism was the sin quo non o f taking part in the new Christian
communities. Baptism was carried out only after the convert had at least a rudimentary
understanding o f Catholic doctrine.
Instruction in Catholic doctrine to prepare the Filipino for the sacraments and for
baptism also meant that the rudiments o f a common identity were being constructed
among otherwise disparate groups. The progress towards this identity construction was
real, because few were forced to accept the baptism rite if they were not cognizant o f
what they were doing.
It was through baptism that the indigenous Filipinos became subjects o f another
independent and sovereign state, one that was spiritual in character and came under the
authority o f the Pope in Rom e.13 At the same time, the friars allowed the Filipinos to
keep their kinship ties and loyalty to their rulers, who were also allowed to keep their
positions o f authority and their lands once they too converted. It was explained that the
Pope delegated his authority to the friars and to the converted datus, who pledged to
promulgate the laws necessary for the protection and the rights o f new Christians. In
theory, running parallel with Papal authority was the authority o f the secular Spanish,
whose duty it was to administer temporal protection, laws, and government in areas
where Papal and spiritual matters had no jurisdiction. In reality, the Catholic Church’s
jurisdiction was omnipresent, leaving the Spanish colonial authorities to work with and
around the Church as best it could.

13Ibid., 11.
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The first few decades o f Catholic presence in the Philippines were a tremendous
success. What the priests were able to accomplish in the first few years with limited
numbers is quite astounding. By the 1590s the number o f friars was only 267, yet they
were able to baptize around 200,000 Filipinos.14 Many o f those baptized in the
Philippines were youths and young children. This was no coincidence, because the friars
realized that the future o f Catholic and Spanish authority lay with the children.15
Representing a foreign faith and foreign ways meant that acceptance amongst the elders
and the older datus was not readily forthcoming. However, through well-laid plans o f
evangelization the friars sought to overcome initial reservations. When a new mission
was established, three buildings usually went up in quick succession: a church (parish), a
convent, and a school. If the datus could not be converted, they could still be convinced
to allow a few o f their children to receive an education at the friars’ schools.
The use o f such a small number o f friars to administer such vast areas was not
meant to be a permanent situation. Instead, the friars were to establish their missions and
make initial conversions, then set about the work o f training indigenous Filipinos to take
over the positions o f clergy at the parishes. But the Spanish friars hesitated in this duty
for reasons explained later in the chapter.
The Church’s refusal to ordain enough Filipino priests to fill positions meant that
the Church and Spain had to rely on other methods o f converting and pacifying the large
numbers o f Filipinos. Since the number o f friars was sparse, much o f the initial work o f
preparing the way for conversion fell to the encomenderos. The encomenderos formed a
system o f tributary labor. Developed as a means o f securing an adequate and cheap labor

14John Leddy Phelan, “Prebaptismal Instruction and the Administration o f
Baptism in the Philippines During the Sixteenth Century,” in Studies in Philippine
Church History, ed. Gerald H. Anderson (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969),
36.
15Ibid„ 35.
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supply, the encomienda was first used in the conquered areas o f Moorish Spain.
Transplanted to the New World, it gave the conquistador control over the native
populations by requiring them to pay tribute from lands, which were granted to deserving
subjects o f the Spanish crown. The indigenous populations often rendered personal
services as well. In return, the grantee was obligated to protect his wards, to instruct them
in the Christian faith, and to defend their right to use the land for their own subsistence.
The Spanish encomienda system filled the need to have both a Spanish presence
and a Catholic presence in the colonies. As part o f their agreement with the crown, those
encomenderos in the Philippines had to personally undertake the spiritual education and
baptism o f the indigenous Filipinos in their wards. Moreover, out o f their profits they
were required to build a parish, supply it with the necessary ornaments and items for the
mass, and build a house for and compensate the friar who came to reside in his ward.

17

For the friars and Church officials who were active in the Philippines, the political
climate could not have been more accommodating.
The union o f Church and State in the Spanish colonial empire was official
colonial policy. The Recopilacion de las leyes de Indias (Recompilation o f the laws o f
the Indies) put the spiritual and cultural welfare o f the nation first, not just economic and
•

•

,

political gain.

i o

The same Recopilacion used to guide Spanish actions in Central and

South America became the guide for the management o f Spanish acquisitions in the
Philippines. Adhering to the doctrines set forth in its religious cannon and the legal rights
bequeathed to it under the Recopilacion, the Catholic Church never limited its role in the
Philippines to spiritual matters.

17
•
•
»•
«
Phelan, “Prebaptismal Instruction and Administration,” 29-31.
18

•

Zaide, Catholicism in the Philippines, 55.
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The local parish priest was given duties beyond those o f caring for the spiritual
life of his parishioners. The priest was a salaried government official.19 He was also
entrusted with purely civil duties, such as organization o f the tribute list, direction o f the
local elementary school, supervision o f the election o f local officials, management of
town council meetings and the approval o f local ordinances. Moreover, he oversaw the
administration o f public works projects, including the maintenance o f roads and bridges.
Leading the administration o f the Recopilacion in the Philippines was Manila’s
first bishop, Fray Domingo de Salazar o f the Order o f Preachers. He arrived in 1581 and
in 1598, Manila became an archbishopric. This was coupled with the establishment o f
suffragan in Cebu, Caceres, and Nueva Segovia. Under this system power emanated
from the top down, and from the altar o f the Church it remade the Philippines into a
Catholic colonial territory. In return for the Church’s cooperation, the Spanish crown
committed itself to the protection and compensation o f priests. The symbiotic
relationship between the Church and the Spanish government was further underscored by
the fact that in the early years o f the colony, the religious were continually consulted
about governmental administrative matters.
The Hispanization o f the Philippines required the Church to do as much. Spain
extending its government to include the Philippines naturally meant that its theocratic
system also had to be adapted to the conditions o f the islands. Spanishness was equated
with Catholicism. To be a good Spanish colony meant that the inhabitants should also be
Catholic. The friars undertook the dual task o f governing and evangelizing the colony,
and in the process they helped construct the Filipino identity. Religious conversion was
the path to it all.

19Horoacio De La Costa, S.J., “The Development o f the Native Clergy in the
Philippines,” in Studies o f Philippine Church History, ed. Gerald. H. Anderson (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 70.
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In order to convert the Filipinos, the friars had to first appeal to the indigenous
populations. That meant a greater understanding o f their beliefs and practices. The first
step was to learn the languages and customs, and here the friars were up to the task. One
o f the first things the friars did was learn and employ the local languages, a necessary
burden given their formidable task o f “conversion.” The first printed book in the
Philippines, the Doctrina Christiana published in 1593, was a translation o f prayers and
Christian doctrines. Other books published after Doctrina were translations or
adaptations o f Biblical stories or explanations o f Christian doctrines.
In 1627 the first dictionary, Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala by Fray Pedro de
San Buenaventura, was published. It was an important tool that helped the Spanish
missionaries learn Tagalog. The earliest translations and publications were therefore
directly related to religion. Knowing the indigenous dialects gave the friars power—the
power to influence, convert, exploit, and subjugate. The naive element o f the Filipino
populace believed the Church was the be all and end all of civilization. The friars, by
translating Catholic doctrine and Spanish law, fundamentally altered the makeup o f the
Philippines.
Aurora E. Batnag of the Philippine National Commission o f Culture and Arts
highlights this transformation o f society through the friars’ translation efforts.
“Translation in the Philippines started as part o f a religious undertaking . . . missionaries
used translation as a tool to spread Christianity among the natives, thus fulfilling a
utilitarian role: to conquer mind and body.”20
The results of learning the dialects and the push for mass baptism allowed a small
number o f priests to baptize the majority o f the Filipinos. Baptisms also allowed the
friars to conduct a de facto census, thus gathering the population data necessary to carry
20

Aurora E. Batnag, Translation in the Philippines,
[http://www.ncca.gov.ph/phil._culture/other_cultural info/language/language translation
.htm] National Commission fo r Culture and the Arts, 2001 (accessed 29 September
2001).
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out another policy o f the Church and crown—the policy of Ruduccion. Reduccion
(literally translated as reduction), implemented by the Church with the help o f the
Spanish military, aimed to gather together scattered tribal groups and resettle them under
the watchful eye o f a parish priest. It not only meant that the friars held tighter control
over the new converts, but it also made the administration o f laws and tax collection
much easier. The Catholic Church and its authority extended to all o f those said to be
living debajo de las campanos, or within the sound o f the parish’s bells.
In a matter o f decades, large chunks o f territory took on the characteristics o f
Castilian organization, leaving behind a Philippine society that had until that time been
little more than Neolithic. Reduccion created new townships organized around the parish
and Catholic authorities. This meant that it was now easier to instruct and train the
indigenous population in Spanish law and Catholic doctrine.
The very infrastructure, government, and civic organization o f the Philippines was
created during this time and owed itself to the work o f Catholic religious orders in the
Reduccion. The founding o f towns, cities, and principalities, which served to organize
the centers o f government, learning, and welfare, were the direct result o f the work o f the
Catholic Church and the religious orders. These orders also established numerous cities
and townships. The Augustinians had the most, with more than 385 cities and towns
established by their order. The Recollects were a distant second with 235, and the
Franciscans established 233. The Jesuits, who were evicted from the Philippines in 1768
but returned in 1859, were responsible for more than 93, and the Dominicans had 90.
Each order was also instrumental in developing agriculture, bridges, water works, and
roads.21 Even today, the Philippines remain divided into provinces that owe their origins
to this Church-based organization.

21

Zaide, Catholicism in the Philippines, 70.
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With Reduccion and baptism came new names, new rules, and new identities for
the Filipino population. Tribal identities were discouraged, and identification with those
living within the sound o f the parish bells was furthered. As each successive generation
joined the church through participation in the rituals, the Filipino identity became closely
linked with being Catholic. The names o f those baptized were logged, and as these
communities grew they fell under the jurisdiction o f the parishes whose responsibility it
was to organize them politically and socially. Little by little, native Filipinos lost their
pre-Spanish identities as they began to adopt the dress and the surnames o f the Spanish.
Gone were names such as Lapu Lapu, replaced instead with De La Cruz, Mendoza, de
Ocampo, and others.
Within the sound o f the parish bells daily life came to revolve almost entirely
around the Church. The Church taught its communities how to read and introduced them
to classical music, rudimentary healthcare, and basic forms o f government. Many o f the
new Filipino artisans would ply their talents to create the ornate interiors o f the baroque
parishes that still dot the Philippine landscape. Catholic doctrine also influenced rituals
and festivals as various tribal traditions were melded within the new communities and
injected with a dose o f Christianity. Dances, songs, and live plays were now performed
with Christian themes. Characters were no longer spirits of the forest, but instead
included Jesus and the Virgin Mary.
Religious holidays, such as Easter and Christmas, became joyous events for the
villages. Today every Catholic town in the Philippines celebrates an annual barangay
fiesta in honor o f their patron Catholic saint. There are large processions and parades
throughout the town with the saints, the mayordomo, or sponsor o f the fiesta, and school
children marching through the settlement to music. In addition, families visit neighbors
and relatives to share special home-cooked foods. Where else in the world can one
celebrate Christmas for literally one full month?
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Thus, the Catholic Church did more than just encourage baptism, adoption o f a
“Catholic” sounding name, or the wearing o f Spanish clothes. The friars woke up the
villagers each day, summoned them to Mass, and subjected them to religious
indoctrination and catechismal instruction.22 The Church played a central role in the lives
o f the Filipino because it touched every aspect o f their existence, from the spiritual to the
ordinary, from birth to marriage, and from adulthood to death.
The Filipinos themselves responded enthusiastically to the new religion.

23

Luckily for the friars, they were able to convert and reorganize the Filipinos due in part to
the absence o f centralized, organized, and complex political structures. In areas where
Spain and other Catholic countries like the Portuguese encountered powerful and
organized civilizations-such as the Hindu kingdoms o f India, the Buddhist kingdom o f
Siam, or the Islamic kingdoms o f Java—they had little success.
The mass of conversions and the Reduccion around the parishes that followed the
Spanish conquest gave the Filipinos, from Luzon to Mindanao, a common set o f social,
moral, and spiritual beliefs that had never before existed. It was the first step in a process
that would see the Church become the central focus o f identity, stronger than any other
symbol or political ideology during the Spanish period. Integration o f religion into the
social fabric of the Philippines was complete and thorough, as the Catholic Church
reproduced the various institutions it had successfully established in Spanish America,
including hospitals, colleges, orphanages, and houses o f refuge.24
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Beyond institutions, the Catholic Church injected itself into the lawmaking
process in the Philippines. The governor-general shared his powers with high-ranking
officials o f the clergy. Friars virtually ran the country side, and with this absolute power
came corruption. Both the friars and the secular authority used each other for gain. The
colonial government used the friars to maintain control, and the friars became the
authority for all matters of state. Government officials consulted the clergy before policy
was made or implemented, and it was not uncommon for the friars to write laws for the
Spanish colonial authority. In fact, the first Philippine civil code was penned by Father
Juan de Plasencia in 1589.25
Education o f the masses was also part o f the Catholic Church’s agenda. The
Church believed that to truly capture and hold the hearts and minds o f the indigenous
Filipino required more than mere submission under the threat o f arms. Primary and
secondary education was established to teach Spanish ways and Church doctrine, but the
education was not complete. The goal was to educate while giving only enough
knowledge to make the population governable. Too much knowledge meant a population
that was hard to control.

For those who were deemed worthy to study, usually the

mestizos (those with a mix o f Spanish and Filipino blood), a university education was
possible either in Spain or at several friar-run institutions, the oldest being the University
o f Santo Thomas, which was established in 1611 in Manila.
Educational indoctrination was also part o f constructing a common political and
social identity. Educated Filipinos from across the vast archipelago could meet members
o f other tribes who only a century earlier may not have understood each other’s
languages, customs, or religious beliefs or recognized different political authorities.
Now in the townships, local parishes, and Catholic universities they shared a common
language, style o f dress, set o f laws, government, and religion.
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The policy o f Reduccion gathered together the disparate tribal groups and laid the
foundation o f towns and cities. Translation and publication o f religious texts were
coupled with conversions, all furthering the creation o f a common identity. Friarcontrolled government and education gave rise to a number o f Filipino elite, and the
Church’s efforts culminated in the creation o f a common political culture around which
the nation o f the Philippines emerged. But the friars were more than spiritual teachers
and government officials. In some cases they were called upon to defend the colony
itself.
The Spanish fleet protected the colony externally. Periodic clashes with the
Dutch, the English, and the Islamic tribes o f Mindanao called upon the resources o f the
Spanish military garrisons stationed there, but the Church also played a role in colonial
defense. Indeed, the clergy were instrumental in helping defend the territorial and
political integrity o f the Philippines from foreign invasion.26 Priests organized and
rallied the population against internal revolts, occasionally taking up arms against
rebellious Chinese traders who lived in the islands, against the Muslims in the south, and
externally against attacks by the Dutch and the British.27
The most prominent example o f the Church’s role in colonial defense came
during the brief British occupation. As part o f the Seven Years War, the British sailed
into Manila Bay and occupied the city. Their occupation lasted from October 6,1762, to
June 11, 1764. It proved to be the only serious imposition o f a foreign power on Spanish
rule until 1898, when Spain would lose the Philippines to the United States. What is
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Some o f these incidences are well documented and include a raid in 1582 by a
Japanese expeditionary force. The year 1603 saw the first large-scale Chinese revolt in
Manila, in 1622 Chinese pirate Limahong occupied Corregidor Island, during 1636 a
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sieged Manila. During the period from 1762 to 1764, the British occupied Manila.
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important about the British occupation, however, is not what it meant for Spanish history
but its illustration o f another role the Church shouldered—defense o f the Philippines.
The religious orders did not simply verbally oppose British conquests, they
actively opposed the British occupation. The occupation government, whether justified
through war or not, was illegitimate in the eyes o f the friars. This meshed with the
concept o f the unity o f the Church and state that was carried into the Philippines. When
one was attacked, the other was to defend.

98

> •

Recognizing that the Church and the

government were one and the same, it is little surprise that the Spanish friars were as
devoted to Spain as they were to their missionary work.
The British were unprepared to deal with the Church as a military threat.
Working with opposition forces, such as those headed by Don Simon Anda y Salazar, the
Church proved an effective resistance. The British made a fatal error in judgment when
they freely granted the right to religious assembly. What they did not realize was that
these assemblies left undisturbed were covert meeting places for resistance fighters
within the perimeter o f occupation.29 The parishes were turned into planning rooms. It is
not hard to imagine that after Mass the talk turned quickly to plans o f resistance. Indeed,
Anda and the friars would not only appeal to anti-British sentiment but also justified their
defense o f the Philippines as a fight against anti-Catholic doctrines.30
«

Almost all o f the religious orders were hostile to the British. When Archbishop
Manuel Antonio de Rojo y Vieyra, the Spanish governor-general, called for the religious
orders to leave their cloisters and help defend the city, many friars filled the ranks o f the
defenders. In most areas the friars were the best trained, most familiar, most fluent, and
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in the best position to organize a native resistance against the English. They knew the
language, the customs, and the native Filipinos better than anyone. Among the orders
called to arms, the Augustinians appeared to be the most active and effective instigators
o f resistance. They even riled fears among good Catholics that the British were heretics
•51

who brought only war and no peace.
Some o f the British did see problems with the Church. One officer, Captain
Blackhouse, is credited with noting that the whole Philippines could be quickly subdued
if the clergy were arrested and confined to Manila.

T9

The friars, who plotted to starve the

British forces out o f Manila, victimized Blackhouse and others. Since the Church
controlled the valuable supply lines leading to Manila, it was difficult for food and other
materials to get to the British without the friars’ help. The Church also worked with
Anda in helping melt parish bells in order to use the metal for casting guns. This forced
the British to seize all parish bells within their area o f control, further angering both the
friars and the Catholic Filipinos.
Throughout the ordeal, the Spanish clergy gave their support to Anda and others
against the British, rallied the Filipinos, took up arms, and facilitated to a great extent the
failure o f British occupation in the Philippines. The military dimension o f the Church,
coupled with its role in the education and infrastructure building in the Philippines, was
part o f the wide swath the Church cut politically in the country. Everything about the
Spanish colonial regime’s legitimacy reinforced a pyramidal social structure created by
the Church and that remained intact until the end o f the nineteenth century. At the top o f
the pyramid were the Spanish officials, the peninsulares, and the friars. Its base
consisted o f the Filipino majority, and the middle was filled with a small bourgeois class

3'ibid., 123.
32Ibid., 124.
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o f mestizos and criollos (Spanish bom and raised in the Philippines).33 Each level was
interwoven socially and politically into the great fabric o f society, and the thread that
bound them all was the ever-present Catholic Church.
Since 1565 the Philippines, under the guidance o f the Spanish friars, had
witnessed steady development. Church policies helped create a new Filipino identity,
religion, and political culture. But underneath the surface tensions begin to mount. The
tension was the result o f several policies made by the friars. These included the friars’
refusal to give the Filipinos what they wanted: full access to the power that being full
members o f the clergy allowed. Education was incomplete for most and religious
training was in general never fully developed, obstructing the path for most Filipinos to
rise to positions of power and influence within the Church. The Catholic Church had
helped create the Filipino nation, but because the friars were unwilling to step aside and
let the natural progression and maturation o f the society to take place, they were directly
responsible for the burgeoning sense o f nationalism.
The Spanish friars enjoyed their roles as power brokers for the Spanish crown,
and they resisted traditional efforts to ordain native priests. In so doing, they failed to
acknowledge a universal maxim o f the Church: The church can only be securely founded
when it is assured o f a clergy sufficiently numerous to administer and develop its various
works, and the church has no assurance as long as its personnel in any given territory are
dependent for their recmitment on foreign lands.34
Traditionally, the Catholic Church established a mission and then set about
training the indigenous population to become members of the clergy. The Church and its
priests had followed this doctrine elsewhere in Asia, including China with the works o f
Matteo Ricci and Japan with Francis Xavier. However, this was not the case in the
'5-2
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Philippines. The doctrinal basis for this exclusion began with the first royal decrees
made by Philip II, who wanted the parishes to remain in Spanish hands because he felt
they were loyal subjects to the crown. It was also based on two councils, the Council o f
Mexico in 1555 and the Third Council o f Mexico in 1585, which prohibited the
admission o f indios to the religious orders. As Gerald H. Anderson writes, the
retardation of the native clergy was the result o f the “ecclesiastical legislation o f the New
Spain, where the failure of a premature attempt to develop a native clergy resulted in a
if

reaction unfavorable to the very idea o f a native clergy.”
The friars’ obstinacy was easily sustained through the structure o fpatronato, a
policy that gave the king the right to appoint clergy and administration in return for his
pledge to protect and compensate the Church. The entire structure o f patronato, through
which the parishes in the colony were administered, contributed to the barring of
indigenous Filipinos from entering the priesthood and achieving any meaningful role.
Under the doctrine o f patronato, the Spanish sovereign in his capacity as royal patron o f
the Church in the colonies defrayed the expenses o f the colonial churches. In exchange he
acquired the exclusive right to presentation to all-important ecclesiastical posts. He then
held wide power in the disposition o f personnel and the division o f ecclesiastical
territory.
Finally, the Spanish cited the cultural level o f the Philippine missions as a reason
they could not turn over control. In their minds, no suitable candidates existed.36 The
Philippines, they argued, were just emerging out o f a rudimentary human existence and
had yet to organize into stable political communities. Whereas Japan, China, and India
had all possessed great civilizations in the past, it was premature to expect that the

35Ibid., 103.
36Ibid„ 77.
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Filipinos would be priests. The Church wanted to “civilize” them first and ordain them
later.
Most friars believed that the indigenous people lacked the temperament necessary
for the job—a nice way to say they feared Filipinos did not possess the intellectual
acumen to be priests and giving them such responsibilities would be a disaster. The
Filipinos, the friars believed, were good only for labor and for assisting the “real” priests.
It was shocking for anyone to suggest that having a native priest was something to be
desired and most surely, such a priest would promote the downfall o f his parish, his
village, and all those in his wake. At the core was a fear that giving the Filipinos the kind
o f power that the priesthood allowed would mean the collapse o f Spanish authority.
The friars had opposed all efforts made by the Spanish crown to appoint men to
the posts, even though according to the patronato doctrine the crown had every right to
do so. The friars fiercely protected their territory from secular influence. They were
successful in their defense based on a simple formula. The crown either left them alone or
they threatened to quit the parishes and missions, leaving no Catholic presence, no
Spanish presence, and thus no governmental presence in the vast majority o f the
Philippines.37
Spain’s colonial government initially backed the friars. The monarchists thought
that keeping the religious in their parish posts was good for the colonial government.
The farther from Manila these posts were, the more important the residence o f a Spanish
friar was to the secular government. The friars were not only zealous missionaries, but
also honored and loyal subjects o f the crown. Their presence in these remote regions
defrayed the expense and effort needed to maintain a large armed force to police the
colony.

37Ibid., 80-81.
38Ibid„ 72.
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The friars “showed the flag” o f Spain and were the eyes and ears o f the secular
authorities. Indeed, through the use o f the sacraments they were able to ensure stability
and control over those in their townships. For example, as part o f the evangelization
process the natives were expected to regularly participate in the sacramental life o f the
Church. Baptism, as mentioned earlier, initiated one into the Church and the State.
Communion sealed the bond and the confessional was a necessary part o f the new
spiritual life o f the Christian. As a result o f the enforced confessional, friars were able to
hear the deepest thoughts, feelings, and motivations o f the Filipino, including those who
harbored ill will against the Spanish authorities.39
One may never know the actual number and frequency o f instances when a friar
was privy to a plot being hatched against the Spanish and then turned over the
intelligence to the appropriate authorities. However, it was frequent enough to gamer the
attention o f preeminent Filipino nationalists like Jose Rizal, who used such incidents as
fodder in his anti-Spanish writings. Indeed, the Catholic religious in the doctrinas were
given credit by governor Pedro Sarrio for having “contributed most to the pacification o f
the malcontents.”40
The Spanish friars exploited their power in the patronato system. They, as part o f
the government, were usually the only visible source o f Spanish authority within the
colony. However, even against this backdrop o f resistance, a native clergy was slowly
emerging in spite o f their best efforts to suppress it. In 1702, some in the Church, but not
the Spanish friars, even went so far as to propose that Manila become a regional seminary
for East and Southeast Asian indios. It would be a place to train them in the ways and
laws o f the Church for service in their homelands. Al though the idea did not come to
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fruition, it did spark the building o f a few seminaries in and around Manila, including San
Carlos in 1772, which was established by Archbishop Sancho de Santa Just y Rufina.41
By the mid-eighteenth century there were at least four educational establishments
in Manila built to train native candidates for the priesthood. These priests were slowly
forming a secular priesthood. It was secular in the sense that they were not bound to any
particular religious order and were separate from the Spanish religious orders. It was rare
that the friars would allow an indigenous Filipino to enter their order. This produced a
split within the Church. On one side were the friars and on the other were members o f the
developing Filipino secular clergy.
Racial prejudice embittered the rivalry between the friars and the seculars almost
from the beginning. The problem only worsened as the number o f Filipino clergy grew,
because this gave the Archbishop the power to impose punishments on friars, a power
that was unenforceable as long as their threat to abandon their parishes was valid. With
the numbers o f Filipino clergy growing, friars who did not bend to the will o f the
Archbishop or yield to the patronato could be replaced. At least that was the theory.
That theory was put to the test in 1773 when Archbishop Sancho expelled the
Augustinians from the parishes in Pampanga and replaced them with indigenous priests.
When the Jesuits were removed from their parishes, Filipino clergy also replaced them.
So great was his need to replace the arrogant and rebellious friars that Sancho hurriedly
ordained Filipino priests, often before their training was complete. The results were
disastrous, and many o f these new Filipino clergy were incompetent. Their parishes fell
into disrepair and stories o f cruelty and thievery perpetrated by indigenous clergy flooded
into the Archbishop’s office.42 Sancho’s disastrous experiment resulted in the general
acceptance by both civil and religious authorities that the Filipino was incapable of
4‘ibid., 85-86.
42Ibid., 95-96.
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accepting the responsibilities o f the priesthood.43 To the secular authorities incompetent
Filipino priests were no better, nor were they an improvement over rebellious Spanish
friars. At least the friars were Spanish and loyal subjects, while the Filipino clergy were
often suspected and thought o f as enemies o f Spain 44
It was a no-win situation for the indigenous clergy. If they were incompetent,
then they served only to justify and prove the negative view o f the incapability o f
Filipinos to assume responsibility for parishes in their own land and justified their
continued subservient role to the Spanish friars. However, if they proved intelligent and
competent, then they were sure to be labeled as rebels with divided loyalties. Indeed, it
seems that the best and brightest among the Filipino clergy did attract malcontents among
the barangays, yet in hindsight this was not unusual. If a Filipino had the right
combination o f acumen, intelligence, and luck, he could rise to a position o f power within
the Church. It is only natural that restless elements o f Filipino society sought assistance
from one o f their own in a position o f power.
The Filipinos desired to be part o f the clergy as much as the friars desired to keep
them out. They realized that the Church offered a path to power and brought respect,
lands, wealth, and influence to those within its structure. Yet the Filipinos were excluded
from these opportunities. Catholic influence in the Philippine colonial government and
among the populace did not translate into opportunities for the Filipinos who aspired to
be priests or members o f the powerful Church hierarchy.
The Filipino clergy were excluded by the system itself on almost every front. The
division o f ecclesiastical territory in the Philippines among the missionary religious order
decreed by Philip II left no room for a secular clergy. The arbitrary limitation o f the
scope o f Filipino clergy necessarily lowered the standards o f its formation. In other

43Ibid., 98.
44Ibid., 100.
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words, the Spanish friars had no need to fully educate and train the Filipinos because they
were to serve only as subordinates to the friars.
The one attempt by Archbishop Santos to cripple the religious orders resulted in
disaster, as poorly trained and half educated native clergy were unable to assume the
responsibilities o f the parishes after the Spanish were removed. It proved to be a selffulfilling prophecy. This purely political maneuver resulted in a deepening antagonism
between the Spanish friars and the Filipino seculars, which rapidly degenerated in a
national and racial enmity.45 This was followed by a growing uneasiness on both sides,
as the Filipino clergy realized revolution was necessary to achieve their goals and the
Spanish friars and secular authorities suspected Filipino clergy o f harboring revolutionary
tendencies and believed that their loyalties did not lie with Spain.
The Church establishment’s rejection o f native Filipinos laid the foundation for
revolution against Spanish rule in the nineteenth century. This revolution can be
considered the first legitimacy crisis, when the Church, long a pillar o f governmental
stability, used its resources and was used by others as a tool to fight against the decaying
Spanish regime. The Filipino clergy were first to rise up against the friars, and thus the
government. They were the most visible protagonists against Spanish authority, and their
efforts were based on the early and repeated attempts to exclude them from assuming
responsibility for the parishes.
Few understood as well as the Filipino clergy the power that came with control o f
the parishes and missions. Flaving this power meant being a part o f the government and
the power structure and enjoying the full benefits the position entailed. It was not simply
a desire to serve God or a desire to put a Filipino face in the parishes, but it was real
power concerns that motivated these Filipinos. Nonetheless, the Spanish had laid a
foundation that excluded Filipino participation.
45Ibid„ 104.
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An interesting dichotomy developed during this pre-Revolutionary period in and
around the Catholic Church. The Church, which was the institution o f governmental
stability and o f continuity, became the early focus and breeding ground for Philippine
nationalism.46 The Spanish friars, long the objects o f scom among the nationalists,
became targets, while at the same time Filipino priests took leadership roles and stirred
up the fires o f nationalism. The Church was simultaneously equated with stability and
revolution.
The catalysts that set the revolution in motion were a series o f political affronts to
Filipino national pride, starting first in 1826 when all Filipino priests were removed from
Philippine parishes and replaced by monastic friars from Spain. This religious expulsion
was followed a few years later in 1837 by the political expulsion o f Philippine
representation to the Spanish Cortes. As these insults to the Philippine people mounted,
the common bonds o f nationalism were fostered both in underground networks and
through the communications o f the Filipino priests. The local parishes served as
intellectual rallying points, as well as central meeting points for members o f discontented
groups. Soon, these groups would foment into a revolutionary movement, one that would
challenge the legitimacy o f the Spanish position and bring about a new era in the
Philippines.
As early as 1870, Archbishop Gregoria Meliton Martinez warned that bitterness
and resentment o f the Filipino priests could boil over into revolution should their
treatment not improve 47 It was feared that the friends and families o f the priests would
be the foot soldiers o f any revolution that might erupt. An interesting feature o f this time
period is the fact that much o f the motivation for revolution was anti-Spanish friar and

46Goodno, The Philippines: Land o f Broken Promises, 27.
47Cesar Adib Majul, “Anticlericalism during the Reform Movement and the
Philippine Revolution,” in Studies in Philippine Church History, ed. Gerald H. Anderson
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 153.
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the period’s literature was anti-Christian, cementing in many minds the permanent break
from the Catholic Church by the Filipino elite. However, this is a misconception because
although it was anti-friar, it was never anti-Christian.
The people never sought to break from religion, but merely desired a break from
what they saw as a corrupt political institution operating under the guise o f faith. The
ilustrados (a group o f highly educated native-born Filipinos) also joined the movement.
Educated, wealthy, and restless, the illustrados joined the secular priests and began to
agitate peacefully for civil rights and the secularization o f the parishes, unheard o f actions
until that time.48
The revolution itself was not anti-Catholic but anti-Spanish friar. Even the most
ardent o f revolutionaries who wanted to see the Spanish friars disappear did not want the
parishes closed or the Catholic faith to be replaced with something else. Instead, they
wanted the corrupt Spanish friars to be replaced with Filipinos, thus giving a boost to
Catholic faith and the revolution at the same time. Anticlericalism during the Philippine
revolution and legislative attempts to neutralize or minimize the traditional power o f the
Church represented the last phases o f a process that began earlier 49
The Spanish monarchists and the friars allied against the illustrados and the
Filipino clergy. The turning point was the Cavite Mutiny o f 1872. On January 20, 1872,
200 Filipino soldiers mutinied due to harsh treatment and oppression by the Spanish. It
was quelled in two days, but three Filipino priests were suspected o f instigating the
mutiny. As a result, Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora were publicly
executed. Other priests and illustrados were exiled and arrested.50 Their deaths
contributed as much as anything to the emergence o f Filipino nationalism. After their

48Ibid., 155.
49Ibid„ 152.
50Ibid., 156.
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execution, an acronym developed from the names o f the martyrs, and GOMBURZA
became the code word used to identify the underground members o f the revolutionary
Kataastaasan Kagalang-galang na Katipunan nang manga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest
and Most Honorable Society o f the Sons o f the Country), or Katipunan for short.
It was widely believed that the three priests were executed simply for being
Filipino secular priests, but they became martyrs to the revolutionary cause. Two camps
were now solidified in the same Church. The Spanish friars emerged as defenders o f the
Spanish sovereignty o f the colony, and the Filipino priests emerged as the organizers and
instigators o f revolution against Spanish control. The positions were irreconcilable. Any
demand made by one, if met, would result in a loss o f power for the side that
acquiesced.51 The chief demand from the revolutionists was that the Spanish hand over
some 700 parishes to Filipino clergy. To do this would have meant an immense loss o f
revenue, territory, and political power for the Spanish government. The friars were the
single largest and wealthiest group in the Philippines.52 Moreover, they were the most
politically powerful.
Illustrados flocked to the cause under the banner o f the martyred priests.
Prominent men, including Jose Rizal, helped fan the fires o f revolution by helping
publish newspapers such as La Solidaridad (1889), which attacked the position o f the
friars in the Philippines. Rizal also wrote Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, both
scathing satirical attacks on the hypocrisy and corrupt nature o f Spanish friars.
The illustrados and other revolutionists were careful not to attack Catholicism in
the process o f attacking the friars. The sympathy for the Filipino secular priests was used
to arouse nationalist sentiment against the Spanish friar, for it was the Filipino secular
priests who were the first to fight Spanish abuses. Yet they remained ardent in their faith,

51Ibid., 158.
52Ibid., 159.
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reminding their followers that it was the Spanish who had corrupted Catholicism and the
Catholic faith was not to blame. Furthermore, they reminded the revolutionaries that
Catholicism was the great glue holding the islands together. The Filipino priests were
comrades in arms against the Spanish. They became instigators, organizers, and martyrs.
Jesuit writer John Schumacher traced this story and the role o f the Filipino clergy
as genitors and carriers o f the nationalist consciousness in Revolutionary Clergy: The
Filipino Clergy and the Nationalist Movement, 1850-1903. Schumacher noted that it was
the Filipino priest who gave birth to nationalism, who nurtured it, and who continued to
support it even when they were forced to yield its leadership to others who would later
betray and abandon the Church in pursuit o f their own power and alternate versions o f the
revolutionary cause.
Some in the revolution, including Amelio Aguilnaldo, made fatal errors in trying
to separate the Church from the State. Apolinario Mabini did likewise. Mabini feared
that any priest, if left in the same position as a government worker, would be a threat to
stability and start abusing power.54 He believed in the separation o f Church from the
State, but others disagreed. One was Felipe Calderon, a prominent revolutionary who
strongly propounded the unity o f Church and State in the Revolutionary Congress o f
1898. Calderon was anti-friar but wanted to keep the Catholic religion as part o f the
state. The Filipino clergy were also represented at the Congress and demanded that any
new Philippine society have the Catholic Church at its base and its foundation. The
Church gave the Filipino a moral compass, norms, and “sense o f identity.”55
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When it came time to vote on an amendment to the provisional constitution that
would have separated the Church from the State, there was a huge fight between those
who favored keeping the Church as part o f the government and those who wanted a clean
break. The first vote on the amendment ended in a tie. However, the chairman broke the
tie and the amendment passed by a margin o f one vote.56 The Filipino clergy were
outraged and felt the revolution’s leadership had betrayed them. The priests who
supported the revolution to get rid o f the Spanish friars never supported the goal o f
dissolving the established power and influence o f the Catholic Church.

Many

revolutionary delegates agreed. No one present at the vote needed to be reminded that
there would have been no revolution had the Filipino priests not organized a stand against
the Spanish friars and the Spanish crown.
The errors o f Aguilnaldo and Mabini aside, most people were mindful o f the
friars’ role in the revolutionary cause, including Rizal, who dedicated his second novel,
El Filibusterismo, to the martyred Filipino priests Mariano Gomez, Jose Burgos, and
Jacinto Zamora. Rizal’s actions, and those taken by Calderon and others, are poignant
reminders that nationalism in the Philippines did not mean secularization o f the
government but instead a “nationalizing” o f the Catholic Church. By doing this it was
believed the obstacles to education, progress, and freedom would be overcome while at
the same time keeping the Philippines a Catholic nation. Unfortunately for the Church
and the revolutionaries, those ideas were not fully realized.
In 1898 the Spanish-American War began, with grave consequences for the
Philippines. Having defeated the Spanish in short order, the Americans became the new
colonial masters o f the Philippines, voiding the established Philippine Republic and
igniting a new war against the Americans. The Catholic Church had few weapons to
combat this new American colonialism, and would see its role diminish in importance as

56Ibid., 169.
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nationalism gave way to a partnership with the Americans. To be Filipino would Still
mean to be part o f the Church, but now America would inject its own influences into the
Philippine psyche, including ideas such as liberty, democracy, the Protestant work ethic,
and the separation o f Church and State. For the first time in the history o f the Philippine
nation-state, the Catholic Church was not needed to legitimate the government.
The United States acquired the Philippines as the spoils from the war with Spain,
and with them came the Catholic Church-based infrastructure. It was unlike any territory
the United States had ever attained. Within American political circles there were those
for and against this acquisition. Some saw the economic and military value o f the islands,
including their undeniable value as a naval base for America’s emerging pacific fleet.
Others objected to the United States playing the role o f an imperialist power. It was, in
their view, unjustifiable in light o f American political culture, which was founded on the
principles o f free choice and rule o f law. To force the American government and
institutions on a people who did not wish them was in itself un-American, yet President
William McKinley and his advisors, mostly in the military, were able to look past any
negatives associated with violating American principles and the tradition o f anti
imperialism and see the economic, political, and even religious benefits associated with
the acquisition o f the Philippines.
Estimates o f public opinion toward the acquisition o f the Philippines after the war
were varied. Businessmen viewed the Philippines as the gateway to Asiatic markets and
a way for the United States to finally become competitive with what they believed would
be the emerging markets in China.57 In American religious circles, there was almost
uniform support for the acceptance o f American responsibility for the islands and
undertaking a “conquest for Christ.” The fact that more than 80 percent o f Filipinos were
Christian did not seem to damper the American spirit for Protestant proselytizing. Many
57
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Americans who were aware o f American involvement in the Philippines viewed the
•

» .

♦

.

acquisition o f the islands as divinely inspired.

co

Divinely inspired or not, the American regime in the Philippines took power and
remained in power throughout the colonial era because o f its military might. The Church,
long the center of politics in the Philippines, was marginalized. In figure 11 the drastic
change in legitimacy is illustrated. The Church was detached from the government by the
American desire to separate Church and State and was marginalized by other factors,
such as the United States colonial economic sector and the United States military.
Legitimacy did flow around the Church, but it was in large part inconsequential to the
ruling regime.
Ignoring the Catholic Church was something the Americans did from the
beginning. One o f the rallying points for acquiring the Philippines initially as a
protectorate was that a conquest o f arms must be followed by a conquest for Christ.59
American Protestants simply ignored that more than 80 percent o f the Philippine
population was Catholic. The few anti-imperialists, such as Samuel Clemens, Andrew
Carnegie, and Charles Francis Adams, who viewed what the United States was
undertaking as being in direct opposition to the spirit o f the Declaration o f Independence
and the Constitution o f the United States, were ignored. These gentlemen argued that the
Filipino was no more eager for American rule than they were for Spanish misrule. The
United States had unmistakably broken with its democratic traditions o f equal rights and
self-government.60 These men’s voices, like those o f the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, were muted by the majority’s clamor to take over the islands.
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Fig. 11. Legitimacy Model o f the Philippines During the American Colonial Era
The final decision was McKinley’s, and given all the bluster about economics and
empire, his description o f his own decision lacked any mention o f empire building, a
desired naval base, or an American counterweight to European expansion in Asia. What
he says instead is that the United States had three undesirable alternatives. The islands
could not be given back to the Spanish, they could not be turned over to a rival European
power, and they could not be left to themselves, because the Filipinos were in his opinion
unfit for self government. McKinley thus concluded that there was nothing left to do but
to take them and “educate the Filipinos and uplift and Christianize them, and by God’s
grace do the best we could for them as our fellow men for whom Christ also died.”61
American colonial authorities never saw themselves for what they were, the first
major extension o f the American imperialist arm. On the contrary, the official line o f the
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United States was that it had come to the Philippines as a liberator, not as a colonizer,
taking up the unenviable but necessary “white man’s burden.”62 Opinions about the
Filipinos themselves were not flattering. Books written at the time described the
Filipinos as “spoiled children,” “indignant,” and grateful for the surfeit o f American
supplies.63 Indeed, the Filipinos were expected to be thankful that a “just” and “noble”
imperial master was pacifying them, not a third-rate European power with antiquated
politics and a friar-controlled bureaucracy.64
American intentions were not all bad. They planned to eventually give the
Philippines independence, but in limited steps. There was still support for the policy o f
filling the Filipinos’ stomachs while keeping their heads empty. Yet there was more than
pure philanthropy to the American conquest. Many Filipinos did not see the Americans
as liberators, but as simply another occupying force, and they met the American army
with a revolutionary army of their own.
Spain’s defeat by the Americans was in a real sense a defeat o f the Catholic
Church as well, and it made the Church’s cooperative position with the government
uncertain. The Spanish friars were not ignorant o f the American political culture, but it is
likely that the friars themselves did not have a clear idea of how they would be treated by
the new American regime. Some probably felt their positions would be sustained against
the Filipinos and the indigenous clergy, and others probably felt a mutual working
relationship could be worked out between the parishes and the Americans. In either case,
the Spanish friars planned on staying in the Philippines without being harassed by either
Americans or Filipinos.
f\0
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In previous centuries the power o f the friars was so great that the Spanish
government rested upon the Church. The Americans had seldom dealt with a Church
whose authority was indistinguishable from that o f the secular government, and one was
always invoked to sustain the power o f the other.65 Garel A. Grunder and William E.
Livezey summarized the friars’ power during the Spanish era quite well, stating that the
friars were “supreme” in the life o f Filipinos.66 The priest exerted a determining influence
in practically every branch o f municipal government. He was president o f the boards o f
health, statistics, and prisons. He presided over taxation and the municipal budget and
was a member o f the board o f partition crown lands. At times, the friars were even in
charge o f the insular police. They closely supervised whatever public instruction was
offered and naturally opposed any liberalizing tendencies or actions that might undermine
their own privileged status or the power o f Spain. In a very vital sense, these religious
leaders were to the Filipinos the real representatives o f Spanish power.
The American administration approached the situation unsure o f how to handle a
Church that was also a government. The situation was complicated by the actions o f
some within the Church itself. As it had during the final years o f Spanish rule, the
Church tried to serve as a rallying point for opposition forces against the Americans.
Some elements within the Philippine Church refused to relinquish their dream of
independence and did not shy away from violent conflict with the American forces. The
most well-known o f these clashes occurred on the island o f Samar, where the bells o f the
local parish were used as a signal to launch a brutal assault on Company C o f the United
States Ninth Infantry. At the sound o f the parish bells, Filipinos dressed as mourning
women pulled out their bolos (large machete knives) and slaughtered fifty-four soldiers.
Retribution from the Americans was swift, and included burning the church and seizing
65Charles Burke Elliot, The Philippines to the End o f the Commission
Government: A Study in Tropical Democracy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 42.
66Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, 123.
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the parish bells. The bells are still in American hands, kept as trophies at F. E. Warren
Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming. To this day, Wyoming veterans' groups resist
giving them back.
The soldiers who had rallied around the Filipino clergy to overthrow the Spanish
looked again to their parishes for guidance in matters o f war. They were fighting a
juggernaut in the American military, but it did not stop them from trying. Discovering
this, the Americans began to target the Church and the Filipino priests became a major
focus o f “pacification.” To do this would require winning over the clergy, and if they
could not be won over they were to be “eliminated.”68
The exact number o f priests targeted, won over, or eliminated is not known.
What can be surmised is that the pressure placed on the Catholic Church by the American
occupying forces was successful. Gradually, the Church withdrew and was pushed out o f
any revolutionary role. The revolution gradually transformed into something
unrecognizable from the war with the Spanish. As the leadership, Aguilnaldo, Mabini,
and others distanced themselves more and more from the Church and the revolution lost
popular support and died out. Scholars readily acknowledge that the revolution became
short-lived when the Church was removed from its center and there was nothing to
replace it as the organizational and spiritual force.69 In many respects, the revolution
failed because it abandoned its religious roots.
The centuries-old conflict between the Christian majority and the Muslim
minority in the south was also very much alive during this time. Unlike the Spanish, the

67Edwin Kiester Jr. and Sally Valent Kiester, “Yankee Go Home and Take Me
With You! Effect on Philippines o f U.S. Colonization,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Smithsonian (May 1, 1999; accessed 22 August 2001).
68

Reynaldo C. Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the
Philippines, 1840-1910 (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998), 114.
69Ibid., 97.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89

Americans had little difficulty in subduing the moros. They were, through superior arms,
more than a match for the fighters o f the moros, who were equipped with antiquated
firearms and a keris. The Muslims ultimately accepted American rule with the signing o f
the Carpenter Agreement in 1915 between Sultan Jamalul Kiram and Frank Carpenter.
They did this hoping that they would be granted a modicum o f autonomy and not be
forced to submit to the authority o f the Christian Filipinos, whose power was centered in
Manila.
The Americans, however, should not be viewed as benevolent imperialists who
had no other choice but to take the Philippines under their exclusive wing and colonial
protection. Elements in the Philippine revolution who had fought against the Spanish
before the American victory had declared through their Malolos Constitution o f 1899 an
independent Philippine state, and the Americans simply ignored this. The Americans did
not plan to share their victory or the spoils o f the Philippines with the Filipinos. After the
dispatch o f the Spanish, the United States made it known that the “insurgents” who had
previously been Filipino freedom fighters must recognize the authority o f the United
States.70
The American administration took the islands, but it also inherited the problems.
Problems o f education, infrastructure, land reform, and government all taxed the
intellectual and material resources o f the United States. An elite and educated body o f
Filipinos existed, but they were few in comparison with the overall population and were
not o f great use in fostering the American administration.
Among the most important problems facing the new American administration was
how to deal with the Church. The Americans had never seen or dealt with a Church-State
apparatus that was so intimately intertwined. The indigenous Filipino clergy also had to
be dealt with, along with the issue o f the Spanish friars. The questions and problems
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facing the Americans were daunting. They had to pacify a population, deal with the
friars, keep the native clergy content, and honor their own American political traditions
o f separation o f Church and State.
To deal with this issue, President McKinley tapped Jacob Gould Schurman, then
president o f Cornell University, to head a commission to look into these difficulties. By
the end o f 1899, the commission submitted a report stating that American stewardship
was needed for an indefinite period until the Filipinos themselves were educated and
responsible enough for self-government.71 It did, however, deal concretely with the
Catholic Church issues. From the beginning o f American rule in the Philippines, it was
officially announced that the cardinal principle o f policy would be consonant with a
fundamental rule o f American life: Keep the separation between Church and State “real,
entire, and absolute.”72 As a corollary, there was to be absolute religious freedom. This
separation o f Church and State was an expression o f the American political culture and
ideals, not o f religious convictions.
A second commission was established under the authority o f William Howard
Taft. President McKinley gave the Taft Commission legislative and executive authority
to put in place the civilian government the Schurman Commission had recommended. In
499 statutes issued between September 1900 and August 1902, the Taft Commission
attempted sweep away more than three centuries o f Spanish and Catholic rule and replace
them with American-style law. In place o f a constitution, the United States passed the
Organic Act of 1902, which among other things extended the protections o f the Bill o f
Rights to the Filipinos and imposed, for the first time in Philippine history, an official
government mandate for the separation o f Church and State.

71Ibid., 59.
72

•

Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule (New York:
Shoe String Press, 1968), 96.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91

Declaring the separation on paper did not make it reality. The Catholic Church,
the friars, and the power they wielded were still issues that needed to be addressed, and
Taft took it upon himself to give them his personal attention. Most o f the members o f his
civilian government were clamoring for the expulsion o f the friars from their land and
from the Philippines because they had observed that the Spanish friars were the targets o f
much Filipino animosity. The friars were the reason for the revolution to begin with, and
keeping them in their parishes could only hurt America’s effort in the Philippines. Yet at
the same time, Article VII of the Treaty o f Paris meant the Americans had to protect the
friars and their lands.
The Church issue was made more complex by the fact that the Church owned vast
estates throughout the Philippines and was also engaged extensively in banking and
general businesses.73 Complicating matters was the Vatican’s handpicked representative,
Archbishop Placido Chapelle o f New Orleans, who was sent to the Philippines to oversee
the transition from Spanish to American control. Archbishop Chapelle arrived on
January 2, 1900. Paradoxically, he was the wrong man for the right job.
Once in the Philippines, Chapelle gave the illusion o f representing both the
Papacy o f Rome and the United States, but as a champion o f the friars he failed to
understand his role as an American representative. His aims for the Church clouded his
judgment and ended up superseding any patriotic tendencies.74 Chapelle pressured the
American administration to return the friars to their estates, in plain disregard for the
inhibitions against the United States government or its agents being involved with
ecclesiastical preferment.75 He also tried to get recognition for the Church’s exclusive
73
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right to control property and charitable or educational works, which under Spanish rule
had been mixed civil and ecclesiastical authority.76
Chapelle’s crusade to get exclusive rights to all Church-owned property and even
that once held in joint custody by the Spanish secular authorities and the Church
frightened many Filipinos, who feared an American-friar alliance. Fortunately for them,
his requests were denied, and the fact that the insular government was legally contesting
the right o f the Church or friars to the property helped satisfy many Filipinos.77
The damage Chapelle did to the American efforts to resolve the friar issue was
serious. He blatantly supported the friars’ interests, and to many Filipinos he seemed to
represent the American view. Coinciding with Chapelle’s seemingly royal treatment by
the American authorities was the imprisonment o f Adriano Garces, a Filipino priest who
was a chief opponent o f the Spanish friars. This action seen alongside the pomp and
circumstance afforded friars by the Americans, including the military protection o f some
friars, led many to believe the Americans were getting too cozy with the friars.78 Indeed,
it was not uncommon for Catholic dignitaries to be provided army wagons for pastoral
tours and occasionally be granted a guard o f constabulary at their disposal. Even
steamboats were available for the use o f the Church’s dignitaries.79 The Church even
managed to pressure the Americans to appoint Catholics to the highest offices overseeing
education in the Philippines.80
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There may have been more than one way to deal with the friar issue, but
Chapelle’s methods were not one o f them. Contrary to what Chapelle was purporting to
be the American stance, the American authorities set two objectives. The first was the
reduction o f the economic power o f the Catholic Church and the second was the
expulsion of the religious orders (friars) from the islands.81 Together the main religious
orders—the Dominicans, Augustinians, and Recollects—held almost half a million acres o f
the best lands and considerable business and political influence. Given that they were the
targets o f Filipino animosity, they could not be allowed to stay in the same powerful
positions. Taft’s commission concluded that the best way to deal with the issues was to
purchase the friar lands and resell them to the Filipinos and others who wished to
purchase them.
Directions from Washington were clear and echoed Taft’s findings. Secretary o f
War Elihu Root told Taft that separation o f Church and State was one o f the fundamental
and imperative provisions o f American government and could not be compromised.
Moreover, there was a need to adjust the relations o f these agencies in the Philippines
from one o f close union to one o f complete independence.82
McKinley’s assassination on September 14, 1901, and his subsequent replacement
by Theodore Roosevelt did not change America’s Philippine policy. At Roosevelt’s
request, Taft proceeded to Rome in June 1902 to meet Pope Leo XIII to try to solve the
friar problem. The deal Taft eventually struck was to purchase 410,000 acres for roughly
$7.2 million in gold. Taft believed that unless serious efforts were made to get the Holy
See to withdraw all friars, there would be no peace with the elite on whom the American
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policy o f conciliation depended.83 Taft’s work continued, and so did progress on the
•

•

•

Cooper Bill, which authorized the purchase o f friar lands.

84

Coupled with the Americans’ movement to buy the friar lands and rid the
Philippines o f them for good were the schismatic movements within the Church itself.
Gregorio Agliplay, an ordained priest o f the Catholic Church, broke away from the
Roman Church to establish his Independent Philippine Church (Inglesia Filipina
Independiente). Also called the Aglipayan church, it grew out o f the Filipino clergy’s
deep resentment against the Spanish government and the Catholic Church for failing to
faithfully carry out the secularization o f the church.85
The Aglipayan church was based on the Roman model and was essentially
orthodox Catholicism with a nationalist bent, allowing full participation for the
indigenous clergy who would join their ranks. Aglipay believed that those who joined
his movement would also inherit the church buildings and property o f the Catholic
Church once the Americans had evicted the Spanish.86 It was this promise and the fact
that those who joined his movement also brought ownership o f their parishes that fueled
the explosive growth o f the Aglipayan church.
As the Aglipayan movement built momentum, it began to gobble up the lands and
parishes o f the Catholic Church. It did so when a parish priest quit the Roman Church
and joined the schismatics or when the congregation voted to do so. However, the
purchase o f the best friar estates posed difficulties, as did a legal challenge to the
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movement, which was heard before the Philippine Supreme Court on November 24,
1906. In the case o f Barlin v. Ramires, the court held that the Catholic Church was the
sole legal owner o f all disputed churches and other parish properties.87 Deprived o f its
main source o f inspiration-the takeover o f property—the Aglipayan movement lost
momentum and became politically irrelevant within a decade.
The Inglesia ni Cristo (INC) is quite a different story. Founded in 1914 by the
charismatic Felix Manalo, the Iglesia ni Cristo (Tagalog for "Church o f Christ") claimed
to be the one true Church o f Christ. Manalo heralded himself as God's last prophet. Since
its founding, it has grown to boast more than 200 congregations in some sixty-seven
countries outside the Philippines, including a large and expanding community in the
United States. From its humble beginnings, membership grew and current estimates
range from three million to ten million members worldwide.
At its onset, the INC poured large amounts o f resources and energies into
condemning the Catholic Church. Like the Aglipayan movement, it offered dissatisfied
Filipino Catholics an alternative to the friars’ legacy. However, unlike the Aglipayan
church, it did not rely on the seizure o f Catholic property to make converts. Thus, when
the Church won its legal battle the INC did not falter. It survived and grew and remains
politically powerful today, a fact made clear in later chapters.
During this time the Catholic Church itself, made up o f a few remaining foreign
friars and loyal indigenous clergy, was being pressured on all sides. Schismatic
movements such as Aglipay’s and the INC, initially drew both property and parishioners
away from the Church, and the influx o f hostile Protestant missionaries seemed to only
exacerbate the problem. The hostility between the Catholic Church and the American
Protestant missionaries was real. Many missionaries came to the island with the apparent
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notion that their first and most imperative duty was to fight the Catholics.

But the

Church was not going away without a fight, and it was prepared to do what was
necessary to survive.
Though it is true that the Aglipayan schism, the INC, and the entrance o f the
American Protestant denominations shook the Church and caused a great deal o f
consternation, it survived weakened but basically intact. Under the Americans, the
Church may not have been the force o f legitimacy it once was, but it retained the nominal
adherence o f the immense majority o f Filipinos in the twentieth century and thus
remained a major potential force in Philippine society and politics.89 The Church and its
clergy were wise in the ways o f political manipulation and realized that the American
regime could be one o f two things: the tool to break its hold on the people forever or the
instrument allowing it to stay politically relevant and involved in the population’s
everyday lives. Initially, it seemed a difficult task but later the Catholic cause would be
helped along by the Americans themselves.
At the outset, American representatives were distinctly hostile to the Church and
were inclined to treat it as if it were identical to the discredited Spanish hierarchy.
Further experience in the Philippines brought the Americans to see the immense power
the Church wielded. While the land negotiations were ongoing, there grew an American
desire to make use o f the Church’s power as a means o f political
control, rather than opposing it to keep it continuously against American rule.90 The idea
o f using the Church to further American aims had existed since Taft’s arrival. Taft and
many o f his associates fully appreciated the fact that the Catholic Church had done much
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to civilize and stabilize the Philippines. Moreover, Taft believed that the Church’s great
power and influence could still be used in advancing America’s agenda.91
Using the Church to further American aims was a delicate task, helped along by
the Church’s willingness to find shelter in America’s shadow. The Americans had only
to be careful not to appear to favor the friars. Moreover, the Americans had to ensure the
absolute separation o f Church and State and carefully avoid anything resembling
concessions to the Church.92 It was a public policy keeping with the political traditions
o f the United States and also ensured the Filipino who had fought against the friars that
the Americans were different and would not forsake their traditions or reinstall the friars
to their positions o f power.
At the same time, the vast majority o f the population still needed and held
affection toward their Catholic faith. This affection was used to foster pro-Americanism,
making the United States’ colonial occupation more tolerable to the Philippines. To
accomplish both tasks meant a staunch and very public legal enunciation o f the
separation o f Church and State, paralleling a much less public effort to buy friar lands,
sell them to the natives, install American priests where the Spanish had once been, and
support the native clergy who were pleasant towards American aims.
The United States was adroit at playing both sides of the card. The Filipinos, who
were unable to throw o ff the yoke o f American imperialism, benefited by ridding
themselves o f the corrupt friars, taking possession o f their own lands, and maintaining the
faith that had unified them politically, socially, and culturally for more than 300 years.
The Church also took steps to continue their internal reforms, structuring the Church to
better fit the Philippine model. The Quae Mari Sinico issued in Rome on September 17,
1902, increased the number o f bishoprics, increased training for the indigenous priests,
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and elevated their role in Church affairs. Other reforms included replacing the Spanish
•

friar prelates with American bishops in 1903.

Q -3

The Manila Council o f December 8-29,1904, took up these and other matters and
marked a real turning point in the Church’s history in the Philippines. Since then, the
Church’s political progress has been slow but steady.94 In the end, the Church had
successfully rebuffed the Aglipayan schism, and after eighteen years o f evangelical work
the Protestants had converted only 124,575 Filipinos, or 1.3 percent o f the population.95
The failure by the Protestants or any o f the schismatics to make significant progress in
the long run is yet another testament to how deep the Church’s roots ran in the
Philippines.
Divorced from a direct role in political affairs, the Catholic Church attempted to
remain relevant by having Filipino clergy attend to the needs o f their parishes and
parishioners as best they could. Sacraments still needed performing, schools still needed
to be run, health care needed to be doled out, and the Church could still dominate in all
the places where American forces had yet to penetrate. The Church continued to run its
schools and universities, including two universities that remained the premier institutions
for Philippine elite. Those were the University o f Santo Thomas, the royal and pontifical
university o f the Philippines, and the Jesuit-established Ateneo de Manila University.
The Catholic Church had to share intellectual, political, and cultural space with
the mass appeal o f all things American. Americanism itself became sort o f a religion,
and Uncle Sam’s American way was a moral ideal to be emulated. Identification with
things American sometimes became as powerful as any religious affiliation. Church
leaders struggled to find ways to remain relevant. Understanding that the stiffest
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competition for the hearts and minds o f the populace was not with any anti-clerical
ideology but with Americanism, they decided to adopt some aspects o f the American
way, such as the use o f the rule o f law to affect change and remain congruous to the
everyday life o f the nation’s populace.
The Church also pushed parishioners to have a larger voice both in Church affairs
and in social affairs. By doing this, it was hoped that Catholics would gamer greater
political leverage through greater political activity. The logic was that the more the
Church expanded parishioners’ involvement, the greater the Church’s influence would be
in secular political institutions.96 It would take nearly three decades o f constant effort,
but eventually it yielded success.
Three decades after the Americans had established control, the Catholic Church
managed to regain some political relevancy. The 1930s saw a rejuvenation o f Church
importance to politics, as Catholic scholars and the secular leadership were brought
together in an exchange o f ideas. This was the result o f the strong foundation and the
kind o f deeply rooted influence the Church enjoyed in the Philippines, along with the fact
that the Catholics still held administrational power in the premier universities. The
students they produced were still Catholic, and the majority o f the scholars, politicians,
and government workers were all still Catholic. It was reasonable, therefore, to assume
that when the United States began to get serious about transitional control o f its colony to
indigenous hands it would turn to the best and brightest o f the nation, who just happened
to be graduates of Catholic institutions who were influenced considerably by the Church.
In the legal arena, the push for independence was spearheaded by the efforts o f
Sergio Osmena and Manuel Roxas, who led a mission to the United States between 1931
and 1933. The United States passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Law, which provided
granting the Philippines independence after a ten-year period. Due to some objectionable
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provisions, the Philippine Legislature rejected it, and in 1934 Manuel Quezon, himself a
graduate o f the University o f Santo Thomas, led another mission to the United States to
secure passage o f the Tydings-McDuffie Law, which provided, among other things,
establishment o f the Philippine Commonwealth before granting independence.
The culmination o f these efforts was the 1934 Commonwealth Constitution, the
product of the finest Catholic minds assembled from the nation’s parishes and
universities.97 From 1898 to 1934, the Catholic Church had been attacked, suppressed,
and marginalized by the Americans. The Commonwealth Constitution was proof that the
Church was back. It was again a force o f legitimacy in the Philippines. The
Commonwealth Constitution is still called the first truly “Christian doctrine” o f national
law.

98

This document was to serve as the law o f an independent Philippines.
Remarkably, the Catholic Church survived the ideological onslaught o f American

government, military, and Protestant denominations to reemerge in 1934 as the co-author
the new constitution. It was positioned once again as a force o f legitimacy in Philippine
politics. Unfortunately, the Commonwealth government outlined in the constitution
would never be truly tested. Japanese aggression was growing in East Asia and would
spill over into Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Faced with a new enemy, the time for
enlightened law in the Philippines had not come. Now was a time for war and national
survival.
The price o f being America’s ally in Asia was high for the Philippines. More than
200,000 lives were lost fighting the Japanese, and the material destruction o f Manila and
other important cities was almost complete. The fighting was costly, but as they had so
many times in the past the Filipino people prevailed, their tenacity as fighters and their
survival as a people unquestioned. Their reward was independence. The United States
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kept its agreement to grant independence. On July 4, 1946, the Philippines declared
independence and the third Philippine Republic was inaugurated.
To help the newly independent nation, the Americans offered the Philippines a
“mini-Marshal Plan,” o f $600 million per year." The amount was considerably less than
the European nations were offered. And by the time the money was distributed, the
amount was smaller than that offered to rebuild Japan. The miniscule help the United
States offered to its former colony and its staunchest ally in Asia bordered on insulting,
but the Americans added more salt to the Philippines’ wounds.
In 1946, before a single dollar was earmarked for the Philippines, the United
States extracted a number o f preferential provisions from the nation through two major
agreements. The first was the Rehabilitation Act (mini-Marshal Plan), and the second
was the Trade Act (Bell Act). Both were implemented in 1946. Provisions in both bills
required the Philippines to revise their constitution and civil, criminal, and trade laws so
that American citizens and business interests were granted parity with their Philippine
counterparts in economic matters.100 The latter was reaffirmed in the Laurel-Langley Act
o f 1956. The problems were made all the more intense by a weakened sense o f identity
and national morale, weakened by the pre-war American occupation, the Japanese
onslaught, and the diluted Catholic Church and its institutions. If the Philippines were to
rebuild and if its poorest elements were to be lifted up, the nation would need a
revitalized Church.
During the Spanish era, the Catholic Church had provided governance and
guidance, and during the revolution it had provided leadership. However, the American
colonial period had effectively weakened the Church-State cooperation that was endemic
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in Philippine society. The brief Commonwealth period illustrated the Church’s
resilience and its ability to reclaim its spot as a partner with the Philippine government.
It survived the Japanese onslaught and helped the Philippines become the first colony in
Asia to gain independence. In so doing, it attracted the respect, admiration, and attention
o f leaders and revolutionary movements across the region.101
The next few decades would witness a reinvigoration o f the Catholic Church
worldwide. Vatican II, Liberation Theology, and the rise to power o f Ferdinand Marcos
would all serve, in different ways, to push the Church’s activities to the forefront o f
Philippine politics. The culmination would be the Church’s role in the People Power
revolution, which played a significant role in bringing down an authoritarian regime and
bringing the Church back to the forefront o f Philippine politics.

101Ibid„ 46
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CHAPTER III
FROM LIBERATION TO DESPOTISM

The Japanese occupation did more than destroy lives and property. It created a
new threat and a new challenge to political stability in the post-war Philippine political
landscape, particularly in central Luzon. This instability, greeted head on by the
government and the Church, was the maturation o f the peasant unrest that fomented
nearly a decade earlier at the height o f American colonial involvement.
Since the Spanish colonial era, much o f the arable land in the Philippines had
been owned by the Catholic Church or by a small number o f elites. These landowners
worked out what was in their minds a mutually beneficial relationship with peasants, who
served as tenants on the land. The peasants and the landowners had a paternalistic
relationship. The peasants cleared and cultivated the land and the landowner shared in the
harvests and provided loans to the families when they needed extra funds. The landlords
also sought cooperation with the Church to ensure the spiritual needs o f the tenants were
satisfied. The American colonial period resulted in a further disintegration o f this
relationship.
In addition to the Church-State ties being weakened, the American presence
brought a fundamental shift in the landlord-tenant relationship. Before the Americans’
arrival, these large haciendas had little support outside o f their local communities. The
tenants and landowners needed each other, and this promoted a bond between landlords
and peasants. The landlords extended protection and patronage to the peasants in return
for their labor. But with the Americans pushing capitalism and demanding cash crops
from every acre o f land, the large landowners now had an outside market for their goods,
as well as an outside source o f income. For the landlords, doing it the American way was
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more profitable and any harm was passed on to the peasants. Indeed, the need to appease
the peasants was less and less important.1
It was when the landowners stopped taking care o f their peasant tenants that
trouble began to brew. The landlords’ failure to take care o f the peasants was seen by
many as an affront to the tradition o f utang na loob. This concept is loosely translated as
a feeling o f gratitude, obligation, or reciprocity for those who exchange services, or as
one favor deserving another. In the past, landlords gave loans and looked after their
workers. Now they increasingly ignored them and demanded a larger share o f the
harvests while giving less and less in return. Faced with these increasingly harsh living
and working conditions, the peasant tenants began to protest. Unfortunately, they had no
legal recourse or outlet for their anger and frustration. Small, unorganized groups o f
peasants attacked landlords, burned crops, and sometimes refused to harvest the crops.
Such acts had limited success. Landowners brought in strikebreakers or other peasants
and used violence to compel their tenants to work.
Increasingly, peasants realized their shared predicament and common grievances.
They learned that they had little power individually or in small groups. To have power,
they needed to organize and band together.3 Several organizations sprang up during the
1930s. Among the most prominent o f the peasant groups during that period was the
KPMP (Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas), the National Society o f
Peasants in the Philippines, and the AMT (Aguman ding Maldin Talapagob), the General
Workers’ Union, which was also affiliated with the Socialist Party. There was also the
emergence in 1930 o f the PKP (Partido Komunista ng Philipina),, the Communist Party
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2Ibid., 37.
-2
Leonard Davis, Revolutionary Struggle in the Philippines (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1989), 37.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105

o f the Philippines. By working together, fears o f eviction, arrest, or reprisals were
decreased.
Government fears of Communism germinated during this time period and
accelerated in the aftermath o f World War II in what has since been termed a “red scare.”
Fears o f Communism that would later dominate the decade following World War II
would have their genesis during this time, but the reality was something quite different.
Initially, the PKP lacked strong ties with the peasantry. Moreover, even after the
consolidation o f the Socialist Party and the PKP in 1938, the number o f Communists in
the peasant movement was relatively small. The Communists and the peasants shared
common enemies, which made them allies. Their enemies included the landlords, the
Philippine Constabulary, which was practically an army for landowners, and local
politicians. The courts did not offer any recourse, as the judges were often members o f
the elite or appointed by them.4
The Japanese invasion o f the Philippines in 1941 gave the peasants a new enemy
to combat. Unfortunately for the peasants, the problems with the landlords and the
Philippine government were merely compounded during the years o f Japanese
occupation. How the movement would have progressed in the absence o f the Japanese
threat is unknown. What is known is that after the Japanese invasion, the peasants’
resentment grew even more towards the government and landowners who colluded with
the Japanese during the war.
The events o f World War II eroded whatever good faith may have previously
existed between the peasants and the landlords.5 The Church, however, was never one o f
the peasants’ targets. Though the Church remained largely conservative, it was also antiJapanese. Filipinos on the whole thought their God and morality were superior to those
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o f the Japanese and their emperor.6 Any government., colonial or otherwise, that did not
embrace the Christian faith was not legitimate, no matter how many Filipinos died or
suffered under its control. However, the Church lacked the will and the resources to
launch an effective counter-insurgency, and the clergy avoided taking up arms against the
Japanese. Resistance, in Luzon at least, fell to peasant organizations.
As peasants watched the Japanese rape, pillage, and murder their way through
Luzon, many turned to guerilla warfare as a way to resist. Resistance against the
Japanese grew from previous peasant movements, with most o f the anti-Japanese
members coming from the KPMP and other peasant organizations. The new united front
against the Japanese was called the Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon (People’s AntiJapanese Army), also known as the Hukbalahaps or simply the Huks.7
During the war, the Huks’ main goals were to harass the Japanese and police the
countryside in order to establish some semblance o f law and order where none existed.
This was a necessary function because the Philippine Constabulary and the landlords had
switched loyalties and worked in concert with the Japanese. Banditry and crime went
unchecked unless groups such as the Huks made an effort to police areas under their
watch. Yet the Huks were not a police force. They were also not initially much o f a
fighting force. They were poorly armed, poorly trained, and poorly organized, but they
learned through experience and often obtained their weapons from the soldiers they
killed. They gradually developed into an effective guerilla force. Luis Turac, a member
o f the Socialist and PKP parties, became the Huks’ overall commander.9 Turac
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embodied the continuity between the peasant movement o f the 1930s and the Huks o f the
1940s.
Throughout the war, the Huks put up a fierce resistance in areas they controlled.
Attacking the Japanese in small groups, they then disappeared into the jungles. It was
dangerous work, as the Japanese were fierce in their retaliation against suspected Huk
villages. However, the Huks never gave up and even helped the Americans who returned
in 1945 to push the Japanese from the Philippines. Fighting side-by-side with the
Americans, the Huks thought that if they were valuable allies, they would be able to
return to their normal lives after the war with a government that honored and respected
their contribution to the Philippine nation. This was not the case.
After the war, the Huks were not honored. Quite the contrary, during the closing
months o f the war the Americans and the Philippine authorities turned against the Huks.
The Americans feared Communist subversion and wanted the Huks disarmed.9 Those
who refused were arrested, persecuted, and attacked. The Americans, the Philippine
government, and later even the Catholic Church issued propaganda that exaggerated the
threat o f Communism in the Philippines. As the evidence showed, the PKP had little
impact on the Huks’ political direction and ideology. Pushing for equanimity in harvests,
enforcement o f the constitutional bill o f rights, and fairness in elections hardly qualified
as Marxist, but that was the thrust o f Huk ideology in 1946.10
Still, the Huks were looking for a way to peacefully end their armed conflicts with
the government. The events o f 1946 changed that. The Congressional elections held in
1946 proved to be the watershed in Huk-Philippine government relations. Six candidates
fielded by the Huks won seats in the new government, and for a time it seemed that the
Huks would put down their weapons in favor o f a political settlement with the
9Ibid„ 34.
10Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study o f Peasant Revolt in the Philippines, 171.
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government. However, the government would not accept the election results. With little
evidence, they accused the Huks o f election violence and fraud. The new president,
Manuel Roxas, prohibited the six Huk-sponsored candidates from taking their seats in the
Congress.11 The Huks were outraged and returned to guerilla warfare, this time against a
familiar enemy, the Philippine government.
The peak o f Huk activity was between 1949 and 1951. Estimates o f Huk strength
•

during this time period range from eleven to fifteen thousand members.

12

Yet the Huks’

efforts, both civilian and military, suffered from a chronic lack o f funding. There was
never enough food, clothing, ammunition, or other supplies. Moreover, by 1951 the
Catholic Church had entered as a third party into the fight against Huk insurgents in
Luzon. As their efforts helped that fight, the Huks rapidly declined.
The constant pressure on the Huks from the government, the Americans, and the
Church took its toll. By 1951, the guerillas suffered from “battle fatigue” and were
simply tired o f fighting and wanted to return to their fields.13 The Philippine military,
with the help o f the Americans, applied more and more pressure to Huk units by killing,
capturing, and liquidating them in increasing numbers. United States assistance to the
Philippines during the years from 1951 through 1956 totaled $500 million.14 American
aid provided roughly half o f the funds used to fight the Huks.
The Americans wanted the Huks suppressed to further their own interests, which
were more geo-political than altruistic towards the Philippines. The United States wanted
to make sure the Philippines did not fall to the ideological threat o f Communism that
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surfaced in Southeast Asia after the war. The colonial era was over, not just in the
Philippines, but also in other parts o f Southeast Asia, where indigenous movements
sought to break the chains o f colonial rule. The new anti-colonial movements were often
spearheaded by ideologues who absorbed the teachings and tactics o f Marx, Lenin, and
Mao.
Communism had claimed China. It was now threatening American interests in
South Korea, and minor Communist tremors were being felt in Vietnam, Cambodia,
Thailand, and Indonesia. The United States did not want to lose the Philippines as China
had been lost. For its part, the post-war government in Manila did not want to be toppled
by Communist insurgents and sought help from all sectors, including the Catholic
Church, to counter the threat.
Government reforms, although modest, created a feeling o f progress among those
Huks who were tired o f fighting. It seemed that the government, particularly o f President
Ramon Magsaysay, wanted to reach out to the Huks and bring them back into the fold o f
normal Philippine society. He used a characteristic stick and carrot approach couched in
frank language. He was quoted as saying to the Huks, “As guardians o f our nation’s
safety, it is our duty to hunt you down and kill you if you do not surrender. But, as
fellow Filipinos, we would rather help you return to a happy Filipino way o f life.”15
However, the government’s work would have been less effective without the Catholic
Church’s cooperation. Magsaysay and his government turned to the Church for help
against the Huks and other groups that tried to destabilize the government.

l5Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1955), vi.
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Accepting the call to service against the Huks after 1946, the Catholic Church
became a more aggressive pressure group that consolidated its conservative elements.16
The Church, though largely left alone by the Huks, now became active in the drive to
force Huk acquiescence to the government’s will. The partnership is not surprising,
considering members o f the new Philippine leadership were products o f Catholic
universities and strict religious education and saw the Church as the one organization that
i n

could protect their “flock,” and thus their constituents, from the evils o f Communism.
In the fight against the Huks and Communism, the Church became politically
active.18 Few organizations turned out to be as staunchly anti-Communist as the Catholic
Church. It was willingly drawn into the hysteria o f the “red scare” and did everything it
could to promote the cause in the parishes and to ensure that “solid Catholics trembled
with holy indignation at the mere mention o f Communism.”19 In the fight against the
Huks and against Communism in many forms, the Church became politically active.

00

The Catholic Church made an effective and valuable ally for several important
reasons. First, it was a grassroots level organization operating at the same societal level
as the insurgents. Second, it was anti-Communist to the core. Marx’s godless ideology
had no place and no support in the conservative Catholic Church o f the mid-twentieth
century. Furthermore, while it was true that the Americans trained and equipped the
Philippine military and provided funds to the government, both actions helping counter
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insurgency, American influence could not penetrate the Communists’ grassroots level
organization. Here is where the Church proved invaluable.
The Church was at its core a grassroots organization, and the best place to observe
the actions and operations o f the Communist enemy. Their parishes dotted the landscape
and their parishioners came from the same segments o f society from which the
Communists attempted to recruit their members. The Church had both the motivation
and the ability to inform on the Communists.
One o f the first and most effective actions taken by the Church was the
establishment o f organizations that worked against the Huks’ base o f support, including
quite a few organizations that actively competed for members from the poorest segments
o f society. These were the same constituent groups the Huks targeted in their recruiting
efforts. Among these organizations was the Church-established Catholic Welfare
Organization (CWO), created in 1945. The CWO was meant to assist in all phases o f
relief work after the war. Later, it took on the role o f an anti-Huk political front.
In 1947, the Institute o f Social Order and the Young Christian Works Association
were created by the Church along the same lines as the CWO, recruiting members from
various segments o f society, including the poorer elements that the Huks also targeted. A
few years later in June 1950, Fathers Walter Hogan and Juan Tan started the Federation
o f Free Workers (FFW), a democratic and specifically anti-Communist labor union.
Jermias Monetymayor and Fernando Esguerra established the Federation o f Free Farmers
(FFF) three years later along the same lines. Both the FFW and the FFF were staunchly
anti-Huk, and the efforts o f both the FFW and the FFF helped stem the tide o f peasants
who were joining the Huks.21
With fewer peasants taking up arms against the government, their energies were
now used to serve the Church-inspired aims, including rebuilding the Philippine nation
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state and legitimating the ruling regime. It should be noted that the important aspect o f
these and other Church-sponsored organizations is that they provided an alternative outlet
for energies that might have otherwise been employed by the Huks. At the same time,
these Church-inspired grassroots organizations served as effective intelligence-gathering
arms for the Philippine government, which was militarily engaged against the Huks.
After two decades o f helping the government counter the Huks and other leftist
causes and helping stabilize the situation in the post-war Philippines, the Church
possessed little in the way o f political clout to show for it. Indeed, the Church’s
leadership role against the Huks did not win them new political powers in Manila.
Instead, the Church leadership sat as politically weak as it was before the onset o f World
War II.
The Philippine government, meanwhile, continued to strengthen its ties with
Washington. At the same time, the traditional Church-State cooperation that
characterized most o f Philippine history progressively deteriorated. A situation existed
where the government was more than willing to use the Church and its resources to
promote its own agenda, but it was unwilling to share power or influence either publicly
or privately with the Church or its bishops.
The attitude displayed by the government’s leadership reflected the real nature o f
legitimacy in the Philippines. In the past, the government had enjoyed legitimacy
because o f and through the Church. Now the Church’s role had declined to such an
extent that the government did not seek, nor did it need, the Church’s direct support to
remain in power. The Philippine government was now legitimate because o f the political
relationship it enjoyed with the United States. Legally, it had an American-style
constitution, its laws and policies mimicking those o f America.
Militarily, its forces were propped up by United States aid. The threat of
Communism had been neutralized and the United State provided the arms, infrastructure,
and money with which to build a new republic. The charisma o f leaders such as Manuel
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Roxas, Elpidio Quirion, Ramon Magsaysay, Carlos Garcia, and Diosdado Macapagal was
also sufficient enough to carry elections and give each a mandate to govern. Under their
leadership and with American dollars, the Filipino standard o f living was raised, meeting
the utilitarian standard o f legitimacy. The Church was in no position to compete with
American influence. If anything, the Church and its traditional institutions stood in the
way o f “progress.”
The United States, with its military power and economic support, usurped more
than the Weberian types o f legitimating functions once enjoyed by the Church. For more
than 300 years the Catholic Church was the institution that provided the common
ideational values and norms for the diverse Filipino population, even to the point of
constructing identity. For the overwhelming majority, to be Filipino was to be Catholic.
The situation was reversed as illustrated in figure 12. The American presence influenced
norms and values, both indirect determinants o f legitimacy. By the mid-1960s, America
began to assume a pseudo-religious role as well, and not simply by supplying hundreds o f
American Protestant missionaries. American ideals, ideology, and pop culture flooded
into the post-war Philippines. Everything from blue jeans to American flags on jeepneys
crowded Manila’s streets.22 But Americanism had its limits.
Crowded streets, kids in blue jeans, and American dollars flooding Manila were
not representative o f the Philippine experience in its totality. The rising towers o f
Makati, financed by foreign investment, were in stark contrast to the shantytowns found
in Manila and in the rest o f the country. Elites may have enjoyed the post-war economic
boom and the views from their American sedans, but most Filipinos were poor. They did
not enjoy the luxury o f wearing American clothing and eating in fast food restaurants or

22
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The colorful and often gaudy jeepney is a staple of Philippine roads. Originally
constructed from surplus and leftover American JEEPS, the jeepney is the primary mass
transport vehicle across the archipelago. Although no longer constructed from surplus
American JEEPS, the jeepney still rolls off the assem bly line maintaining the trademark
characteristics o f its forbearer.
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benefit from the money coming from the mini-economy produced by American military
bases.

Philippine Government
1945-1965
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Fig. 12. Legitimacy Model o f the Philippines During Independence, 1945-1965

Most Filipinos barely lived at the subsistence level, and Americanism offered
them little hope. No matter how much political support the United States offered
Philippine administrations, it could not address the desperate needs o f the average
Filipino who was trapped in poverty. America could not solve the problem o f the
Philippine poor. However, one institution was in a perfect position to do just that— the
Catholic Church.
It was among the poorest elements o f Philippine society, by far the majority, that
the Church found a new road to political relevance and a return to its place as the most
prominent and important mediating variable in determining governmental legitimacy.
The impetus for this new direction was the Second Vatican Council, more commonly
known as Vatican II, a landmark series o f ecumenical meetings sponsored by the Catholic
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Church from 1963 to 1965 that would challenge Catholic leadership and laity across the
world to refocus their efforts on capturing the hearts and minds o f their flocks. Political
relevance for the Church might not have been one o f the main objectives o f Vatican II,
but it was certainly one o f the most important results for the Philippine Catholic Church.
The Second Vatican Council was called almost 100 years after the Church
convened a similar council o f its hierarchy in the nineteenth century. It was termed
Vatican II by the press, and the documents and changes to the Church that would emerge
out o f two years of meetings would fundamentally alter the Church in a variety o f ways,
including its role as a force for social action. Vatican II was the idea o f Pope John XXIII,
who announced to the world in January 1959 his ambitious plans to convene the council.
It is said that the inspiration came to him during a time o f prayer, a fitting beginning to
the single most important event for the Catholic Church in the twentieth century. The
first Vatican Council was held from 1869 to 1870, and many observers believed that this
would be the final council the Church would convene because Pope Pius IX had
promulgated the dogma o f infallibility.23
Vatican II was convened on October 11, 1962, in Rome. It was for the Catholic
Church an “opening o f the windows” and a time for aggiornamento, or bringing the
Church up to date.24 It has since been called the “greatest religious conference o f all
time,” a spectacle of 2,600 bishops, abbots, and heads o f religious orders.

The Pope

welcomed input from all levels o f the Church, encouraging the members to offer
suggestions as to what sorts o f ideas the council should tackle. It was a time to look
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internally, and also to rejuvenate efforts to reach out to non-Catholics.

26

•

The Council was

successful in many areas, even after the death o f Pope John, because the spirit o f the
Council was continued by his successor, Pope Paul VI.
Pope Paul VI carried Vatican II to fruition, and the thoughts and ideas coming out
o f the meetings would impact the Philippine Catholic Church on numerous fronts.
Vatican II was ecumenical, and its essential thrust was to address the Catholic Church’s
declining relevancy worldwide. It also sought to update Church procedures, rites, and
other aspects of Catholic doctrine that had remained relatively unchanged since the
Council o f Nicea in A.D. 325. In many ways, Pope Paul was even more ambitious than
John XXII. He not only made the legacy o f John his own but also tackled the Roman
Curia, the main source o f the Pope’s power and authority within the Church.27
At the most basic level, Vatican II attempted to drag Catholic thought, liturgy, and
the sacraments out o f the middle ages and into the twentieth century, making them more
accessible and appealing to the masses and more relevant to the needs o f the world’s
poor. Vatican II was an attempt to stem the tide o f not only Protestant challenges, which
were far more effective at winning converts with their use o f charismatic movements, but
also stop the increasing migration o f tens o f thousands away from the Church and into the
arms o f the numerous Communist movements and their godless doctrine.
The two-year Vatican II conference brought many fundamental changes to the
Church, including a renewed interest in helping the poor overcome poverty. It also
26

Indeed, Pope John XXIII believed so strongly in this reunion o f Christendom
that he created the Secretariat for Christian Unity whose sole job was to, in an ecumenical
fashion, reach out to Protestant denominations
77

The working power o f the Church is the Roman Curia, made up o f twelve
Congregations, three Tribunals, and six offices and legitimized by Canons 242-264. Its
membership at the time o f Vatican II was predominately Italian. The Curia is described
this way in Christus Dominus 9: “In exercising supreme, full, and immediate power in the
universal Church, the Roman pontiff makes use o f the departments o f the Roman Curia
which, therefore, perform their duties in his name and with his authority for the good o f
the churches and in the service o f the sacred pastors.”
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empowered traditional elements o f society whose voices had been silenced by both
poverty and authoritarianism.28 After Vatican II, the Church espoused particular
economic policies that were nationalist and pro-worker.29 In many ways, it placed an
authoritative stamp on embryonic Church-sponsored anti-poverty movements already
active throughout the world, including a nascent movement in the Philippines.
The social involvement that grew out o f Vatican II also emerged as the concept o f
liberation theology. Liberation theology is described by Vitaliona R. Gorospe as
originating in Latin America as “a theological pastoral movement” that spread to other
countries in the third world and in certain circles, in the first world. Liberation theology
refers to a special concern for the poor and the victims o f oppression, which in turn
begets a commitment to justice. Moreover, it designates a theological reflection centered
on the biblical themes o f liberation and freedom.

TO

Ironically, liberation theology had much in common with the Marxist ideology the
Catholic Church opposed. It shared a sense o f empowerment for the poor and a desire to
combat the problem of class exploitation, and its target was usually the ruling elite, who
were seen as rich and out o f touch. Also like Marxism, liberation theology had its birth in
European humanist thought. Where it differed was its reexamination o f the mandate
found in the Christian New Testament, a collection o f books believed to be the doctrine
given by Jesus to his apostles and his earthly church.

28

•

•

•

For more detailed readings on Vatican II, see Michael A. Davies, Pope John’s
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Bom in European thought, liberation theology was nurtured in Latin America,
where remnants o f the Spanish colonial empire had left the Catholic Church permeating
Ti

all segments o f society, much as it did in the Philippines.

In the twentieth century,

however, the Catholic Church in Latin America found itself often aligned with leftist
groups against authoritarian regimes and an emphasis was placed on the political
dimension o f their faith. Through liberation theology, the Catholic Church was now seen
as an institution o f social criticism, not simply a place to preach the gospel.
Liberation theology, including those ideas expressed by Gustavo Gutierrez, author
o f A Theology o f Liberation, contended that all theology was dynamic and was an
ongoing exercise involving contemporary insights into knowledge, humanity, and history.
The key is the ongoing nature o f theology. The Church realized through liberation
theology that the teachings o f Jesus were not interpreted in a dogmatic way. Indeed, they
could not be if they were to be responsive to the modem needs o f the poor. The Church
recognized that the poor, though they may be promised to inherit the earth in the latter
days, needed their situation addressed now. Jesus had shown special attention to the poor
during his time on earth, and the Church as his temporal representative must do the same
in theory and in practice.
Gutierrez argued in his writings that religion and theology were to not just to be
learned but also practiced. This was not a novel idea in the Philippines, where the
Catholic Church’s theology had steadily mixed with secular activities for centuries.
Indeed, throughout the Spanish colonial period the Philippine Catholic Church had taken
31The literature on the theology o f liberation is vast. For more information, see
Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology o f Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation, trans.
Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1973); David
Lehmann, Democacy and Development in Latin America: Economics, Politics, and
Religion in the Post-War Period (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990);
Rosemary R. Ruerther, Liberation Theology: Human Hope Confronts Christian History
and American Power (New York: Paulist Press, 1972); Philip McManus and Gerald
Schlabach, eds., Relentless Persistence: Nonviolent Action in Latin America
(Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1991).
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theology out o f the pulpit and organized an entire nation-state around it. It certainly was
not the idea shared by later liberation theologians, but it is difficult to argue that it did not
try to make Christ’s doctrine manifest in the physical world. The post-Vatican II
situation gave the Philippine Catholic Church another opportunity to “do” theology, both
in the Philippines and across the world by organizing and lifting the poor and politically
empowering them in the process.
Liberation theology quickly made the leap from its early incubation in Latin
America to Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Given the shared Spanish and Catholic
tradition between Latin America and the Philippines, it is not surprising that this theology
appealed to the Philippine Catholic Church which, weakened politically after the war,
needed an avenue to regain its relevance. The poor, whether in Latin America or the
Philippines, were the beneficiaries o f liberation theology. The enemies and targets o f this
new theology were typically capitalists, as well as their cronies in the government who
were seen as exploitive and greedy. Liberation theology seemed tailor-made to the
Philippines, for there the poor were plentiful and so were capitalist targets.
The Church, traditionally a loyal ally to the government, worked hand-in-hand
with many o f these officials to help suppress Communist rebels like the Huks. However,
they had not reaped any rewards for themselves or their parishioners. Moreover, since
1934 the Catholic Church had remained active through the establishment o f their social
organizations and outreaches, as well as against the Huks. These and other efforts were
essential in helping keep the Philippine nation-state together, a nation-state that
throughout its history had a natural tendency to fragment.
The Church never abandoned the traditional role it had in identity formation and
continued to remain and foster national unity in the remotest reaches o f the Philippine
archipelago. But in the political realm, secular politicians took advantage o f the Church,
and they had their influence on legitimacy curtailed. The Philippine government cared
more about American military and financial help than the Church’s support. Much like
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their revolutionary predecessors, Philippine politicians took the Church’s support for
granted.
Keeping the Church politically marginalized was not easy, and history illustrated
that it was impossible to dampen its influence or maintain the political distance
indefinitely. The Church itself was not about to sit idly by while its political fortunes
grew progressively weaker. Vatican II was the proverbial nod from the hierarchy in
Rome that the Philippine Church needed to move forward politically, and the theology of
liberation served as a blueprint for the Church to reclaim some influence.
The new avenue o f political power was quite different from the friar-based
politics o f the Spanish, and it did not cater exclusively to the elites as it had done in the
post-war years. As the rich got richer and the poor got poorer in the Philippines, the
Church took advantage o f this inequality. It did not promise an equality o f outcome
because it was not in the business o f economics, but it did appeal to the poor socially and
politically in ways that other organizations could not. The Church, as the center o f the
community, rallied communal resources around the common goals o f economic
development or something as simple as alleviating the hunger o f the villagers. Doing
these simple things allowed the Church to accomplish two complementary goals that
were in line with the new Vatican doctrine. The first was helping the poor lift their
standard o f living and in the process accomplishing the second, which was the
reemergence o f the Church into a politically relevant and powerful social organization.
Liberation theology unfolded relatively quickly in the Philippines. The Church,
for the most part at the parish level, began to change its tone. Mass was performed as it
had been for centuries, but the message coming from the priests now reflected the new
attitude o f liberation theology. The message emphasized that God was not passive, but
was dynamically involved on behalf o f the poor and destitute. Likewise, the Church was
there to help organize them, to give the poor a voice, and to ensure that the government
would not and could not violate the social contract with the people that they were
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entrusted to protect. Indeed, the Philippine Catholic Church sought to preach, instruct,
and act in accordance with the very foundation o f liberation theology: "To know God is
to do justice."32
The Philippine poor were receptive. Politicians were forced to follow the
Church’s lead in addressing the issues important to the poor. This would have been
impossible had the Church not motivated them to get out to vote and ensure their voices
were heard. Even in contemporary Philippine politics, astute politicians realized that
addressing the issues related to the poor was one o f the surest ways to win an election.
For example, in 1997 and 2000, public opinion polls conducted by the Social Weather
Station (SWS) found that 82 percent o f the population felt that helping the poor was
“very” important to any candidacy.33 In 2000, the SWS found that helping the poor rose
in importance to 91 percent. The issue topped the list o f characteristics the people
wanted in their politicians.34 As a related corollary, the surveys further found that 74
percent believed a candidate should possess religion and the values associated with being
a man or woman o f God.
Public opinions polls consistently illustrate that issues related to the Philippine
poor are at the top o f the list o f concerns that politicians must address should they desire
a mandate at the polls. These numbers can be credited in large part to the work o f the
Church, which during the 60s, 70s, and 80s brought the poor to political relevance. The
Church made the poor a large block o f votes through their investment o f time, money,
and manpower into organization and social programs. The work paid dividends in later
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34Ibid„ 34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122

years when it was the poor who were called upon to rally for the election o f the Church’s
own slate o f congressional delegates and presidential candidates.
Many factors may go into explaining the continued rise in the importance o f
issues related to the poor, but there is no doubt that since Vatican II the Catholic
Church’s constant emphasis on the poor and empowering them at the polls is reflected in
national surveys. As an astute political body, the Church and its representatives in the
parishes, missions, and educational institutions capitalized on those issues and garnered
political power at the polls. The Church realized that few national politicians canvassed
the vast slum s o f the Philippines. Thus, the Church played a role as the mediating
variable between the poorer masses and the candidates. The Church could either support
or deny a candidate votes.
As Vatican II and the theology o f liberation made the Philippine Catholic Church
politically relevant again, there was a need among some more conservative elements o f
the Church to balance this emerging power. Even from the Vatican, officials felt a need
to strike a balance between affirmative policy measures and restraining clergy from being
overly proactive in the political realm.
Simply put, the Vatican feared that there was too much activity on the part o f its
priests. While it endorsed a struggle against tyrannical governments, the Vatican warned
its clergy against direct involvement in politics and any efforts to inject Marxism into the
Church’s work on behalf o f the poor.35 The Vatican apprehension stopped short o f
condemning the efforts o f the Philippine Catholic Church, stating that civil disobedience
campaigns like those that were to be employed against politicians and led by Catholic
bishops in the Philippines were in keeping with the Church's doctrine and worldview.36
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Respecting the Vatican’s wishes and the tone it wanted set in Church-State
relations, the Philippine Church nonetheless remained staunchly independent in regards
to liberation theology, believing their mandate came from God, the spirit o f Vatican II,
and the Philippine people themselves. The Philippine Church believed that the
conservative court o f the Pope, particularly the larger court of Pope John Paul II (1978present), needed respect but not to the detriment o f the Philippine parishioners’ welfare.
The actions the Church set in motion in the Philippines in the wake o f Vatican II came
years before Pope John Paul II took office in 1978.
Before and during the 50s and the early 1960s, the Catholic Church had retained
much o f its colonial-era economic, political, and social power and remained a bulwark o f
q*7

conservatism.

This did not stop a small but growing progressive movement within the

Church from making waves. Many o f these so-called progressives had “leftist”
tendencies and were strengthened by the actions o f Vatican II. Part o f this strengthening
was a push by the Philippine Catholic Church to establish five commissions at the local
and national level to implement the various policies o f the Council.
Among these bodies was the Episcopal Commission on Social Action, with its
own national secretariat, the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), created in
1966.

38

The establishment o f such apostolic social organizations drew attention from

government leaders, especially with the Church’s expressed desire to combat any
infringement on human rights and abuses by the government. This was an area where the
incoming government o f Ferdinand E. Marcos, who ruled from 1965 to 1986, became
notoriously prolific.
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By 1969, 2,000 church-sponsored social action projects had been started, and
IQ

nearly 90 percent o f all dioceses had a hand in some social action programs.

Along

with social organizations, the Philippine Catholic bishops became more vocal against
government abuses. The use o f the pastoral letter became commonplace as an effective
way to issue statements on a wide range o f issues, from the theological to the political.
Pastoral letters usually shied away from direct confrontation and instead emphasized the
Church’s mission in the temporal order, which meant that among other things the Church
should safeguard human dignity against government abuse. Pastoral letters also called
attention to the close relationship between social development and evangelization,
bringing in Socialist and left-leaning rhetoric to address the issues o f the poor. Coupled
with that was the Church’s conscious decision to make extraordinary efforts to go to the
barrios in order to sharpen their focus on social transformation.40
The establishment o f NASSA and the issuance o f pastoral letters were
preliminary steps, but the Catholic Church did not always act as a monolith in their social
or political activities. Indeed, there were many different elements that worked beneath
the umbrella o f the Philippine Catholic Church, and some were active in other more
clandestine ways. Moreover, not all o f these activities opposed the government. Social
organization o f the barrios was one thing, but strengthening the Church’s political clout
while maintaining its commitment to the faith did not always mean publicly confronting
the ruling regime.
A prime example o f this clandestine and “conservative” operation to gamer more
political power was the penetration o f the Philippines by an elite and secretive Catholic
sect known simply as Opus Dei. Opus Dei had only a few objectives, and at the top o f
the list was the desire to permeate and influence all segments o f elite society. Opus D ei’s
39Ibid., 77.
40James H. Kroeger, M.M., “Evangelization in the Philippine Church: 1965-85,”
Philippine Studies, no. 35 (1987): 8.
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unique brand o f politics and social action harkened back to a more medieval time when
the Catholic Church and the State were one. The situation in the Philippines was one
where the Church’s connections to the State had steadily eroded since the American
occupation. This was an unacceptable situation to some. Opus D ei’s activities were part
o f the solution to the problem. Their activities were another way to get the Church back
to the level o f power and influence it once enjoyed, and it did so not through the power o f
the poorer masses but through recruitment o f the elite.
Opus Dei itself was and remains a cult within a religion. It revolves around the
personality o f its late founder, Josemaria Escriva, who saw his creation as one institution
that should be heavily invested in politics. In the beginning, Opus Dei’s membership was
restricted to only those members o f high society levels who were actively engaged in
non-clerical work. Opus Dei members were integrated into the Catholic Church as
whole. However, the leadership soon realized that to control the membership completely
and to guard its own secrets from less-supportive elements within the Catholic Church
required a priesthood exclusive to Opus Dei. Escriva successfully petitioned for and
founded a priestly order exclusive to Opus Dei in 1943, dubbing it the “Society o f Priests
o f the Holy Cross." Opus Dei was given swift pontifical approval in 1947, and later
became a Personal Prelature in 1982.41 Both these things are a testament to the
organization’s power and influence within the Church hierarchy.
Opus Dei tried to maintain a level o f secrecy unmatched in the Catholic Church.
What is known from the internal documents is that Opus Dei’s raison d ’etat is that
members are to “hallow and Christianize the institutions o f peoples, o f science, culture,

41A Personal Prelature is defined as a jurisdictional and hierarchical structure by
which the Catholic Church sets for itself special pastoral initiatives for the good o f all the
“people o f God.” It is entrusted to a prelate, has its own priests, and can incorporate into
itself those lay persons who wish to contribute to the Prelature’s pastoral goals. The idea
was conceived during Vatican II.
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civilizations, politics, the arts, and social relations.”42 To follow through with this
mandate, members were required to work at all societal levels, from the poorest elements
to the elite, including working to shape and form opinion among elites in academia,
finance, and politics. Since its inception, Opus Dei had been active in formulating policy,
both in Rome and internationally, in various nation-states where it had penetrated the
foreign policy and domestic policy levels o f government bureaucracies. Indeed, Opus
Dei had been called a religious “Fifth Column,” and it had never shied away from
confrontation with elements in secular society, other religions such as Islam, or even the
Catholic Church itself.43
As part o f the Catholic Church’s push to regain power in the Philippines, Opus
Dei was allowed to penetrate the Philippines in 1964, and since then it has steadily grown
in influence. After its arrival, Opus Dei gave considerable attention to the Philippines as
one o f the “front line” countries.44 Within the Philippines, it enjoyed the full backing o f
the Philippine Catholic Church and influential Catholic leadership. Membership was
kept small and elite, but despite its own efforts, membership rose to nearly 3,000 people
in the Philippines. Although this may seem like a small number, it is comparable in size
to the number of members found in much larger countries, such as the United States.
A quick look at the profile o f Opus Dei membership gives one an insight into why
the organization is so successful in its recruitment efforts and has such influence in
government and society. In the Philippines, the membership is traditionally located in
large urban areas like Manila and Cebu City, with smaller segments in Laguna, Iloilo,
Bacolod, and Davao. More than 70 percent o f Opus Dei members are married, and a

42Gordon Urguhart, Conservative Catholic Influence in Europe, Opus Dei: The
P ope’s Right Arm in Europe (Washington, DC: Catholics for Free Choice, 1997), 1.
43Robert Hutchinson, Their Kingdom Come: Inside the Secret World o f Opus Dei
(London: Corgi Books, 1997), 14.
44Ibid., 500-502.
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conscious effort has always been made to recruit members from a cross-section o f elite
society. Opus Dei members are politicians, bankers, corporate managers, businessmen,
lawyers, and other professionals, some o f whom are well known in public and others who
remain power brokers behind the scene.45
Devising a term that describes what Opus Dei tried and continues to do in the
Philippines is not easy, for Opus Dei is unique in the Catholic Church. It has both
fundamentalist tendencies and secretiveness. Its work is best termed integralism, a word
that harkens back to a time when Church and State were inseparable, a quixotic notion
and worldview of a modem-middle age 46 The idea o f integralism, which would seem
impossible to accomplish for most religious groups, drove Opus Dei to begin work in the
Philippines and no doubt continues its work there today. Regardless o f the pace of
progress, the organization is undeterred, and for good reason. When compared to other
religious groups, Opus Dei is “better organized, more unobtrusively hospitable, and more
clearly thought through than are those o f any other organization, religious or secular . . .
The Work, quite clearly, works.”47
Nowhere is this more evident than in the Philippines, where the Opus Dei agenda
has been pushed at all levels o f society since its introduction.48 One o f Opus Dei’s first

45“Weekender: Q&A with Opus Dei’s Msgr. Joseph Duran,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (November 27,1998; accessed 3
December 2001.
46Penny Lemoux, People o f God: The Struggle fo r World Catholicism (New
York: Penguin Books, 1989), 42.
47Robert Roya, “Opus Dei: Leadership and Vision in Today’s Catholic Church,”
First Things, no. 83 (May 1998), 56.
48
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When describing its own efforts in the Philippines and elsewhere, Opus Dei
favors the analogy o f salt. Salt gives flavor but does not attract attention to its presence.
Yet the analogy is filled with pitfalls, because if too much salt is present it will destroy
the flavor. Moreover, in abundance it can poison both land and water.
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tangible successes in the Philippines was the construction and operation o f the Center for
Research and Communication, founded in 1967 by two Opus Dei members, Dr. Bernardo
Villegas and Dr. Jesus Estanislao.49 The institution’s mission was simple, to produce the
next generation of Catholic-trained leaders and elite to penetrate the government and run
the Philippines.
Graduates o f the Opus Dei institution were to be the best o f the best, and once in
power they served the Church’s interests in any capacity they could. Opus Dei was also a
permanent presence in other Catholic universities. Although the organization did not
take over the administration o f the schools, it was there to help make sure that what was
taught, be it economics or politics, was in line with the Catholic doctrine and that
graduates would maintain their ties to the Catholic Church after obtaining positions o f
power.50
Financing Opus Dei’s efforts, including those at the Center for Research and
Communication, which later became the University o f the Asia and Pacific, required the
group to tap an extensive web o f international support. Its activities in the Philippines
received major funding and support from other Opus Dei-affiliated organizations based in
the United States and Europe, including the Hanns-Seidel Foundation o f Germany, which
itself is accredited by and receives funding from the European Union. Together with
another Opus Dei affiliate, Limmat, the Hanns-Seidel Foundation helped fund Opus
Dei’s extensive operation in the Philippines during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.51
Opus Dei’s early activities were largely clandestine and effective, but they were
still only a small part of the Catholic Church’s activities in the Philippines. The Church’s

49W. J. West, Opus Dei: Exploding a Myth (Crows Nest, Australia: Little Hills
Press, 1987), 138.
50Ibid., 143.
51Urguhart, Conservative Catholic Influence in Europe, 12.
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main thrust remained with the masses, and this activity was overt for all to see and
evaluate. Its public nature also meant that its political enemies monitored its actions. By
1969, the Church’s social participation gradually moved from small community and
parish-based initiatives o f development to cultivation o f community-based
organizations.52 Within a decade, the Church’s own mandate broadened from merely
one o f social welfare to include a demand for social justice, and from simply developing
the poor to liberating them from the harsh conditions o f tenancy to government’s human
rights abuses.
The Church continued to push socially and politically, but political gains within
the Philippines were initially slow and not up to par with the social progress the Church
enjoyed in its effort to aid the poor. However, any sort o f political gain was a good thing
considering the Church had been marginalized for decades. These gains, while marginal,
would prove extremely valuable because they came at a time when great political change
was about to grip the Philippines. During the 1960s, the Church was gaining momentum
as a political and social force for change in the Philippines at a time when its more vocal
and advocatory elements ran afoul o f the new govemment-a government and leadership
that would prove more authoritarian than any since the Spanish occupation and more
anti-Church than since the American’s arrival. This new government was the
government o f Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Marcos came to power in the presidential election o f 1965 by defeating incumbent
President Diosdado Macapagal on a ticket that was one part nationalism, one part
charismatic appeal, and one part typical Philippine politics—the bribing o f individual
voters and the barrio leadership. Marcos appealed to the masses for several reasons,
including his insistence on his glorious record as a soldier. He was never shy about
touting his record as a war hero, which itself was fraudulent. As a candidate, he ran on a

Kroeger, “Evangelization in the Philippine Church,” 8-9.
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platform that promised governmental reform that would lift the Philippines out o f the
poverty o f the Third World. During his tenure as president, he accomplished neither.
He did, however, bring a new level o f political oppression, violence, and social
chaos to the Philippines. His one and a half terms as a constitutional and legal president
were fraught with largesse at the expense o f his own people. He had a Napoleonic
complex o f his own and a marriage o f convenience with Imelda Romualdez that suited
his political ambitions. Together they looted the Philippine treasury, ignored the
suffering o f the people, and grew paranoid in their unquenchable thirst for complete
authority over the Philippines. Those that got in his way, be they members o f the military,
his friends, or political foes, did not endure. Organized resistance had a way o f falling
under the category o f subversion and mass arrests, torture, and even murder were used as
tools to squash dissent.
Some o f his later political targets were the left-leaning progressives within the
Catholic Church. In the end, getting at the Church and politically neutralizing it proved
the ultimate challenge for Marcos. Targeting the Church politically was one thing,
attacking it with the tools o f his policy state was another. In a country where the Catholic
Church impacts more than 80 percent o f voters, Marcos had to be careful about the type
o f action he took to silence any opposition to his regime that existed in the Church
hierarchy.
In hindsight it is ironic that Marcos, who believed himself called by God to lead
the Philippines, later turned the power o f the State against God’s church and in the end
was brought down by this same Church during the People Power revolution o f 1986. But
People Power was still thirteen years away, and the Philippines first had to suffer through
years o f brutal authoritarian rule. The events o f martial law and the People Power
revolution are discussed later in the chapter, but to understand how he went from being a
self-proclaimed ardent Catholic to the Church’s top political enemy requires some
background analysis.
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Marcos’s political history was as checkered as any politician’s. His life, from a
very early age, was filled with murder and intrigue and a sense o f destiny and divine
intervention.53 Marcos knew how to manipulate his image and use those around him to
gain votes. Those used for that purpose included his wife Imelda, who he chose for her
beauty and talents and who he later nurtured into the ultimate socialite who could work a
room with the best politicians. They were a true power couple. Marcos also used all
means-money, influence, utang na loob, United States financial aid and support, and the
Philippine military—to obtain and maintain power.
In the presidential election o f 1965, Marcos wooed voters with money and the
media with favors and overwhelmed his opposition in the public relations war.54 He
played the dual role o f new blood and wise statesman. He played on pent-up frustrations
and portrayed himself as a father figure wanting to take care o f his nation. He was a
nationalist par excellence, vowing to make the Philippines great, alleviate poverty, and
keep their soldiers out o f America’s Vietnam conflict.55 Marcos was assuming the roles
o f the wise leader, the statesman, and the father. One observer o f the Philippine political
culture correctly noted this fact. Beth Day Romulo wrote that, “What Filipinos have
always looked f or. . . is a datu: a father figure, a single leader who will take care o f his

53

As a youth in law school, Marcos was charged with murdering one o f his
father’s political opponents. He was later jailed for one year while awaiting trial. He
finished his law degree during this time and defended himself in court. Although the
evidence showed that he pulled the trigger to avenge his father’s loss o f honor, the
Philippine Supreme Court later acquitted him on all charges.
54William C. Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator: The Mind o f Marcos as Revealed
in His Secret Diaries (Boston: Little Brown, 1993), 16-17.
55Sterling Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty (New York: Harper & Row, 1988),
183.
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people. No one has understood this national yearning, and taken better advantage o f it,
than Ferdinand Marcos.”56
The truth about Marcos is far more complex. He fancied himself a soldier, a
military leader, a savior, and even a consolidator o f an empire, much like Napoleon.57
But many things about Marcos were not what they seemed. For example, he was not the
war hero he claimed to be. Much o f his storied past existed only in his imagination.
Moreover, buried in the government archives in Washington D.C. were documents that
contested Marcos’s claims to heroism as well an arrest order issued by the United States
military charging Marcos with wartime racketeering.58
Padding one’s war record for the benefit o f public office may not be ethical, but it
is certainly easier to understand than Marcos’s quest to silence the Church against his
regime, especially considering what he wrote in his personal diaries about his own
relationship with God. Marcos himself claimed to be a staunchly religious figure and a
“good” Catholic. It is ironic that he considered himself a devout Catholic but went above
and beyond most Catholics in his claim that God spoke to him personally. It appears that
Marcos did not need the benefit o f a priest and was granted a special audience with the
Creator himself.
Marcos believed that he was God’s personal political and social tool in the
Philippines. Indeed, Marcos believed that his own hands did God’s work. His dreams
were visions from God, his voice spoke God’s words, and even during the most
tumultuous times o f his presidency he believed his solution, martial law, was all part o f

56Beth Day Romulo, Inside the Palace: The Rise and Fall o f Ferdinand & Imelda
Marcos (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1987), 19.
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God’s plan.59 Being God’s personal servant meant that he was above the petty level o f
the Catholic Church. Indeed, he may have equated himself as an equal to the Vicar o f
Christ in Rome. One can only speculate about the level o f his delusion. However, one
thing is certain. Marcos claimed that God was calling him to save the Philippines, to
purge the subversive elements o f the Church, and to declare martial law.60
Believing as he did in his own special relationship with God, Marcos did not start
as an enemy o f the Church. He, like other presidents and politicians before him,
embraced the unifying aspects o f the Catholic faith and understood, supported, and
sought to utilize the conservative elements within it. In a way, the Marcos regime
understood the value o f having the Church as an ally in efforts to win popular support for
and even legitimacy o f his regime, much like the United States attempted to do during the
early years o f their colonization o f the Philippines. Just as it had been for the United
States, Marcos believed the Church was best used as a mediating variable to temper the
political feeling coming from all sectors o f society. The Church was best for Marcos
when it was a tool to be exploited to further his political aims. Only when it began to
interfere with his ambitions did the Church become an enemy.
After taking the oath o f office and becoming the sixth president o f the republic on
December 30, 1965, Marcos let loose a political steamroller, dolling out pork barrel
projects, reneging on campaign promises and consolidating his power.61 Marcos began to
court the United States more openly as well, for military aid more than anything. The
military was his favorite project, and he set out to make it bigger, better equipped, and

59Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator, 69.
60Ibid., 102.
61One blatant political promise Marcos violated was his assurance during the
campaign that he would not commit combat troops to Vietnam. After his election, he
committed 2,000 Philippine soldiers to Vietnam.
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run under tighter control.62 Marcos’s increasing authoritarian tendencies were
demonstrated by his step-by-step approach to increasing his own presidential powers
during his first term. To be safe, potential political opponents such as the Catholic
Church needed to make sure they stayed out o f his way. At first this was not difficult to
do. At the time o f Marcos’s first election, the Catholic Church was only beginning its
activity at the barrio level o f society, socially organizing the peasants in a variety o f
social and political elements.
The Marcos mystique was strong during his first two years and was tested at the
polls during the 1967 midterm election. This election showed just how powerful his
political machine was at the time. With one exception, his Nacionalista party won every
senate race. A young senator from Tarlac, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, claimed the only
•

•

•

opposition victory.

ftX

•

Ninoy Aquino was to become the bane o f Marcos’s political career

almost from the beginning. In fact, it was during Marcos’s triumph in the election o f
1965 over Diosdado Macapagal when Aquino’s name first surfaced as a political force
capable o f challenging Marcos. Aquino, working on behalf o f Macapagal in his home
province o f Tarlac, made sure that Marcos did not win that province.64 Marcos, who
never forgot a political slight, made note o f this fact.
After the elections o f 1967, Marcos’s political honeymoon was over. Crime rates
soared in Manila and the problems o f hunger and poverty plagued the nation.65 Rumors
o f corruption were spreading. During this time, Marcos showed early signs o f what
would later be his legendary corruption during his first administration. Once in the
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presidency, Marcos used his cronies and some members o f his cabinet to muscle in on
private businesses. Mrs. Marcos was doing the same thing.66 Critics were also worried
about his seemingly singular focus on building up the military.
Marcos faced vocal opposition in the congress and on the street. He was accused
among other things o f being a tuta (lap dog) o f the Americans.67 The attacks were more
frequent and more personal as the 1969 presidential election loomed. However, Marcos
was prepared for a fight. He had the money, his solid voter base in his home province o f
Ilocos Norte, and many Mends eager to help.68 He also had grandiose plans that included
a movie about his life. It was to be called Maharlika, and though it was not finished in
time to make a difference in the election, it was evidence o f Marcos’s increasing selfimportance and willingness to waste funds on himself rather than helping his own people.
For the 1969 election, Marcos had a war chest o f money unmatched by his
opponents and an army at his disposal. He was willing and able to use the powers he had
available against individuals or groups that caused him trouble, including the Catholic
Church. Marcos was adamant about staying in power, and was willing to pay off barrio
political bosses and individual voters and threaten political opposition. But in 1969,
dissent was a non-factor, including opposition from those elements o f the Church who
were despondent towards Marcos’s increasing authoritarianism. More than anything, this
was the result o f the opposition’s choice for president, Sergio Osmena Jr. He lacked both
charm and charisma, and his base o f support did not extend beyond his home province o f
Cebu.

66Romulo, Inside the Palace, 170.
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Marcos won by a margin o f almost two million votes and soon after, accusations
were hurled about election fraud.69 Indeed, it seemed that Marcos was not content to
simply win the election in 1969, he wanted a landslide. So much money was spent on the
election that it had a negative impact on the Philippine economy. The final tally was
more than $50 million used to buy votes. If Marcos ran short on money, he simply
ordered the central bank to print more pesos to pay off his political cronies and to buy
votes on a massive scale. One victim o f this spending orgy was the Philippine peso,
which was devalued by 50 percent as a result o f the inflation caused by the amount o f
»

currency printed and given out by the Marcos campaign.

70

At Marcos’s second inauguration, he promised democracy instead o f
totalitarianism .71 Marcos delivered the reverse. His second term got off to a rough start
due in large part to the ailing economy, something that Marcos himself was blamed for in
the press. Things grew worse as students and leftists took to the streets to demand that
Marcos either do something or step aside. His response was to unleash the riot police and
tear gas the protestors.
There was a real fear among the dissenters that Marcos would try to stay longer
than the constitutionally allowed two terms. This was a valid fear, because not long after
his victory Marcos began making plans to hold a constitutional convention in hopes o f
changing the constitution and the government to a parliamentary style o f government.
This constitutional convention called in 1971 gave Marcos virtually unlimited power.72
His reasons for wanting this change became clear a few months later. For now, he had to
contend with an increasing level o f civilian violence directed towards his government.
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It was also during the street protests o f 1970 that the first hints o f Marcos’s antiChurch policy were revealed. His personal diary, found in 1986 a few months after his
hasty flight from the presidential palace in the wake o f the People Power revolution, gave
insight into how he grew wary o f the Church as a political obstacle to his political plans.
At the height o f the protests, as police were beating the students, the new session o f
congress was set to begin. As was customary, a priest was present to give the opening
prayer.
Marcos bristled at this particular prayer. It was no ordinary invocation. Instead,
it was a scathing attack on elements o f the Marcos government offered by Father Pacifico
Ortiz, the Jesuit head o f Ateneo de Manila University. Ortiz used his prayer to pick at the
conscience o f all those present for their abuses o f power, students, and the conditions in
the Philippines. Later that night, still fuming about the prayer, Marcos wrote his thoughts
in his diary. He called the prayer “poor taste” and went on to blame extremists, the press,
and even the priest’s prayer for helping instigate the riots in the streets.73 This delusional
blame that Marcos placed on Father Ortiz was representative o f a pattern o f blame for
unrest in the Philippines. He would blame everyone, including Catholic priests, during
the months ahead.
Marcos did not explain just how the opening prayers o f one priest evoked riots in
the streets, and he simply ignored the role his own policies and riot squads played in the
violence. Ignoring responsibility, Marcos chose to overlook what history has since
revealed. The reality o f the violence o f 1970 is something quite different than the official
Marcos version. Using evidence from his diary, it is now clear that much o f the unrest
and violence in the streets, including the Battle o f Mendiola, where several civilians were
killed in a bombing, resulted from Marcos’s own political plans and intrigue. Further
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evidence suggests that he personally approved the planting o f government agents among
the student protestors in order to instigate violence and unrest.74
Marcos did these things out o f fear o f what might happen should he lose power.
He did not want his political career to come to an end. Moreover, he believed that he was
the only man who could guide the Philippines on a course to prosperity. The students,
the extremists, and the Catholic Church filled with men like Father Ortiz made Marcos
extremely uncomfortable. Opinionated priests were the kind o f individuals who stood in
the way o f his political plans.
Ortiz was indeed representative o f a movement coming out o f the Church. Still
conservative, Vatican II’s theology o f liberation and the push for increased social action
rippled into the mainstream Church. Men like Ortiz and later Jaime Cardinal Sin felt its
affects. Slowly, the mainstream Church embraced more and more activist elements as
the Marcos administration grew more authoritarian, eventually culminating in a clash o f
wills in the People Power revolution. But even in 1970, Marcos sensed the danger to his
authoritarian designs. He feared that a growing number o f “Father Ortizes” in the Church
might cause problems for his long-term plans to stay in power.75
Marcos had ample blame to pass around and plenty in reserve for the Church,
which he blamed for increasing unrest. His vitriol knew no bounds. He even accused the
Catholic Church of hiring thugs to force the poor to rise up in protest.

To counter this

perceived trend, he launched a secret investigation into the conduct o f priests and leaked
reports to the media that some in the Church were in league with the communists. Using
the “red scare” to attack the Church was a common Marcos tactic, even though evidence
o f such a Communist threat did not exist.

74Ibid., 44.
75Ibid„ 62.
76Ibid., 67.
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The Communist scare, the instigation o f protests, and the careful eye Marcos kept
on the Church were part o f his larger plan. He was positioning himself for a major power
grab, an opportunity to suspend the writ o f habeas corpus and arrest and detain his
political opponents. With opposition silenced, he could act with a free hand. But in
1970, the time was not ripe for action.
Marcos’s political instincts were sharp and he saw that the Church posed a future
threat to his position. As a result, he sought other means o f legitimizing himself in the
eyes o f the Catholic faithful by circumventing the indigenous Catholic hierarchy. One
idea was to invite Pope Paul VI to the Philippines. Marcos believed that a Papal visit
would serve to dull any criticisms hurled at him by the Filipino clergy. What better way
to show how “religious” and “Catholic” he was than to hop from photo opportunity to
photo opportunity with the Vicar o f Christ? It was in simple terms a stroke o f political
genius, at least in theory. His idea to use the Pope to further his political capital did not
work as planned.
Marcos hoped to foster a warm relationship with the Pope, but reality was quite
different. The Pope rebuffed the invitation to stay at the presidential palace, refused to
ride in the presidential limousine with the first family, and showed little desire to attend
the functions Marcos planned.78 This did not sit well with Marcos, who at every turn put
his own positive spin on the situation. Even when Benjamin Mendoza attempted to
assassinate the Pope on the tarmac o f Manila airport, Marcos took credit for saving the
Pope’s life. The entire fiasco with the Pope is in some way indicative o f Marcos’s
relationship to the official Church, for although in retrospect it seems he did little to save
the Pope, Marcos credited his own “karate chop” with saving the Holy Father.79
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The chill that existed between the Catholic Church and the Marcos administration
took a public turn in November 1970 when Pope Paul VI rebuffed Marcos’s and his
wife’s efforts to join him on an official visit to the Philippines’ poorest areas.80 This
action by the Pope was indicative o f his treatment o f the administration for the extent o f
his visit. The Vatican and the Philippine Catholic Church worked to keep the Marcos
administration out o f the official visits as much as possible, highlighting a demarcation o f
power and influence. The line ran between Marcos’s control o f the government and
military and the Church coveting the poor masses.
To his chagrin, Marcos noticed the trend o f the Church’s conscious efforts to
increase their political capital among the poor segments o f society and the growing
overall political power that would result should they succeed. Since the beginning o f the
decade, Marcos had grown increasingly uneasy with the new power o f the Church and its
role in promoting anti-Marcos sentiments throughout the country. His investigation into
the “religious personalities actively engaged in various efforts to promote restlessness
and disorder . . . ” turned up little useful political ammunition.81
Marcos’s efforts to suppress the Communists and quell student unrest had also
been less successful, and nationalist unrest over the laigging economy was growing.
Coupled with his economic woes was an obstructionist Congress that threw up political
roadblocks to his domestic and foreign policy agenda. It was both unclear and uncertain
whether, even with a corrupt political machine behind him, he could win the 1973
presidential election. When the Catholic Church and its increased ability to mobilize the
poor into a sizable voting block was factored in, Marcos understood that he did not stand
much o f a chance in a free and fair election.
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Marcos may have overestimated the Church’s strength between 1970 and 1972,
but he did not overestimate its potential. Church activities during this time were far less
odious than he believed. By and large, the Church stayed out o f foreign policy and on the
national scene it injected itself into only a few legal issues. One issue the Church did get
involved in was in 1970, when the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines
(CBCP) made a push for a Non-Partisan Constitutional Convention to be convened in
1971. The Church’s hope was that such a conference, with its participation and
oversight, would produce a document that would heal the opposition’s wounds, calm the
student protests and be favorable towards the Church’s activities on the national level.
Alongside the push for a new constitution was the continued promotion o f moral,
spiritual, economic, social, cultural, and political elements in society. By 1972, the
Church was increasingly a champion o f the disenfranchised. As such, it filled a huge
vacuum as an advocate for traditionally oppressed groups. It was a de facto role for the
Church because no other group could or would take on the responsibility.
The Church pressed forward, largely under Marcos’s political radar. However, as
the 1973 presidential election loomed over the horizon, Marcos grew uneasy. He
believed that if the clamor o f the opposition in congress, in the Church, or on the streets
was an accurate indicator o f the political climate, then it was unlikely that he could stay
in power. On a legal basis, Marcos’s fears were moot. He had already been elected to a
second term and the existing constitution forbade him to run for a third.
It is in this light that his push for a constitutional convention and the creation o f a
parliamentary government is understood. Marcos wanted the convention to convene and
finish its work as soon as possible. He also wanted a parliamentary government, and as
luck would have it, the student protestors in the street wanted the same thing. In
Marcos’s mind, he was merely giving them what they wished.82 However, while they
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wanted a parliamentary form o f government, the protestors did not want Marcos as their
first prime minister.Marcos knew that creation o f a parliamentary government would
ensure that he remained in power indefinitely. As president, he was limited to two terms.
As prime minister, he could serve at the behest o f the parliament. All he needed to do
was win the seat o f Ilocos Norte, and not a plurality o f the votes in a nationwide election.
The Nacionalista party’s stronghold on any future parliament was its insurance policy.
With a parliamentary system, his hold on power was guaranteed, but Marcos did not have
the luxury o f time in his quest for the constitutional change.
If he was going to act, he needed to act before 1973. Unfortunately for Marcos, it
seemed unlikely that the convention could produce a document in time, and it was further
unlikely that the delegates could or would ignore the protestors’ insistence that Marcos
and his family be banned from holding office after his presidential term expired in 1973.
Marcos was not about to let the protestors or the Church interfere with his goals. He
devised an alternative plan, and he called it his “total solution.”83 This total solution was
martial law.
83Ibid., 53.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CHURCH UNDER MARTIAL LAW

Marcos once mused in his diary that what was needed to enact his total solution
was a little more violence and vandalism. He believed that following that violence and
vandalism, he would be justified in doing anything to ensure order. Time was o f the
essence, for he needed to invoke martial law as quickly as possible to seize his political
opponents, silence his critics, and make sure that a new government was in place before
any elections were held. He even hoped he could instigate an attack on his presidential
palace, believing that would be enough to give him just cause to implement his total
solution}
Marcos feared Communists, extremists, students, journalists, and the Church. He
labeled them all as subversives and considered them all potential targets o f the total
solution.

Indeed, the Church stood out among the others as having a special role as a

political enemy. Marcos believed that there existed a “Jesuit-fascist-CIA” united front
specifically for the purpose o f deposing him and his government.3 No evidence o f such a
plot ever really existed. It was just something Marcos believed, and it was evidence o f
his paranoia about the Catholic Church.
The total solution needed to be implemented quickly. Yet in mid-1972, the
violence was nowhere near the levels necessary to implement martial law. Marcos
needed to devise a plan to change this situation. He called in his defense minister, Juan
Ponce Enrile, to Malacanang to discuss the final event that would necessitate martial law.
The two eventually settled on a staged ambush o f Enrile’s motorcade. An attack on such
a high-level official by “extremists” would necessitate a call for martial law.

'Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator, 56.
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Enrile agreed to go along with the ambush, which was set for Friday, September
22,1972. Ironically, years later Enrile became one o f the key players in Marcos’s
downfall. However, his willingness to serve Marcos’s devious and violent designs
clearly illustrate that he was not without blood on his hands. It was Enrile’s complicity in
Marcos’s plans that allowed opposition leaders such as Ninoy Aquino to be arrested and
take their first steps towards martyrdom. It was this “ambush” that allowed Marcos to
take to the airwaves and declare martial law and name the Catholic Church as one o f its
targets. How ironic that fourteen years later, Enrile would beg the same Church for its
help to save his own life. But this was 1972 and not 1986, and the fake assassination
attempt set in motion a series o f events that threw the Philippines into its darkest hour
since World War II.4
After martial law was declared, one o f the first orders o f business was to seize the
media.5 Marcos signed an executive order during martial law that allowed the Philippine
Ministry o f Defense to take control o f the mass media, including both the print and
broadcast media that the state promptly seized. Violating the basic freedoms o f the press
and free speech was another “necessary” step to retain control o f the government and
keep the media out o f the hands o f less desirable elements. The fear o f “Communists”
was always invoked when Marcos did something that was both unjust and unpopular.
Under martial law, Marcos ordered the closing o f all but one o f Manila’s sixteen
daily newspapers and seized all but one o f the seven national television stations. Each
new violation o f the constitution was justified under the guise that the “Communists” had
infiltrated the press. By the end o f martial law in the early 1980s, the Catholic Church
operated Radio Veritas, one of the few radio stations that survived Marcos’s media
seizures.

4Seagrave, The Marcos Dynasty, 244.
5Ibid., 246.
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One might ask why Veritas was not also shut down. It may have been because
Veritas was, for the most part, apolitical. Its programming centered on the gospel o f
Jesus Christ and usually avoided political rhetoric. There was also another reason. While
seizing newspapers and television stations was one thing, attacking the Catholic Church’s
public affairs voice was quite another. Silencing Veritas would have been a very public
attack on the Church, and one unparalleled under Marcos’s regime at that time.
The total solution also meant that Marcos set about to make quick work o f his
political opponents. He had the loyalty o f the military, the Philippine Constabulary, and
the Nacionalista party. What he did not have was the legal basis to remain in power or to
continue martial law indefinitely. But he had a plan to fix that situation. By the time his
plans were implemented, the martial law regime he had established was a far cry from the
forms o f legitimate governments the Philippines had possessed in the past.
Marcos’s first step after martial law was to call for a constitutional convention to
be held in 1973. It was a continuation o f the process that began in 1970, although it was
now hijacked by the Marcos martial law machine. His approach to the convention was to
run it like a campaign, and that included bribery. Each delegate was given “messages”
from the president in the form o f crisp new pesos o f various denominations.6 Those he
could not bribe were often jailed. Marcos’s money and the power intoxicated many, and
in the end the constitutional convention went just the way Marcos wanted. He got his
new parliamentary government. He also managed to have his term extended to six years
and his election to the presidency ensured despite opposition protests, including those
from the Church.7

6Rempel, Delusions o f a Dictator., 142-143.
7In article VII, section II o f the 1973 Constitution, it reads in part, “The President
shall be elected from among the members o f the National Assembly by a majority vote o f
all its Members for a term o f six years from the date he takes his oath o f office, which
shall not be later than three days after the proclamation o f the National Assembly, nor in
any case earlier than the expiration o f the term o f his predecessor.”
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By 1973, after implementation o f the total solution, the Catholic Church was fast
becoming the focus o f anti-Marcos energy. Francisco Claver, bishop o f Bontoc, clearly
saw the connection between Marcos’s total solution and the Catholic Church when he
noted, “The suspicion is in fact strong that one o f the reasons for Martial Law was
precisely to put a stop to a process, helped along by [Church] efforts.”

o

The process Marcos wanted to stop was still in its embryonic stage. When the
Church criticized him, he accused its members o f being Communists. And although
Marcos had a tendency to label everything as “Communist,” there was some validity to
his fears. Some Communist cells in the Philippines, particularly in Negros, relied on the
Catholic Church to provide food, shelter, and protection.9 At times, the Church even
offered financial and logistical support for the cadres.10 Yet even the most liberal views
of the Church’s involvement in leftist organizations showed that at the time o f the
declaration o f martial law, only a handful o f priests and laymen actually joined the
Communist Party.11 As time went on more priests, nuns, and laymen belonged to the
Communist insurgency, but never at the levels Marcos believed.
Church involvement in the anti-Marcos struggle took a variety o f forms, and the
conversion o f priests and nuns from non-violent activists to armed revolutionaries
occurred in two contrasting fashions. For some, accepting a Maoist “people’s war” was
the result o f frustration over the conservative Catholic leadership’s inability to fully
implement the goals of Vatican II.12 This included national Church leaders such as
o
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Archbishop Rufino Santos, who as bishop o f Manila and the de facto leader o f the entire
Philippine Church had undertaken many good works during his career. But he was better
known for his ability as comptroller o f the vast Church holdings than he was as a voice o f
change. Indeed, Santos was a far cry from the kind o f reform-oriented, liberal-minded
bishop needed to lead the Church against Marcos.13
Others in the Church never accepted a Maoist revolution or a “people’s war,” but
they joined the movement to realize a mixture o f two important ideological undercurrents
in Philippine society, one old and one new. The old—nationalism and the new liberation
theology—proved to be a potent mix.14 Out o f that mix came the establishment o f the
Christians for National Liberation (CNL) on February 17,1972, on the 100th anniversary
o f the martyrdom of Fathers Mariano Gomez, Jose Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora. The
CNL was the formal integration o f segments o f the Church and the Communist Party o f
the Philippines (CPP).
The integration o f some Church officials into organized leftist organizations
seemed to prove Marcos’s earlier concerns that the Catholic Church would be the home
o f a revolution against his administration. But the CNL collaboration was not the only
opposition. For example, Father Antoniio Y. Fortich, bishop o f Bacolod, started social
action programs among his parishioners to help curb the abuse o f martial law. He also
went above and beyond his Church duties to help organize labor. Moreover, he pushed
his young Jesuit charges into taking stronger anti-government stances. He believed that
Filipinos did not have the luxury o f waiting for “messiahs,” but instead must push for
social change on their own.15
13
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Marcos was aware o f Fortich’s activities and those of others and issued stem
warnings through his staff to cease and desist. Juan Ponce Enrile, whose own contrived
assassination attempt brought the Philippines to martial law, issued warnings to the
Catholic clergy not to “rock the boat.”16 Warnings were backed up by action. Marcos
did not hesitate to issue arrest warrants against the Church.
By mid-1973, twenty-six priests and nuns had been formally arrested or detained
by the government. The number o f laymen arrested while working for Church causes is
more difficult to determine.17 But in one incident that seems typical o f the martial law
period, more than fifty youths were arrested while working with the Catholic Social
Action Center and thirty-five were arrested while working for Jesuit priests. The
activities for which they were arrested fell under the definition o f subversion, although
the Church and government could never agree on exactly what constituted subversion.
Regardless o f the number arrested, the majority o f Church’s members were still
low key in their opposition to Marcos. Only a small number o f renegade priests joined
leftist organizations, and the rest went about their daily lives with only the occasional
pastoral letter protesting Marcos’s regime. This did not mean, o f course, that anti-Marcos
sentiment was not strong within the mainstream Church, but the Church lacked a leader
around whom to organize effective resistance. At the local parish level, many brave
priests and nuns instilled courage in their followers to stand up against Marcos, even
while they were being arrested and jailed. However, a national leader with the right mix
o f charisma, bravery, and audacity needed to combat martial law had not been found.
Throughout the formative years o f martial law, Cardinal Santos remained the
leader, but he was not the kind o f man to give in to revolutionary tendencies. His death
in 1974 changed the situation. After the cardinal’s death, the door was open for a new
16Ibid.
17“Marcos Meets Moslem Rebels,” New York Times, 6 December 1973, sec. I, p.
7.
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priest to rise to that position o f power. The Church chose wisely. Replacing Santos,
whose surname meant saint, was Jaime Sin, whose own last name is the source o f
numerous religious puns. Jaime Cardinal Sin was no stranger to protest. The cherubic
son o f Chinese mestizos, he was active in the Church for many years before rising to the
leadership position. However, as the newly appointed bishop o f Manila, he took over de
facto leadership o f the Philippine Catholic Church. All eyes were on him.
It did not take long before Marcos tested the new Archbishop. The first test came
when the administration issued an official government statement “thanking” the Church
for its “cooperation” during a military raid on a Jesuit novitiate on August 26, 1974.
Cardinal Sin, upon reading this outrageous statement, called privately for the government
to issue a retraction.18 It did not.
Cardinal Sin went into action. It was the first test o f his new position and o f his
new power. His response took the form o f a strongly worded pastoral letter that was read
in parishes throughout the country, a tactic later used proficiently and profusely by
Cardinal Sin and others during the embryonic stages o f the People Power movement o f
1986. Coupled with the letter was a call to the faithful to attend a prayer vigil at the
Manila Cathedral. Marcos, acting through his own Church connections, urged Sin to call
off the vigil. He did not.
The vigil started small but quickly grew to include more than 5.000 worshipers by
September 1. The cardinal was moved by the response and so were the people. Those in
attendance were a part of something special. They were hearing for the first time open
criticism o f the government from the highest-ranking member o f the Catholic Church.
Almost overnight, the hopes and dreams o f a people yearning to be freed from the
oppression o f martial law rested on the shoulders o f one man, Jamie Cardinal Sin.

,8Joseph Lelyveld, “Marcos Mending Religious Fences,” New York Times, 18
October 1974, sec. I, p. 5.
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During the vigil, Marcos invited Cardinal Sin to the palace not once, but twice.
He had the cardinal lead Mass, read homilies, and discuss issues with him. These
attempts to woo Sin over to his side were fruitless. In the end, Marcos ordered his
administration to issue a statement o f retraction asserting that the Church hierarchy did
not in fact cooperate in the raid.19 In his first showdown with Marcos, Sin prevailed.
Under Cardinal Sin’s leadership, the Church was emboldened. It was
emboldened to a degree that a vigil against injustice was not enough. It went further in
calling for an end to Marcos’s total solution. The first official call to lift martial law
came during the same month as the vigil. In a statement issued on September 3, 1974,
the Catholic Bishops o f the Philippines, led by Cardinal Sin, formally asked President
Marcos to lift martial law and restore the civil liberties he had done away with two years
earlier. The statement read in part, “On the occasion of the approaching holy year 1975,
with its theme o f renewal and reconciliation, we respectfully suggest that bold steps be
taken to gradually lift martial law and thus pave the way for healing the wounds o f the
nation.”20
Marcos scoffed at the call to end his martial laiw. But one thing was certain under
Cardinal Sin—the Church was reinvigorated. Part o f this reinvigoration included the call
to end martial law, but it also included the revamping o f previously underfunded and
neglected social action groups, such as the National Secretariat for Social Action
(NASS A). As noted earlier, the bishops created NASS A in 1966 to promote the active
participation o f the Philippine Catholic Church in the transformation o f society. It
remained committed to peace, justice, and the liberation o f the Philippine people from all
structures o f oppression. Under Cardinal Sin’s leadership, it became important again.

19“Catholics Hold Vigil in Manila to Protest Raid on a Novitiate,” New York
Times, 2 September 1974, sec. 1, p. 3.
20“Filipino Bishops Ask End o f Curbs,” New York Times, 4 September 1974, sec.
I, p. 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

During martial law NASS A worked in, sponsored, and promoted programs that
emphasized human development through “consceintization.” Among these works were
establishment of Basic Christian Community-Community Organizations, or simply Basic
Christian Communities (BCC).21 The BCCs were inspired in part by Vatican II’s
injunction to greater lay participation in liturgical and sacramental functions. In remote
areas where there were only one or two priests for thousands o f parishioners, the BCCs
•

enabled the Church to maintain its influence.

99

The Church’s work in general and the BCCs work in particular fundamentally
changed the social and political empowerment level at the bottom strata o f Philippine
society. In a way, the BCCs harkened back to the Spanish era, when the Catholic parish
was the center o f the community, guiding and directing the community in matters o f
social and political concerns. Although the friars were long gone, the organization o f the
BCC was centered on the Church, which was now headed by indigenous clergy and
guided and encouraged participation in decisions that affected parishioners directly
within both the Church and their communities. The BCC was a way to engage the
masses in collective action to solve collective problems.
Revitalization o f the Church did not mean an end to persecution. BCCs and
Cardinal Sin’s leadership did much to bring the mainstream Church into social action, but
also made it an easier target in some respects. Indeed, Sin’s actions heightened the
profile o f many who had earlier remained off o f Marcos’s lists. The level o f persecution
would vary from month to month, with some years being worse than others.
In an effort to put a stranglehold on Church involvement in peasant organizational
activities and the inevitable linkages provided by the combined efforts o f the Church and
leftist groups, Marcos issued a decree in 1975 that required Church organizations to

21
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22Jones, Red Revolution, 208.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

152

obtain government approval before assisting in labor causes and banned foreign
missionaries from trade-union activities. The decree served to reinforce the ban on
strikes and lockouts imposed at the outset o f martial law. The Catholic Church reacted
by charging that Marcos was preventing them from performing their “Christian and
human duty to help the poor and suffering.”23 It also violated the Bill o f Rights, but since
the Bill o f Rights had ceased to be relevant upon the imposition o f martial law, it was a
moot argument.
Failure to heed these decrees brought harsh government reprisals and threats. It
was not uncommon for the government to “leak” threats against the Church. In February
1975, one such government leak was o f an unsigned arrest warrant that contained the
names o f 155 priests, nuns, and Catholic laymen. Included in this extensive list were four
bishops who were, according to the warrant, to be charged with “rebellion and inciting to
sedition.”24 The government leaked this and other warrants as a warning to the Church
that its actions were being monitored. The leak struck fear in those whose names were on
the list and prevented open confrontation with the Church.
The year 1976 saw continued arrests o f clergy, deportations o f missionaries, and
raids on Church property. Not only did the Marcos government arrest priests, but the
military raided the offices o f Jesuit publications and seized Catholic-owned radio stations
in Mindanao.

Year after year, these sorts o f activities continued. In 1978, attacks

against the Church were punctuated by the arrest o f the Jesuit priest Father Romeo
Intengan and the murder o f his staff worker, T. Tantiado 26 Father Intengan was targeted
23
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25Ibid.
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for being the founder o f the anti-authoritarian political party the Nagkakaisang Partido
Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (United Democratic Socialist Party o f the
Philippines). The Nacionalista party-controlled government feared the actions o f
Intengan’s party so much that they used terror and intimidation to try to silence its
activities.
Even the most powerful members o f the Church leadership were not immune to
Marcos’s harassment. Cardinal Sin had his activities watched closely by the Marcos
administration. Sometimes he was unduly detained and kept from leaving the Philippines
when he attempted to make official visits to the Vatican. This was an outrage to be sure,
but it was a common occurrence in a country ruled by the singular power o f a corrupt
man. Yet the Cardinal was quite lucky. Inconveniencing his travel plans was a minor
thing compared to the list o f options Marcos might have considered, which included
arrest or assassination. Cardinal Sin realized that he could be targeted at any time.
Clergy and laymen suffered almost equally under Marcos’s tyrannical political
policies. During martial law, more than 20,000 Philippine citizens were arrested for socalled political crimes. Among these were twenty-eight prominent and politically active
Catholic priests and nuns.27 Some were even tortured after their detainment. Their crimes
are unknown, probably because their crimes were little more than trumped-up charges
created to give the government an excuse to arrest them. These men and women were
little more than politically effective organizers, and for that reason they were targeted.
The way Marcos prosecuted his struggle with the Church was careful and
cunning, and his tactics often remained unknown to the public. Still, there were no less
than twenty-two major military raids on Church institutions during the remaining years o f
martial law, and there is little doubt that far more were conducted on a lesser scale.28

27Kroeger, “Evangelization in the Philippine Church,” 10.
28Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church, 114.
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Through the use o f terror tactics, Marcos tried to restrict the clergy to merely preaching
the gospel, and in so doing end any threat to his political fortunes. He failed to do both.
However, Marcos’s tactics were successful in slowing growth in Church activism.
He did not, however, stop it. His political combat with the Church was indirect, and he
avoided direct confrontation. Even Marcos realized that it was unwise to launch a direct
frontal assault on the Church because it would certainly invite a backlash against his own
administration. No matter how politically powerful the Church was or was not, it still
had at least the nominal allegiance and respect o f the vast majority o f the population.
Marcos controlled the State and the power inherent in it, and by using this power he won
the majority o f the battles. But in the end, the Church would win the war.
The marginalization and persecution o f the Church during the height o f martial
law had other consequences. As Marcos’s campaign had early success, he pulled away
more and more from the Catholic Church as an institution o f legitimacy for his own
government. He had to fill in the huge vacuum created by the Church’s removal. How
did Marcos then deal with creating at least a myth o f his own legitimacy? Marcos’s
approach to the legitimacy o f his martial law regime was a Faustian approach to Weber’s
model o f the legal, charismatic, and traditional aspects o f legitimacy mentioned in
chapter one (see figure 13). On the charismatic side o f things, he fostered his own cult o f
personality, as demonstrated in the film about his life and the vast work o f Philippine
history he commissioned in order to link himself with other great Filipino heroes, from
Lapu Lapu to Jose Rizal.
Marcos used the military and his cronies to ensure complete power, and to cover
up for his lack o f legal authority he held o f series o f referendums. These votes showed
the world that his government enjoyed a mandate from the people. The referendums
were a prime example o f how low he had fallen. During the days leading up to the third
referendum held on February 27, 1975, Marcos campaigned even though he was the only
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candidate. The people were powerless, and again only the Church could organize a voice
o f opposition.

Martial Law Regime
1972-1981

Z.3- Cromism
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Fig. 13. The Legitimacy Model Under Martial Law- Mediating variables that normally
would not show up in such a model (cronyism) play prominent roles in stabilizing the
regime. The military, this time the Philippine military, is also key in preventing dissent
and stabilizing the government, as is the United States continued financial support. The
Catholic Church still remains one o f the variables, but its suppression by Marcos causes it
to lose some prestige from the previous period. What is absent is “utilitarian” legitimacy.
Marcos neither cared nor had to appeal to this form o f legitimacy.
At first their numbers were small, numbering around 5,000 protesters, but it was a
start and a daring one considering the amount o f power the Marcos police state could
bring to bear on the Church if it desired. But in 1975, it was not necessary for Marcos to
act any harsher towards the Church than he already did. Through a combination o f voter
29“5,000 in Manila Join Protest March Against Regime,” New York Times, 22
February 1975, sec. 1, p. 8.
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payoffs, harassment, and outright murder, Marcos made sure that he won every
referendum on martial law. He was to be, in effect, the president for as long as he was
alive, and should he die, Imelda Marcos was there to take over.
In reality, Marcos’s legal mandate and his legitimacy had long since gone out o f
the people’s hands. While he may have at one time enjoyed the benefits and moral
certitude o f legitimacy that came in the legal sense, it was now hollow. The constitution
that gave him his power was written by him, and it was approved by men he had either
bribed or threatened into acquiescence.
What Marcos had in abundance was traditional power. His administration was
along the lines o f Weberian traditionalism. He used bribery, nepotism, and favoritism to
install his people in positions o f power and had his opposition arrested. To gain power in
the Marcos government meant pleasing Ferdinand or Imelda, and it had more to do with
one’s own personal loyalty to Marcos than with any intellectual ability one possessed. It
was a common saying under martial law that everything was “relative,” meaning you had
to be related to the Marcos clan if you wanted to succeed in the Philippines.
A prime example o f this was Herminio Disini, who was related to Mrs. Marcos
by marriage. Because o f his family position, he went from being a menial worker in a
tobacco company to having ownership o f a conglomerate with assets exceeding $500
million.30 Virtually all o f the television stations and newspapers passed into the hands o f
Marcos relatives, and a mere 20 percent o f the population controlled 53 percent o f the
nation’s wealth. Marcos padded his own pockets and those o f his relatives, and yet he
tried to put forth a face o f “constitutional authoritarianism” for his government.
Utilitarian legitimacy was harder for Marcos to foster. As chapter one discussed,
the utilitarian model o f legitimacy is based on the population granting the right to rule to
a regime or government that in return takes care o f the population’s needs and desires.
on

Fox Butterfield, “5-Year Old Philippine Martial Law Builds Personal Power o f
Marcos,” New York Times, 9 January 1978, sec. 1, p. 8.
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Marcos and his administration were woefully inadequate to perform the task o f taking
care o f the Philippine people. This was not because o f lack o f resources. Money poured
into the State from the International Monetary Fund and other sources, but it never made
it to the people. Instead, Marcos cared more about catering to his own excess than taking
care o f his people.
Marcos’s brand o f authoritarian stability actually brought some foreign
investment, but much o f the new cash flowed straight into the bank accounts o f Marcos
•

•

•

and his allies, and Marcos left the Philippines $26 billion in debt a decade later.

3 1

*

His

excesses were legendary and bordered on the preposterous. For instance, his government
granted massive loans—out o f the money given by the International Monetary Fund or the
United States-to his cronies to build expensive five-star hotels in Manila while the poor
went without adequate housing. On a smaller scale but just as outrageous was when
much-needed money was diverted from the Typhoon Relief Fund to pay for Marcos’s
daughter’s wedding dresses.32
Imelda Marcos was notorious for buying everything from precious stones to
Manhattan real estate and charging it all to the Philippine government. Cardinal Sin was
not above using biting social humor when discussing Mrs. Marcos’s disproportionate
spending. He was once quoted as saying that Imelda was “into mining” as the source o f
her wealth, but he did not mean the kind o f mining that brings forth precious metals from
the ground. Instead, her mining was along the lines o f “this is mine, and this is mine, and
this is mine.”33 Indeed, by the time Marcos was chased from office by the People Power

31
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revolution it is estimated that his net worth was around $30 billion, more than enough to
retire the national debt o f the Philippines.34
Marcos’s military kept him in power. Before 1972, the armed forces numbered
55,000, and a mere five years later it had increased to 160,000.35 The military was
staffed with Marcos cronies, and it represented a real threat o f violence to the opposition
and more corruption in civil society, because many generals sat on the boards o f directors
o f top Philippine corporations.
The use o f the military to intimidate opponents was only one tactic Marcos used
to stay in power. He heaped debt upon the citizenry, violated basic human rights, and
persecuted opposition political and social establishments like the Church, all in an effort
to remain on top. To Marcos, violence was necessary in martial law to bring about a
“New Society” and a “New Republic.” The crackdowns against dissidents inside and
outside o f the Church were justified for the elimination o f subversion and the protection
o f national security.36
Marcos’s targeting the Church as part o f the conspiracy to subvert his “New
Society” coincided with the Church’s own attempt at remaining politically vigorous
under the leadership o f Cardinal Sin and the activities o f the CBCP and the BCCs. The
Church still did not confront martial law directly, but its work continued at the grassroots
level. Political patience gave way to empowerment o f the poor, gathering o f allies in the
middle class, and work in all sectors for possible unification as a single political voice
under Church leadership.
The Marcos regime did not sit idly by while NASSA, the BCCs, and Cardinal Sin
organized Church resources into politically relevant units capable o f challenging him at

34Ibid„ 251.
35Butterfield, “Martial Law Builds Personal Power,” 8.
36Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church, 65.
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the grassroots level. Besides arrests and violations o f human rights, Marcos took political
action when he commissioned several top-level government committees within the
Ministries o f Labor and Defense to investigate the Church’s activities. As Robert
Youngblood writes, “The Marcos regime’s uneasiness [with Catholic Activists] . . . was
underscored by two confidential government reports, one by the Ministry o f Labor in
1975 and the other by the Ministry o f National Defense in 1978.”37
Both reports outlined the danger o f the Catholic Church’s activities after Vatican
II and its adoption o f liberation theology in the Philippines, including the paranoid belief
that the Church was being manipulated by Communisit elements and even the Central
Intelligence Agency. The reports recommended undercutting and thus weakening
Church “activists.” The BCC movement was labeled “dangerous” because o f its potential
as “an infrastructure o f political power” on a national scale. Therefore, the report stated in
general terms that the Church must be dealt with and countered.
These two reports blurred the line between what was considered radical and what
was considered mainstream and thus acceptable within the Catholic Church. Both reports
recognized that the Church’s influence in politics could not be completely curtailed. It
could only be slowed. Later in 1983, the Crisis Papers were also critical o f the Catholic
Church and recommended to the Marcos government more proactive steps to stem the
tide o f Church influence. These steps included divide-and-conquer tactics, such as
legislation guaranteeing the vital interests o f the Church, curtailing criticism o f the
Church in the state-run media, and downplaying ideological differences between the
Church and State while using the state-controlled media to highlight even the smallest
ideological schisms within the Church.
As the stranglehold o f the Marcos government tightened, the strength o f the
Catholic Church’s opposition continued to expand. The commissions that Marcos had

37Ibid., 93.
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ordered to study the problem issued recommendations that were implemented neither
fully nor successfully. Cardinal Sin, now president o f the CBCP, continued to strengthen
the Church’s position through his own efforts. He was not only charismatic, but also
politically astute, unflappable, and the right man for the job. Sin may have been the
perfect adversary to Marcos.
Sin avoided direct confrontation with Marcos, preferring instead to use what
became his modus operandi for political declarations, the pastoral letter. He issued a
slew o f them throughout the remaining years o f martial law. One o f the first was entitled
“Reconciliation Today.” This particular letter, read throughout the parishes o f the
Philippines, proposed the National Reconciliation Council, which would bring elements
o f the Church together with business leaders and government officials to help bring the
Philippines out o f the martial law period and reconcile the government with the people.
The Marcos administration ignored this overture.
This did not deter Cardinal Sin and the Church from continuing to challenge, at
least from the pulpit, the martial law regime. Indeed, calls to end martial law had come
sporadically since Sin became bishop o f Manila in 1974. In 1979, the cardinal issued a
firm and uncompromising pastoral letter calling for the end o f martial law, stating
unapologetically that martial law was destructive to the Philippines and had not brought
progress but instead “killings” and “fear” to the people.38 He called for its immediate
abandonment, stressing that the continuation o f a failed policy was senseless. He further
called for the release o f Marcos’s chief political opponent, Ninoy Aquino, who had
languished in prison since 1972.
Such pastoral letters alarmed some about the fears of blurring Church-State
authority, but Sin still publicly stated he believed in the separation o f Church and State.
He qualified his statement by reiterating that this did not mean that the Church should sit
TR
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in isolation from temporal matters. For better or worse, the Catholic Church was married
to the system. Catholics take marriage seriously and in a marriage o f any kind, whether
literal or political, it is until death do they part.
In 1981, Cardinal Sin continued to blast the Marcos government for violating
religious freedoms in the Philippines. In an address to the Catholic bishops in Baguio, Sin
stated that the government was conducting “a deliberate, finely orchestrated campaign to
•IQ

throttle the freedom o f the church to speak on matters o f Catholic morality.”

That

statement came in the wake o f fraudulent presidential elections held in June, yet another
Marcos farce. Tempers were beginning to reach a boiling point and patience was running
out. In the year ahead, Church anger spilled onto the streets as a group o f 5,000 priests,
nuns, and laymen rallied in the streets o f Cebu City in December 1982 to protest
Marcos’s policies, as well as to bum him in effigy.40 Similar gatherings were also held
that same year in Manila and Bacolod.
Though not fatally damaged by the Catholic Church’s attacks, Marcos realized
that the Church had the potential to accrue political weight over time. To counter it, he
reached back into his bag o f tricks to pull out a tactic that he had used earlier. In his
mind, it seemed like the best way to counter an attack by the Philippine Church was to
embrace a higher authority, and since God had yet to appear by Marcos’s side, the Pope
was certainly a good second choice. As he had before with the visit o f Pope Paul VI,
Marcos wanted to use a visit by Pope John Paul II to his political advantage. Pope John

TO
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Paul II was an extremely popular pontiff and had he embraced Marcos, it would have
been the best political anting-anting he could acheive.41
Both the Church and Marcos wanted a visit from the Pope. They had pushed for
it for several years. The Pope’s final acceptance o f an invitation and his subsequent visit
did not have the effect Marcos had hoped. John Paul II did not embrace Marcos or grant
him any special anointment, but it did bring an end to martial law. In a gesture o f good
will, Marcos ordered the end o f martial law on January 17,1981, a month before Pope
John Paul II’s visit. It seemed just enough time to tidy the political landscape up while
not risking any destabilization o f his government. However, it did not curry any political
favor with the Pontiff.
The end o f martial law did not mean the end o f the problems between the Church
and the Marcos government. Marcos’s “reelection” in 1981 only meant that the
Philippines had another six years o f terror and in 1982, no less than a dozen clashes
occurred between the Church and State, including raids on buildings and arrests o f those
politically involved religious and lay workers 42 It seemed that Marcos was intent on
keeping the Church out of politics, knowing full well the gravity o f his situation should
the Church be able to effectively mobilize the voting power o f the BCCs and other social
organizations.
The Church, emboldened by its perceived victory of having martial law lifted,
rebuffed Marcos’s efforts to keep it marginalized and away from temporal governmental
matters. In 1983, the new CBCP president, Archbishop Antonio Mabutas, stated that the

41Part o f the folklore o f the Philippine people is the belief in the protective
qualities o f certain magical talisman called anting anting. These anting anting can be
anything from tattoos on the body to small metal discs worn around the neck.
Antinganting are believed to be powerful enough to prevent death in battle or a loss in
politics, or even promote something as mundane as making sure you have good luck on
the job.
42Kroeger, “Evangelization in the Philippine Church,” 12.
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Church could not restrict its mission only to the religious field and disassociate itself
from temporal problems. It was a challenge for the Church in the wake o f martial law to
help build “not just a new society, but a new and just society . . .”43
In 1984 the Church grew more vocal in its criticism o f Marcos. It issued a mid
year pastoral letter titled “Let There Be Life,” which confronted three specific national
problems: the secret marshals, the economic crisis, and constitutional Amendment VI.
The secret marshals had been the bane o f both the Church and political opposition in the
Philippines, responsible for the effectiveness o f the crackdown across the archipelago.
The economic crisis was hurting the Philippines at all levels, from the business interests
in Makati to the poorest segments o f Philippine society at the most basic level. Marcos,
obsessed with remaining in power and enriching himself, did little to stimulate the
economy.
The church’s opposition to Amendment VI was the most virulent. Amendment
VI to the 1973 constitution, the result o f unprecedented bribery and heavy-handed tactics
as discussed earlier, empowered President Marcos to exercise lawmaking powers
alongside the Batasan Pambansa, the national legislative body. Considering the Batasan
was nothing more than a rubber stamp on Marcos’s policies, the inclusion o f Amendment
VI gave Marcos unlimited power to rule unopposed.
The Church never expected the protests to yield quick results, but the fight that
had been waged since the 1960s at the grassroots level and at the national level since
1974 was slowly cracking the Marcos regime. Already he had lifted martial law, and his
total solution had created nothing more than total problems. The Church capitalized on
it, not for its own enrichment, but for the sake o f its flock. The Church fully expected
Marcos to refuse and fight its efforts at every turn, and that is what he did.

43Ibid„ 18-19.
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Since it was expected that Marcos would not voluntarily give up his presidency,
the Church was prepared to take other action. It pushed hard and encouraged
participation by its members in what it called a “parliament o f the streets.”44 In this mass
protest activity the people, long victimized by the Marcos administration, finally let their
voices be heard. But just as Marcos in 1972 lacked a proper level o f violence to justify
his call for a total solution, the Church was missing a catalyst to bring out large numbers
o f people to apply adequate pressure on the administration. Martial law itself was not
enough to motivate the masses, but the Church did not need artificial violence like the
kind Marcos used as a catalyst for his total solution. It needed a tangible symbol on
which to focus its rhetoric. This is what was missing in 1983.
Cardinal Sin, the CBCP, and the rest o f the Catholic Church needed only the right
opportunity or person around which to rally their forces and bring to bear the political
power they had amassed since 1972. Few could have predicted what would make this a
reality. Fewer still expected that the murder o f one o f Marcos’s key political rivals and
one of the Philippines’ most popular opposition leaders would provide the impetus
needed for the Church to help bring the downfall o f Marcos’s government. It was not
expected, but that is precisely what happened.
The role Ninoy Aquino played as Marcos’s chief political opponent and rival was
discussed briefly before. From the very beginning o f martial law he was an adamant
opponent o f Marcos, but sitting in a government jail left him powerless to act. Ninoy was
eventually released from jail and essentially exiled to the United States. Alongside Ninoy
was his devoted wife Corazon “Cory” Aquino. Little did she know at the time that her
own destiny would be intertwined with the Church’s work, Cardinal Sin’s leadership, a
people’s revolution, and Marcos’s fate.

44
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Cory Aquino was bom Maria Corazon Conjuangco in 1933 to a family o f upper
class and staunchly Catholic Filipinos. Her family was both rich and politically powerful
enough to have their daughter educated in finest Catholic institutions in the United States.
Her education began at the all-Catholic Raven Hill Academy in Philadelphia, and later
the Sister School o f Assumption Convent and Notre Dame convent school. Her primary
education was accentuated by her life at the College o f Mount Saint Vincent, a Catholicrun institution o f higher learning situated in the Bronx and administered by the Sisters o f
Charity.45 Throughout her college years, she was also active in several Catholic lay
organizations. She was by birth and by training immersed in the Catholic faith, a fact that
proved important during the struggles against Marcos when the Catholic Church anointed
her to take up the fight.
After her Catholic education, she would eventually marry Ninoy Aquino in 1954.
In what can only be seen as a bizarre twist o f fate, Ninoy had at one time dated Imelda
Ramuldez, the future Mrs. Ferdinand Marcos. After marriage, Cory assumed the duties
o f a mother and housewife, and Ninoy became a politically powerful figure from the
province o f Tarlac.
Ninoy was imprisoned for most o f the 1970s until Marcos, who feared his
political power even in jail, had him exiled to the United States in 1979. Ninoy’s exile
also allowed him to receive needed medical treatment for a chronic heart condition. In
the United States, he at least had access to the best medical care, although he did not wish
to leave the Philippines. Life in the United States was good for both Ninoy and Cory, but
living in America meant that Ninoy was out o f the mainstream o f Philippine opposition.
He was restless and wanted to return to the Philippines to serve as the conscience o f the
anti-Marcos forces. In 1983, he and Cory decided to return. Ninoy chose to go alone

45Lucy Komisar, Corazon Aquino: The Story o f Revolution (New York: George
Braziller, Inc., 1987), 14.
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first and left the United States on August 13, 1983, on a return trip to his homeland.
Eleven days later, Cory arrived in Manila to bury her husband.46
The events o f that day are now part o f Philippine history. When Ninoy’s plane
landed in Manila, he had no protection, not from the Church and not from the opposition.
He was set up, a sitting duck for Marcos’s forces. As 30,000 supporters waited on him to
emerge from the airport, Ninoy was escorted off the plane onto the tarmac where he was
gunned down. Ninoy was assassinated in one o f the most brutal ways imaginable, being
shot in the back of the head by Philippine soldiers.47 Ninoy’s assassination profoundly
affected the Philippines on all levels. Not only did it lead to political upheaval later, but
it also it caused a flight in economic capital as the wealthy moved their money out o f the
country to safer locations because they were unsure about the future. The peso was
devalued 38 percent and the poverty level skyrocketed to 70 percent.48
It is said that Imelda Marcos warned Ninoy and others around him that if he
attempted to return to the Philippines he would be killed.49 The crime was never solved
to the satisfaction o f Ninoy’s supporters. Moreover, President Marcos did little to
investigate the murder. He did go through the motions o f establishing a commission led
by his hand-picked Chief Justice Enrique Fernando as chairman, and he even offered
Cardinal Sin a spot on the committee, something Sin promptly refused.50
Until this point, the Marcos-caused problems that existed in the Philippines, such
as the peso devaluation and rising level o f poverty, took time to notice. That was not so
with Ninoy’s murder. The outpouring o f mourners was instantaneous. During Ninoy’s
46Ibid„ 50.
47Ibid„ 6.
48Ibid., 51.
49Romulo, Inside the Palace, 174.
50Ibid., 195.
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funeral, the tens o f thousands who showed up to pay their respects overwhelmed his
widow, Cory. The funeral procession itself numbered two million people.51 It remains
one o f the largest funeral processions ever.
The hundreds o f thousands o f mourners who turned out to pay their respects to
Ninoy and to call for Marcos’s resignation crippled Makati, metro Manila’s main
business district. The rallies continued even after Ninoy was buried. It was the catalyst
the Church needed, and it gave birth to a new political movement. Businessmen, the poor,
and the clergy united in a single cause to oppose Marcos. At the movement’s center
would be Ninoy’s ill-prepared widow, Cory Aquino, who was buoyed by faith and
guided by the Church.
The Church had, until Ninoy’s assassination, been engaged in what Cardinal Sin
called a policy of “critical collaboration.”52 The collaboration kept the government and
the Church from having a direct confrontation. This allowed the Church to slowly build
its forces for an opposition push against Marcos and speak out through pastoral letters.
The Aquino assassination accelerated the opposition’s momentum. Pressure mounted on
Marcos as the “parliament o f the streets” grew in size. In August 1984, Sin again called
for national unity and reconciliation between the opposition and the government,
knowing full well that Marcos’s government would not respond favorably to his second
call for reconciliation.
Marcos’s reaction was expected. The Church’s leadership was not surprised by
the unresponsive nature o f Marcos towards their overtures. Since the implementation o f
his total solution and his targeting the Church as an opposition movement, he had never

5'Robert H. Reid and Eileen Guerrero, Corazon Aquino and the Brushfire
Revolution (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 21.
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taken a truly conciliatory stand towards the Church.53 Sin and the Church realized that
the future lay not with Marcos’s appeasement, but with a leader they had yet to choose
and in an opposition they could organize. Before Aquino’s assassination the identity o f
the leader was unclear, but the organization o f the middle class and peasantry was well on
track. In the wake o f the tragedy, the Church called for unity between the groups—a
united stand against the government on mutual concerns.54 Its leader had been found, and
it was Cory Aquino.
There was little doubt among the opposition that Marcos was behind Ninoy’s
murder, and this fact only galvanized support for Cory. Marcos’s guilt was evident in his
government’s actions and the state-run media’s complete lack o f coverage o f the event.
The few newspapers that dared print anything about the event had their doors shut, and
daring journalists who challenged the official Marcos line were invited to “meet” the
military.55 Radio Veritas was the only exception.
Aquino’s funeral drew millions o f mourners, but no official coverage from the
state-controlled Philippine press was given to the event. One o f the largest funerals in
world history garnered no favorable press coverage in the Philippines. Veritas was the
only notable media outlet covering the funeral.56 It clung tenaciously to the story,
defying the martial law regime to shut its doors. Veritas did this because the Church
bankrolled it, and its chairman was none other than the pugnacious Cardinal Sin.57

53Ibid., 57.
54Ibid., 58.
55Bryan Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage: The Untold Story o f the People
Who Brought Marcos Down (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 173.
56Monina A. Mercado, ed. An Eyewitness History: People Power The Philippine
Revolution o f 1986 (Manila, Philippines: James B. Reuter, S.J. Foundation, 1986), 10.
Jonhson, The Four Days o f Courage, 174.
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The funeral was a backdrop to both mourning and anti-Marcos politics. Cardinal
Sin officiated at the funeral and the world witnessed the Church shift its focus,
aspirations, and hopes onto the shoulders o f the grieving widow, Cory. She was at first a
reluctant recipient o f the Church’s mandate. Questions about how a humble housewife
could be the secular head to depose the seemingly all-powerful Marcos were valid. Cory
herself had to be talked into taking the political lead by Cardinal Sin. But Sin’s words,
often described as having an “emphatic impact” on world leaders, were convincing.58
The Church had to do less to convince the public to embrace Cory. Nonetheless, it
sought to endear her to the public by appealing to the Filipino affinity for the Christian
pasyon. The pasyon was used to draw a parallel between what had happened to Ninoy
Aquino and the suffering and death o f Jesus Christ. The pasyon o f Christ was and
remains a popular religious story that is both recounted and reenacted in the Philippines.
The pasyon is the story found in the New Testament o f Christ’s suffering in the Garden
o f Gethsemani, his desire to have the Father lift his suffering and his fate, his betrayal by
the apostles, his arrest and his execution by the corrupt Roman authorities. It is also the
story o f victory over death and the resurrection, and it offered an understandable
metaphor for the Philippine experience.
In the Philippine Catholic Church’s political take on the story, Ninoy Aquino was
the fallen savior who wished his fate could be altered by God but realized it could not.
He had to see it through. His Galgoatha was the Manila airport and his cross was the
tarmac where he, like Jesus, was betrayed by his own people and executed by their
corrupt government. Cory was portrayed as the suffering Mary. Mary the mother and
Mary Magdalene, who wept at the death o f the fallen savior. In a country where every
year hundreds literally have themselves crucified to reenact the suffering o f Jesus, such

co
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powerful imagery invoked sympathy and support for Cory, precisely as the Church hoped
it would.
The pasyon allowed the Philippine population to have a connection with their past
and their present. Christ’s suffering was transformed and personified in the modem era
by leaders o f nationalist movements, including Jose Rizal and Benigno Aquino. Cory
was viewed in the same light as the suffering Mary, mourning the lost savior and
speaking o f Ninoy’s death as her country’s resurrection. It was an amazing combination
o f images, the religious pasyon and the call for secular democracy in the fusion o f
Catholic imagery with secular politics.59
As Cory’s political capital began to rise, the pressure put on Marcos for reform
increased throughout 1985. The Church played an integral role in applying that pressure.
It was largely due to this massive political pressure exerted by the Church that Marcos
called snap presidential elections in 1986. He was not constitutionally required to do so,
and it was a full year before his “constitutional” term expired. Marcos felt, as he had
before the calling o f martial law that he could catch his political opponents off guard and
unorganized by calling for snap elections in 1986 instead of 1987. He could then set his
own political machine in motion, as he had during the previous referendums on martial
law and elections, to prove to the world that he still held a mandate from the Filipino
people.60 But this was not 1969, nor was it 1973, and the Catholic Church had the power-a candidate and a platform to challenge Marcos as he had not been challenged since
assuming office.
The election itself was a referendum on Marcos’s years in power, but with Marcos
it would be impossible to have an honest vote. His political machine went into overdrive,
blasting the Church, bribing officials, and doing whatever it took to win the election.

59Steinber, The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place, 180.
60Romulo, Inside the Palace, 214.
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However, this time Marcos could not escape the watchful vigilance o f the Catholic
Church, an institution that in 1986 had reached its full political capacity and power, and
was finally able to confront the Marcos government head-on.
The legitimacy of the Marcos regime had been fragile since his declaration o f
martial law. Hairline fractures developed throughout the 1970s within the various
institutions and conventions that had fostered his regime. Marcos stood on very shaky
legal ground, his charismatic legitimacy was equally fragile, and his appeal to
utilitarianism was effectively nonexistent. The Church was headed toward a full
reclamation o f its place as the primary mediating variable in Philippine legitimacy. It
would be the one to help determine just who would lead the Philippines in 1986, and it
would not be Ferdinand Marcos.
The methods used to organize the populace have been covered at some length so
far. These included Radio Veritas, whose primary purpose was to spread the gospel but
which was taking a more political turn in its broadcasts. The Church also had social
organizations previously mentioned, the BCCs, pastoral letters, and something new—the
National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). Although formally
organized in 1983, NAMFREL had its roots with the establishment o f the Operations
Registration Committee (1957) and in the Citizens National Electoral Assembly (CNEA)
formed in the 1960s. The Catholic Church helped develop, create, and organize
NAMFREL. Its membership before the 1986 election read like a who’s who o f the
Catholic powerful, including Cardinal Sin. Even today, NAMFREL has several powerful
Catholic clergy serving on its national board o f directors.61 At the time o f the 1986
election, NAMFREL had the backing and full faith and support o f the Church,
businesses, labor, and civic groups.

61For a current list o f NAMFREL’s members and board o f directors visit
http://www.atenista.net/namfrelqc/about.htm.
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NAMFREL’s reach was extensive because it was based on the Church’s
nationwide organization.62 With NAMFREL, the Church had the only organization that
could compete with Marcos and his party. During the months leading up to the 1986
election, NAMFREL fielded an estimated 500,000 volunteers strategically placed in
nearly 90,000 polling places. Working through the organizational power o f NAMFREL,
the grassroots reach o f the BCCs, the oversight function o f the priests, and the charisma
brought by Cory and Cardinal Sin, the Catholic Church proved to be unstoppable.
Marcos’s days were numbered.
Marcos must have been shocked. He and Imelda had underestimated the forces
aligned against them. It seemed that his decade o f persecution against politically active
elements within the Church was fruitless, for he woke up in 1986 to a real juggernaut like
he had never faced before. He was furious at the actions o f the Church and Cardinal Sin,
but he was unable to arrest or assassinate the popular leader, lest he bring about his own
downfall. Instead, he blasted Sin’s efforts by publicly accusing him o f “destabilizing the
/I

nation.” Marcos even went so far as to accuse Sin o f being a Christian version o f the
arguably insane Islamic revolutionary Ayatollah Khomeini.64 Sin took these and other
personal assaults in stride. He knew his power base was strong and his political influence
was on the rise. There would be a new leader in the Philippines who would be granted a
mandate o f legitimacy by the people, and this legitimacy was to pass through the Catholic
Church as it had for the majority o f Philippine history . It was enough to make anyone
confident.
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Cardinal Sin remained vigilant even as he helped Cory navigate potentially
political pitfalls. Part o f his activity on behalf o f the Church and the voters was his call to
the laity to help keep a watchful eye on Marcos’s political machine in order to stave off
election fraud. Part o f his plan included a request to send in accounts o f electoral
cheating, which he would then turn over to former United States Vice President Walter
Mondale. His call was answered in large numbers.65 Sin, along with other priests and
ministers, also directed his flocks through sermons and pastoral letters to take part in the
voting. Voting became part o f one’s Christian duty in 1986. The people answered this
call in record numbers. Once at the polls, they voted for the Church’s hand-picked
candidate, Cory Aquino.
As stated earlier, Cardinal Sin and the Church convinced her to run, but the
process o f completing the opposition ticket and selecting Cory’s running mate was not as
easy. Cory may not have been the most politically astute person, but she knew what she
did not want in her campaign. She did not want Salvador Laurel as her vice president,
even though he was clearly the best choice given the fact that he had an organized
political machine behind his campaign—something she lacked and desperately needed to
win.
Cory’s reasoning for keeping Laurel off the ticket was that she felt Laurel did not
meet the moral standards to run on a leadership platform.66 Throughout the early primary,
both jostled for political position and each side criticized the other. Laurel had not
decided to give up his own presidential aspirations in deference to the Church’s choice in
Cory. But division meant a possible Marcos victory and the choice in candidates could
not have been more clear. The primary came down to an immoral candidate versus an
inexperienced one. The fragmentation that it produced in the opposition might have

65Casper, Fragile Democracies, 74.
66Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 69.
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never healed and it may have doomed their chances against Marcos had the Church not
intervened.
Not having the party machine that Laurel possessed or his political instincts, Cory
knew she would need the Catholic Church. It was the only force in the Philippines that
by giving its blessing and support legitimized her candidacy to millions. She needed the
Church’s help, and during the indecision about Laurel she needed its advice. Her first
step was to formally announce to the Church her decision to seek the presidency. On
December 6, 1985, Cory went to see Cardinal Sin in his sprawling white villa in Manila
and said, “Your Eminence, I have prayed over this. And I have made up my mind. I will
run.”67
Sin’s response to Cory’s simple statement was direct and pointed, for he knew
Cory did not possess the political machinery or acumen needed to win against Marcos,
who was certain to pull out all stops in his corruption machine. “With whom are you
going to run?” Cardinal Sin asked. Cory answered that she could not run with Laurel.
After hearing her explain her concerns, Sin took on the role o f the trusted advisor. His
tone shifted to one that was more appropriate for the representative o f the truly legitimate
force behind any decision for her to run, any hope she had o f future political success, and
any legitimacy her presidency could hope to possess. He said to her, “Cory, you cannot
do it alone . . . It is foolish to rim if you are going to lose.”
In these a few words, the cardinal cautioned Cory not to dismiss the political
machinery that backed Laurel. Cory knew what Sin was implying without saying it
directly. She knew that Sin wanted her to consider Laurel, and she also knew that he
would talk to Laurel himself, evaluate his fitness, and help him accept a secondary role in
the future government. Feeling the pressure o f the Catholic Church on her shoulders

67Ibid„ 75.
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Cory humbly replied, “Your Eminence, before I came here, I made up my mind.
Whatever you tell me to do. I will do.”68
On December 11, 1985, Cory again visited Cardinal Sin, and he blessed her and
prophesized that she would indeed be the next president o f the Philippines. He called her
the Philippine “Joan o f Arc.”69 Although neither Aquino nor Sin could have known it, in
that single act o f submission the future o f the Philippine government’s character was set.
It would be the government of Cory Aquino that would be awarded the mantle o f
legitimacy from the Catholic Church. It would also be her government that would oversee
the full restoration o f the Catholic Church’s power and political influence to the levels it
had enjoyed almost a century before.
The Church’s mission, especially Cardinal Sin’s, was to convince Laurel to accept
the secondary spot on the presidential ticket. Sin paid a personal visit to Laurel to discuss
the matter. Cardinal Sin spoke to Laurel in his typical diplomatic fashion as
powerbroker, intermediary, and adviser, “You are wise in the way o f politicians . . . (but)
the sympathy o f the people will go to her. Join with her, and you will win.” 70 It is said
that a tear rolled down Laurel’s cheek as he fought with his pride. “Now go and decide,”
Sin told him. He did, choosing to be Cory’s vice president.
Even unbiased observers within the Marcos circle now state unequivocally that it
was Jaime Cardinal Sin who brought Laurel and Aquino together and convinced Laurel
to shelve his presidential ambitions in favor o f Cory.71 It was this action by Jaime Sin
that prevented the split in opposition votes that most likely would have doomed any
chance to dethrone Marcos in the election. Sin, through his act o f political intervention,

68Ibid.
69Ibid., 76.
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had saved Aquino’s candidacy and more than a decade o f preparation by the Church was
also salvaged. Cory had only two months to prepare for the election, but now she had a
united ticket and she had the Church on her side.
Initially, Cory’s campaign was strong on generalities and short on specifics, but
this did not matter. There was no need for her to be strong on both. She was leading a
moral crusade, and this kind o f campaign was much more than a campaign o f policy
wonks and issue-specific details. Her political message was both simple and appealing,
77

“Sobra na—Tama na— Palitan na!” (“Too much— Enough Already— Change him!”). "
This moral crusade pitted Cory and her backers in a constant fight to combat what
they felt would be inevitable cheating by Marcos. Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral letter
warning o f a “sinister plot” to frustrate the people’s will, including bribes to teachers,
district campaign managers, and others to buy their votes. Sin took the unprecedented
step o f offering absolution before the sin, telling people that they could take the money
but that “money offered to you in no way obliges you to vote for a particular
candidate.”73
Alongside the usual vote-buying schemes and violence, Marcos made a conscious
decision to counter the Church’s influence at the polls. The Church had NAMFREL, but
Marcos had his own weapon at the precincts and they were the ones who would officially
tally the votes. Marcos’s government Commission 011 Elections (COMELEC) issued an
order prohibiting priests and nuns from engaging in partisan election activities, with
threats o f fines and long imprisonment. It was a blatant and atrocious double standard
meant to target the Catholic Church, for no order was forthcoming when anti-Catholic

72Ibid., 217.
73Ibid„ 88.
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charismatic religious group Iglesia Ni Kristo and its three million members publicly
backed Marcos.74
There was no limit to the lengths to which Marcos would go to discredit the
Church. During the actual voting, Marcos ordered his state-run television networks to
broadcast images of nuns carrying ballot boxes, with the announcers absurdly telling the
audience that what they were seeing was evidence that the Church was trying to cheat.75
It was not convincing. Nonetheless, his efforts at cheating bore fruit. At the height o f the
vote count it appeared as if Marcos would successfully steal the election. His cronies
successfully rigged the results at some o f the ballot boxes and at official vote-counting
establishments.
One thing remained to be done. NAMFREL planned a quick count o f all the
votes and the results would be broadcasted over Veritas. If this happened, Marcos knew
his fraudulent election could be in jeopardy. To counter this possibility, Marcos sent
Imelda to Brother Raymundo L. Dizon, then president o f De La Salle University, to
demand that he stop the NAMFREL count. The Marcos administration knew
NAMFREL results would not match those o f the Marcos controlled COMELEC.76 Dizon
refused.
COMELEC was expected to cheat, and early returns only verified the inevitable.
The cheating brought down the mood at NAMFREL headquarters. Before their eyes,
Marcos was successfully stealing the election from the Church, from the people, and
from Cory. Workers at NAMFREL, burdened with the reality that despite their ardent
efforts they might come up short, were melancholy as the results came in. But the
Church did not give up and did not shirk its responsibility and role as the force of

74Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage, 51.
75Ibid., 48.
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legitimacy in the Philippines. It had thrown down the gauntlet in the election and it was
the time for it to put everything it had in resources, people, and leadership on the line. If
political change was to happen—and no change could be more absolute than deposing
Marcos—then it had to take a stand now.
Keeping the spirits up at NAMFREL was an important task, and taking part in
this effort was again Cardinal Sin. Word spread quickly through the NAMFREL
headquarters that Sin would be coming to visit, to lift their spirits, and to reinvigorate
their efforts. “The Cardinal is coming. He will defend us against Marcos,” was the
rumor spreading through the workers.77 Through the force o f personality, Cardinal Sin
kept the fight alive at NAMFREL. And come he did.
Cardinal Sin entered NAMFREL headquarters that night like a film star
surrounded by a phalanx o f security men, being jostled by throngs o f women trying to
touch him and kiss his ring and eager autograph-seekers thrusting papers and pens in his
70

path.

Sin pushed his way through the crowds, offering his ring with one hand and

signing autographs with the other. Sin’s presence in NAMFREL that night was more than
just a visit to rally the troops. It was a real manifestation o f the Church’s willingness to
fight Marcos.
Sin’s visit and his work on behalf o f NAMFREL and others made people believe.
He gave them hope when most felt that they did not have a chance against Marcos’s
corrupt political machine. In the showdown o f Church versus State, Cardinal Sin led the
charge. His visit to NAMFREL completed the circle because NAMFREL itself was
founded at the urging o f the cardinal, who gave its first president, Jose Concepcion, his
full blessing. Sin also provided him with an elite corps o f priests and nuns to act as
recruiters and organizers, and this was merely the first step. NAMFREL’s work was

77

Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage, 46.

78Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

179

thought o f as a Christian apostolate, using bishops to verify possible members and weed
out the saboteurs and infiltrators.79 So on the night o f Sin’s visit, it was just another in a
long line o f proactive measures he took on behalf o f the Church. And that night, Cardinal
Sin and the Church asked the faithful not to give up hope, telling all the foreign press in
attendance to stick around because something big was going to happen soon.

80

It did not take long for something big to happen. One o f the most important
events from the election period o f February 1986 happened on the evening o f February 9,
when thirty government COMELEC computer operators charged with counting the votes
quit their jobs and walked out. They did so out o f conscience, accusing the Marcos
government o f electoral fraud and cheating. They were given protection by the Church
and moved to a Church safe house to prevent Marcos from exacting revenge.
The Church was doing all it could to bring Marcos down. It hand-picked the
opposition candidates, fielded a half-million people to oversee the elections, set up an
anti-Marcos radio station and weekly journal, castigated the government from the pulpit,
ardently prayed for its downfall, and now sheltered its enemies.
Even the skeptical nonpartisan foreign press started to believe in the Church’s
power to challenge the Marcos machine. Bryan Johnson, who was among the journalists
in the foreign press corps covering the events, wrote:
To a Protestant skeptic such as myself, such profound faith was nearly
incomprehensible. Until then, I had thought o f the Philippine Catholic
church as a wealthy and dogmatic bureaucracy; its opposition to Marcos
had seemed mostly symbolic. All that talk of Good vs. Evil and “God On
Our Side” was the standard rhetoric o f battle, the same absurd claim made
by everyone from Hitler to the Ayatollah Khomeini. But Jaime Sin had put
a large dent in my cynicism. Who knows? Maybe God did care about the
millions o f poor, devout Filipinos pleading for His intercession.82
79Ibid„ 47.
80Ibid., 49.
82Ibid., 50-51.
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As a skilled observer o f events, Johnson noticed how Marcos had for years
criticized the Catholic bishops for their unwarranted intrusions into politics, and had even
accused them o f harboring Communist sympathizers in their ranks. But he had always
been careful to couch the attacks in oblique language, avoiding any direct assault on the
Church itself. In a country that is 90 percent Catholic , where half o f the female
population seems to be named Maria, Lourdes, or Evangeline and no home is complete
without a wall shrine to the Christ-child Santo Nino, it is political suicide to declare open
war on the Roman Church.83
Political suicide perhaps, yet some politicians did not believe it was a risk, and
certainly Marcos had no choice. He did not realize that the Catholic Church did more
than just encourage participation in secular politics and that it made voting a symbolic act
o f the Christian faith. Along those lines, the Church also carried out voter mobilization
campaigns. Voting in the 1986 election was for the parishioner as much a Catholic duty
as taking Mass, confession, and the Hail Mary.
Even before the election was completed, the Church hierarchy in the Philippines
and even the Papacy in Rome let it be known that they did not intend to extend the
trappings o f moral and political legitimacy to Marcos. The Church also took an active
role in opening up the long-controlled Manila press by starting publication o f a new
tabloid, Sign, and the Catholic magazine Veritas. Radio Veritas, the Catholic station that
survived the Marcos crackdown on freedom o f speech, continued to prove itself as a
useful and influential tool in spreading the Catholic Church’s call to action during the
election.
After the COMELEC defections, it was clear that Marcos was going to steal the
election as expected. What was also equally expected was the Church-backed
NAMFREL’s announcement that its quick tallying o f the vote results gave the election to
83Ibid.
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Mrs. Corazon Aquino.84 The Church was invested at every level o f Cory’s election that
night. The NAMFREL vote counters, the vast majority o f them Catholics, declared her
the winner o f the vote, and the Catholic radio station Veritas was the first place Cory
went to claim victory.

o;

When COMELEC declared Marcos the winner, there was little surprise. This
election was by all accounts one o f the most corrupt elections in Philippine history. Just
as the COMELEC defectors had warned and just as the NAMFREL workers feared,
Marcos had stolen the election. What was different this time was that the Church and its
flock were prepared to do something about it. In 1969 and 1972 they did nothing, but in
1986 things were different. The Church moved quickly to declare the new Marcos
presidency null and void.86
On Sunday February 9,1986, Sin made an address after the Mass at Santo
Domingo and Baclaran churches. He was dressed in yellow and green, the symbolic
colors o f Cory and Laurel, and in his speech he praised the voters’ courage, NAMFREL,
and Aquino. Moreover, he warned that God would not forgive Marcos if he was
responsible for fraud. God may not have been on Marcos’s mind, as he did indeed try to
steal the election. Cory waited for the Church to act.
In the days following the fraudulent claims by the ruling regime, the Catholic
bishops deliberated on the appropriate response. On February 13, the CBCP discussed
and reflected on their positions well into the early morning hours. Members argued
amongst each other about whether to take a strong position.88 Imelda Marcos tried to
intervene and break up the meeting. She hoped her actions would prevent the bishops
84
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from issuing a statement. Her action was yet another example o f how much those in
power feared the Church’s voice. She even went so far as to try to bribe Cardinal Sin
with extravagant gifts.
In her pleas for the cardinal to influence the CBCP not to act against her husband,
Imelda Marcos threw a temper tantrum in what was called “one o f the most delicious
scenes in Church-State relations.”89 It was to no avail. Cardinal Sin had no intentions o f
stopping the CBCP, and he himself wanted the statement to be one that would define the
Church’s position against Marcos. When complete, the CBCP’s statement was both blunt
and scathing in its language against the Marcos presidency. It left little doubt in the
minds o f the public and the international community about the official Church position.
The CBCP statement declared in unambiguous terms and with moral certainty
that Cory Aquino had won the presidency. It was one o f the most explicit political
statements the Church had ever issued, not simply during the Marcos era but also during
post-Vatican II Church history. The bishops called the election “unparalleled in the
fraudulence o f their conduct.”90 Moreover, they condemned the disenfranchisement o f
voters and declared that the government had no moral basis on which to govern.
The statement was read around the country in all parishes and churches, and it did
not take long for Marcos to respond. His cronies blasted the bishops’ statement, calling it
“inflammatory” and “rash” and insisting that it posed “an imminent threat to the peace
and tranquility o f [the Philippines].”91
Coupled with the CBCP’s statement was the first o f what would become a series
o f massive anti-Marcos rallies organized by the Church. In the past rallies were held, but
rarely did they number more than a few thousand participants. This new rally was

89

Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage, 56.

90 Reid and Guerrero, Corazon Aquino and the Brushfire Revolution, 26.
91Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage, 57-62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

183

trumpeted as a “Triumph o f the People” prayer rally and held on February 16, 1986, in
Manila’s sprawling Luneta Park. Two million people attended, led in prayer and protest
by three bishops and thirty-five priests. The Church worked on all fronts.
As an amusing aside to the growing size and power o f the rallies, Cardinal Sin’s
political power caught the attention o f other would-be plotters for Marcos’s presidency.
In more than one instance Cardinal Sin was included, without his knowledge, in the
planning o f political intrigues such as the coup plot being hatched by Marcos Defense
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Enrile planned to overthrow Marcos and establish a new
“National Reconciliation Council” that was to include Cory, General Fidel Ramos, and
Cardinal Sin.92
Marcos learned o f Enrile’s plan and set in motion another chain o f events that led
to Cardinal Sin and the Church being involved with Enrile and Ramos, but not in the way
the two military men expected. Remember that Enrile was a major player in the events
that brought about martial law and persecution o f the Church, as well as being a
mouthpiece for various threats and warnings hurled at the Church throughout martial law.
The events set in motion after Marcos’s own intelligence reports showed that Enrile was
planning a coup would lead to an ironic twist o f fate in which Enrile would beg the
Church to save his life.
After learning o f the plot, Marcos ordered the arrest o f Enrile and Ramos. Tipped
off to the coming trouble, both men sought safety in their respective camps and among
their loyal followers. But none could offer them complete security. They had to call
upon the Church to protect them in their hour o f need. Their defections from the Marcos
administration, combined with events already set in motion by the Church, culminated in
the massive protests in the streets that have since come to be known as the People Power
Revolution.

92

Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 110.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

184

Enrile joined forces with General Fidel Ramos at Camp Aquinaldo with a handful
o f soldiers who supported their cause. They knew that an attack could come at any time,
and that their actions, while bold, were doomed without the support o f the Church and the
people. To be successful against Marcos meant more than guns and ammunition, it took
faith in the Church’s ability to rally the people around their cause. Marcos was far from
politically impotent. He still controlled the presidency, and he still had the loyalty o f the
armed forces and the firepower to crush the infant revolt by two o f his top military
officials. He did not, however, control the Church.
Enrile’s wife was the first to appeal to the Catholic Church for help on the day her
husband defected. She called Cardinal Sin directly and appealed to him to help her
husband. Cardinal Sin responded favorably and contacted the leadership o f many o f the
religious orders o f nuns and priests in Manila and told them to “go to the chapel and
stretch out your arms and pray and fa st. . . We are in battle, and you are the powerhouses
QT
. . . ” Prayer was needed first, and action followed next.
Enrile also telephoned Sin. He said to the cardinal, “I will be dead within one
hour . . . I don’t want to die . . . if possible do something.”94 Even Fidel Ramos, a
Protestant, told the cardinal that he embraced an image o f the Virgin Mary and pleaded
with Sin to “help us by calling the people to support us.”95 The cardinal replied that he
would indeed help them both, comforting Ramos and Enrile by saying, “In fifteen
minutes, your place will be filled with people.”96
On February 22, Cardinal Sin took to the airwaves on Radio Veritas. As he spoke
to the people, the Church’s candidate, Cory, slept in the Carmelite Monastery protected
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by a battalion o f nuns who vowed to die if necessary to protect her. Cory was resting and
waiting patiently for her opportunity to assume the presidency. Hearing the cardinal on
the air, Marcos sought to silence Radio Veritas, but fortunately for the Church the
military commander he told to destroy the facility ignored his order.97 As such, the
opposition was able to hear Sin and other officials broadcast messages o f inspiration and
urgency in these critical hours.
The Church did not take the requests from Ramos and Enrile lightly. Cardinal Sin
knew that calling upon the six million Catholics in metro Manila would be dangerous.
He knew what Marcos was capable o f and once People Power began, Marcos had
options. General Fabian Ver, an ardent loyalist o f the Marcos regime, came up with one
plan that called for the government to instigate a bombing and arson campaign and then
crack down on this supposed criminal activity by calling for martial law. The plan was
called Operation Everlasting, and it included the arrest o f many officials, including Cory
Aquino and Cardinal Sin.98 It was outrageous to say the least, but it was an action the
Marcos government considered.
If Marcos decided to open fire, thousands would be killed and the blood would be
on his hands 99 So when Sin went to broadcast again, he knew the full weight and
magnitude o f his request. He announced on Veritas that day that he was “deeply
concerned about the situation o f General Ramos and Minister Enrile,” and he made a call
for the “people to support [Enrile and Ramos]” and to “go to Camp Aguinaldo and show
your solidarity with them in this crucial period.”100

97Ibid., 116.
QO

Romulo, Inside the Palace, 223.

"Johnson, The Four Days o f Courage, 78-79.
100Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 115.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186

Pushed by the Church and the exhortations o f Cardinal Sin, hundreds of
thousands took to the streets. They answered the call to defend those in the Marcos
administration who had defected from his camp. When Marcos’s troops closed on the
camp, they did not meet armed resistance but instead human barricades as nuns knelt in
front o f the tanks and recited the rosary.101 It was an unprecedented scene in world
history, and from February 22-25, 1986, the events that would become known as People
Power unfolded.
With People Power in full swing, the Church now protected the same officials
who during martial law were responsible for the arrest, torture, and execution o f many o f
the faithful. Nonetheless, Radio Veritas broadcasted repeated calls for the people to take
to the streets to protect those who had defied Marcos, and come they did. Veritas
increasingly became a thorn in Marcos’s side, and eventually he was able to have some o f
his loyal forces bomb the transmitter and knock the station off the air. However, the
destruction o f their tower was too little too late for Marcos’s position. By then, hundreds
o f thousands had come to the streets in and around EDSA Avenue, forming a human
barricade against the tanks and armed forces loyal to Marcos.
The Church-sponsored nature o f the People Power revolution is unmistakable.
Even one of the most popular and well-known books dealing with the events o f People
Power, entitled An Eyewitness to History People Power The Philippine Revolution o f
1986, is dedicated not to Enrile, Ramos, or even to Cory but to the Virgin Mary. The
events o f February 1986 are called a “Marian revolution” by no less than Francisco S.
Tatad, Marcos’s former press secretary, a member o f Opus Dei, and a current member o f
the Philippine Senate. Senator Tatad and other influential and politically powerful
Filipinos wrote that the revolution’s strength and sustenance was drawn from the masses
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held and conducted by men like Cardinal Sin and prayers offered to the Virgin Mary.

102

It was a case o f rosary beads against M-16s.
At first, rosary beads and prayers were not enough to convince Marcos to budge.
He was not going to leave without a fight, no matter how many people took to the streets.
In a late night press conference following the Enrile and Ramos defections, Marcos
blasted his former defense minister as being “out to grab power and rule the country
through a junta.” His rage also extended to Cardinal Sin, whom he called “an inciter to
rebellion” and “a mouther o f subversion statements!”103 He tried to move forward with
his own inauguration, but his broadcast was interrupted after supporters o f the People
Power revolution took control o f the major broadcasting relay stations.
The United States watched the events with interest, and even President Reagan’s
administration recognized the Church’s importance in the political developments within
the Philippines. The Reagan administration requested that Cardinal Sin go to
Malacanang to negotiate a peaceful end to the standoff in a face-to-face meeting with
Marcos. Sin responded: “It should be the president o f the United States who insists that
he should leave the country.”104
The United States also hastily arranged a phone call to Cardinal Sin from Jose
Azcona, the president o f Honduras, where it was hoped Marcos could go into exile.
President Azcona told the cardinal, “We have decided not to accept him, but if you ask,
we will do it.”105 Both instances are further evidence o f the Church’s powerful political
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position. Here was the world’s most powerful nation turning to a priest to resolve a
crisis, bring peace to a nation, and ensure American interests in the region.
Having lost all ability to communicate with the country and seeing his military
routed by hundreds o f thousands o f citizens, Marcos finally realized his situation was
hopeless. Indeed, while he may have held nominal political power and influence in the
military, he could not rule a country where the citizenry was in active revolt. He had lost
the mandate o f legitimacy long ago, and martial law and his penchant for corruption
allowed it to remain only as a facade. The Church brought reality home to Marcos. His
time was up. At 9:00 P.M. on February 25,1986, American helicopters airlifted Marcos
and his family to Clark Air Base. He was then flown to Guam, and after Cory rejected
his appeals to return to the Philippines, he was exiled to Hawaii.
The family’s departure from the Philippines only embittered Marcos against those
who deposed him. He and Imelda were particularly ungracious in their comments
towards the Catholic Church. Marcos himself continued to call Cardinal Sin “an
Ayatollah Khomeini,” while Imelda referred to him simply as “a son o f a bitch.”106 They
were furious at the People Power movement organized by the Church and outraged at
what they felt was illegal assistance given by the Church to Cory’s campaign. They
charged that the Catholic Church contributed more than $30 million to Aquino’s
campaign, a charge that Church officials scoffed at and denied. The Church had room to
scoff, because Marcos himself had stolen billions from the Philippine people to remain in
power.
The anger was understandable. The Church forced Ferdinand Marcos, president
and dictator o f the Philippines for more than twenty years, to flee the country o f his birth.
He died in exile. He had lost international support for his government, but domestic
support had long since dried up. Thanks to the brave souls in the streets, the military
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defectors, and the Catholic Church’s leadership, Cory Aquino became the new president
o f the Philippines.
Cory was in power because o f the Church, and as she faced the task o f ruling the
country she needed its support, assistance, and legitimacy then more than ever. The
Church’s actions during the election o f 1986 were unprecedented in modem political
history, yet when viewed through the lens o f this study one can see how the Church was
merely reclaiming its lost legacy. Its power as the force o f legitimacy had come full
circle. With the election complete, Cory legitimized, and the Philippines reclaimed, the
Church’s next task was to pick up the pieces o f a tattered nation left by years o f Marcos
corruption and rebuild Philippine pride in the government and in the nation-state as a
whole.
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CHAPTER V
THE PARTNERSHIP OF POWER

The Philippine Catholic Church’s work in the post-Vatican II era made the events
leading up to People Power possible. Organized peasant and dissident movements aided
the process, but the Philippines’ fragmented political nature made any large-scale
resistance by these groups unlikely. The Church was the only institution with the
resources and organizational capability to oppose Ferdinand Marcos. With its vast
network o f priests, nuns, and laymen working in the Basic Christian Communities, the
parishes, and at the national level, an anti-Marcos coalition became a reality. In the end,
Marcos had not given the Philippines a total solution but instead a total problem, and it
was the Church that provided the ultimate answer.
Ninoy Aquino’s assassination was the watershed in the Church’s resistance
movement. It culminated more than a decade o f work that had grown increasingly bolder
with each year. Ninoy’s martyrdom enabled the Church to make a final social and
political push that included pastoral letters, protests by clergy, mass rallies, and the
mandate o f legitimacy being passed to Cory Aquino. When Cory was finally recognized
domestically and internationally as the Philippines’ new president, her recitation o f the
oath was the symbolic culmination o f martyrs’ sacrifices both in the Church and in the
streets. People who had given all for love o f their country made those sacrifices.
Cory Aquino took the oath with her hand placed firmly on a Bible held by Dona
Aurora, the mother o f her slain husband Ninoy. Together, she and her supporters sang
the Lord’s Prayer. At that moment in history, the Philippine Catholic Church had come
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full circle. It had risen like a phoenix from the ashes of martial law to once again claim
the preeminent position o f power (see figure 14). The Church was now both a mediating
variable and a partner in power. No other group or organization possessed the same
influence and credibility as the Church. It was again the kingmaker and the force o f
legitimacy in the Philippines. From the time Cory took office until the day she left no
other organization wielded as much influence or control over the government’s
legitimacy as the Church did.

Aquino Administration
1986-1992

Z 2-M ilitarv

Z1 -Catholic
Church

/4 -

X .'-C lia riN m a lii:

Fig. 14. The Church and Aquino’s Administration - Aquino’s ascension to the
presidency was coupled with the rise o f the Church as both a partner and a mediating
variable in her legitimacy. Unlike Marcos, Aquino also addressed utilitarian concerns
of her constituency. At no time since the 1898 revolution had the Church enjoyed
such preeminent influence in Philippine politics, and that is why it is illustrated as
rising above and as coequal with the government.
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The oath o f office was just the beginning. During the next few months and years,
the fledgling Aquino administration was challenged and tested. These challenges
included writing a new constitution, restoring morality to the presidential office, and
lifting the Philippine people out o f poverty. The years o f Marcos’s administration had
done little to alleviate the poverty o f the masses, and millions still struggled to survive.
Marcos had cared only about guns and neglected the butter o f his nation. Rebuilding all
that was tom down during martial law was a daunting task requiring sacrifice from every
sector, including the politicians who had grown fat on the plunder o f the Philippines.
Aquino’s stiffest test came from politicians who wanted to maintain the status
quo, not from the people who were eager to see a new life and hope for their children.
Tests also came in the form of military coups. There were seven in total, and it is likely
that many more were planned but never brought to fruition. The coup attempts against
Aquino were led by disgruntled members o f the military who saw Aquino as soft on
Communism, weak on the military, and unworthy to hold the position o f president.
Undoubtedly, a level o f Philippine machismo played into the various plots that were
hatched. Cory was, after all, a soft-spoken Catholic woman, hardly fit in the eyes o f
some in the military to run a country being tom apart by Communist insurgency, Islamic
separatism, and banditry.
These disgruntled military elements wanted to seize power. However, even
during the military coup attempts the Church emerged as the Aquino administration’s
protector. Indeed, through it all Cory had but one strong and faithful ally on which she
always leaned—the Catholic Church. During her administration, the Church’s full
political and social power was used to stave off the coup plotters, keep her in power, and
mold and shape the character o f Philippine politics.
The Aquino administration represented many things for the Church and the
Philippines. The Church and its apostle, Cory Aquino, led their flock, which was
symbolized by the Philippine masses, into the light o f a new era. Marcos’s vanquishing
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was a fitting end to the “miracle” that was People Power. The Church’s role in affecting
the lives o f so many millions within the country, providing solace and a solid foundation
against Marcos, and crowning a new president were just the first steps in its reemergence
as the force o f legitimacy.
Cory understood, as did the world, that she was president not simply because o f
the people’s votes and the actions o f Enrile and Ramos. She was president for two main
reasons. The first reason was the sacrifice o f her husband Ninoy, who had paid the
ultimate price for his country. The second reason was because she had the Catholic
Church’s full faith and support. The Church gave her a platform from which to speak,
infrastructure to build upon, and a voter base on which she could rely. But winning the
election was merely the first major hurdle to be cleared. Having accomplished that, she
needed to turn her attention to rebuilding her government. Just as the Church had helped
her construct one of the most amazing political victories in history, it was also prepared
to build her government.
The situation that existed during the Aquino administration was one not seen
since the days o f the friar-run Spanish government. After more than a decade o f study,
however, scholars o f the Aquino administration are confident in writing that the official
political support and activities o f the Catholic Church during her administration were
significant factors in shaping the Aquino government’s character.1 “It is impossible to
separate the two . . . ” commented one Western diplomat. “The one unquestionable winner
. . . has been the Church. It is now stronger than ever with the enhanced moral authority
o f having rid the country o f Marcos, with a very direct and effective line into the
presidency.”2

'Battung et al., Religion and Society, 31.
2Matthews, “Speaking Voice o f the Church.”
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This partnership manifested itself in a variety o f ways. Among them was the
Church’s role in hand-picking a number o f Aquino’s government officials, both at the
cabinet and sub-cabinet level. The Church also served as an oversight body on other
appointments in the bureaucracy. Indeed, it was common knowledge during the Aquino
administration that those who wished to serve in the civil service and who sought
powerful and influential positions knew that the “church [was] a sure channel for
acquiring posts .. .”3
The process o f putting together a cabinet for the Aquino administration was
extremely important. It had to be done correctly and with the right people. Mistakes
made in selecting personnel could hamper the entire administration. Aquino’s
government was a fresh start, and with the Church’s help she intended to make a clean
break with the Marcos past. Besides Cardinal Sin, other Aquino advisors included her
brother Peping, close friend Jimmy Ongpin, Joker Arroyo, and the President o f Ateneo de
Manila, Father Joaquin Bemas.4
Aquino’s economic advisor was Bernardo Villegas, a Catholic with ties to Opus
Dei. There were other Opus Dei representatives in her government as well, and they
filled many o f the top positions. Among the most notable included Jesus Estanislao, the
minister o f finance, who was responsible for reigning in the out o f control inflation,
stabilizing the Philippine peso, and laying the ground work for the growth that would
characterize the latter half o f her administration and that o f her successor, Fidel Ramos.5

Casper, Fragile Democracies, 124-25.
4Mercado, An Eyewitness History, 127.
5Jesus Estanislao received few accolades during his term as Philippine finance
secretary. The Harvard-trained economist became President Corazon Aquino's third
finance chief. Estanislao's most lasting legacy is the restructuring o f the Philippines'
foreign debt. Estanislao negotiated with commercial creditors and multilateral lenders
such as the World Bank and the IMF, and the result was a complex arrangement that
retired some national debt while lowering interest rates and spreading out payments.
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Jose Concepcion, the Catholic layman Sin hand-picked to head NAMFREL, was
made minister o f trade and industry. Concepcion was also president o f the Council o f the
Laity and had a vision to meld his own ministerial functions with business leaders.
Concepcion stated, “I see the church, the military and the private sector working together
to eradicate the country’s problems.”6 Joint efforts by the Church, the laity, and business
interests were seen as one avenue to address the difficulties facing the Aquino
administration.
This Church’s heavy involvement in the Aquino administration overshadowed the
military’s role. During the proceeding decades the Philippine military had played a major
role in legitimizing the government, shoving aside the Church as the major player. Now
the roles were reversed. The Church reclaimed the top spot with the People Power
revolution and soon after, strains between the Church and the military became apparent.
On many occasions, Aquino did not consult the military about her political
appointments. Whether this maneuvering helped foster the coups is a matter o f debate,
but ignoring the military resulted in tension between their camp and the Church. If the
military was angry that its advice was not sought, the Church basked in the attention.
Cory consulted the Church about almost every decision. In fact, her cabinet’s religiosity
t

n

was so well known by the media that it was dubbed the “Council o f Trent.”
This “Council o f Trent” helped her form policy and administer the complex job o f
rebuilding the Philippines. On the domestic front, the Church was particularly influential
in matters such as family planning and education. To help shape her education policy,
Aquino chose one o f the Church’s hand-picked candidates, Lourdes Quisumbing, to be
her minister o f education. At the time o f her appointment, Quisumbing was the president

6National Catholic Reporter, June 14, 1986 no 20, page 1.
7Eduardo Lachica, “Corazon Aquino's Strategy Calls For a Campaign That Never
Ends,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Wall Street Journal (February 2,
1986; accessed 1 September 2001).
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o f Maryknoll College, a Catholic girls’ school. Quisumbing had no experience in
government and no experience running a nationwide education network. She did not
have a background in politics at all, so why did Cory Aquino choose her? What were her
qualifications? Most importantly, she had the support o f the Church and Cardinal Sin
and according to their sources, she led an exemplary family life, was an able
o

administrator at Maryknoll, and was a good Catholic.
With her cabinet taking shape, Cory moved in concert with the Church to abolish
the Marcos constitution o f 1973. This constitution was the basis o f Marcos’s exceptional
power and allowed him and his government to become more corrupt than any in the
modem era o f the Philippines. With the Church’s help, Cory sought to dismantle the
legal trappings o f the Marcos administration piece by piece in a fast and efficient manner.
A mere month after taking office, she abolished the Batasan (national assembly) and with
it the constitution.
The Philippines were now without a governing document. To fill this void,
Aquino turned to Father Bemas, who drew up what was called the “Freedom
Constitution.” This provisional document penned by an influential member o f the
Church provided Aquino with enough executive power to govern the Philippines until a
new constitution was written and ratified.
To help write a new Philippine Constitution, Aquino turned again to her Catholic
advisors. This led to a Constitutional Convention in 1987 that included an unprecedented
number o f clergy filling its ranks and committees. Not since the days o f the
Commonwealth Constitution had the makeup o f the drafters almost guaranteed a
document that would be favorable to the Church’s aims and goals.
Among the well-known clergy and laity that served on the Constitutional
Commission were Bishop Teodoro Bacani, the former Jesuit president o f Ateneo de
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Manila and a theological and secular law specialist, Father Joaquin Bemas, who has
already been mentioned as president o f Ateneo and author o f the provisional constitution,
and Sister Christine Tan, one o f the most popular and charismatic nuns in all o f the
Philippines.
The commission was charged with more than creating a new document outlining a
legislative and executive structure. Real human needs had to be addressed, the kind o f
needs the Church had committed itself to championing during the Marcos years. As
such, committees dealing with civil liberties, abortion, divorce, identity, social justice,
and human rights were formed. Almost every committee had at least two members from
religious organizations. In all, two-thirds o f the constitutional committees had
representatives from the Catholic Church. With that level o f representation and input into
the formulation o f the Philippine legal code, it was inevitable that the constitution would
reflect Church opinion.
The Constitutional Convention proved more than ever the length and depth o f the
Church’s role in legitimating the new government. It was a fundamental example o f the
kind o f power the Church enjoyed as a result o f Aquino’s victory. No organization in the
Philippines has played such a powerful and influential political role before or since.
Completing the constitution was merely the first step. The Church wanted to
ensure that the document was ratified after its completion. Aquino relied upon the
Church’s power and political pressure to make sure that happened. The Church did not
disappoint her. Cardinal Sin himself was quoted as saying that ratification o f the 1987
Constitution was the moral duty o f every elected official. It was equally important that
the people support it, adding pressure on their elected officials to not drag their feet
during the ratification process.
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Ratification was achieved quickly and the new constitution was considered a
significant victory for the Aquino administration and for the Church.9 The fact that
scholars recognize the Church’s victory parallel with that o f Aquino’s secular
government is another telling reminder o f the close partnership between Church and State
that reemerged during the Aquino era. Moreover, it is evidence o f the impressive
mediating role the Church played in influencing all sectors o f governmental legitimacy,
including the establishment o f laws and legal norms.
The Philippine Constitution shares many similarities with the United States
Constitution. For example, the 1987 Constitution established a presidential system with a
bicameral legislature, restoring the political structure the United States had implemented
in the Philippines at the time o f independence. But in other ways it is quite different. The
constitution’s intricate details do not need to be outlined in this study, but a few important
aspects o f the document are worth noting because they illustrate how the Church was able
to inject its own agenda into the law.
The form o f government the committee agreed upon was a restorative move o f
sorts. As mentioned earlier, Marcos abolished the legislature in favor o f a parliamentary
system in 1973. He insisted on these changes to ensure his reelection. Marcos also had
Amendment VI, which gave him the power to rule by legislative fiat, also abolished in
1987. Besides setting mild restrictions on foreign investment and requiring two-thirds o f
the Philippine Senate to approve treaties, the constitution also granted women equal
treatment before the law. In response to martial law it prohibited secret detention,
violence, and torture.10
While it never mentioned the Church specifically, the document’s tone was
clearly inspired by Church doctrine. As a “Catholic” document, it banned abortion from
9Youngblood, “The Corazon Aquino Miracle and the Philippine Churches,”
1,240.
10Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 137-38.
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the time o f conception. Moreover, it outlined in Article XIII the government’s
responsibility to enact measures that “protect and enhance” the right o f all people to
human dignity and the reduction o f social, economic, and political inequalities. These
goals are precisely the same ones the Church sought in its quest for social justice under
liberation theology. It is ironic that something Marcos fought so hard to prevent would
eventually become part o f a new constitution.
There were also explicit references to freedoms o f speech, assembly, and the
press, all rights Marcos violated during the martial law period. Along with these basic
rights were the establishment o f an official language, Filipino, and a weakening o f capital
punishment, which the Catholic Church had hoped to abolish. While it did not make
capital punishment completely illegal, the constitution made it very difficult to pass a
death sentence for criminals, a clear victory for the death penalty opponents within the
Church. Also in the area o f criminal law, the writ o f habeas corpus was strengthened and
could no longer be suspended indefinitely.
Even before the ink was dry on the constitution, the Church was pressuring the
Aquino administration on several fronts. Among them was the issue o f land reform.
Many in the Church felt that her administration was in danger o f falling behind on its
promise o f land reform, a much-needed policy to appease the more violent elements o f
the peasantry. But more than anything, land reform was seen as a first step in alleviating
poverty in the Philippines, a condition that saturated the vast majority o f its citizens.
Cardinal Sin joined the chorus o f those within the Church attempting to reach Aquino on
this issue.
In a strongly worded pastoral letter read at Manila's cathedral, Cardinal Sin
reiterated his pressure on the government: "We ask our government. . . to turn its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

200

attention to the issues o f land reform and the concerns most closely related with it.”11
Aquino had raised “genuine hope” among the poorest segments o f society on the issue o f
land reform. Archbishop Sin applied a bit o f public pressure on Aquino when he said the
government's "credibility" depended upon "its sincerity and readiness to act in this
area."12
Cardinal Sin and the Church were not expecting miracles, but they were expecting
action. Blood was being shed over the matter, and its inclusion in the new Philippine
legal code was essential. Sin stated, "We realize that what has been beyond the capacities
o f past government for so many decades—and perhaps centuries—cannot be adequately
resolved in a few months . . . But realistic implementation o f programs must begin, with
all deliberate speed."
The Church’s efforts were rewarded with the inclusion o f Article XIII in the
constitution. Article XIII deals with the issue o f social justice and human rights. More
specifically, sections four through ten address the issue o f agrarian and natural resources
reform and land reform. The problems tackled in the national governing document were
meant to address and emphasize the importance to future governments o f taking care o f
the elements o f both rural and urban poor. These elements were o f particular importance
to the Church as its traditional constituency, and they were also the same societal
elements that the Communist insurgents targeted for recruitment.
A healthy nation required uplifting all citizens. Tackling the large hacienda
owners was the first task the Church felt was necessary, and the state itself was one o f the
largest landowners in the Philippines. Prying the land away from elite families was
certainly politically risky, but redistributing the state’s lands was less so. Indeed, Aquino

n Keith B. Richburg, “Filipinos Criticize Aquino Over Shooting: Church Stresses
Absence o f Land Reform,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Washington
Post (January 26,1987; accessed 13 September 2001).
12Ibid.
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enjoyed the wealth produced by her family’s hacienda, and she showed little sign o f
moving to redistribute her own land or pressuring the other large landowners to do the
same.
The state, with its immense holdings, was a different story. Targeting large tracts
o f government land was not as politically risky as targeting elites and not nearly as
hypocritical. It was to be the first step in giving something to the poor, landless farmers.
Section six reads, “The State may resettle landless farmers and farm workers in its own
agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.”
In urban areas such as Manila where thousands lived literally on mountains o f
garbage, the need was urgent. The Church pressed the Aquino regime and the
constitutional committee to address this need. It was successful, and section nine o f the
1987 Constitution put into law the general principle that it is the state’s duty to help
alleviate the problem o f urban poverty and provide the basic needs o f life. It reads:
The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with
the private sector, a continuing program o f urban land reform and housing which
will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to under
privileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall
also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation o f such program the State shall respect the rights o f small
property owners.
The constitution also addressed the abuses o f public trust, the sort o f abuses the
Church decried that were rampant during the Marcos era. Article XI, section one
declared that employees “must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.” It also took steps to curb the military’s power, barring any
member o f the military from engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities.
It prohibited the imprisonment o f individuals based on their political beliefs and
aspirations.
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Some o f the most outrageous past abuses by the government and the military were
violations o f basic human rights. Curbing government and military influence also meant
curbing the possibility o f repeated abuses. The constitution went further in specifically
addressing human rights issues, and there are several striking and clearly Churchinfluenced aspects, including the establishment o f a human rights commission in Article
XIII.
Family issues were also addressed, and this was clearly the fruit o f the Church’s
labor on the various committees. The unique focus the Philippine Constitution has on the
Filipino family is remarkable in that it explicitly addresses issues o f marriage and
children along the lines o f the Catholic Church. In Article II, section twelve it reads that
the state "shall equally protect the life o f the mother and the unborn from conception,"
effectively ending abortion. The anti-abortion clause was the work o f the Catholic
representatives on the committees, but the Church was also successful in two other major
constitutional provisions.
The first was Article XV, entitled simply “The Family.” In a few amazing
sentences the Philippine Constitution, and thus the government itself, takes a direct
interest in the welfare o f not just individuals but the traditional, Church-sanctioned
heterosexual family unit. Sections one and two read:

The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation o f the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation o f
the family and shall be protected by the state.
In those few sentences, the Philippine Constitution strengthens and supports the
family unit with the fall backing o f the government itself, and makes divorce, for all
intents and purposes, illegal.
Finally, the Church’s influence is found in yet another major part o f the
constitution. Remembering the role o f the BCCs, NASSA, NAMFREL, the CBCP, and
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even earlier efforts by Catholic-sponsored social organizations to fight social injustice
and how Marcos tried to crush them all, the new constitution addressed the issue o f
“People’s Organizations.” Indeed, it was the Church’s work through these “People’s
Organizations” that facilitated the first People Power revolution. Therefore, the basic
idea of such organizations’ value and usefulness was realized in 1986. One year later as
the constitution was being penned, the importance o f these groups was not lost on the
drafters.
In Article XIII, sections fifteen and sixteen it states:

The State shall respect the role o f independent people's organizations to
enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework,
their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful
and lawful means. People's organizations are bona fide associations o f
citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and
with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure . . . The right o f
the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation
at all levels o f social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be
abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment o f adequate
consultation mechanisms.
The 1987 Constitution is a remarkable document in so many ways and a testament
to the revitalization o f the democratic ideals and the spirit o f freedom. Even today,
reading the words is a refreshing experience to those who appreciate a government built
upon egalitarian principles that uplift and protect less fortunate elements o f society. One
can feel within each paragraph the hard work o f the committee members who poured
every ounce o f commitment they had into creating a set o f laws and principles based on
the ideas they felt God had endowed naturally to humankind. The document was so
loved by the people and the Church that it found easy ratification, and future efforts to
alter these words met with stiff opposition.
With the new constitution being handled and overseen by trusted officials,
including clergy, Aquino turned her attention to local government matters. Marcos had

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

204

stocked the various mayoralties with his cronies and the city councils with an equally bad
lot. Aquino believed that dealing with this problem required drastic measures, so she
began the wholesale firing o f more than seventy provincial governors, 1,600 mayors, and
more than 10,000 council members.
The firing o f so many elected officials was an unexpected and a politically daring
move by Aquino. The officials’ dismissal was justified as necessary to purge the
polluting elements o f the Marcos administration. Firing them was the easy part. The
difficult task was replacing them, because Aquino had no intention o f allowing elections
to replace these individuals. She was smarter than that, knowing that elections might
only bring back the sort o f riff-raff she had just purged. She chose instead to appoint
officials to fill the offices.
Appointment instead o f elections may have violated the type o f democratic
principles that Aquino and her new government stood for, but it was a necessary step.
There was a danger that if elections were held, the result would be widespread corruption
and voter fraud at the local level, resulting in the reinstallation o f the very Marcos cronies
she had just fired. Rather than allow any o f the Marcos corruption to taint her
administration, she chose instead to follow her own conscience and sought the Church’s
advice before making any appointments.
To illustrate how involved the Catholic Church was in this appointment process,
one need only note that before making an appointment, the administration held
consultations with local bishops and priests.1 The consultations with the Church at this
level illustrate the political power the Church enjoyed throughout the Aquino
administration. Church involvement in choices o f a few cabinet-level offices is amazing
in itself, but to have a hand in choosing hundreds o f local officials is another level o f
influence altogether. It demonstrates the political penneation that was thorough by this
time.
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Aquino rightly believed that besides being worthy o f her trust, these local-level
Catholic officials were in the best place to judge office holders’ suitability.13 These
priests, like the friars before them, were in the trenches doing the dirty work while others,
such as Cardinal Sin, were more nationally recognized. Sin could never have given an
informed opinion on each of the vast number o f council seats to be filled. However, these
local-level priests did so with authority and the kind o f expertise that came from living
their entire lives in the communities. They knew the families better than anyone, being
present at community marriages, baptisms, and funerals. The type o f information that
comes from knowing a community and its members from cradle to grave could only be
gleaned from local-level priests.
Aquino’s cabinet, local appointments, and constitution were all issues tackled
during her first year in office. Through it all, the Church and its leadership were there to
offer assistance when needed. Each o f these and other actions helped the Aquino
government become thoroughly ensconced in power and provided a little breathing room
for one man who needed it—Cardinal Sin. Feeling that he had made his contribution to
Philippine politics, Sin thought it wise to step back and evaluate his position. In March
o f 1987, the Archbishop made a decision and surprised everyone with a statement
regarding his political future.
He announced that he was withdrawing from the political arena. To some this was
no doubt a welcome sign o f a return to normalcy in politics, especially to those who
feared the Church as a political rival. To others, it was a shock and a sad day knowing
that the Philippines were losing one o f the most effective and charismatic political figures
in history. Cardinal Sin did not simply announce his retirement from politics, he went a
step further and recommended that other clergy do likewise. “From here on in I shall

13Keith Dalton, “Cardinal Sin Steps Down from Political Stage,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Sydney Morning Herald (March 6, 1987; accessed 10
September 2001).
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stay in the background," he said, "I shall not talk too much. I shall be avoiding the
limelight."
Sin denied that his decision was due to pressure from the Vatican or the Pope. No
matter what side o f the issue one was on, one did not have time to savor Sin’s retirement
very long. In a matter o f weeks, he was back injecting himself into political matters. Sin’s
retirement was brief, maybe one o f the shortest political retirements in history. It was not
long before he was pulled back into the strife-torn world o f Philippine national politics.
There was really no other choice. Aquino needed his support and that o f the Church if her
administration was to survive the turbulent times ahead.
Part o f the reason Aquino needed the Church was to counterbalance the military’s
influence and power. The military was constantly shifting, trying to gain as much power
for itself as possible. This often meant that during the Aquino government the military
and the Church clashed. Indeed, they were not on the best o f terms to begin with, having
been at odds throughout martial law. The bad relations between the Church and the
military had started more than a decade before when the Marcos administration chose the
path o f martial law and the Church dedicated itself to the "liberation" o f the poor. The
army, at the behest o f Marcos, was used to fight the left-wing Communist insurgency that
thrived in impoverished areas.13
On more than a few occasions, the battle against the Communists led to the
persecution of Church members. Many in the military seemed to find it difficult to
distinguish their left-wing enemies from the priests and nuns. Thus, they were equally
harassed. This left bad blood between the Church and the military, differences healed
only temporarily by the Church-military alliance to bring down Marcos and install
Aquino as president. Even this alliance was partial, and many elements remained loyal to
13

•

Gustav Niebuhr, “Friction Between Philippine Armed Forces, Catholic Church
Sparks Growing Violence,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 29 November 1987, sec.
A, p. 1.
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Marcos or stayed on the sidelines awaiting the final outcome o f the 1986 special elections
and the People Power movement.
The Church did not fear the military and sought to counterbalance it at all levels
through its own power and influence. The military had to respect the Church, both
during the Marcos era and the Aquino administration, because the Church remained the
only institution in the Philippines with both a nationwide communications network and
the legitimacy to use that network for political purposes. This network proved invaluable
in pressuring Marcos to leave and in protecting those elements o f the military that needed
shielding during the Enrile-Ramos defection.
Until his final days in Malacanang palace, Marcos fought a bitter war o f words
with the Philippine bishops, particularly Cardinal Sin. Just before fleeing into exile,
Marcos uttered words that evidenced the Church’s important actions. He made no
mention o f the military, but he accused "priests and nuns" o f working hand-in-glove with
Communists to bring him down.14 To the military’s chagrin, the Church’s authority
continued to increase in Philippine society.
In spite o f or because o f its own actions, the Church became the only independent
institution outside o f government control. Citizens no longer turned to independent
mayors and congressmen to try to get grievances redressed. The average person had but
one place to go for a reliable solution, and that was the priest. All o f this meant that the
military remained suspicious o f the Church even after Aquino’s victory, and the feeling
was mutual.
The suspicions about the Church were well grounded. Aquino’s administration
rested on shaky ground more than a few times during her tenure. She was caught
between the generals and the bishops, but it was the military that threatened her
government’s stability, and it was the Church that helped bring her through each coup

14Ibid.
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attempt. The Church held more o f the cards, having brought People Power to the
forefront and using its high-profile position to effectively support Aquino through the
various nefarious plots.
The military-sponsored coups proved the most serious challenges to Aquino’s
government. Some o f the coups the Church faced do wn were not severe, such as the
Manila Hotel incident, in which the conspirators were punished with thirty push-ups and
allowed to go back to duty. But others were serious grabs at power.15 For example, in
1989 elements o f the right-wing Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (RAM) seized
portions o f Makati and threatened destruction o f the presidential palace. The military
never wholly supported Aquino and their its failed, but not without a cost in political
capital and human life.
Aquino did not have the military’s complete loyalty, but she did have General
Ramos and the Catholic Church on her side. At the height o f the coup plotting, Cory
turned to the Church and Cardinal Sin to join her in a meeting with top military officials
at the Malacanang palace. It so happened that one o f the plotters was none other than
Juan Ponce Enrile, one o f the aforementioned plotters o f the Marcos era. It was not
enough that Enrile had been given the defense portfolio during the Aquino
administration. He had his eyes on the president’s seat and ruling the country. Instead o f
helping Aquino build the country, he was determined to overthrow her government.
Although he was never labeled a traitor, Enrile’s actions can be seen in a treasonous light.
It is peculiar to Philippine politics that he was allowed to go free and even later was
elected a senator, as was former coup plotter and RAM leader Gregorio Honasan.16

15Ibid.
16Carlito Pablo and Fe Zamora, “No Link with Estrada Loyalists: Young Officers
Head Held for Questioning,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Manila Times
(October 25, 2001; accessed 23 August 2002).
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During the tense days against Marcos, it was Cardinal Sin and the Church who
rallied around Enrile, protecting the defense minister from Marcos’s guns with the
Church faithful. Yet after the People Power victory, Enrile began plotting to overthrow
the very government his earlier actions had helped establish, and he made an enemy out
o f the very Church that had saved his life.
The particular plot in question was a serious power-grabbing attempt dubbed
“God Save the Queen.” Enrile’s plotting included a plan to depose Aquino and place
himself as head o f a military junta. The particulars o f the coup are not important, but
what is important is that it failed to succeed, in large part because o f the actions and
pressure brought by the Catholic Church. Aquino needed the Church’s support and the
cardinal’s advice, and she asked Sin to postpone his trip to Rome and to see what he
could do to help the situation.17
With some forces still loyal to Aquino and headed by the stem and dependable
Fidel Ramos, Cory had some breathing room. The Church gave her more. Cardinal Sin
placed a call to Enrile just as Aquino had wanted, and he attempted to persuade him not
to go through with his attempts to seize power.18 Sin focused on Enrile’s own
responsibility as a cabinet member who was not supposed to be talking o f coups but
coordinating and supporting Aquino’s administration. He emphasized the magnitude and
futility o f the coup, and Cardinal Sin laid the responsibility for any bloodshed on Enrile.
Still fearing plotters, Cory asked again that Sin stay and not go to Rome, and he
agreed.19 She herself stated publicly that any coup attempts by “misguided elements”
would be met with People Power.20 In the end, the coups were aborted and Enrile was

17Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 158.
18Ibid., 221.
19Ibid., 224.
20Ibid., 227.
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forced to resign. He is lucky he was not jailed or worse. Attempts to topple Aquino
failed repeatedly, largely because o f her continued appeal as the embodiment o f the
pasyon and the Catholic Church’s support. Both o f these things acted as buffers to her
popularity and her political control and helped secure the administration by
characterizing any attempts to topple her via a coup or legislation as a rebellion against
God.21
The Philippine Catholic Church staked its very prestige and reputation on
Aquino’s success. It was a political marriage. She was the Church’s darling until the
very end. She was the bride, the Church’s personal selection as president, legitimized by
the Catholic vote and by the Catholic Church. Cardinal Sin and the rest were not about to
abandon her fortunes to those military elements that sought to illegally seize power. Not
content at merely supporting the president herself, the Church shored up her
administration by campaigning for, supporting, and endorsing Aquino’s own slate o f
candidates for the congress during midterm legislative elections. In response, Aquino
was thankful and always devout, even at times praying her rosary on national television.
As if dealing with disgruntled elements o f her own military were not enough,
Aquino inherited several active rebellions and separatist movements from Marcos.
Among these were various Islamic separatist groups located in the southern archipelago
on the islands o f Mindanao, Sulu, and Jolo. There was also a Communist insurgency that
still held on to the antiquated idea o f overthrowing the democratic government and
establishing a Marxist regime. The National Democratic Front (NDF), the Communist
Party of the Philippines’ (CPP) political front organization, led the charge during the
Marcos era along with its armed element, the New People’s Army (NPA). Both the
Communists and the Muslim separatists threatened the life and property o f thousands o f
Filipinos and the stability of Aquino’s government.

21

Casper, Fragile Democracies, 152.
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Marcos’s method o f dealing with the Muslims and Communists was to crack
down on them. He launched military attacks against them throughout his administration.
Attacks instead o f reconciliation created deep wounds o f mistrust between the
government and the rebels. The level o f mistrust on both sides seemed almost
insurmountable. Moreover, during this period Marcos often lumped the Church’s
socialist activity in with the Communists, justifying his attacks on both the NPA and on
the Catholic Church. Yet the Church was never an ally to the NPA, nor was it an enemy.
As mentioned earlier, there were some leftist elements o f the Church that were not far in
their ideological views o f social reform from many o f the leftists in groups like the NPA,
and there were a few priests who officially joined the Communists. Where they differed
was in the use o f violence and removing God from the center o f their ideology . It may
seem ironic that a priest would join and fight for an ideology that at its core was antiGod. It is just another example o f the strange alliances that distaste for Marcos created in
the Philippines.
In dealing with the Communist insurgency after the 1986 election, the Church
was again aligned with Aquino. Or it may be better stated that Aquino was more in line
with the Church’s position. The Philippine Catholic Church’s hierarchy continually
rebuffed efforts by some Communist leaders to be included in a power-sharing role after
Marcos’s downfall.

99

This was a change in posture after Aquino’s assumption o f power,

as the Church had been in careful collaboration with leftist groups throughout martial
law. With Marcos deposed, the Church could afford to take a stronger stance against
leftist elements both in the New People’s Army (NPA) and in the Church itself.
More decisively, the bishops decided to assert their own authority over the
Church’s National Secretariat for Social Action, a body that proved successful in
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countering some o f the negative aspects o f martial law but had for a decade been widely
suspected o f being under the control o f NPA sympathizers who were siphoning off funds
to support various guerrilla organizations.23 With Aquino installed and made legitimate,
the Church was not about to share its power with leftist insurgents. The military had to be
dealt with on relatively equal footing, but Communist rebels could be overshadowed.
The Communists made it easier given their ridiculous demands for power sharing.
The National Democratic Front’s own proposals for “nationalistic foreign policy”
included the immediate closing o f United States military bases on the islands and
removal o f Catholic-based education from the islands’ school systems. Both o f these
requests were inconsistent with the Church’s goals.24 The Church could tolerate the
United States bases in 1986 and preferred to wait for negotiations to resolve the base
issue once the lease expired. Indeed, the Americans were a potential military force to be
tapped if Aquino needed extra firepower to ward off coup attempts. This is precisely
what happened in 1989. Little mention need be made o f the demand for Marxist-based
education, because that was something completely intolerable to the Church.
Denying the Communists’ demands on the American base issue and on the
education system did not mean that Cory opposed a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
And with the Church on her side, it seemed that such a resolution was feasible. One step
briefly discussed earlier in the chapter was her creation o f a Commission on Human
Rights. The Commission was headed by Pepe Diokno and included Church
representation at all levels. Sister Marianni Dimaranan was the former head o f Task
Force Detainees, which during martial law was the largest national Church-backed
human rights organization. She was the Church’s chief representative on the Commission

23“Philippine Rebels Said to Get Funds From Bishops,” [Wire Service OnlineDow Jones Interactive] Washington Post (February 5, 1988; accessed 3 November
2001 ).
24“Philippine Rebels Jar Conservatives, Church,” Chicago Sun-Times.
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on Human Rights. She had spent much o f her life documenting abuses committed by the
military and paramilitary groups during the Marcos administration and was the perfect
choice to sit on the Commission.
The 1987 Constitution included Article X, which allowed for establishment o f an
autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao. The region’s organization was to be based on
religion, cultural heritage, and the economic and social structures o f the people living in
those areas. It was hoped that by giving concessions to the separatists, peace could be
achieved. Cory’s administration went a step further by taking police power out o f the
constabulary’s hands and placing the responsibility o f peace and order with local Muslim
police.26 As chapter 3 mentioned, the Philippine constabulary was notorious for its abuse
o f peasants and minorities. It was corrupt and often used private armies controlled by
wealthy landowners and corrupt politicians. Just as the Huks had banded together to
police their own areas, Cory’s deal allowed the Muslims to provide a police force to take
care of their own.
Aquino’s attempts at making peace with the rebels had both high and low points
during her six-year term, but even in her presidency’s waning years she did not give up
on the peace efforts or fail to include the Church as part o f the solution. As late as 1990,
Aquino was quoted as saying she intended to "invite the leaders o f the private and Church
sectors to join the government in convening a national peace conference so that we can
work out, resolve and act to attack the deep sources o f our divisions, our conflicts, our
injustices and inequities in society which are obstacles to peace."27 Until the end she was
searching for peace for her fellow Filipinos, no matter their creed or religion.

25Komisar, Corazon Aquino, 141.
Philippine Constitution, art. 10, sec. 21.
27Robert H. Reid, “Aquino Calls for Decade o f Peace in Philippines,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (January 1,1990; accessed 12
November 2001).
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While Aquino’s efforts ended with her leaving office in 1992, the Church’s
activities as a peace broker spilled over into the administration o f Fidel Ramos. Ramos, a
Protestant and former general under Marcos, had helped bring Aquino to power during
the People Power revolution. Under Aquino, he served as defense minister and won a
narrow plurality to become president o f the Philippines. One o f the first questions posed
to Ramos was how, as the first Protestant leader o f a predominantly Roman Catholic
country, he could forge a working and lasting relationship with the Catholic Church.
Ramos had to appease the Church because he was not its ideal man for the job. He
was not Catholic and did not initially cater to Cardinal Sin or other bishops, so
hisrelationship with the Catholic Church was precarious. At times he clashed with the
Church head on, and at other times they worked in unison. His strength lay in his ability
to get things done without worry o f coup attempts. Secure in his position as president, he
could deal directly with both the economic and political troubles that had plagued
Aquino. Chief among these troubles were the insurgency movements and dissident
groups, both areas where the Church proved useful to Ramos’s efforts.
The problem o f insurgency was not going away. On February 15,1992, the NPA
ambushed government soldiers on the island o f Mindanao, killing forty-one people and
highlighting the real danger that still existed from the groups. Early in his administration,
Ramos declared "national reconciliation" the highest national priority. He legalized the
Communist Party and created the National Unification Commission (NUC) to lay the
groundwork for talks with Communist insurgents.29

28

•

•

Sandra Burton, “Stepping Into Cory’s Shoes: Fidel Ramos Succeeds President
Corazon Aquino o f the Philippines,” Time, 15 June 1992, 41.
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In September 1992, Bishop Fernando Capalla o f the CBCP and Feliciano Carino,
secretary general o f the National Council o f Churches o f the Philippines (NCCP), joined
the nine-member NUC, which was entrusted with formulating a national reconciliation
program to resolve problems with dissident groups. Government efforts under Aquino
and Ramos had come up short alone, and Ramos realized that true peace needed to
incorporate the religious, including the Catholic Church. It was time to give the Church
and its leadership a real try to end the conflicts that directly affected domestic stability
and international relations with nation-states such as Malaysia and Indonesia. These
nation-states had a direct interest in seeing the separatist movements in the Philippines
quelled, lest they encourage their own dissidents.
The CBCP and the NCCP also formed the Joint Committee for Peace. Philippine
churches, along with other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), initiated peace
consultations at the local level.30 In June 1994, Ramos signed into law a general
conditional amnesty covering all rebel groups, as well as Philippine military and police
personnel accused o f crimes committed while fighting the insurgents. In October 1995,
the government signed an agreement bringing the military insurgency to an end.
Although outstanding differences remained and many o f the underlying social problems
were not addressed, the actions Ramos and the Church took removed the threat to
government stability posed by the Communists and Muslim insurgencies.
The Ramos government also worked with Catholic and Protestant church
organizations on projects and programs to protect the environment, improve the
socioeconomic wellbeing o f the poor, and address a growing Vietnamese refugee
problem.31 It did so because the government itself remained staffed with a large
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contingency o f men and women who were educated in the most prestigious Catholic
universities in the Philippines. These universities continue today to act as feeders for
personnel in the Philippine government. Through the education process, the Catholic
Church ensured its survival and guaranteed that those sympathetic to its agenda remained
in power.32
Cooperation to alleviate the problem o f insurgencies and social welfare projects
did not mean that Ramos’s relationship with the Church was always smooth. Quite the
contrary, he would raise the Church’s ire on numerous occasions, including his move
towards “family planning” and changing the 1987 Constitution, a move that would come
to be known as “Cha Cha,” short for Charter Change. His first clash with the Church was
over the issue o f family planning. Ramos addressed the Philippine Congress about the
country's population growth rate and endorsed a family planning program that met with
stiff Church opposition.
Remembering that the Church itself had made sure abortion was outlawed in the
1987 Constitution, Ramos took his appeal directly to the people. Passing out condoms,
something Cardinal Sin once called only fit “for animals,” angered conservatives within
the Church. Whether Ramos liked it or not, he was president o f a Catholic nation, and he
was president in large part because the Church had supported his candidacy. He
remained president in large part because the Church thought him adequate for the task.
Indeed, he owed his life to the actions o f Cardinal Sin and others who put their own lives
on the line to protect Ramos at Camp Crame when he defected from the Marcos camp
during the People Power revolution. But the past was the past, and during his tenure as

Esteban A. De Ocampo, The First Filipino Diplomat (Manila, Philippines:
National Historical Institute, 1978), 94.
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president his actions earned him the moniker “Infidel” Ramos from his Catholic
opponents.33
Being labeled an infidel by the Church was in stark contrast to how Ramos was
initially embraced. Early in his administration, Ramos was invited to speak at Catholic
gatherings, including crowds o f hundreds o f thousands in Luneta Park where he and
Cardinal Sin appeared onstage at a rally against poverty. But the honeymoon period
between Ramos and the Church did not last.
Besides the abortion issue that resulted in him being labeled an infidel, the pivotal
event in the Ramos-Church relationship was his consistent desire to change the provision
o f the 1987 Constitution that would allow him to run for a second six-year term. This
became known as “charter change,” or “cha cha” for short. As evidence has shown
earlier, the 1987 document was no ordinary constitution. It was a Catholic document,
penned and ratified through the hard work o f the Church and the martyrs o f Marcos’s
state violence. It was written to fit their needs and peppered with protective mechanisms,
such as the six-year term limit, to keep the Church and the Philippine population from
experiencing a repeat o f the Marcos era. The drafters were not about to let Ramos or any
government official run roughshod over their hard-fought victory. Tampering with the
words o f the constitution was akin to editing the Bible itself for many in the Church.
Cardinal Sin again led the political fight that ensued between Ramos and the
Church. It was man o f the cloth versus man with the gun and Catholic versus Protestant,
and the prize was either the salvation o f the 1987 Constitution or another six years o f
Ramos. The Church did not hold back on its rhetoric against Ramos. It accused him o f
attempting to stay in power at any cost, even being willing to throw the Philippines back
in the dark ages. To add to the rhetoric’s impact, the Church made many o f its statements
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on carefully timed days. For example, on the fourteenth anniversary o f Ninoy Aquio’s
assassination, Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral letter reminding the Philippine nation o f the
trouble that would befall them should Ramos insist on staying in power. Sin’s alluding to
Marcos’s murderous actions and comparing them to Ramos’s desires to stay in power
was a bit overdone, but it was effective.
The two opposing camps could not have presented a starker contrast. One camp
had the president and the other had the Church o f People Power and Cardinal Sin, the
man who had led the Mass at Ninoy’s funeral, guided his widow to the presidency, and
called upon the flock to protect Ramos from the bullets o f Marcos’s assassin. Now this
same Cardinal Sin told the faithful that Ramos wished to throw progress away in a blind
pursuit of power. Sin blasted Ramos for not leading the Philippines with “enlightened
political responsibility, social stability and prosperity . . . ” but instead leading the country
“back into the dark ages o f pre-martial law political dynasties, warlordism, corruption,
sham democracy and debilitating poverty.”34 It was am impressive use o f the Church’s
power to persuade.
In other statements, the Church accused Ramos o f endangering the future o f the
Philippines with his charter change ideas. As if endangering the future and
impoverishing the nation were not enough, Sin even went so far as to warn that the
Philippines might become "another Cambodia," with civil war, murders, and executions
if Ramos got his way.35 Comparing what Ramos wanted to do with the evil inflicted upon
the Cambodian people by Pol Pot was certainly excessive hyperbole, but in a country

34“Filipino Cardinal Fights Re-Election o f President,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Seattle Times (August 24, 1997; accessed 23 October 2001).
35Jonathan Mirsky, “Manila Faces Civil War Under Ramos,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Times o f London (September 12, 1997; accessed 27
October 2001).
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where Cardinal Sin led a politically powerful political body, Ramos had to take it
seriously.
Ramos did not give up or back down easily. He and his allies struck back with
their own attempts to scare the public with predictions o f religious fundamentalism. One
pro-Ramos observer wrote, "It is a shuddering thought. This country could be the
Catholic equivalent of Iran. We will have a mullahtocracy, except that we address them
as monsignors."36 Such charges met with little public support. The Philippine population
did not believe or even fear a mullahtocracy o f Catholic monsignors, and there was no
danger of religious fundamentalism washing over the Philippines unless one considers 80
percent o f the population adhering to one faith and enjoying the Catholic Church’s
leadership to be a brand o f fundamentalism.
Ramos and his supporters should have known that their appeals to the fear o f
fundamentalism would come up short. They were in a position o f power with the help o f
the Church, and the Church was a part o f the fabric o f Philippine society and would be
there long after Ramos had turned to dust and his administration had faded from memory.
Had it not been for the Catholic Church, Fidel Ramos would probably not have had the
chance to become president at all.
This fact did not deter Ramos from trying to push through his charter change
ideas. His continued efforts to do so meant a head-on confrontation with the Church.
The Church and its allies, including former President Cory Aquino, threatened another
People Power-like demonstration should Ramos start a fight. Sensing that a showdown
was imminent, Sin called on the Catholic faithful to prepare for a rally against Ramos and
against charter change. In a prepared statement read just days before the proposed
September 21 rally, Sin said, "If you are against military rule and authoritarianism, if you
■jz:
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are for freedom, go to Luneta on September 21. If you are afraid, do not go to Luneta.
Luneta is only for the brave."37
Ramos’s allies countered the Church’s call for a rally and other efforts to
influence the legitimacy o f his administration. One group, calling itself the Philippine
Constitution Association (PCA), went so far as to formally request an intercession by
Pope John Paul II to stop Cardinal Sin’s “aggressive interference” in political matters,
arguing that he was sowing dissension in the country. In the letter, the PCA said Sin
"has been fomenting hatred and conflict" with his anti-charter change pastoral letters,
leading many Catholics to break away from the Church and join other religious
groups.”38
The letter further stated, “Many Catholics have stopped attending masses because
they don't want to hear political sermons . . . Some have even changed religion.” The
PCA did not say how many Catholics had broken away from the Church to join
opposition movements, but the number must have been miniscule because public opinion
data since Ramos’s era show no sign o f Catholic affiliation weakening among the
population.
Sin shrugged off the complaint, justifying his actions as being in line with the
spirit o f Vatican II. The Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines (CBCP) backed
Cardinal Sin. Pro-Ramos lawyers, with the full faith and support o f Ramos himself, filed
petitions against Cardinal Sin and his activities. In effect, it was an attempt to put a
national-level restraining order on the Archbishop o f Manila. The Philippine Supreme
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Court, however, sensibly ruled that lawyers Vincente Millora and Ricardo Valmonte
IQ

“failed to establish sufficient justification” and denied their request.
Seeing that the “stick” approach was not working, Ramos then tried the “carrot.”
Setting aside his rhetoric and his cronies’ attempts to silence the Church, he decided to
broach the matter with Sin face-to-face. Despite calls from within his administration to
keep the Church out o f political decisions, Ramos dined with Cardinal Sin at the
Malacanang palace and met with seven officials o f the Church’s governing body, the
Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines, led by Monsignor Pedro Quitorio. Both
occasions appeared to acknowledge the strong link between the Church and the business
o f government in the Philippines.40
Yet these meetings did not stop Ramos from continuing his efforts to counter the
mainstream Catholic Church by courting opposition and breakaway movements, such as
the charismatic Catholic offshoot group El Shaddai. With more than ten million
members, El Shaddai made a powerful ally for Ramos. Speaking at the thirteenth
anniversary o f El Shaddai’s founding, Ramos tried to circumvent the Catholic Church’s
negative reaction to his charter change ideas. Mike Verlade, the leader o f El Shaddai,
warmed to Ramos, foreshadowing his own slow move away from the mainstream Church
and out from under the shadow o f Cardinal Sin.41

39Carlos B. M. Santos, Norman P. Aquino, and Miguel C. Gil, “SC Affirms
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Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (August 25, 1997; accessed 12 October
2001).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

222

The Ramos-El Shaddai partnership did not deter the Church from its opposition to
charter change. Ramos had to admit and recognize the Church’s power and even met
several times privately with Cardinal Sin to try to politically negotiate himself out o f a
potential political mess. The mere fact that the president o f the Philippines was taking
time out o f his schedule to meet with religious leadership to discuss his political strategy
is more evidence o f the Church’s role as an important variable in governmental
legitimacy.
As a constitutionally elected president, it was Ramos’ prerogative to push any
agenda he wished within the scope o f the law. His attempts to chang the charter were not
illegal. They were, however, unpopular with the Catholic Church. It is for this reason
Ramos and his proposals were doomed to fail. Sometimes even as meetings took place
between Ramos and Sin, more than 3,000 priests and nuns rallied in front o f the
building.42
On other occasions, President Ramos showed up unexpectedly at Cardinal Sin’s
residence to reassure the Church that he had no plans to become a dictator and that the
constitutional changes were safe, and to ask the Church to call off rallies against his
administration 43 When reporters caught Ramos emerging one night from Sin’s villa,
they questioned him about the visit. Ramos simply responded, "I asked him to please
reconsider the planned rally on Sept. 21 because that would be counterproductive toward
our wish to heal the wounds o f the nation." He added that the mass demonstration would
just exacerbate differences. It is more likely that he was worried about being deposed or
wished to safeguard his legacy and not have it lumped together with Marcos’s.

42“Sin Ignores Ramos’s Plea to Call Off Protest,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Asian Political New (September 8, 1997; accessed 12 October 2001).
43Miguel C. Gil, Cecille M Santillan, and Carlo B. M. Santos, “Ramos Fails to
Stave Off Rally vs Charter Change,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
Business World (September 11, 1997; accessed 3 December 2001).
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The Church would not be silenced on this issue. It made noise over the charter
change proposal, both figuratively and literally. Churches nationwide rang their bells,
and Catholics blew their car horns in a noise barrage encouraged by the Church.44 This
noise barrage was the beginning o f the countdown to a September 21 demonstration.
Cardinal Sin, never one to miss the symbolism o f an event, organized the rally to
coincide with the twenty-fifth anniversary o f the imposition o f martial law in the
Philippines. The symbolism was there, and it was time for the substance.
Ramos and the Philippine Congress knew they had no chance and, fearing a
showdown with the Roman Catholic Church, eventually abandoned the idea o f charter
change. The call came after Ramos and his allies heard the announcement by Sin and
former president Aquino that they were going to mobilize more than one million people
at the September 21 rally. The rally went ahead as scheduled.
September 21, 1997, would prove once again how powerful the Catholic Church
remained. Before the event, questions swirled as to whether or not the Church would
produce the numbers they had promised in Manila and the rest o f the Philippines. Could
they convince enough people to turn out in a show o f peaceful protest against Ramos’s
charter change? These questions were answered with a definitive “yes.” An estimated
600,000 protesters poured into the streets in Manila, and more than 100,000
demonstrators gathered in Bacolod. Tens o f thousands turned out elsewhere in the
Philippines to send Ramos and his allies a strong message. That message was that the
powerful and influential Church was there and it was watching, and no one was going to
be allowed to tamper with its blessed constitution.
The rally o f 1997 was the exclamation point on the Ramos-Church rift. After
that, Ramos and the Church did not face off again on any large-scale issues. Ramos

44“Cardinal Sin Calls for Church Bell Protest Against Philippine Leader,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Toronto Star (September 5, 1997; accessed 12
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served out his term as president, which ended in 1998, and made no further attempts to
remain in power. However, Ramos never left public life completely. He still resurfaces
from time to time alongside Church officials at various national rallies, lending his
support to their continued political fights. Ironically, he is usually seen at these rallies
standing on stage, arm-in-arm, shoulder-to-shoulder with Cardinal Sin. In the
Philippines, old foes can be new friends again. The Church remains there with open arms
to welcome those who may have “lost their way.”
Ramos may have “lost” his way politically, but he was forgiven. This was so
because in the past he had been instrumental in helping bring Aquino to power and won
early favor with the Catholic Church. His missteps and mistakes in the eyes o f the
Church were his insistence on family planning and charter change. He was not, however,
an immoral man, at least in the eyes o f the Church hierarchy. Once out o f office, he was
redeemed to become a Church ally. The same cannot be said for Ramos’s vice president
and the man who would become the third president in the post-Marcos era, Joseph “Erap”
Estrada.
Joseph Estrada and the Catholic Church started o ff as uneasy allies because o f
Ramos’s charter change actions. The Church objected to the charter change on
constitutional grounds and out o f fears o f renewed dictatorship. Estrada objected because
had designs on the presidency, and a second Ramos term meant an end to those
aspirations. But their mutual dislike o f Ramos’s initiative was not enough to endear
Estrada to the Church. Estrada himself had the kind o f personal life that put him in the
same tabloidesque league with Bill Clinton and Ted Kennedy. Needless to say, he was
not a favorite o f the Catholic Church’s moral majority.
Before entering politics, Estrada was a movie actor. He was the star o f more than
100 films, and in real life he was fond o f playing Robin Hood-type roles and fancied
himself a champion o f the poor. He often compared himself to Ronald Reagan, although
that comparison is neither fair nor warranted and does a great disservice to Reagan.
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Estrada the politician was not much different from Estrada the movie star. Outside o f the
cinema and the legislature he was an admitted drinker, gambler, and philanderer. He was
never shy about his activities.
His movie career and his role as Ramos’s vice president had won him popular
support from the nation’s poor, but his lifestyle did not endear him to the Church. Once
its temporary solidarity had eroded with Ramos’s constitutional term, the Church ended
its moral cease-fire with Estrada. Subsequently, his declaration o f desire to run for the
presidency prompted Cardinal Sin to call for “morality” in the opposition. This call for
morality in an election where Estrada was sure to be the frontrunner was clear evidence
o f the Catholic Church’s early opposition against an Estrada presidency. It was in a way
a preemptive strike, one that was needed if the Church was to dampen Estrada’s
substantial support among the poor.
During the 1998 election, the Church’s support was important to all o f the
candidates. The election came down to who could gamer a plurality o f the vote, and the
Church’s support was considered crucial. At that time, the Church’s key figure was still
Archbishop Cardinal Sin. His vow to leave politics back in 1987 was never realized. He
never really left and reemerged repeatedly during the Aquino and Ramos administrations
or whenever “infidel” Ramos needed a good nudging in the “right” direction.
By 1998, public opinion polls showed that nine out o f ten adult Filipinos knew
who Cardinal Sin was, and among those surveyed, 69 percent trusted him.45 This level o f
tmst was unmatched by any official in or out o f the Philippine government. Cardinal’s
Sin’s tmst rating was built by the activities he had engaged in during the previous decade,
from People Power to preventing charter change. Any candidate in the 1998 election had
to take him seriously and take his public and private support o f their campaign into

451998 Social Weather Survey, done nationwide on 1,200 respondents o f voting
age, for a 3 percent error margin. SWS media releases may be verified on the webpage at
http://www.sws.org.ph.
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consideration. Even candidates like Estrada, who had little chance o f winning the
Church’s favor, were careful in their public criticisms o f Sin or the Church.
Estrada did not, however, pay the Church the deference that other candidates
showed. For example, during the 1998 campaign it was commonplace for candidates to
meet with Church officials. In fact, eight o f the eleven presidential candidates showed up
at forums organized by the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines.
Conspicuously absent from these forums was Joseph Estrada. He chose to avoid such
Church-sponsored forums, relying instead on the solid lead he had in the polls.
The situation vexed the Church. Although its official position and that o f
Cardinal Sin was “neutral,” it was clear to all observers that the Church did not want
Estrada to win the election. Coming to this conclusion was not difficult. Statements
from Church officials made it clear that Estrada was not the favored choice. Indeed, he
was a political pariah in their opinion. Keeping him out o f office was difficult because o f
the support he enjoyed with the masses. It was not that the Church did not control a
strong Catholic vote. The problem the Church faced was the sheer number o f candidates,
which split the Church vote. If the Church wanted to keep Estrada out, it needed to unify
the opposition.
Issues o f insurgency, abortion, and foreign policy became less important to the
Church as the election of May 11, 1998, got closer. The Church realized that a split in
the vote would allow Estrada to win. In an unprecedented display o f political
partisanship and with the Church’s blessing, Sin made a desperate attempt to ward off the
vote split. Throwing away any pretense o f impartiality, Cardinal Sin, acting on behalf o f
, the Philippine Catholic Church, urged the less popular candidates to withdraw from the
presidential race in order to keep an “unqualified” candidate from winning.46
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Sin did this so that the Catholic vote would not be split and divided among
candidates who may have been fine individuals but did not stand a chance at winning the
election. It was hoped that by having some o f the less popular candidates withdraw, a
strong and unified anti-Estrada vote could be mobilized. This sort o f influence, or some
may say “meddling,” in politics by the Church is astonishing to observers who have no
idea about the historical role the Church played in Philippine politics and legitimacy.
Though unparalleled in a place like the United States, the Church’s attempt to directly
affect the outcome o f a presidential election in the Philippines and install the sort o f
regime it wanted was and remains the norm.
Asking candidates to withdraw from presidential contention was not a foolproof
plan, for there was no guarantee that the candidates would do as the Church asked. If the
plan failed, the Church had other measures. The pastoral letter was again used to issue
political opinions from the Church. Sin issued a series o f letters to the Catholic dioceses
to be read in parishes throughout the Philippines. The sentiments expressed were simple,
to the point, and clearly anti-Estrada. The Church wanted parishioners to ignore the
various public opinion polls that showed Estrada in the lead.
The letters not only encouraged the voters to ignore the polls but also hinted that
the election o f the next president was a moral referendum on the Philippines itself.
Voters had more to consider than just personal interest, because their vote was to
illustrate the kind o f people they were by the kind o f leaders they elected. One letter
stated, “Our future depends most o f all on our choices, and especially on our choice o f
leaders. . . Listen to the voice o f conscience and do not be intimidated by survey results.
Our choice for president will show what kind o f people we want to become."47
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In a pastoral letter issued on May 3,1998, just eight days before the election, the
Church stated in a matter-of-fact manner that the most probable winner, Estrada, would
be disastrous for the Philippines. Any pretense o f impartiality was purged. Such bold
political statements, particularly aimed at bringing down a presidential candidate who
was merely exercising his political right to seek office, drew considerable fire from the
opposition. Sin’s reply to the criticism was in his usual affable fashion: “I am guiding
my people because if I do not guide, what kind o f shepherd am I?"
Sin was indeed a shepherd for the Church, and he wanted the flock to choose a
candidate that the Philippines could be proud o f and a person worthy o f imitation. This
meant a good Catholic and someone who would seek out the Church for counsel. In the
Church’s view, the Philippines must be united around a common positive moral vision
for the Philippines. These ideas were summarized in the Church’s pastoral letters, which
were direct attacks against candidates with links to the Marcos administration, and
particularly a womanizer like Estrada.
Other religious organizations entered the fray against the Church and in favor o f
Estrada. He may not have had the backing o f Cardinal Sin or the Catholic Church, but he
did have the backing o f the Iglesia ni Cristo, which declared its support for Estrada
during the campaign. The Inglesia was not as large, but its members were committed and
wealthy and its endorsement helped to further solidify Estrada’s wide margin in the polls.
Estrada was not above exploiting religion. A Catholic himself, Estrada used
elements o f the Church and its trappings to further his image as a “friend” o f the Church.
For example, when it came time to receive Mass and blessings from priests, Estrada
usually surrounded himself with the poor, who he claimed to be the champion o f during

48Marcus Gee, “Vote Pits Church Against State: A Philippine Archbishop Takes a
Tough Stand in Campaign for President,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
Globe and Mail (April 27, 1998; accessed 1 November 2001.
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his campaign.49 These and other blatantly political actions that exploited religion
appalled many, but it never stopped Estrada from joking about it during the campaign.
Buoyed by his lead in the polls, Estrada could afford to make statements that left the
Church’s collective jaws on the floor, particularly in matters o f sexual indiscretions. In a
country where speaking o f sexual matters is taboo between adults even in private,
Estrada’s comments about then United States President Bill Clinton were outrageous. He
said, "Both President Clinton and I have sex scandals. But Clinton has the scandals, and I
have the sex."50 Such statements galled the Church.
Estrada also had allies in the public and private sector. Although it is unclear if
Estrada was behind any moves to shut the Church out o f its role as overseer o f elections,
there was a decision by the government-controlled Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to ban priests and nuns from helping monitor the May 11 election. The
timing seemed odd at best. COMELEC further ordered that in order for NAMFREL to
be accredited, Archbishop Sin and eight o f his religious associations must be dismissed.
This was further evidence o f the government’s desire to remove the Church from being a
factor in an Estrada candidacy.
Estrada’s allies were not against legal action to lessen the Church’s influence in
the 1998 election. As Ramos’s allies had done before, groups tried litigation to tie the
Church’s hands. One such group, the pro-Estrada Muslim Reform Party, filed a petition
calling for an investigation o f Sin for possible violations o f the Omnibus Election Code.
Party Chairman Alim Farouk Kali criticized Sin for his remarks that Vice President
49Ramoncito De la Cruz, “Ex-Actor in Lead for Filipino President, Markets Stay
Calm, but Church Concerned about Man Known as Champion o f Poor, A Hard Drinker,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Rocky Mountain News (March 9, 1998;
accessed 3 November 2001).
S0David Thurber, “Estrada Claims He'll Prove Critics Wrong,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (May 12, 1998; accessed 13 November
2001 ).
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Joseph Estrada was certain to win but unfit to govern the country because o f his
questionable character, saying the statements indicated his favoritism toward another
candidate. The Church and Cardinal Sin accepted the criticism in stride.
Unfounded and irresponsible litigation was one thing, but the Church had to be
careful o f its long time nemesis, the military. Whether it liked Estrada or not, it did not
want the military involved in the electoral process The Church wanted to make it clear
that any undue government influence in general or military involvement in particular
would be met with a powerful Church response. The Church did not want Estrada to win,
but it did not countenance cheating to affect the election’s outcome. Given the military’s
record, the Church’s caution was warranted.
Flexing its political muscle, the Church warned the military to stay out o f the
election. The Church declared May 10 as “the Lord’s Day,” and also stated that
Christians must oppose any form o f cheating. But if cheating did take place or the
military intervened in the free and fair elections, it would be opposed with "People
Power."51 Sin stated, "In case o f electoral fraud, people power, the people empowered
by the Lord, will not fail to prove anew God's special Providence and its democratic
institutions."
In the end the Church both won and lost, for the elections o f May 11, 1998, were
not fraught with cheating, but Joseph Estrada won. Estrada did not gamer a majority o f
the vote, but he did win the election based on a plurality o f the vote. It was not the
stunning victory reported in the worldwide press, for he received 34.6 percent o f the total
vote. The rest was split amongst a plethora o f less popular presidential candidates. The
Church was successful in keeping the majority from voting for Estrada, but it could not
keep one-third o f the voters from choosing a man o f questionable character.

51“Philippine Cardinal Warns Army to Stay Out o f Elections,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Press (May 4,1998; accessed 13
November 2001).
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The 1998 elections proved to be peaceful, and this was also a testament to the
Church’s enduring influence. While the Church may have not had a direct role in
electing Estrada, it was one o f the primary reasons the polls were safer than in the past.

52

Due to the rise o f the Church, civilians no longer dominated politics as they once had,
and factional poll violence declined. Church participation is o f particular importance for
democratic consolidation because it institutionalizes nonviolent participation. The
subculture o f violence and corruption was in some ways tamed by the Church’s activities.
The Church opposed condemning the national security state and economic
policies that emphasized efficiency and export at the expense o f the poor. It accelerated
political education and aid to nongovernmental and human rights organizations,
mobilized followers to monitor elections, staged rallies, and confronted regimes through
its Church-owned media. Its opposition to Estrada aside, the Church made sure that it
kept up its role o f the insurer o f free and fair elections, even if it meant the election o f a
man it did not want in office.
Estrada’s plurality victory was hardly a stunning rebuke o f the Catholic Church,
but it was evidence of the Church’s weakening electoral influence. There was little
chance that Estrada could have received that high o f a percentage without a sizable
number o f Catholics who had ignored the Church’s advisory and voted for Estrada. The
first round of the political fight between the Church and Estrada went to Estrada.
However, this fight was going the full twelve rounds, and as was illustrated earlier, the
Church would not wilt and go away. It would regroup to fight another day.
Estrada’s inauguration met with the usual pomp and celebration, but not the
exuberance the Church had offered to his predecessors. The Church had no intention o f
cutting Estrada any political slack, as evidenced by the lack of a honeymoon period.

52John L. Linantud, “Whither Guns, Goons, and Gold? The Decline o f Factional
Election Violence in the Philippines,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, no. 20 (December
1988): 298.
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Political tradition usually allows a new administration a honeymoon period. This period
is a time when the new president enjoys the well wishes o f even his defeated foes.
Estrada did not enjoy a honeymoon period. Cardinal Sin did not show up for Estrada’s
inauguration and no sooner had he won the election than the Catholic Bishops
Conference o f the Philippines (CBCP) began forming a committee to review
constitutional amendments Estrada intended to propose. Estrada, like Ramos, planned to
offer up a few minor constitutional changes during his administration.
The Church did not take its defeat at the polls lightly. It may have failed get the
desired results in the presidential election, but legitimacy in the Philippines comes from
more than the ballot box. To be legitimate in part means to be effective, delivering on the
utilitarianism discussed earlier. Estrada’s ability to maintain his popularity, to push
through his agenda, and to maintain his office had yet to be seen.
It was well known that Estrada had designs on the 1987 Constitution, the Catholic
Church’s baby. If his designs were real, then Estrada needed to prepare for a political
fight with the Church and a serious test for his administration. To the Church, the 1987
Constitution meant “the destiny o f the people . . . ” Any changes, even any talk of
changes, had to include a dialogue with the Church.53
Cardinal Sin also shot a preemptive volley across the Estrada administration’s
bow. The political volley was not meant to sink the new government, but merely to warn
Estrada against embracing corrupt elements o f the past. The Church and Sin feared a
return o f "former plunderers," referring to close associates o f the late Ferdinand Marcos.
One such “plunderer” was the business tycoon Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., one o f the most
powerful figures during the Marcos regime and a man who was cozy with Estrada.54 "I

53“Church to Join Cha-cha Effort,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
Business World (June 4, 1998; accessed 13 November 2001).
54“Cardinal Sin Blasts Return o f ‘Plunderers,’” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Associated Press (July 7,1998; accessed 13 November 2001).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

233

am worried about the ease that accompanies our dealing with the former plunderers of
our nation. Money is not the end o f everything. Friendship and utang na loob cannot be
the sole criteria for our decisions and actions," Sin stated.
Estrada gave little attention to the Church’s warnings, although at times he sought
the Church’s help for domestic initiatives. One such initiative was his much-vaunted war
on poverty. The Church and Estrada joined forces, at least rhetorically, in their efforts to
alleviate the persistent problem o f poverty. However, taking credit for the initiatives was
another story. Not wanting to give the president credit for the initiative, Cardinal Sin
made sure in public statements that it was the Church that thanked Estrada for joining it
in the war on poverty, instead o f the government thanking social organizations like the
Church for helping governmental efforts.55
Ramos’s family planning initiatives also continued during the Estrada
administration, drawing direct fire from the Church. Taking its cues from the Vatican,
the Philippine Catholic Church continued to be the most active opponent o f population
control in the Philippines. Politicians, wishing to balance the real need for population
control within the poverty stricken country with their own political needs, walked a fine
line between family planning and support o f Estrada and the Catholic Church’s very
conservative policy towards birth control.
Adding to the fire was the Church’s insistence that abortion o f all types remain
illegal in the Philippines, something Estrada was open to changing. Abortion was seen
by some o f the more liberal elements in Estrada’s government as one form o f population
control. Moreover, in a country where a baby is more likely than not to be bom in abject
poverty and a burgeoning sex industry fuels the rapid spread of HIV and other sexually
transmitted diseases, the Catholic stance showed its inflexibility. But this position did not
change.
55“Estrada, Sin Join Forces In Fight vs. Poverty,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Business Daily (September 22, 1998; accessed 3 December 2001).
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Other aspects o f the Church’s activities and influence during the Estrada years
were less conspicuous. For example, The Church injected itself into the Estrada
administration’s domestic policy, including the “conscience committee” that Estrada
appointed to review death penalty cases. The death penalty had always been a
contentious issue for the Church, and it tried during the writing o f the 1987 Constitution
to have it outlawed. However, it was unsuccessful and Estrada had every intention o f
reinstating the use o f the death penalty in certain instances. His inclusion o f the Church in
the matter demonstrated his own need to appease it as much as possible.
Estrada was also sensitive to the Church’s role in the use o f People Power,
although at the time he could not have imagined that People Power would be used to end
his presidency. He did know that its use helped secure the new era in Philippine politics,
an era he enjoyed and that led to his presidency. Trying to capture the spirit o f EDSA,
and some may say hijack it, Estrada created a commission to ensure the annual
commemoration o f the EDSA revolution. He even gave Cardinal Sin an honorary
membership on the commission.56
The smiles and handshakes went both ways between the Estrada camp and the
Church. Working with Estrada was a necessity if the Church wanted to accomplish
objectives such as staffing the bureaucracy. Filling political positions was important to
the Church, and it was wise to focus on those organizations that were beneficial to the
Church’s goals in the next election. The Church already controlled NAMFREL, but
COMELEC was another story. To help rectify this situation, the Catholic Church
strongly pushed for the appointment o f one o f its allies, Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, to the
highest post in the organization. Cardinal Sin, teamed with influential Archbishop

56“Erap: Keep People Power Alive,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
Manila Standard (February 9, 2000; accessed 3 December 2001).
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Ricardo Cardinal Vidal o f Cebu and other religious leaders, successfully pushed for the
appointment.57
The issue o f United States military bases was another area in which the Church
remained involved. In 1986, the Church was in favor o f keeping the bases open, but 1998
was a different year. Back in 1991, Cory Aquino and the Church had rallied to extend
the lease o f bases but failed to win support in the government, and as a result, the bases
were closed. Seven years later, the Church had removed all pretense o f support for
United States military activities in the Philippines. On the issue o f the United States
military, it seemed the Church took on the characteristics o f a political party. It had the
ability to shift and change its position. It was unlike other moral or religious issues, such
as abortion, on which the Church and its leadership never wavered.
Whereas in the late 1980s it had supported keeping the United States military in
the Philippines, the late 1990s saw the Church adopt a more nationalistic agenda, urging
the Philippine Senate to reject an accord that would allow United States troops to train in
the Philippines. Although the substance o f its claim is questionable, the Church believed
that a new pact with the United States would threaten the Philippines’ security.58 In a
Church homily, Cardinal Sin said the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was too vague
and opened the door to American placement o f nuclear weapons on Philippine soil.
Senate leaders recognized that Sin’s opposition “cannot be ignored.”59

57Cecille M. Santillan and Cathy Rose A. Garcia, “Church Leaders Name
Preference for Top Comelec Post, Palace Choice Known Soon,” [Wire Service OnlineDow Jones Interactive] Business World (October 9,1998; accessed 3 December 2001).
58

Jim Gomez, “Influential Church Leader Urges Philippine Senators to Reject
U.S. Pact,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (May 17,
1999; accessed 3 December 2001).
59“Philippine-US Defense Pact to Push Through Despite Objections: Officials,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (May 18,1999;
accessed 3 December 2001).
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The Church remained relevant because it remained important. In areas other than
politics, for example, the Church was often called upon to counsel and support the
government. Estrada, who during the campaign promised to bring a settled peace to the
trouble regions o f the Philippines, backed away from his initial proposals. He
unilaterally suspended talks with Muslim separatists and Communist rebels on the
southern island o f Mindanao. Senate Defense Committee Chairman Rodolfo Biazon
feared a resumed war and appealed to the Church and Cardinal Sin to pressure Estrada to
resolve differences through negotiation.60
Since the late 1980s, the Catholic Church in the Philippines had been actively
involved with peace efforts in the archipelago. Some o f these efforts were discussed
previously, as was the Church’s role as primary mediator between the insurgencies and
the State. The Church was also proactive in peace talks between the government and the
leftist New People’s Army. Estrada sought a role for the Church in helping his
government deal with both new and old threats to domestic peace.
Estrada’s administration called upon the Church to conduct talks with various
factions o f the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayaff, a more recent
insurgent threat that acted as a terrorist-kidnapping gang in the Mindanao-Sulu area and
purportedly had ties to Osama bin Laden. Church officials had in the past successfully
negotiated cease-fires between the government and these militants. The Church even
actively pursued a joint dialogue between priests and Muslim clerics in an effort to unite
the Filipino people from Luzon to Mindanao under a common cultural banner, all
evidence of the Church’s continued role in shaping and forming the Philippine identity.
Its work with the government did not stop the Church from criticizing Estrada’s
approach to peace. Whether it was a real attack on his failure to lead on the issue or just

60Raissa Robles, “Civil War Fears Amid Estrada Peace Tour,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] South China Morning Post (February 26, 1999; accessed
3 December 2001).
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another chance to weaken the legitimacy o f the Estrada presidency is a matter o f debate.
But the attacks were anything but mild. Cardinal Sin accused Estrada's government o f
failing to provide leadership amid the crises o f the Muslim insurgency, kidnappings and
bombings:

There is a growing perception that there exists a vacuum o f leadership. Even
government personnel, especially those with decision-making powers, cannot get
their act together . . . This situation will not leave us unless the government gives
us clear directions and a common course o f action . . . the people are clamoring
for a clearer, more analytical and more unified leadership.
President Estrada was willing to meet with the Catholic bishops about the way his
administration was handling the insurgency issues, even desiring an open dialogue on the
Church’s proposals to end the armed conflict. Meetings such as these with Church
officials helped Estrada maintain a balance in his own policy in the region. It also gave
him the opportunity to explain to the bishops in a fonnal setting his administration’s
policy.
Domestic policy was not the only area in which the Church was utilized during
the early Estrada administration. In the late 1980s and 1990s Church officials, including
Cardinal Sin, served as de facto ambassadors to China, probing the Chinese government
in matters o f religious freedom and reestablishing relations with the Republic o f the
Philippines. Sin, himself o f Chinese decent, visited China on several occasions serving
as an unofficial but extremely influential representative o f the Philippine nation.
The Church also pressured the government successfully on other foreign policy
issues. The most noticeable example was the situation in East Timor. East Timor had
recently voted for independence when Estrada took office. He had to balance his need
for good relations with Indonesia, from which East Timor was trying to break away,
61“Senior Philippines Church Leader Assails ‘Vacuum o f Leadership’ During
Crisis,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (May 20,
2000; accessed 3 December 2001).
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while being sensitive to the fact the East Timor was a predominately Catholic nation with
tremendous sympathy from his country’s population and the Church.
The Church admitted that the Philippines were too far from East Timor to be
directly affected by the turmoil there, but it drew parallels based on the commonality o f
their religion. The Catholic Church and its leadership, including Cardinal Sin,
consistently urged the Philippine government to exert pressure to stop the bloodshed in
East Timor, where anti-independence militias were murdering Catholics.62 Up to twenty
Filipino nuns and priests were in East Timor during the height o f the violence. "This
should stop . . . I am appealing to the [Philippine] Secretary o f Foreign Affairs and to the
ambassador o f Indonesia to the Philippines to exert moral pressure to stop further
bloodshed," Cardinal Sin stated.63
The pressure the Church exerted worked. Estrada agreed to commit 1,000 troops
to the peacekeeping effort and said the final number o f Philippine peacekeepers would
depend on a decision by the United Nations. He was also willing to offer $200,000 in
government funds to help the situation.64 The Philippine Catholic bishops also attempted
to pressure the United States to put American troops into East Timor and halt what they
described as Indonesian "genocide" in the mainly Catholic territory. Indonesia was also
targeted. More than 2,000 priests, nuns, Catholic schoolchildren, and activists and a
small group o f East Timorese added to the political pressure with demonstrations. These
protests were staged in front o f the Indonesian embassy.
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“Philippine Church Leader Urges Pressure to Stop East Timor Bloodshed,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (September 9, 1999;
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“The Philippines should help promote democracy in East Timor," said Cardinal
Sin, who led the nuns and priests at one o f these demonstrations. “We have been vigilant
about our democracy. We also want democracy to reign in East Timor." Estrada
welcomed the decision made by Catholic bishops and business leaders in Manila to send
humanitarian assistance to East Timor. Church groups also launched a campaign o f their
own to raise funds for humanitarian aid to East Timor. The National Secretariat for Social
Action, Justice and Peace and Caritas Philippines began a "Save East Timor" campaign.
NASSA hoped to solicit more from corporations, prominent personalities, politicians, and
major Catholic universities.
The cooperation between the Church and State regarding East Timor may
represent the best o f times for the Catholic Church an d the Estrada administration.
Having come to power in spite o f Church opposition, Estrada did not feel any particular
allegiance or affinity towards the Church or its leadership, but he had to be wary. Estrada
understood that because o f his lifestyle as much as his politics, he was a political target
for the Church. He needed to be careful in his dealings both domestically and
internationally to stave off the ever-present Church and its willingness to release pastoral
letters condemning Estrada for his missteps.
Estrada had at one time been aligned with the Church against Ramos in the debate
over charter change. As a witness to history, one would think that he would avoid such a
fight for his own administration. Yet he did not. Perhaps it was his own feeling o f
invulnerability based on his electoral success. Whatever the case, he chose to make
charter change an issue in his administration, and just as it had during the Ramos years,
the Church was there to meet the president in political battle. The new clash over
changing the 1987 Constitution would spark a series o f events that would make Estrada a
frequent target o f Church criticism and scrutiny. In a matter o f months he would be
embroiled in repeated scandals, all culminating in the call for People Power II and the
sudden and dramatic collapse of the Estrada administration.
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CHAPTER VI
THE POLLS, THE PULPIT, AND THE STREET

Joseph “Erap” Estrada was elevated to the office o f president through a large
plurality o f the vote in 1998. His popularity among the masses superseded any
politician’s at that time, and this popularity would prove to be a formidable hurdle for the
Church to overcome in its own efforts to influence policy and Estrada’s presidency. He
posed new challenges for the Church, because while it did not want him in office, Estrada
proved that without the Church he could still be elected and legitimized.
Estrada was the epitome o f the populous politician who attempted to use other
methods to maintain his legitimacy. He challenged the Church’s role as the mediating “z”
variable. Attempting to maintain the Church’s position as the “z” variable meant
inevitable confrontations between the Church and Estrada. Indeed, during the Estrada
administration it seemed the penchant for the Church to criticize his government and for
Estrada to blast the Church was matched only by the seemingly endless number o f calls
from both sides for “reconciliation.” The pattern seemed to be: assault-^ reconcile-^
assault again-> reconcile once more, all the while preparing for the inevitable final
political battle. This future battle could take many forms. It could happen at the next
election if Estrada survived, or it could happen in the streets should the Church come
across an issue that necessitated a People Power-type revolution to depose the president.
This chapter is therefore important in illustrating how the Church adapted its
strategy to fit the problem, and in the process emerged more politically powerful and
invigorated. Challenging Estrada’s legitimacy would require an adjustment in strategy,
and it was an adjustment that the Church was able to make. Through the use o f specific
instances from the Estrada administration, the reader will come to understand just how
the Church was able to manipulate events in its favor and eventually succeed in bringing
Estrada down.
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The previous chapter mentioned briefly how the Church and Estrada began his
administration with a hint o f cooperation. However, this cooperation had its limits, and as
Estrada pushed forward with his domestic political reforms in the second year o f his
administration, he had the backing o f the business community but not the Church.
Estrada’s main domestic project for the year 1999 was his Constitutional Correction for
Development (Concord), a fancy name for what had in the past commonly been called
“Charter Change.” As Estrada floated trial balloons for his own version o f “Charter
Change,” the Catholic Church hardened its stance against him. In time, the Church called
for a rally to denounce Estrada and what Cardinal Sin called the “cronies” o f the late
dictator Ferdinand Marcos who were influencing the Estrada administration.1 It was also
a very public way for the Church to express its displeasure with Estrada’s attempts to
change the constitution.
Estrada insisted that his changes were different from Ramos’s because he would
limit his changes to economic provisions, such as the ban on foreign entities owning land.
Any political changes he wanted to make would take affect after he was out o f office.
The Church did not support this argument. Cardinal Sin called Estrada’s plan a
“dangerous exercise,” fearing that opening the constitution to change would allow the
involvement o f what Sin termed “crazy people.”2 By opposing Estrada’s ideas for the
constitution, the Church and Cardinal Sin believed that they were doing their “duty” as
Philippine citizens by remaining “vigilant” so that the gains o f EDSA would not be lost.
The Church feared opening up the constitution to any change that might lead to an
extension o f term limits. This would allow a political enemy like Estrada to serve up to

1Cecil Morelia, “Aquino, Church Leaders Gang Up on Philippine Leader,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (July 30, 1999; accessed 8
August 2002).
2Ibid.
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twelve years in office, an unpalatable situation for the Church.3 It believed such a move
would endanger the fragile Philippine democracy, and it felt that general legislation could
address any economic problems and a constitutional assembly was unnecessary.
Estrada expected Church opposition and took his case for Concord to the press.
He argued that provisions in the 1987 Constitution hurt the nation’s economy because
they limited foreign investment. But words were not enough to convince the press or the
people. Estrada needed the support o f popular figures. If the mainstream Church was not
going support him, then Estrada had to find someone else. He did, and he soon trotted
out Brother Mike Velarde, the leader o f the Philippines' largest charismatic movement, El
Shaddai, and Estrada's spiritual adviser.
By having Brother Mike at his side Estrada hoped to illustrate that he had
“religious” support for his proposed changes. Velarde, who went against the Church and
Cardinal Sin by backing Estrada's presidential campaign, organized a birthday celebration
to coincide with a rally o f support for Estrada. It was no accident that this celebration
corresponded with the Catholic Church’s own planned rally against Concord.4 The rally
organized by Verlade and Estrada was expected to draw a larger audience, because while
the Church offered patriotism and rhetoric, Verlade and Estrada offered a festival
atmosphere and a chance for families to come and enjoy a free meal.5

3“Sin Taps Church Network vs Constitutional Change (Pastoral Letter’s Targets:
Cronyism, Threat to Press Freedom,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
BusinessWorld (August 1, 1999; accessed 22 November 2002).
Verlade’s actions drew heat from the mainstream Church, even to the point of
generating talk o f an official censure from the Church. The censure, had it proceeded,
would have been based on the “official” position that Verlade was transgressing Church
doctrine while preaching the gospel to his followers. The unspecified and unclear nature
o f the charge mattered little, for Verlade’s real crime was his unqualified support for
Estrada.
5Raissa Robles, “Free Food at Rally Expected to Draw Millions,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] South China Morning Post (August 18, 1999, accessed 8
August 2002).
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To counter Verlade’s and Estrada’s moves, the Church mobilized its power base.
Indeed, it had all it needed to counter Estrada’s moves, for it could work within
democracy and appeal to nationalism and Catholicism to counter his actions. Cardinal Sin
urged through a pastoral letter for the faithful to join the Church’s rally against Concord.
The letter was read during Mass in Catholic churches nationwide. In his letter, Sin
stressed past Church successes and exhorted parishioners to join if they “still believe in
freedom and you want our children to remain free, join me . . . for our rally for freedom.
Let us not wait until it is too late. Vigilance is the price o f freedom."6 In the letter, he
also linked Estrada with Marcos and called for "morality," "transparency," and "truth" in
Estrada’s government. Sin also said that the rally was a show o f “patriotism," and
patriotism was an expression o f the love o f God and the Church.
Estrada did not let the issuance o f the pastoral letter pass without a reaction. He
branded Cardinal Sin's statements as "lies" and "baseless accusations."7 Moreover,
Estrada believed that his actions would benefit the people and as such, he had God’s
support. "Despite all the insults [the Church] will make, similar to those o f Cardinal Sin's,
they cannot change my mind because I believe the voice o f the people is the voice o f
God," Estrada said.8 However, Estrada was careful not to push the Church too far. Just a
day after he issued his statement, he expressed hope that he and Cardinal Sin could sit
down to a nice lunch and patch up their differences.9

6“ Sin Taps Church Network vs Constitutional Change.”
7Donna S. Cueto and Blanche S. Rivera, “Palace Tells Critics: Erap no Marcos,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (September 22,
2000; accessed 8 August 2002).
8“Sin Taps Church Network vs Constitutional Change.”
9“Erap Turns Conciliatory,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Manila
Standard (August 17, 1999; accessed 17 November 2002).
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Estrada’s sober and conciliatory tone contrasted sharply with the angry rhetoric he
often directed towards the Church. But he was not alone in his criticism. Top
government officials also urged the Church leadership to refrain from preaching a
"gospel o f hate" against the Estrada administration.
Batangas Representative Ralph Recto, a member o f the administration’s Laban ng
Masang Filipino, called on Sin and other Church leaders to stop using the pulpit to raise
"alarmist statements" regarding Estrada and Concord.10 When August 20,1999, arrived,
the Church’s anti-Concord rally drew an estimated crowd o f more than 150,000 people.
The Church’s efforts from the pulpit paid huge dividends. People took to the streets in
several major cities to oppose Estrada’s efforts. In Manila alone, the number was
estimated to be 75,000. These rallies were the first large-scale public opposition
organized by the Church against Estrada’s administration. The Church framed itself in
the role o f valiant warrior opposing the oppressor. Those who came heard a litany o f
anti-Estrada propaganda, much o f it comparing his administration to Marcos’s. "We
fought a dictatorship then," said Josefina Fernando, a Franciscan nun who spoke to the
protestors. “We are here to prevent this government from ending up like that one.”11
The Church’s success at turning out tens o f thousands was a point o f pride, but
surprisingly it could not match the success o f the Verlade-Estrada rally held the same
weekend. That rally drew more than 600,000 people in metro-Manila. It was certainly
impressive, but neither Estrada nor Verlade could have believed the masses were there
simply to celebrate a birthday or support Estrada’s Concord. Indeed, they were there for
the festive atmosphere and the free food, and the politics o f the event were secondary. In
the end, the numbers at the Church rally might have not matched Estrada’s, but those in

^IbidL
11Jim Gomez, “Filipinos Protest Proposed Change to Constitution,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Seattle Times (August 20, 1999, accessed 8 August
2002 ).
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attendance at the Church’s rally were there with purpose, were politically astute, and
were active and did not show up simply for free food.
The Church claimed a moral victory that overshadowed Estrada’s numbers. "The
rally last Friday achieved its purpose. We said what we wanted to say. We manifested
openly, peacefully and emphatically our concerns, more specifically regarding the
proposal to change the Constitution. Now the ball is in the President's court," said
Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines President Archbishop Oscar Cruz.

10

With

both rallies considered successes, each side waited for the other to react.
Estrada’s reaction was quick and reconciliatory. He agreed to meet with Cardinal
Sin to discuss Concord. However, those plans were put on hold almost immediately. No
real excuse was given as to why Estrada changed his mind. Perhaps he believed the
numbers at his own rally provided him with the necessary political clout to demean the
Church’s role in the Concord issue. After his rally, Estrada belittled Cardinal Sin and the
Church’s political role, saying the Church and the cardinal should concentrate on
preaching spiritual and moral values and stay out o f his politics. "Maybe he [Cardinal
Sin] should leave the matter o f running the government to the duly-elected leaders—past
and present. We are the ones accountable to the people.”13
Estrada may have overlooked the Church’s role in his own legitimacy, but
advisors close to him did not. It seems that behind the scenes pressure was exerted after
his comments, and Estrada made a counter-announcement a few days later. He recanted
his earlier statements and vowed to “consult” the Church before making any changes to
the country's constitution. It was an astonishing about face. Estrada abruptly visited Sin’s
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“Church Waits for Signals from State,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Manila Standard (August 21, 1999; accessed 1 September 2002).
13“Erap: With Cory, FVR, Yes: With Sin, No,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Manila Standard (August 23, 1999; accessed 1 September 2002).
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residence for a late afternoon meeting. Although Estrada believed there were no
specifics to discuss, he said he felt the meeting was necessary to mend fences.14
Estrada also preempted speculation about whether or not the Church would play a
role in legitimizing possible changes to the constitution. After the meeting, he outlined
for the press his plans to appoint a preparatory commission whose sole purpose would be
to look over all proposed changes and come up with a specific plan to address the
constitutional amendments. Furthermore, he agreed to let the Church help select
members o f the committee. Lastly, Estrada promised that once the committee had
completed its work he would submit it to “his eminence."15
In a matter o f days, Estrada went from telling the Church to “stay out” o f politics
to including it in every level o f his decision-making process regarding the Concord.
Either he or one of his advisors realized that fighting the Church over changes to the 1987
Constitution was a losing battle. It was better to make the Church a participant in the
process itself and ensure its full support for any changes that might be made.
The Church accepted the president’s offer, but it never really felt comfortable
with Concord. Moreover, it continued to encourage street protests against “Charter
Change.” In September 1999, thousands marched in Manila's streets to mark the
anniversary o f Marcos’s declaration o f martial law. The rallies were not a mere
remembrance o f the past but were also tied to Estrada’s efforts with Concord. Rallies
were held simultaneously in thirty-two cities and provinces. Each gathering was a potent
mix of Church theology and political activism, with people waving anti-Estrada banners
and carrying images of the Virgin Mary.

I4“Erap Meets Cory, Jaime at Palace o f Archbishop,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] BusinessWorld (August 31, 1999; accessed 23 November 2002).
15Barbara Mae Dacanay, “Estrada Bows to Cardinal's Will,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] G ulf News (August 31, 1999; accessed 12 June 2002).
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Estrada’s pledge to include the Church was never fulfilled to the Church’s
satisfaction. There was really no way for Estrada to placate the Church, for it never
called off its vocal opposition against the administration’s plan for Concord. One Church
organizer, Father Robert Reyes, said that the Church-sponsored outpourings would “. . .
not stop until the President listens to the voice o f the people and stops pushing for
[Concord]."
Reyes said that the Church was committed to bringing more people to the streets
if necessary.16 Cardinal Sin added, "The moves to amend the charter now is a threat to
our democracy. The reasons for changing the charter are not clear. The character o f the
•

•

•

17

people who will be tasked with amending the charter gives me a nightmare.”

Estrada was unwilling or unable to concede his policies to the Church’s influence.
He did not want the Church to dictate the policy or the makeup o f any “Charter Change.”
It was better to strategically retreat from Concord at this point and regroup to fight
another day. In essence, the Church’s pressure worked and in January 2000, Estrada
announced that he would back off his plan to change the constitution.
The Church welcomed the move, sending out the figurative olive branches o f
peace. Cardinal Sin released a favorable public message via the Philippine press stating
that the Church was not Estrada’s enemy over Concord but was merely engaged in an
honest disagreement about policy. Sin offered a change in the tone o f political rhetoric,
saying, “I believe in the goodwill and good heart o f the President. Our criticisms o f his

16“Thousands March Against Cha-Cha,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] BusinessWorld (September 22, 1999; accessed 21 November 2002).
^Thousands Join Philippine Protest Rally,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Japan Economic Newswire (September 21,1999; accessed 17 November
2002).
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administration do not make us his enemies or oppositionists. We really want to make him
succeed."18
It is unlikely that Estrada was moved by the Church’s kind words, because he and
the Church knew it was matter o f time before they clashed again. Dropping Concord
from his domestic agenda earned Estrada some breathing room, at least publicly. He
made other favorable moves in his governmental appointments. The Church was
particularly pleased by the appointment o f Alfredo Lim as interior secretary. Lim's
appointment was seen as a “peace offering” to Cardinal Sin and ex-President Aquino.
In 1998, Lim had been Sin’s choice and the Church worked to get him elected. However,
like the other candidates, Estrada soundly defeated him.19 His inclusion in the Estrada
administration was a roundabout victory for the Church.
Estrada may have told the Church and the public that he was dropping the idea o f
Concord, but he was never through with his Concord propaganda. Estrada continued to
celebrate “Charter Change” as a personal and national priority. Although he had agreed
not to push for it in 2000, Concord was his pet project and ten days after publicly
shelving it, he claimed the press had misunderstood his true intentions. Far from
disposing o f the plans for Concord, Estrada said that he would “never backtrack” because
he fervently believed that change was necessary.20
Estrada’s behavior was not schizophrenic. Perhaps he believed that if he paused,
regrouped, and rethought his strategy he could take up the issue again in the future. At
1ft
“Sin Happy with Concord Deferment,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Manila Standard (January 11, 2000; accessed 12 June 2002).
19Jonathan Sprague and Antonio Lopez, “Act II for Estrada,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Asia Week (January 21, 2000; accessed 8 August 2002).
90
“Philippine President Says Moves to Amend Constitution Continue,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Manila Times (January 13, 2000; accessed 12
November 2001).
•
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the time, Estrada still had four years left in his term, plenty o f time to push through
constitutional change. Perhaps it was the result o f a leader’s inability to accept a political
defeat at the hands o f the Church, or maybe it was simply that he could not stomach the
patronizing statements in the press coming from Cardinal Sin and other Church officials.
Estrada continued to enjoy support from a large segment o f the population. He
believed, and rightly so, that close to half o f the population supported some form of
constitutional change. In the first four months o f 2000, the numbers only grew stronger.
Pulse Asia, in its March 2000 survey, found that 45 percent o f the population agreed that
the country's constitution needed to be amended. That was up from 39 percent during
September 1999. The ranks of those who disapproved o f the move, on the other hand,
dwindled from 57 percent to 44 percent during the same period.21 So why was it that
Estrada needed to bow to the Church’s wishes and its criticism o f his administration? Did
he not have a mandate from the people? Indeed he did, both from the 1998 election and
from the polls on Concord. Yet as this study has consistently illustrated numerous times,
without the Church’s support it is difficult to maintain the people’s support.
Estrada did not deal well with criticisms and patronizing statements from the
Church. When attacked, he often struck back. He even promoted a boycott against the
widely read Philippine Daily Inquirer, which had been particularly critical o f him and his
policies and seemed to favored the Church in much o f its coverage. Estrada publicly
accused the Inquirer o f maligning him and filed a libel suit against the publication. The
suit was dropped after the owners wrote a front-page apology.
Seizing this controversy, the Church attacked Estrada on many levels. The issue
provided yet another way for the Church to chip away at his credibility and his
legitimacy. The Church pointed out that it was not the fault of the Inquirer that Estrada

21

Luz Baguioro, “Filipinos Warm Up to Idea o f Charter Change,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Strait Times, (April 19, 2000; accessed 11 September
2002).
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suffered from what Cardinal Sin called a "crisis o f credibility." Sin also bashed Estrada’s
suit as an attempt to censor the press and prevent free political commentary. Sin noted,
"When we see clear attempts to silence the opposition and to harass free expression how
•

•

can the citizens not worry about a return to authoritarianism?"

99

In addition, Cardinal Sin urged Estrada to behave more like a president, and "to
look at criticism with openness, humility and even with gratitude."23 He publicly
questioned Estrada’s fitness to govern. “When government officials make statements in
public with no reflection, decorum and finesse, how can the citizens' respect be won?
When government deals are done under dark clouds o f suspicions, how can trust in public
office be sustained? When the cronies o f the dictatorship are perceived to be close allies
of government, how can we believe that justice will indeed be served?" Sin asked.24
Estrada bit back in a published interview. In it, he pointed his own finger of
shame at the Catholic Church. He brashly lumped Cardinal Sin in with openly
subversive and violent groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the New
People’s Army.

9^

Such charges went above the usual rhetoric exchanged between the

Church and State. In the same interview, he oddly expressed an admiration for the unity
o f Vietnam and said he was disturbed by the Philippines’ disunity. He went further,
making vague references to a plot to destabilize his own government. There is little doubt
that he meant to include the Church among those groups that wished to overthrow him.

99

“Church Accuses Philippine Leader o f Muzzling Press, Opposition,’’[Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (July 22, 1999; accessed
17 November 2002).
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
“'I Am In control': The President Defends His Reworked Agenda,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Asia Week (February 2, 2000; accessed 8
September 2002).
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Expressing an admiration for a brutal Communist dictatorship was certainly no
way to win the Catholic Church’s support, particularly when there was an ongoing
political fight over the future o f the Church-crafted constitution. Estrada had a few highprofile allies to keep the pressure on, including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who in the
past had benefited from the Church’s power during the 1986 revolution. Forgetting what
the Church had done for his political career, Enrile publicly charged that it was now a
destabilizing force at work against the Estrada administration.26 To have raised the ire o f
so many Estrada allies meant that the Church was effective in its criticism.
The Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines (CBCP) vehemently denied
Enrile’s claims. “Our business is to point out the corruption and moral ills in the
government," said Monsignor Hernando Coronel, CBCP spokesman. Coronel also stated
that it was not the Church’s business to topple governments and the criticisms
surrounding Concord and other issues were merely part o f the “prophetic” role that the
CBCP and Cardinal Sin had a right to exercise.27 When asked to characterize his own
role in relation to the government, Cardinal Sin said, "When necessary, I am an
accelerator and people accuse me o f being a radical. When the situation calls for it, I am
the brakes.”28
In a few words, Cardinal Sin had summarized the Church’s role and his position
as its leader. Neither could keep silent, for their roles were ones o f oversight. They did
not seek to create policy, but they were determined to help shape it and oppose it if it
conflicted with Church goals. They were the mediating force, giving voice to a
population who might otherwise be bulldozed by the political machine o f the Estrada

“Bishops Deny Plot vs. Erap,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
Philippine Daily Inquirer (March 9, 2000; accessed 5 August 2002).
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
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government. When the single voice o f a voter was not enough and when something or
someone needed to mobilize thousands to be heard, Cardinal Sin felt that the Church had
a right and a duty to do it. The people may not have always agreed with the Church’s
stance, but there had never been mass opposition to its policies and positions.
Despite the political bickering, by early 2000 the Church and the president were
sure of their respective roles in the political drama o f Philippine politics. Never far from
the surface were the Church’s desire to depose Estrada and Estrada’s desire to circumvent
the Church’s influence and push his agenda through Congress. Yet all was not political
warfare between Estrada and the Church. Often in the public arena the proverbial
“hatchet” could be buried long enough for a political truce to take affect.
An example o f this reconciliation came in February 2000, during the fourteenth
anniversary o f the first People Power Revolution that had toppled Marcos in 1986.
Estrada portrayed himself as its champion. In actuality, he had been a minor victim o f
the People Power Revolution. After the first EDSA revolution when Corey Aquinio took
office, one o f her first principle acts at the Church’s behest was to fire hundreds o f local
officials believed to be connected to Marcos. Estrada was then serving as mayor o f San
Juan in Metro Manila and was summarily dismissed.
Putting a spin on his past victimization at the hands o f the Church, Estrada said he
accepted his removal because he believed that at the time it was the only way for true
reform to be implemented by the Aquino administration.29 He went further in his mea
culpa by claiming that his dismissal in the wake o f EDSA I, as People Power has come to
be called, prompted him to seek higher positions. He became a senator, vice president,
and eventually president. It was a blessing in disguise and after winning the presidency,
Estrada continually identified himself as a champion o f the events at EDSA.

29“Erap: Keep People Power Alive.”
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The anniversary proved to be a political Christmas o f sorts when bad feelings
were put aside in celebration o f a wondrous birth, in this case the birth o f a new
Philippine democracy. The tone carried over into March 2000. Perhaps both sides were
weary and in need o f a respite, for since 1998 the Philippines had experienced almost two
years o f political fighting between the Church and Estrada.
Publicly at least, both sides continued the time o f reconciliation and good feelings
for the next few weeks. For his part, Estrada urged Filipinos to forgive him for past
transgressions and broken campaign promises. The Church urged the people to pay less
attention to the president’s failings and focus instead on unifying and working together
towards solving society’s problems.30 However, like a bad marriage, it was inevitable
that the respite would end and the bickering between the two sides would resume.
A mere month after the “reconciliation,” Cardinal Sin opened up a new political
assault on Estrada. He blasted the administration and accused the highest levels of
government o f having what he termed a “vacuum o f leadership.”31 What prompted his
outrage was a spate o f bombings in Manila and the Estrada administration’s failure to
arrest those responsible. Estrada had also failed to address the issue o f poverty to the
Cardinal’s satisfaction. Finally, the Church had offered in good faith to mediate the talks
between Muslim separatists and the government, but had been snubbed by Estrada.
Estrada did more than rebuff the Church’s offer to negotiate with the separatists.
He also ignored pleas for a temporary cease-fire from a Church-led coalition that
included groups such as the Coalition for Peace, the Makati Business Club, the National

TO
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“Estrada Wants to Rectify Past Mistakes,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] G ulf News (April 22, 2000; accessed 4 June 2002).
o1

Norman Bordadora, Carlito Pablo, and Juliet L. Javellana, “Sin Slams 'Vacuum
o f Leadership' in Gov't,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily
Inquirer (May 25, 2000; accessed 8 July 2002).
32Ibid.
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Peace Conference, Abanse Pinay, the Akbayan Citizens' Party, and the Association o f
Major Religious Superiors o f the Philippines.33 Estrada’s administration also blasted the
Papal envoy, Archbishop Antonia Franco, for suggesting in a speech that Estrada did not
want peace in the Philippines.34 The cardinal defended the envoy as a “man o f peace.”
He turned the tables on the critics, charging that anyone who was “offended by a man o f
peace cannot be men o f peace themselves."
Attacking a “man o f peace” was construed as further evidence that the Estrada
government lacked something substantial in leadership. However, the Estrada
administration immediately attempted to rebuff any claims of a “vacuum o f leadership” at
the top. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora blasted the Church’s insinuation and
implied that the Church had no clue about the president’s real nature. Press Secretary and
Presidential Spokesman Ricardo Puno Jr. said much the same thing. In denying any
vacuum of power, he said, “It is clear the President is not just in control. He and his
Cabinet are also working hard to address the problems o f the country, including those
concerning our economy . . . with all due respect to our Cardinal, [I don’t know] what he
based his statement on the supposed leadership vacuum in the government."36
During the Papal envoy scandal and the argument over leadership, there were the
first hints o f something bigger brewing in the way o f scandals. The rumors o f this new

33Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Erap Rebuffs Sin, Cory on Ceasefire,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 1, 2000: accessed 8
August 2002).
34Armand Nocum and Norman Bordadora, “Erap Men Mad at Papal Envoy,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 14, 2001;
accessed 8 August 2002).
35Norman Bordadora, “Sin Defends Papal Nuncio, Lambastes President's Men,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 15, 2000;
accessed 7 September 2002).
36Gilbert Felongco, “Manila Denies Sin's Charges,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Gulf News (May, 26, 2000; accessed 7 September 2002).
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scandal revealed an affiliation between Estrada and large gambling cartels in the
Philippines. The Church had always found the Estrada administration’s lackadaisical
attitude towards gambling offensive, and as early as January 2000 it seemed the Church
had some insight into possible connections between gambling illegalities and the Estrada
administration. One thing was certain, if a scandal could be created, Cardinal Sin and the
Church would go out o f their way to link it with the Estrada administration. Indeed,
gambling was choice material for the Church. It was often linked with “poverty” and a
"5*7

“lack o f direction” within Estrada’s government.
The scandal that would develop out o f these rumors is pivotal to this study, for it
is the final fight between Estrada and the Church. It is the final showdown between two
powerful political forces, and one that sees the Church and Estrada come face to face in a
political showdown for his legitimacy as president. The scandal itself and how the
Church used it to take legitimacy away from Estrada is fascinating on many levels. Not
only is it the story o f a president’s downfall, but it illustrates the Church’s power to make
news, create controversy, and energize enough o f the people’s authority to topple a
government.
Being two years removed from the scandal, this study has many luxuries o f
hindsight. However, one question that cannot be answered fully is whether or not the
Church had advance knowledge o f the impending scandal. But whether it knew or not,
the Church behaved in a particularly unsavory manner towards the Estrada administration
in the weeks leading up to the story breaking. There were no olive branches passed
between the two camps, and the Church did not offer any reconciliatory rhetoric. In fact,
it publicly turned up the pressure on Estrada. But these attacks were merely a prelude to
the bigger scandal, one that would see the Church launch its final assault on the
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presidency and bring to fulfillment its long-expressed desire to remove Estrada from
office.
The irony and symmetry o f what was about to unfold could not fail to be
appreciated. The Church had a hand in driving Estrada from his mayoral office in 1986,
yet it had been unsuccessful in keeping him from winning the presidency. Since 1998, it
had never failed to publicize every major and minor fault o f Estrada and his
administration. Those were nitpicking political attacks and did not damage the
president’s overall popularity among the masses. What the Church needed was
something big, something that the majority could not overlook.
The Church needed an issue to serve as the foundation for a new “People Power”
revolt to rip legitimacy away from Estrada. In late summer 2000, when Estrada remained
as popular as any elected president during the same time, the Church found that issue. It
was the political ammunition it needed to topple Estrada. This new scandal would prove
to be the missing link required to energize the Church and the public and take away
Estrada’s mantle o f legitimacy.
The story began when one o f Estrada’s closest friends sought the Church’s
assistance and guidance in a matter o f great importance. This “friend” had information
that the president was involved in high-level illegalities, and he felt that the Church
would be interested in knowing the specifics. Estrada’s “Judas” in this political passion
play was a man by the name o f Luis “Chavit” Singson. Singson had been both Estrada’s
friend and political confidant for much o f their political lives. Singon, the governor of
Ilocos Sur, bolted from his friendship with Estrada after the President seized tax revenue
from the treasury o f Ilocos Sur. At the time he sought out the Church’s help, he was
serving as the provincial governor o f Illocos Sur. Singson’s relationship to Estrada meant
he was privy to important personal information. It also meant he had powerful allies, and
turning on them meant making powerful enemies.
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To protect his life and ensure his credibility, Singson sought out the Catholic
Church’s assistance, support, and protection before going public with his story o f
on

Estrada’s massive corruption.

Cardinal Sin eagerly listened to the story. Singson’s

story was not filled with the typical allegations hurled against Estrada. His story was
something quite different. As Governor o f Illocos Sur, Singson claimed he was forced to
collect payoffs and kickbacks for President Estrada, including P I30 million from the
province's tax proceeds and P414 million from a gambling jueteng.39
Allegations o f illegal gambling fit in well with the picture the Church wanted to
paint o f Estrada as being incompetent, irresponsible, a liar, a thief, and immoral.
Singson’s allegations had in effect spilled Estrada’s proverbial blood, and the sharks o f
the Church began to circle. Singson asked for the Church’s help and he got it. But it
came at a price. The Church would make sure that Singson brought his “crusade” against
Estrada to a successful completion.
When the story o f Singson’s revelations hit the Philippine press, it had an
immediate impact on the economy and the value o f the Philippine peso. The peso
plunged to a low o f 47.35 per dollar and stocks hit a two-year low. Singson now feared
for his life, and he said as much in his statements to the press: "I had wanted to come out
with this for a long time but I could not because the president was my friend . . . It is hard
to go against a powerful man—they will file cases against you, they will even try to kill
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“Cardinal Sin Supports Singson Efforts on Gambling Allegations Against
Estrada,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] AFX News (October 9, 2000;
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The way in which Singson made his allegations public by working through the
Church appears to build a strong circumstantial case that the Church applied the
necessary pressure on the otherwise loyal Singson to turn on Estrada publicly. The
behind-the-scenes machinations o f Cardinal Sin, other Church officials, and Singson are
not fully known, but a deal was certainly struck in which the Church would offer moral
support and a modicum of protection for Singson if he was willing to tell his story in full
and serve as the chief witness in the moral crusade and Estrada’s eventual impeachment.
Singson was certainly not the Church’s poster boy for ethics. He had admitted to
illegalities o f his own, but he was a useful tool in helping turn the public against Estrada.
The Church offered support and Singson offered evidence. The partnership, such as it
was, seemed to work well. Singson, Cardinal Sin, and the Church were pleased with the
results of their initial meetings. Singson himself said, "I left my meeting with Cardinal
Sin with a stronger resolve and an inner peace, as he assured me o f his prayers and
counseled me not to be afraid o f telling the truth."41 In other words, Cardinal Sin had
praised Singson for his courage to come forth and give the Church the much-needed
evidence to finally eliminate Estrada. In so doing, Singson was offered forgiveness for
his own crimes and the protection afforded by the Church to someone who can be o f use
in its political aims. Singson had given the Church the long-awaited key to bring down
Estrada, and it was a chance that the Church could not and would not miss. It was a
convergence o f luck for both sides. Estrada had long dodged the Church’s fire, but this
time it would be more difficult.
Some may doubt that the Church had a concerted plan to oust Estrada. But after
he was merely implicated in an alleged illegal jeuteng by the admitted criminal Singson,
the Church went straight to the press and the people to call for Estrada’s resignation.

41Ceres P. Doyo and Norman Bordadora, “Singson Dubbed ‘Enrile o f Erap’”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (October 10,
2000; accessed 20 November 2002).
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Indeed, a mere day after Singsong’s press conference Cardinal Sin, speaking on behalf
the Church, called for Estrada’s resignation, saying he had lost "the moral ascendancy to
govern.” He also called for Estrada to “relinquish his office and turn it over to the
constitutional successor."42
The Church circumvented the courts and the constitutional process to get a jump
on influencing public opinion. Given the tradition o f being innocent until proven guilty
and the Catholic Church’s forgiving nature, it seemed at least a bit hasty to call for the
resignation o f the nation’s highest elected official before a complete hearing o f the facts.
The media did not fail to notice the early signs o f the Church’s planned strategy. They
said Singson’s press conference looked like the early beginning o f a “People Power” type
uprising. As in 1986, the Church was there and Singson appeared to play a role similar to
the one played by Marcos’s defense minister, Juan Ponce Enrile.43
It is also likely the Church had preliminary contact with Estrada’s “successor.”
She was none other than Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the daughter o f former President
Diosdado Macapagal, who was defeated in 1985 by Ferdinand Marcos. Arroyo was
Estrada’s vice president, but she understood the importance of the Church as an ally.
And if the time came and the Church called her to power, whether through another
“People Power” or other means, she would be ready to serve.
It was not accidental that the same day the Church called for Estrada’s resignation
Arroyo resigned her cabinet post as secretary o f social welfare.44 She had been advised
to do so by Cardinal Sin. Arroyo’s action sent a very public message to Estrada that she
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“Philippine Church Leader Calls on President to Step Down,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (October 11, 2000; accessed 7
September 2002).
43Doyo and Bordadora, “Singson Dubbed 'Emile o f Erap.’”
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Jones Interactive] AP Online (October 12,2000; accessed 7 September 2002).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

260

supported the Church’s call for his resignation, and that Estrada would not have her
support in the months ahead. It is not mere speculation whether or not the Church’s
actions and those o f the vice president were concerted. She admitted as much a few
months later.45 Her admission was not surprising given the close relationship between the
Church and Arroyo during the scandal and the continued role the Church had in advising
in her administration. It is unlikely that she would have made such bold moves had
Cardinal Sin and the Church not assured her full political and moral support in the
coming months.
The CBCP on October 13 2001, also called for Estrada’s resignation. In the
CBCP’s statement, it said that Estrada had lost the right to serve as president. CBCP
President, Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, upped the ante when he officially endorsed
Cardinal Sin’s earlier call for the people to unite in the expression o f their outrage about
the president's alleged illegalities 46 The Church, acting in its role as the mediating
variable in the Philippines, had launched an effort to influence public opinion and
organize the faithful around the cause o f withdrawing legitimacy from Estrada and
banishing him from public office.
Other Church members involved in anti-Estrada activities immediately backed the
CBCP and the Cardinal’s call. "President Estrada has turned the national leadership into a
national disaster. He has lost the moral and political basis to run the country and must
therefore heed the growing calls for his resignation," said Father Joe Dizon, the
spokesman for the September 21 Committee, a Catholic group that gained prominence
45James Hookway, “Arroyo Makes Preparations For Possible Life After Estrada —
- Acceding to Presidency, She Would Confront Conflicts Among Supporters — 'We Will
Go Straight to the International Capital Market,'” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] The Asian Wall Street Journal (January 19, 2001; accessed 8 September
2002).
46“Catholic Bishops Support Cardinal Sin's Call On Estrada To Resign,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] World News Connection (October 13, 2000;
accessed 8 September 2002).
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for leading nationwide protest actions against corruption, martial law, and the Estrada
administration.47
The Church moved quickly to solidify its political support. Part o f this effort was
the unification o f disparate factions that acted independently against Estrada. This
required the Church to form alliances that normally would not have been considered. For
example, it bucked its traditional wariness o f the military and joined with the 2,000strong Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabayan (RAM), a group o f ex-military rebels
who backed Corazon Aquino's rise to power. They also joined with the Guardians, a
group composed o f 800,000 reserve and active military soldiers, as well as the Young
Officers Union and other legitimate groups in the Armed Forces to call for Estrada’s
resignation.

48

As special-interest support was growing and uniting with the Church’s effort, the
public response was expected to follow. But the public did not immediately respond
favorably to the Church’s call for Estrada’s resignation. Perhaps it was scandal fatigue or
the belief that this was another in a long line o f accusations hurled by the Church at
Estrada. Whatever the reason, in the early days o f the scandal public opinion polls
revealed that the masses were unmoved by the situation. Pulse Asia found in its poll
taken on October 16 that 53 percent o f Manila residents wanted Estrada to hold on and
stay in office 49 It was a solid majority unmoved by Cardinal Sin’s call.

47Jennee Grace, U. Rubrico, and Jacquelin P. Conclara, “Cardinal Sin Airs Call
for Estrada to Resign,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World
(October 12, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
48“Sin, RAM, NGOs Join 30 Lawmakers,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Manila Standard (October 11, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
49“Survey favoring Erap Shows Nation's Pulse,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Manila Standard (October 16, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

262

But the Church was not alone in this fight, and it was confident that enough o f the
population would come around to its way o f thinking when needed to bring down
Estrada. The Church’s call for resignation was meant to move events on several fronts,
not simply to cause an instant and measurable affect in the polls. Public opinion was
certainly important, but the Church’s action aimed to pressure political leaders as well.
The public was known to respond sluggishly, but the politicians who feared and respected
the Church’s voice responded more quickly. Just days after Sin’s announcement, thirty
members o f the Philippine House o f Representatives signed a resolution "endorsing the
verified complaint for impeachment."50 Along with Arroyo’s resignation, it was the first
real step towards pulling legitimacy from Estrada.
Estrada was clearly perturbed by the Church’s unusual quickness to judge him
and his administration. He immediately issued statements calling the Church’s stance
“unfair” and rejected any call for resignation or “snap elections” meant to unseat him.51
In a televised statement, Estrada said, "It is my conviction that the call for my
impeachment or resignation is unfair as it is hasty."52 In other television interviews, he
added that he could not understand why the cardinal prejudged him when he had not
heard his side.53 In private, Estrada surely knew what was at stake. He had been targeted
by the Church before and survived, but this time things were different.

50Jason Gutierrez, “Philippines' Estrada Rejects Quit calls Over Bribe Scandal,”
Agence France-Presse (October 11, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
51“Philippines Estrada Rejects Church Call For Resignation,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Dow Jones International News (October 1 1 ,2000;
accessed 8 September 2002).
52 “I'm innocent and I'll Survive This Crisis - Erap,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Manila Standard (October 12, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
53Armand N. Nocum and Juliet L. Javellan, “Estrada says Declaring State of
Emergency 'Farthest Thing from his Mind',” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] World News Connection (October 14, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
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At the outset, Estrada rejected the Church’s calls and vowed he would never
resign. He then tried to divert attention away from his scandal by privatizing gambling
activities once overseen by the government. The hope was that this move would show
that no one in government would ever gain from gambling. It also reaffirmed his
commitment to the masses that had so strongly supported him during his movie career
and political life. He also tried to contrast the argument for his impeachment with what
he called his continued fight for the oppressed and the poor. Like America’s Bill Clinton,
Estrada and his advisors sought to turn the people’s attention away from scandal and back
to a domestic agenda. A Social Weather Station poll on November 6, 2001, reported that
44 percent o f Filipinos did not want Estrada to resign and only 29 percent did.54
Estrada categorically denied Singson’s charges and lashed out at the Church and
Cardinal Sin. Estrada said he would not “accommodate” Cardinal Sin’s wishes because
his pact was with “the masses” and not with the Catholic Church.55 He was willing to
fight for his job and for his legitimate mandate. Indeed, the battle ahead was one that
would test the strength o f the legitimacy model on every level. The question was, how
strong would Estrada’s mandate be when the authority gained from the law, his
charismatic appeal, and his utility to the people was filtered through the Catholic Church,
which now expanded its role and authority as the mediating force to determine Estrada’s
fitness as president? This battle was fought using the constitution, in the legislature, and
over the support o f the masa.56
The Church began where its power base was the strongest and most effective, and
soon the “parliament o f the streets” began to assemble at mass rallies across Manila and

54Rigoberto Tiglao, “Fool’s Polls,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
Philippine Daily Inquirer (December 8, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
55“T'm sorry it had to come to this',” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
Manila Standard (October 14, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
56Masa is the colloquial term used by Estrada to describe the masses.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

264

the Philippines. The Church realized, as it had since the early days o f Marco’s martial
law, that in order to push its agenda it needed the people’s support. The first call to
action came on October 17, 2000. In attendance at this small rally were Cardinal Sin,
former President Aquino, Vice President Arroyo, and close to 2,000 supporters. It was a
small rally, but it was a beginning. At this first rally, Sin openly prayed that Estrada
would do the “heroic” thing and resign, while Arroyo spoke to the crowd about her recent
resignation from the cabinet. She appealed to the masses in her way by saying that her
own resignation from Estrada’s cabinet allowed her to join Cardinal Sin, Aquino, and the
“cabinet o f the people” to oppose Estrada’s presidency.57
When she was asked by a reporter about the possibility o f an another EDSA
revolution along the lines o f the first People Power, she replied, “We do not know yet
where all these will lead to because only God can decide where we should go. What is
important is that we are following His orders. We are praying to know what He wants us
to do.”58 In matters of politics, Cardinal Sin and his bishops were often the only ones who
were given credit for knowing God’s orders. Realizing as much, Arroyo verified in this
same interview that her actions had the authorization o f Cardinal Sin and the Church.
A day later, 6,000 clergy, business leaders, and members o f various political
groups held a rally in Makati, Manila’s financial district, to demand the president's
resignation.59 The rally came hours after forty-one members o f the House of
Representatives filed an impeachment motion against Estrada. At a rally a few days later,

57“Anti-Estrada Forces Hold Mass Rally in Manila,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Xinhua (October 17, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
CO

t<

“Philippine VP Arroyo Discusses Role in Unifying Opposition,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] World News Connection (October 17, 2000; accessed 8
September 2002).
59Arturo Bariuad, “Thousands Protest Against Estrada,” [Wire Service OnlineDow Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (October 18, 2000; accessed 8 September
2002 ).
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the number was 10,000.6° Things were moving rapidly in the Church’s favor. Even the
nation's Muslim minority weighed in, branding Estrada as an "evildoer" unfit to govern.61
These street protests were all leading up to a larger rally planned and organized by the
Church for November 4, 2000.
The rally being planned was significant on many fronts. It was scheduled to take
place on Church property, but not just any property. It was to take place at the EDSA
shrine. Holding a rally at a shrine that had been declared holy ground and was official
Church property brought with it political and spiritual connotations. Any anti-Estrada
rally held at EDSA was sure to send a powerful message to Estrada and his allies that the
Church meant business and was not going to let this issue die without seeing his
resignation.
In order to gather the number o f supporters required to make this happen, the
Church had to use its tried and true public relations methods. Calls went out from their
print and broadcast media as well as in pastoral letters from the pulpit. The letters were
issued to all parishes, Catholic schools, religious communities, and institutions and called
each member to mobilize in full force for the rally.62 Father Joe Dizon o f the Estrada
Resign Movement (Resign), urged the public to heed Cardinal Sin's pastoral letters and
the Church’s call to rally, saying this was "both a moral obligation and a patriotic duty."

63

60“Pressure Rising on Philippine Chief,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Deseret News (October 10, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
61Dirk Beveridge, “Filipinos Blast Estrada; Vice President Says Resignation Only
Way Out,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press Newswires
(October 25,2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
Normal Bordadora and Yolanda Fuertes, “Cardinal Sin Justifies Acceptance o f
Donation From Manila's Gambling Firm,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
World News Connection (October 25, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
63Christine Avendano and Norman Bordadora, “Velarde Challenged: Church, or
Erap?,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer
(November 3, 2000; accessed 8 September, 2002).
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Dizon went further to vent his frustration over Estrada, stating, “Each day that he clings
to power, Estrada gives the people more reasons for his resignation or ouster. What is
worse is that he and his henchmen are shamelessly pointing at the people's protests as the
cause o f the economic and political crisis when he is the problem."64
Estrada described the proposed rally and the Church’s other actions as “assaults”
against the republic. Fearing that he would lose support from key segments o f the
government the Estrada administration pressured the military not to support the Church
or any other group that might try to oust him. Defense Chief Orlando Mercado, who was
Estrada's campaign manager during the 1998 elections, was dispatched to meet with the
head of the armed forces, General Angelo Reyes, and new Philippine Army commander
Brigadier-General Diomedio Villanueva to caution both men to remain neutral and not
engage in “partisan politics."65 Estrada’s fears were real, because he knew the Church’s
power, especially if it could gain the momentum o f past EDSA rallies.
Some o f Estrada’s supporters were more vocal and less gracious in their anger at
the Church’s call for his resignation. Just a few days before the Church’s rally, a group
o f several hundred rallied outside Villa San Miguel, the home o f Cardinal Sin, and pelted
his residence with dead fish and tomatoes.66 The group was quickly arrested and charged
with defacing the cardinal’s property, and Estrada distanced himself from the attack. He
also called for no further harassment o f Cardinal Sin. However, it is unlikely that such
actions would have happened without at least tacit approval from Estrada.

64Ibid.
65Raissa Robles and Frank Longid, “Estrada Seeks Military Backing,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] South China Morning Post (October 23, 2000;
accessed 9 September 2002).
66“House of Sin Pelted With Tomatoes, Fish,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Manila Standard (October 28, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
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Through it all, Singson continued to meet with Cardinal Sin and Church officials.
Each time it seemed he had new revelations for the priests. Speaking at Sin’s Villa,
Singson opened up new public accusations o f philandering against Estrada. He accused
the president o f spending the people’s money on “beautiful ladies.”67 Estrada’s
philandering was no secret, but the possibility that he had used the poor’s hard-earned
money to finance his liaisons was something altogether different. To have a mistress was
one thing, but to keep her on the backs o f the poor was quite another.
The Church used this and the previous accusations o f gambling illegalities to call
for the activation o f Article VII, Section eleven o f the 1987 Constitution to remove
Estrada from office.68 It was yet another avenue the Church could use to apply pressure
on Estrada. Leading law professionals agreed with the Church’s use o f the law. The
College o f Law Student Council and the Legal Advocacy Group o f the University o f
Saint La Salle were leading the charge when they issued a joint statement calling for
Estrada's resignation or impeachment for allegedly violating the constitution and
betraying the public trust.69 They had attacked his character and his utility and every day
they were rallying popular opinion to their cause, but Estrada remained unmoved.
With the Church’s help, Vice-President Arroyo joined and led a newly formed
United Opposition, which was an alliance o f opposition parties committed to
participation in mass actions held by other anti-Estrada forces. Other high-profile
politicians, such as Opus D e i’s own Senator Francisco Tatad, continued to pressure

f\1

“Estrada ‘Paid Millions for Services o f Women',” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (October 28, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
68

Section 11 reads, "Whenever the President transmits to the President o f the
Senate and the Speaker o f the House o f Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties o f his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice President as Acting.”
69Avendano and Bordadora, “Velarde Challenged: Church, or Erap?”
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Estrada. Tatad asked Estrada to resign and came up with a power-sharing scheme that
would include Arroyo and a coalition cabinet to rule the country in the interim.

70

Estrada

refused to consider it.
The rallies, the defections o f Arroyo and Tatad, and the dozens o f legislators
calling for Estrada’s impeachment led political analyst Alex Magno to describe Estrada
as "damaged goods" and write in the Christian Science Monitor that Estrada’s attempts to
stay in power could lead to the destruction o f the Philippine economy.

71

Former

President Cory Aquino agreed with this analysis. Speaking at the Catholic Ateneo de
Manila University before a thousand delegates from the Kongreso ng Mamamayang
Filipino (Kompil), one o f the largest anti-Estrada coalition groups in the Philippines,
Aquino said, “For every day that he holds on to office, the peso drops in value, more
investments retreat, more factories and businesses shut down, more workers lose their
jobs, and more families go hungry."72 Estrada had lost the people's confidence, she
claimed, "because [he] seems to have lost any sense o f accountability." It appeared that
Estrada was willing to take the chance and he was unmoved by criticisms from all
sectors. He still believed he had a mandate from the people to stay in office, to fight the
charges, and to finish his term.
The Church’s rally went on as planned on November 4, 2000. Amazingly, some
in the mainstream Philippine press seemed to support and endorse it. In particular, the

70

•

•

•

“Philippines: Estrada Rejects Proposal to Share Power with Opposition,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] BBC Monitoring Source: GMA 7 television,
Quezon City, in Tagalog 1000 gmt (October 27, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
71Abby Tan,“Heat's on Philippine President,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Christian Science Monitor (October 29, 2.000; accessed 8 September 2002).
77

•

Dona Pazzibugan and Alcuin Papa, “Fight Between Good, Evil,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (October 30, 2000; accessed 20
November 2002).
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n 'i

Philippine Daily Inquirer printed an exhaustive list o f the assembly points.

Anyone

wishing to attend the rally in Manila or elsewhere in the Philippines could have found out
just when, where, why, and how to do it by simply reading this supposedly unbiased
newspaper.
The four-hour rally was dubbed Ipagdasal ang bayan, bantayan ang katotohanan
(Pray for the country, safeguard the truth) and was described in the papers as being
marked both by both religious activities and political speeches.74 Most o f the speeches
focused on getting rid o f Estrada. More than 100 thousand people gathered at EDS A that
day and Cardinal Sin used the podium to launch another verbal jibe at Estrada: “We are
here to pray for the President. Resignation from the presidency will be good for his so u l.
.. The presidency is not good for you because you are not capable to run this country."75
He went further, telling Estrada to "shake the dust from your feet and leave . . . Mr.
President, the poor elected you because you said you were for the poor. Can you now tell
them that you lived a simple life as a sign o f your concern for them?”76
Sin claimed that Estrada’s resignation was both “constitutional and biblical."77 At
EDS A, the Church covered all bases in its attack on Estrada. Having locked up “God’s”
opinion, it now proclaimed to have a legal standard as well. After the cardinal finished
speaking, Cory Aquino took the stage and voiced her unity with the Church. In her

73Norman Bordadora,“ 100,000 Expected at EDS A Rally today,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (November 4, 2000; accessed 9
September 2002).
74Norman Bordadora, Rocky Nazareno, and Juliet Javellana, “'Take Final Bow
Now',” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer
(November 5, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
75Frank Longid, “80,000 tell Estrada to Quit,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] South China Morning Post (November 5. 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
76Bordadora, Nazareno, and Javellana, “'Take Final Bow Now'.”
77Ibid.
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speech, she praised the Church and Cardinal Sin, recognizing the Church’s role as the
voice of conscience in Philippine politics and change when necessary.
Cardinal Sin was the gatekeeper and the key master, and the Church was the
arbiter o f legitimacy and authority in Philippine politics. Thos were powers vested to
them by the people themselves. Aquino said, "In a nation o f many voices, [Sin’s] has
stood out because he has always been able to galvanize the flock to action. Without him,
the democracy born out o f the EDSA People Power Revolution would not have been
possible. And because o f him, we are proudly united today."78 Aquino’s words were not
lost on the thousands gathered, nor were they lost on the woman who the Church wanted
to be Estrada’s replacement, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
Arroyo looked upon Cardinal Sin and the Church with great deference. If she
were to be president it would be the Church, working through the people, that would give
her that opportunity. It would be the Church that would ensure she had a legitimate
mandate to rule the country. Could there be any doubt that she would also defer to the
Church once she was president? That question was partially answered when reporters
covering the EDSA rally asked Arroyo about how she would handle a possible
resignation deal with Estrada. Arroyo’s answer intimated that she did not have the power
or authority to handle such things.
It was an astonishing admission, for if the duly elected vice president did not have
the power to handle the president’s resignation, then just who did? Arroyo’s answer
revealed the solution. Arroyo’s answer to this question was stark. She said that anyone
who wanted to negotiate for Estrada's exit should go to Cardinal Sin. "I think [Sin and
Aquino] are the best persons who can reflect a consensus . . . [Interested parties] should

78“The Cardinal,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily
Inquirer (November 16, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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approach them."79 In some ways, her short answer was a brief window into the soul o f
Philippine politics and into the future o f her administration.
Estrada’s initial reaction to the November 4 rally was simple: “No amount of
rallies can make me resign."

SO

He was prepared for a political battle that would work to

his favor if the impeachment proceedings made their way to the Philippine Senate, where
his allies were sure to help him. Cardinal Sin’s response was equally blunt: “If he will
not step down, the situation could worsen and he may have to step down with great
embarrassment, humiliation and ignominy."

o1

It appeared that neither side was going to

budge. Both camps continued their preparations for a political clash.
The same day as the Church’s rally, Estrada had to deal with more bad news.
Manuel Villar, the speaker o f the Philippine House o f Representatives and one o f
Estrada’s strongest allies, left the Estrada camp and took more congressmen with him.
Villar’s move effectively destroyed Estrada’s majority in the House o f Representatives.82
Senate President Franklin Drilon also resigned from Estrada's ruling Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino (LAMP) Party and threw his support behind efforts to remove Estrada from
office.83

79Donna S. Cueto and Christine Avendano,“Estrada: Why Will I Agree to
Graceful Exit?” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer
(November 11,2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
oa t

Jim Gomez,“Filipinos Rally Against Estrada,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] AP Online (November 4, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
81Ibid.
82

Richard Lloyd Parry, “Estrada Hanging on to Power After Allies Jump Ship,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Independent (November 4, 2000;
accessed 8 September 2002).
83Rajiv Handrasekaran, “Impeachment Seems Likely in Philippines,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Washington Post (November 4, 2000;
accessed 8 September 2002).
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Opposition was mounting against Estrada day by day, and his choices were
becoming limited. If he hoped to counter the Church’s efforts successfully, he would
need to prove to the Church and to the public that he still enjoyed a popular mandate
from the masses. Estrada had more than rhetoric to back up his claims o f legitimacy,
because not only had he won a free and fair election, but public opinion still favored his
staying in office. Moreover, he claimed he had the support o f the United States, which he
said advised him to "stick it out" through the constitutional process amid the calls for his
resignation. His last claim is subject to scrutiny since the official United States position
was to stay out o f Philippine domestic affairs.
Estrada was also willing and able to do something, and other politicians could not
use his charismatic appeal to call for the people’s support. He still enjoyed the support o f
the Inglisia ni Cristo and El Shaddai, each with millions o f their own very loyal flocks
ready in support. He also had legions o f poor Filipinos who viewed him as a folk hero.
He had used his own rally to counter the Church’s attempts at “People Power” over the
Concord issue.
So while he lashed out at business interests and the Church for what he called a
"destabilization campaign" against his administration, Estrada was making his own plans
for a counter-rally to show the world the support he enjoyed among the masses.

oc

Estrada’s rally took place a mere seven days after the November 4 rally organized
by the Church. His call for support from the masses resulted in more than a million
people gathering in Manila for a government-organized "prayer rally.” How ironic that in
his darkest hour, when he was criticizing the Church for its prayer rallies, he allowed his

84

Leotes Marie Lugo, and Manolette C. Payumo, “Estrada on the Attack, Blames
Business and Other Groups for Crisis,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
BusinessWorld (November 10, 2000; accessed 8 September 2002).
85Ibid.
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government to officially sponsor one o f its own. To ensure massive numbers, Estrada
declared that November 11,2000, was a non-working holiday and reports said that some
government agencies “asked” or pressured their employees to attend.
At the rally, Estrada sounded more like a parish priest than a beleaguered
president. In front o f the multitude that had gathered, he pleaded to God for his
administration’s salvation: "Almighty God, we offer you everything, my presidency, my
whole being, our identity as people, our hearts and minds because all o f these came from
you. We also pray for everyone to be enlightened so all our actions will be for the good
o f all, especially our economy." Estrada further asked God to "help us move forward our
economy for the good o f our poor and small countrymen."87
Estrada’s rally caused a bit o f concern inside the anti-Estrada coalition. Senator
Ramon Magsaysay Jr. admitted that the opposition and the Catholic Church appeared to
be losing, at least temporarily, to Estrada in the battle to win the hearts and minds o f the
poor in supporting calls for his resignation. Magsaysay and others met with Mosignor
Socrates Villegas, rector o f the ESDSA Shrine and Cardinal Sin’s spokesman, and other
Catholic priests to find ways to reach out to the common people.88 They certainly needed
a plan to counter Estrada’s rally, and they needed to do something quickly or they risked
losing their early momentum.
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Mynardo Macaraign, “More than a Million Filipinos Gather for Estrada 'prayer
ally',” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (November
11, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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Dario Agnorte, “Estrada Seeks Divine Forgiveness and Guidance,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Kyodo News (November 11, 2000; accessed 9
September 2002).
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It did not take long for the Church to counter Estrada’s moves. On November 14,
2000, the Church called for a nationwide “people’s strike.” This strike was, according to
the Church, a way for the average Filipino to “express their outrage at the immorality in
public office."89 It was also a chance to take the spotlight and media coverage off of
Estrada’s success. Indeed, the success o f Estrada’s rally led many political observers to
conclude that the Church would not have enough support or political will to stage a
second People Power revolt to remove him from office.
The experts were wrong. The Church had every intention o f pushing forward
with efforts to de-legitimize Estrada through the power emanating from the masses. And
anyone who doubted its political will needed only to refer to the words o f Father Reyes,
who summed up the Church’s plan o f action: "Congress will impeach him, the united
opposition will press for his resignation, and if these fail, the Filipino people will be
forced to oust him."90 People Power was definitely in the works.
Estrada’s rally would be the high point o f his counter-offensive. He would never
again be able to mount the kind o f public support necessary to counter the Church’s
opposition. After November 11, his allies were left throwing mere political spears at an
ironclad Church. Among the petty things his allies attempted was filing sedition
complaints against Cardinal Sin, Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, and even Vice President
Arroyo. Ironically, lawyers hired by the Marcos family filed the complaints, which were
soon dismissed by the Quezon City prosecutor’s office.91 Arroyo scoffed at the charges
89“Sin Supports Nationwide People's Strike Today,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (November 14, 2000; accessed 9 September
2002).
90 Arturo Bariuad, “Estrada Ousted By People Power II,” [Wire Service OnlineDow Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (November 14, 2000; accessed 8 September
2002 ).
91Andrea Trinidad-Echavez, “Philippines: Aquino, Cardinal Sin Seek Dismissal o f
Sedition Complaint,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Inquirer News
Service (November 17, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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and believed they were merely attempts to "undermine" her credibility.

01

They were also

meant to distract and harass Church leadership.
Earlier, Estrada had distanced himself from just these sort o f personal attacks on
Cardinal Sin. He then said that “being the Archbishop o f Manila and a prince o f the
Catholic Church, o f which I am a member, he deserves honor and respect from everyone,
including those who do not agree with him on some things."93 But now all bets were off,
and this was a fight for his political life. He would try any legal means he could muster to
oppose the Church.
Events were rapidly deteriorating in the Philippines as Estrada’s impeachment
moved forward. By early December, the peso had continued its slide against the dollar
and tensions had mounted. Any hope that Estrada had to repair the economy by keeping
protests off the streets would be ineffective. The Church had no intentions o f calling off
its protests. Indeed, other rallies were already in the works, including a Pananalangin ng
Bayan Para sa Katotohanan (Nation's Prayer for Truth) followed by a “Jericho March."
Cardinal Sin and other Church officials planned to lead thousands o f anti-Estrada
protestors around the Philippine Senate building on December 7, 2000, the first day o f
Estrada’s impeachment trial.94 The walls were not going to “come crumbling down,” but
it was hoped that those inside would feel the pressure to convict Estrada. The circling o f
the Senate was also meant to draw media attention to the impeachment and apply
pressure to those senators who remained loyal to Estrada. During the march, a "torch for
92Christine O. Avendano and Cathy C. Yamsuan, “Gloria Blames Palace for
Move to Impeach Her,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily
Inquirer (November 16,2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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“Philippine Leader Denounces Attack on Home o f Cardinal,” [Wire Service
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truth" was to be passed Olympic-style by opposition leaders, including former presidents
Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos and Vice President Gloria Arroyo.95 The “Jericho
March” was part o f a larger nationwide Church effort that included as many as seventyseven rallies held at all the dioceses throughout the Philippines.
In each of these efforts, the Church acted more like an opposition political party
than a religious institution, broadcasting its calls for the faithful to attend on its own radio
stations, through pastoral letters, and even placing fill 1-page advertisements in the
nation’s newspapers. The ads mixed a dose o f prayer with a repeated call for Estrada to
step down. In one advertisement Cardinal Sin wrote, "We must pray very hard for the
president. It is only in the light o f the spirit o f love for God and country that he will be
able to see the value o f resignation."96 The Church even made alternative plans for those
Filipinos who may not have been able to attend the rallies. This included those who had
to stay at home, in offices, factories, or schools. The Church urged them to switch off
their lights to observe five minutes o f darkness as a symbolic act that would mean a
demand for Estrada’s resignation.97
At the start o f the impeachment trial the big question was not “i f ’ the Church
would inject itself in the process but “how” it would do so. The answers would come
quickly. The day the impeachment trial began, Church officials held a special Mass for
senators and their staff and while this special mass was labeled “impartial,” the faithful

95“Thousands Gather Ahead o f Philippine Leader's Corruption Trial,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (December 7, 2000;
accessed 9 September 2002).
96P. Parameswaran, “Philippine Church's Hatchet Man Sin Keeps Crossing
Swords with Presidents,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence FrancePresse (December 6,2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (December 6, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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were nonetheless urged to attend an anti-Estrada prayer rally being convened by Cardinal
Sin.98
After they prayer the prosecutors wasted little time in opening their attack on
Estrada. They labeled him a “thief’ and accused his administration o f being tainted by
money, mansions and mistresses. One o f the eleven prosecutors, Congressman Joker
Arroyo, compared Estrada to the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, saying, “I wonder
[which one] is the bigger crook?” Arroyo would later produce a check for $3 million
with a signature that he said was a mirror copy o f the presidential signature on Philippine
bank notes. He accused Estrada o f having hidden assets in numerous bank accounts under
a false name.99
Upon hearing the allegations coming out o f the impeachment trial, Church
officials repeated their demand that Estrada quit immediately. Sin believed that only a
quick resignation would spare the Philippines from a long, divisive trial.100 So fervent
was the belief in Estrada’s guilt and unfitness as president that protesters who were part
o f the “Jericho March” and other rallies throughout the nation vowed that they would
continue to protest regardless o f the verdict.101 It was only the first day, and things
certainly did not bode well for Estrada.
The “Jericho March” itself ran into a bit o f trouble, because Estrada still had the
loyalty o f Manila’s police force. He had them block the estimated 80,000 participants
from reaching the Senate building. Police installed barricades roughly one kilometer from
the building. “Jericho” marchers, a diverse group organized by the Church, included
98Craig Skehan, “Estrada Foes And Allies Seek God's Help,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Age (December 7, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
"Ibid.
100Ibid.
101Dirk Beveridge, “President Estrada's Trial Starts,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] AP Online (December 7,2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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members o f the Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino (Kompil) II, the Makati Business
Club, Trade Union Congress o f the Philippines, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan and the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines. The marchers were
only able to push up to the front gate o f the Senate. This was not what they had planned,
but it was close enough for their voices to be heard.102
The loudest voice at the rally was Cardinal Sin’s. He urged Estrada to be true to
his bravado and personally answer "one by one" all o f the charges lodged against him.
Sin demanded that Estrada "be brave and face the truth.” He said, “I hope that you
personally answer the questions o f our senators, not through your lawyers. We want the
truth from your lips personally, not by proxy . . . Mr. President, do not be afraid to
resign."103
Cardinal Sin went further, emphasizing the president’s need to realize the truth o f
his situation, at least the truth as seen through the eyes o f the Church, and compared
Estrada unfavorably to another whom the Church had helped depose. He said, “I say to
the President, do not be afraid o f the truth . . . the truth is, you have lost your moral
ascendancy to govern us. Face the truth and be courageous . . . We were there to face
Marcos. But Mr. Estrada is worse than Marcos because he does not understand
history."104
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The events o f December 7, 2000, like those o f previous months, foreshadowed a
larger problem for Estrada and his allies. They worried, and rightly so, that each passing
day as the people took to the streets the politicians themselves would be placed under
tremendous pressure to produce an outcome that the Church would favor. And the
Church favored only one outcome— conviction.105
The protests in the streets were also indicative o f another problem that politicians,
the police, and the military had to consider. Even if Estrada survived the trial, his
position might be made untenable by mass opposition.106 Just as it had done to Marcos,
Ramos, and Estrada himself over the Concord fiasco, the Church was slowly chipping
away at his legitimacy by marshalling its political clout and focusing it on a single point
in the future—a People Power revolution with Estrada as the target.
At the height o f the trial, Estrada seemed in a hopeless position. Just a few weeks
earlier Estrada had the masses behind him, yet the masses were not taking to the streets
every day begging him to stay. Indeed, it was the Church that was fielding thousands in
the streets demanding he resign. Estrada might have wondered what good was it to have a
million supporters if none were willing to stand by his side when he needed them most.
As the impeachment trial adjourned for the Christmas holiday, both sides had
time to regroup and strategize. The Church continued to push its agenda every Sunday
during Mass. But what started out as peaceful combativeness between the Church and
State erupted into violence on December 30, 2000. Just a few days before the trial was to
resume, five synchronized bomb attacks killed twenty-two people and injured more than
120 people in Manila. Police accused Muslim rebels in the attacks, yet many in Manila

105Craig Skehan, “Police And Priests On Impeachment Duty.”
106John Aglionby, “Philippines President Tried for Corruption: Senate
Impeachment Hearing Told o f Mansions, Mistresses and Kickbacks,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Guardian (December 8, 2000; accessed 9 September
2002 ).
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feared the bombs were linked to the trial. There was the possibility that Estrada
supporters were trying to instill fear in the hearts o f would-be protestors.
Whatever the case was in reality, the escalation o f violence during the height o f
the impeachment trial concerned many, including Cardinal Sin, who confessed in the
wake o f the bombings to feelings o f “hopelessness” over the national situation. He used
this opportunity to accuse the Estrada government o f not only failing to set a high moral
standard for the country, but also failing to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and
heinous crimes.107
Cardinal Sin, working within the Church’s framework, used this opportunity to
question the veracity o f any actions the Estrada administration might take to calm fears.
He said in a public statement that, “If the President cannot give us an example o f moral
leadership, if the police and the military cannot protect innocent citizens from terrorist
attacks in the middle o f the city, if our Cabinet secretaries cannot appreciate
overwhelming evidence that the President is corrupt and they continue to support him,
where else can we turn? This government has not only lost its moral ascendancy to
govern. It seems like this government cannot even give us private citizens the peace and
order that public servants owe the citizenry."108
The bombings did not deter the Church. Indeed, work never stopped and it never
took its eye off o f the impeachment proceedings. The bombings may have caused fear,
but there was a greater concern for the safety o f Church protestors. Many felt that real
danger lay in the possibility o f Church-sponsored demonstrations being counter-attacked
by pro-Estrada forces, triggering an "Indonesia scenario" o f street fighting, violence, and
killings. The media wrote that such an orgy o f civil violence could only be prevented by

107Norman Bordadora, “Sin Admits to Feeling 'hopeless' Over Crises,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (January 6, 2002;
accessed 9 September 2002).
108Ibid.
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the Church. They argued that the Church was the only organization with the power to
stabilize the volatile situation and calm fears o f a doomsday post-acquittal scenario.109
The potential for violence was certainly there. The Church realized this and so
did the military. Both also recognized that by working together, they could mitigate the
possibility o f violence. The Manila Standard reported that a group o f ex-generals,
including National Security Council Adviser Joe Almonte and former ambassador and
ex-General Fortunato Abat, met with Cardinal Sin at his home to discuss the prospects
after an acquittal or conviction. The Standard claimed that this group o f ex-generals had
support from active members o f the armed forces, and that during their visit they assured
Sin that in case o f a Senate acquittal, elements o f the military were ready to ensure that
Church protests were not victimized by reactionary pro-Estrada violence.
The report seemed to coincide with ongoing rumors that the same group had
promised "military intervention" on the Church’s side in case o f acquittal.110 This is an
important point, because here the Church was given what amounts to official assurance
that the military would not intervene in its activities. It would not crack down on an
EDSA II should it happen, and what is more, it would protect the Church’s flock if
Estrada attempted to crush the new revolution against him. It was a win-win situation for
the Church.
The military’s backing o f the Church further emboldened Cardinal Sin. Early in
January 2001, he publicly implied that something larger than the previous street protests
was in the works, and he hinted that a People Power-style revolt could take place if there
was an acquittal. One o f the cardinal's spokesmen, Father Joselito Jopson, said the
Church would first study any verdict, and if there were indications that the acquittal was

109“Post-acquittal Scenario: What's Church Role?” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Manila Standard (January 4, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
110“Military Intervention After Senate Trial?” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Manila Standard (January 8, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
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“premised on deceit and manipulations, there would be no acceptance on [the Church’s]
part."111
The “no acceptance” clause found in the Church’s public statements was chilling.
Sin and his Church were ready to call upon parishioners to join "non-violent" mass
actions "to express . . . indignation" over Estrada’s continued refusal to step down. The
cardinal assured the faithful that their actions were legal and moral, and furthermore it
was their "Christian duty to stand up for what is right and moral," which meant joining
the Church’s effort to oust Estrada.112
Cardinal Sin sent solidarity messages urging other anti-Estrada groups, such as
those that made up Kompil, to maintain the pressure, saying in his message that now was
“not time to be passive and indifferent, not the time to just simply wait."113 The need to
apply pressure on the impeachment court was also o f prime importance for the Church,
because like Vice President Arroyo and members o f KOMPIL, it feared that if left on its
own conscience the Senate could be easily bribed or otherwise swayed by the
presidency’s power and influence. Father Reyes stated that the Catholic Church was
prepared to “march in thousands and even in millions” should the impeachment court not
rule as the Church hoped.114 The Church felt confident that it could mobilize the public
and be protected against counter-rebellions led by Estrada’s backers.
Arroyo took a leading role in urging the anti-Estrada groups to continue the fight
and warned that they all had "cause for concern" because those who "seek to preserve the
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112
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spoils o f power" were moving to "prevent the truth from coming out."115 The leadership
o f KOMPIL agreed, saying it would be no less than “treason” for the Senate to clear
Estrada o f all the charges amid what they called the overwhelming evidence against
him.116 "We overthrew a ruthless dictator. We will oust a criminal President," KOMPIL
declared in a statement.

117

Estrada’s allies scoffed at the Church’s action. In a telephone interview with
Business World, acting Press Secretary Michael F. Toledo spoke o f Estrada’s belief that
the public was well aware that the situation in 1986 was much different than the current
case against the president. He said, therefore, that any “People Power” phenomenon
could not be replicated and would “not get the support o f the Filipino people.”118
The confidence Estrada’s team expressed was founded on a shaky premise. They
either could not or wished not to see the power and influence the Church still wielded.
And why they ignored the reality o f the situation is very puzzling. With the exception o f
his election in 1998, the Church had prevented Estrada from changing the constitution
and forced his hand in East Timor and in other issues. Estrada’s camp should have
realized that the impeachment process had become the most important political issue for
the Church. Only the performance o f the sacraments took precedence over getting rid o f
Joseph Estrada in the year 2001.
The statements about the unlikelihood o f an EDSA II were made by the
administration on January 15, and a day later the validity o f these statements was put to
115Lacuarta, Contreras, and Avendano, “Sin: Keep Up Good Fight.”
i ^“Philippines Warns Against Protest if Estrada Acquitted,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Deutsche Presse-Agentur (January 15, 2000; accessed 9
September 2002).
117
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118Leotes Marie T. Lugo and Jennee Grace U. Rubrico, “1986 EDSA Revolt
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BusinessWorld (January 15, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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the test. On January16, 2001, events transpired that the Church, Arroyo, and KOMPIL
feared but expected. The impeachment trial was effectively halted when the Senate voted
by a margin o f one to keep sealed a “second envelope” o f vital evidence. With that one
vote, the opposition was dealt a major defeat. The Church was now sure that the trial was
as sham, because without all o f the evidence Estrada would never be convicted. Inside
this “second envelope” was the most damaging o f all evidence against the president. The
envelope contained bank records that purportedly proved Estrada had amassed 3.3 billion
pesos ($63.5 million) in unaccounted wealth in illegal bank accounts using four aliases.
Chief Prosecutor Feliciano Belmonte Jr. threatened to resign if the envelope was
not opened. Nonetheless, the senators judging Estrada voted 11-10 not to open the
documents, underscoring how the highly politicized trial had divided the impeachment
court. Congressman Joker Arroyo called the move “shameless” and said, "This means
there are eleven senators who are in the pocket o f the president."119 It did not take long
for the Church to react to the news.
The eleven senators, all allies o f Estrada, became instant targets o f Church anger.
The next few hours would see a flurry o f activity by the Church as it blasted the Senate
and Estrada and immediately called the “people” into action. Within an hour o f the
ruling, several protests erupted in Manila. Cardinal Sin urged people to gather at the
EDSA shrine. On Radio Veritas, Cardinal Sin stated solemnly, "That which we are afraid
of has happened . . . Truth has become a victim o f immoral people."120 In his lament for
justice, there was the call to action and a new “People Power” had begun.

119James Hookway, “A Twist in Manila's Impeachment Trial — Senate Could
Acquit Philippine President,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Wall
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The Philippine Senate failed to fulfill its constitutional duty impartially, so it was
time for the Church to do its duty and rip legitimacy away from Estrada the best way it
knew how—through a People Power Revolution, or an EDSA II. By midnight, Cardinal
Jaime Sin had spoken before an angry crowd o f more than 10,000 people who gathered at
the EDSA memorial. He spoke not only o f the Philippine Senate’s failure, but also
warned o f bloodshed because o f their irresponsible actions.
The protesters gathered included nuns, office workers, and laborers. Many
carried anti-Estrada signs with the words "Guilty" and "Justice died last night" printed on
them. They chanted such slogans as "Enough is enough. You're exposed, Get out." This
was the beginning o f EDSA II, and from underneath the statue o f the Virgin Mary,
Cardinal Sin warned Estrada and the eleven senators who had betrayed the Church about
God’s wrath: “God is awake and God knows the evil they have done . . . We will not
sleep and rest. We must keep watch, keep our candles lighted and overcome this
darkness."121
The rally at EDSA extended into the next day, with the Church leadership calling
for a “political cleansing” o f Philippine politics and Malacanang.122 The Church stepped
up pressure on Estrada by marshaling thousands more angry protesters and demanding he
pack up and leave office along with his cabinet. "Only the foolish and crazy will say that
he is as innocent as a dove and as pure as a baby," Sin told those assembled. "We do not
say resign only to the president, we also say to the cabinet—resign." The Church vowed
to lead intense, nonstop "forms o f public protests including even civil disobedience,"
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because continuing to leave the fate o f Estrada in the hands of the Congress was in their
words an "exercise in futility."
Support poured in from all over the country. The potential for violence was there
and Cardinal Sin was forced to address the issue. "The Church will not allow violence,"
he said, but he noted that it could not "discount the possibility or even the validity o f
extralegal peaceful means, in terms o f civil disobedience."124 And groups participating in
these “extralegal” means were voicing their support from as far away as Mindanao.
"Cardinal Sin has already warned about this and we are ready to mobilize enough people
to show Metro Manilans we are with them in this struggle," said Alvin Luque, head o f the
Estrada Resign Movement (ERM) for Southern Mindanao.125
There were some efforts to dampen EDSA II. Estrada’s allies tried in the media
to discount the Church’s call, even branding Cardinal Sin and the Church as a group o f
“lawless clerics.”

196

Moreover, they wondered out loud if the Church would respect the

constitutional process o f removing a president from office or if it would simply act
unilaterally and attempt to instigate riots to bring down the government and destabilize
the nation. Members o f the media accused the Church o f supporting mob rule and called
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the Church’s idea o f ousting Estrada through “People Power” uncivilized and part o f the
“law o f the jungle.”127
Countering these charges, the CBCP said it was the Church’s duty, morally and
religiously, to seek Estrada’s resignation. The relationship between the Church and State
was not as clearly defined as Estrada’s supporters wished. Indeed, the level o f interaction
between the Church and Estrada’s state was determined not by the constitution but by
how the government was doing its job and whether the Church was being true to the
mission it had expressed for itself.128
Senate President Aquilino Pimentel also quit in protest after the vote and left the
Philippine Congress, along with the entire prosecution team. Estrada appealed for calm.
But there was little for the anti-Estrada crowd to be calm about. Former President Fidel
Ramos, himself a target o f Church rallies in the past, joined Cardinal Sin at the EDSA
memorial and called on the army and police to withdraw their support for Estrada.
Echoing the Church’s call, Ramos told the crowd that the nation's fate "is now in the
people's court."129 Vice President Arroyo was also with Cardinal Sin and warned
Estrada’s backers against encouraging a military takeover to cling to power: "You will
not succeed because the people will not allow it."130
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Cardinal Sin also requested that the poor, part o f Estrada’s core constituency, join
the Church in its efforts. He compared Estrada’s corruption to an attack on the poor,
claiming, "The poor trusted you and you betrayed them. . . The businessmen trusted you
and you lied to them. The First Lady married you and you used many women . . . We
know in our hearts that the President is guilty."

111

Throughout the day protesters continued to pour into the streets and parking lots
around EDSA, shutting down traffic in the area. Cardinal Sin exhorted them to stay
"until evil is conquered by good."132 The political turmoil caused the Philippine currency
to tumble further.133 Yet the people kept coming. EDSA II was growing and gaining
support. Cory Aquino, also present at EDSA, called for more: "Our prayer is that there
will be more people who will gather at EDSA in the coming days."134 Arroyo’s prayer
was soon answered as the crowd swelled to an estimated 200,000 people in a very short
time, bolstered by the arrival o f delegations from all over the Philippines.
The Church’s plan was working, but it was a long time in coming. Since 1998 it
had tried to depose Estrada, yet he had always remained in power. Now at the EDSA
shrine it was 1986 all over again. The people were there in the tens o f thousands, as were
Cardinal Sin and the Catholic hierarchy, all surrounding their political allies and leading
those who answered the call to action. Cardinal Sin understood that without the masses
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little could be accomplished in opposing Estrada. He realized the Church was powerful
because at that moment it led the people, and the people acted through it.
At no other time or place was the Church fulfilling its duty as the mediating force
in Philippine politics and in the legitimacy equation more clearly or more completely
than that day at EDSA. Cardinal Sin now spoke for the people, and through the Church
they expressed their outrage. To the Church and the people, the truth had “been
subverted” and the “fire o f the people’s indignation and outrage” had been ignited. In
one o f his defining moments as the Archbishop o f Manila, Cardinal Sin turned to address
the crowd and told them just how important they were to the Church’s cause: “I have
hope because you are here. You are the hope o f this nation. So long as you are here, I can
keep on hoping. There is only one immoral President and eleven shameless senators.
There are millions and millions o f people who will safeguard the truth and, if necessary,
die for the truth"135
In other remarks, Sin had as much praise for the ten Senators who voted for the
envelope’s opening as he had anger for those who refused. In fact, he broke off from his
homily to lead the crowd in cheers for Senators Raul Roco, Rene Cayetano and Franklin
Drilon, who joined Sin on stage along with other members o f the Philippine Congress.
Rain or shine, Cardinal Sin and Church officials vowed that in the name o f the people
they would all stay at EDSA until they could "reclaim power" from Estrada.136
The indignant but peaceful protests on January 17, 2001, which Defense Secretary
Orlando Mercado referred to as "political dynamics,” were proof o f the people's distrust
o f Estrada and a demonstration o f the Church’s power to call upon the “parliament o f the
streets” to enforce its will. Other actions, such as a mass march to the presidential palace
planned by opponents of the embattled president, were called off because protestors said
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they did not recognize the occupants o f the palace anymore.137 There were also fears o f
violence should the group march on the president’s residence, and Cardinal Sin forbade
it, calling the potential for violence too risky.138 There were also some people who
simply wanted to remain at EDSA, feeling it was the center o f hope and power for the
movement. The march would eventually take place, but only after Estrada’s plight was
certain.
The economy continued to nosedive during EDSA II. The Philippine peso
plunged 5.3 percent during a twenty-four hour period to a low o f 55.75 pesos against the
dollar.139 EDSA II was now a test o f wills. There were to be no negotiations between the
Church and Estrada. The Church had only one requirement, and only one mantra—
resign.140 Indeed, Cardinal Sin reminded everyone within the sound o f his voice that he
had warned o f an Estrada presidency. He had “tried” to educate the electorate and the
elite about the dangers of Estrada as far back as 1997, and now the proverbial chickens
were coming home to roost and the nation was suffering because o f it. Sin said, “I said
this during the campaign . . . If he is elected, it will be a disaster. And (now), you see."141
There were few options remaining for Estrada under Philippine law, and the
Church preferred they not be exercised. They included a provision that allowed the
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Philippine House o f Representatives to form a new group o f prosecutors, a move that
could further delay the trial but at least see it to that a lawful conclusion was reached.
But the Church wanted no more delays. Estrada’s tightly knit group o f core supporters
began to unravel. Soon, Defense Chief General Angelo Reyes appeared at EDSA, and at
his side was Estrada’s defense secretary, Orlando Mercado. Hours earlier they had urged
Philippine soldiers to stay out o f the political fray. Moreover, a newspaper advertisement
signed by sixty members o f the Philippine Military Academy’s class o f 1962 urged
Estrada's departure and said Philippine soldiers "know what to do during the critical days
ahead as they have done in the past for the good o f their country and their people."142
Other top military officials quickly joined them at EDSA.
A desperate Estrada appeared on television, pleading with lawmakers to restart his
impeachment trial. It was an interesting sight to see the embattled president practically
begging to be prosecuted. He was now more than willing to let prosecutors open bank
records that had previously been sealed. Estrada was willing to face any trial or court
except the court o f public opinion or the “parliament o f the streets,” for it was there that
the Church was the prosecutor, and it had already selected the jury, stood as judge, and
had signed an order o f political execution.143
Estrada believed that restarting the impeachment trial would buy him the time he
needed to counter the Church’s moves to rally the people against him. It was also a way
to further his public relations campaign and to discredit anyone who would take his place.
Estrada felt that no one other than him could be legitimate because it was he who had
won an electoral mandate from the people. "Since I still have the support o f a significant
segment o f our people, I don't think that the present polarization can be healed by a new

142Dirk Beveridge, “General Defects in Philippines as Estrada Struggles to Stay in
Office,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (January 19,
2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
143Ibid.
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leader who will take over without an electoral mandate from our people," Estrada said in
a statement clearly directed at Arroyo.144 His appeals for a restart o f the trial were
ignored, and thousands o f people continued to swarm at EDSA and tens o f thousands o f
protestors marched on the palace.
Estrada could fight no longer. Until then, Arroyo had been pensive about EDSA
II and had expressed a concern to do the right thing morally and legally about Estrada.
She often met with her advisors to discuss the issue and on the morning o f January 20,
she had breakfast with Cardinal Sin and Cory Aquino to discuss how to handle Estrada’s
exit. According to Arroyo, Estrada had asked for five days to get his affairs in order.
However, Cardinal Sin was emphatic that this was unacceptable. Witnesses at the
meeting said the cardinal began to pound on the table and spoke sternly to Arroyo:
"Gloria, you owe the presidency to the people. And it is the people who want a new
president."145 There would be no five-day wait. On January 20, 2001, Estrada stepped
down as president o f the Republic o f the Philippines.
Vice President Arroyo immediately took the oath of office on the platform that
had been erected in front o f the EDSA shrine. Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr.
administered the oath. She took the oath in front o f tens o f thousands o f Filipinos
gathered at EDSA, and she shared the stage with her political allies, members o f the
military, and the Church leadership.146 As she swore her solemn oath, she did so under
the ever-watchful gaze o f the Virgin Mary statue that stood so prominently at EDSA. "I
144 Paul Alexander, “Stripped o f Support, President Reportedly Negotiating
Resignation,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press Newswires
(January 19, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
145 Amando Doronila, “SC Justices Finally OK Gloria Oath,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (February 24, 2001; accessed 9
September 2002).
146Amando Doronila, “Philippines: Article Analyzes Estrada's Downfall Analysis
from the Opinion," [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] World News
Connection Inquiries (January 21, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
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accept the privilege and responsibility to act as president of the republic. I do so with a
sense o f trepidation and o f awe . . . It is now, as the good book says, a time to heal and a
time to build," Arroyo told the masses at EDSA.147 Word from Estrada via his executive
secretary, Edgardo Angara, was that he had accepted the decision rendered by the people
at EDSA, the court, and the Church.148
The entire event o f Arroyo’s swearing in offered striking imagery, illustrating
the Church’s power not only to influence but to shape the secular State. One spectator
had words o f praise for all EDSA II had accomplished: "This was a parliament on the
streets and the people have expressed themselves."149 Indeed, they had expressed
themselves, and while the future can never be known with absolute certainty, one thing
about the new Arroyo government was certain. The Church would play an influential role
in its foundation and any future actions it might take.
Arroyo was under no illusions as to why she was now the president. She was
president because o f Estrada’s resignation, but she was in power because o f the Church’s
actions. The Philippine Constitution might have mandated the terms o f succession, but
she was not made legitimate by simple rule o f law. She had not received a mandate at the
ballot box, yet she had the people’s support. She attained the legitimacy o f the Filipino
population through the Church’s efforts.
A day after Arroyo took her oath, Cardinal Sin celebrated a special Thanksgiving
Mass at EDSA. It was a celebration o f the country’s “liberation,” a victory o f the people

147Calvin Sims, “Estrada Forced Out o f Office,” New York Times 21 January
2001, sec. A, p. 21.
148 Peter Goodspeed, “Estrada Steps Down After Cabinet Resigns: VP Sworn in
as President: Filipinos Take to the Streets in Near Replay o f 1986 Revolution,” National
Post, 20 January 2001, sec. A, p. 14.
149Alex Spillius, “'People Power' Topples Estrada: Deputy Takes the Helm as
Disgraced Philippine President is Forced Out,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] The Sunday Telegraph (January 21, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
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and o f the Church. Speaking at the Mass, Sin said that the Philippines now needed to
remain vigilant and not allow a leader like Estrada or a government like that elected in
1998 to beset the nation again. He spoke o f those who in the past warned that the
Church’s struggle would be long, but he said he believed otherwise, saying that God had
always planned to give the Philippines a “special gift.”150 He also noted the role o f the
people, taking special effort to credit their response to the Church’s call as the key to
bringing down Estrada. ”We walked in darkness but now have become people o f the
light. . . Your presence and prayers wrote history. Your love for God and country made
the big difference .. ."151
The Mass was also the perfect opportunity for Cardinal Sin to publicly inject the
Church into the fledgling Arroyo administration. "We will help you for the good o f the
nation. We will also criticize you for the good o f the nation," stated Cardinal Sin. Arroyo
now had unofficial advisors whether she wanted them or not. Cardinal Sin further
assured the assembled masses that the Church would and in fact must be involved in
future politics: “Among all the aspects o f Filipino life, it is politics that needs most the
redemption o f Christ. Politics in the Philippines must be baptized, evangelized and
become a tool not for corruption but for sanctification."153
These words, meant to reassure the public, sent chills through the spines o f those
who advocated a strict separation o f Church and State in the Philippines, most notably
Estrada’s allies. It was ironic that someone so opposed to the Church’s role in

150“Answered Prayers,” [Wire Service Online -Dow Jones Interactive] Manila
Standard (January 20, 2001; accessed 9 September 2002).
15‘ibid.
152 Ibid.
153

“Church says It Will Ensure Arroyo on the Straight and Narrow,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (January 22, 2001;
accessed 9 September 2002).
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government had lost his job not at the ballot box, but by a revolt o f the people led by that
same Catholic institution. Indeed, the Estrada administration posed several paradoxes.
While Estrada attempted to keep the Church marginalized, his actions and his policies
resulted in the Church becoming more powerful.
At no time during the modem era did the Church assume as much influence and
power as it did during the final year o f the Estrada administration. Not even during the
Aquino years, when it acted as a partner in her administration, did it have as much say in
the political future o f the Philippines as it did after EDSA II. Because o f Estrada’s
scandals and because he chose to fight it, the Philippine Catholic Church briefly
superseded even the president in power, forcing his resignation and installing its own
anointed choice into the office. In the wake o f EDSA II, it was a time to sit in awe and
reflect on all the Church had accomplished and ponder future possibilities.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

Nearly five centuries have passed since the Philippine Catholic Church’s
establishment. The previous chapters have detailed Church involvement in the
legitimacy process and its evolution from governmental control during the Spanish
colonial era to overt power-sharing schemes that materialized during the post-1945 era o f
independence. Throughout history the Church has played both lead and supporting roles
in the political pasyon that is Philippine politics, and it has evolved from an arcane body
o f bishops seeking a theocracy to a modem, politically active, and flexible social
organization that adjusts to fit the changing landscape o f Philippine politics. The
Church’s survivability has proven that no matter what kind o f regime mled the
Philippines, it invariably sought the loyalty o f the Church and the Filipino people— rarely
mutually exclusive things. Indeed, whether a particular ruling regime continued often
hinged on whether or not it enjoyed the Church’s support.
The roots o f the Church’s influence run deeper than some social scientists and
politicians like to admit. The Church maintains considerable influence, even as the
average Filipino may wish for it to stay out o f politics. For example, 66 percent o f the
population polled in 1998 felt that religious leaders should not try to influence how
people vote in elections, and 63 percent said they should not try to influence government
decisions.1 Yet when the Church intervenes in secular politics as it did in EDSA I and II,
the public rarely objects and indeed follows the Church’s political lead. For example, as
late as January 6, 2001, 53 percent o f those polled did not want Joseph Estrada to resign,

l4‘Attendance at Religious Services- Survey for October 28-November 14, 1998,”
Social Weather Report Survey (Quezon City, Philippines: Social Weather Station, 1998),
186.
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but in a matter o f weeks nearly 71 percent felt that the Church-sponsored EDSA II, which
forced Estrada’s resignation, “expressed the sentiment o f the majority.”
Polls conducted in the Philippines can be used to show the rise and fall o f the
Church’s trust rating and those o f its leadership, yet it is to the Church that the nation
turns in times o f political chaos.3 Both EDSA revolutions vividly illustrated to the world
the power o f the Church to affect change in governmental legitimacy, and at the same
time showed the weakness o f polls in gauging true public opinion towards the Church.
In the absence o f reliable statistical data, the kind that has only become available
in the last two decades, the researcher is left with qualitative analysis o f Philippine
history and politics to determine the Church’s true nature in government legitimacy. The
totality o f this study has attempted to do just that, and this chapter is the final reservoir o f
ideas and analysis o f the Church within the legitimacy paradigm. It begins with a brief
review o f legitimacy theory and a discussion o f the Church’s place within the model.
The ideas o f Weber and Easton are recounted to refresh the reader on the general
concepts discussed, debated, and challenged in this study. Coupled with this review is a
look at how the Church has performed within the democratic milieu now predominant in
Philippine politics. Democratic politics poses its own unique rules and constraints on
legitimacy, for the people must be accounted for in any legitimacy model. One purpose
o f the concluding chapter is to explain this issue and demonstrate how the people were
and remain a part o f the Church’s actions throughout the twentieth century, especially in
the EDSA revolutions of 1986 and 2001.

2

Maha Mangahas, “From Juentenggate to People Power 2: The SWS Surveys o f
Public Opinion,” Social Weather Report Survey (Quezon City, Philippines: SWS, Inc.
2002), 18, 52.
“The Cardinal,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily
Inquirer (November 16, 2000; accessed 9 September 2002).
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The review o f legitimacy theory and the discussion o f the role o f the Church
within the democratic realities o f the Philippines is followed by a discussion o f the events
in the wake o f EDSA II. It is beneficial for this study to include a few examples o f how
Estrada, and later Arroyo, dealt with the Church’s political influence and authority in
their own quests for legitimacy. In a similar vein, the last half o f the chapter examines at
the Church’s current role in the Arroyo administration and its possible future in
Philippine politics. This includes an examination o f specific policies o f the Arroyo
administration where the Church’s influence is obvious, as well as lesser issues where the
pressure is not so noticeable.
Finally, no look at legitimacy and the Church can be complete without some
discussion o f the future, and discussion about the future of the Philippine Church must
inexorably revolve around what will be a “post-Sin” Church. Jaime Cardinal Sin’s own
political involvement has decreased and continues to do so since the events o f 2001. The
Church may face its own leadership crisis in a few years. Will the Church suffer from a
“vacuum o f leadership” o f its own in his absence, or will it survive and even flourish with
a new generation o f leaders? A few pages are dedicated to answering these and other
questions.
Any study dealing with legitimacy and the role o f a social institution like the
Church tends to focus on pursuit and acquisition o f power within political relationships.
This is not surprising considering that reduced to its most basic element and stripped o f
all its social trappings, legitimacy is simply a government’s ability to coerce consent out
o f a population. The word coerce may seem harsh, but this coercion can take many
forms. The Weberian model o f legitimacy outlined three possible ways, or the three arch
types or classifications that function as independent variables providing authority to the
dependent variable o f “legitimacy.” There are Rational-Legal, Traditional and
Charismatic, and each are considered “ideal” types oflegitimacy found in Weber’s
paradigm.
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Rational-Legal legitimacy rests on the belief that there is a legality found in
patterns o f normative rules and behaviors, and the right of those elevated to authority
under such rules is to issue commands. The government’s ability to coerce legitimacy
from the population stems from its acceptance o f the rules and laws found in a governing
document or contract. Whether it is a Rousseau-like uncomplicated social contract or a
more Lockean document such as the United States Constitution, the people concede that
both they and the government are responsible for keeping the tenets o f the law. One side
yields authority and a degree o f personal sovereignty to the other.
Traditional legitimacy is based on the belief in the sacredness o f ancient traditions
and the status o f those exercising authority. People respond to the government and its
command because that is what the previous generations did. New thought is discouraged,
new ways are not welcome, and new blood is not appreciated within the ruling circle.
Kings, queens, sultans, and chiefs predominate this form oflegitimacy. The power o f the
potentate is unquestioned. Populations are coerced by history, culture, respect, and
custom.
The final Weberian legitimacy type, Charismatic legitimacy, may be the most
intriguing. In this ideal type oflegitimacy the government or regime, which is often
personified in a single individual, coerces its authority out o f the population by appearing
to embody exceptional or exemplary characteristics. People want to follow this type o f
individual or regime because they are so enamored with that person’s qualities that they
are willing to sacrifice a bit o f their own personal sovereignty. Moreover, the ruler or
regime that is legitimized by charisma is ordained with the authority to set out the rules o f
how things ought to be.
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Outside the Weberian model is the Utilitarian type o f legitimacy. Utilitarianism
features coercion equally applied by both the ruler and the ruled. The ruler seeks the
power and authority to govern the nation-state and the ruled seeks as many concessions
from the government as it can get. Nowhere is this concept more readily observed than
in the United States, where candidates are often elected to government office based on
how much money or goods and services they can bring back to their district or state. A
presidential campaign is much the same way. In exchange for a vote, a presidential
candidate may promise more money for national defense, roads, reducing crime, or even
something as mundane as a guaranteed prescription drug program for senior citizens.
As with every independent variable, whether it is Rational-Legal, Traditional,
Charismatic, or Utilitarian, it does not affect governmental legitimacy directly. Indeed,
the cornerstone o f this entire study is based on the existence o f mediating variables that
serve as lenses through which authority is focused. Each o f these mediating variables
filters consent to the government, and consent is based on a belief in norms and values
shared by rulers and the ruled. Mediating variables tend to shape the norms and values.
Thus, any consensus on a norm or value used to legitimate a government is the result o f
actions taken by the mediating variable. These mediating variables may include the
military, business groups, and religious institutions. This study has argued that in the
Philippines, the Catholic Church has become the epitome o f the mediating variable,
influencing legitimacy of any and every type.
Discerning the Church’s role in the Rational-Legal type oflegitimacy proved to
be the least problematic. As was discussed in previous chapters, the Church has at times
been more than simply a mediating force in Philippine governmental legitimacy. It has
actually been the government. Extensive resources exist documenting the Church’s role
during the Spanish colonial era, when it helped write the laws, staffed the bureaucracy
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with its candidates, and at times even had its Archbishop serve as chief executive o f the
colony.4
The Church also organized cities, built infrastructure, and protected the
population against pirates, heretics, and other Europeans who sought dominion over
Filipino territory. Later, the death o f three priests was the catalyst for the Filipino
revolution o f the late nineteenth century. During the revolution, Spanish friars were the
object o f scorn and Filipino priests were part o f the revolutionary leadership. Parishes
served as weapons stores and rallying points for colonial defense, and later for the
revolutionary cause against Spain and the United States.
The Church also brought 1,000 years o f Catholic tradition with it to the
Philippines. The success it had in baptizing and converting the indigenous population to
the Catholic faith meant that in a few years, large segments o f the Filipino populace
accepted the catechism and the authority o f the Church and all it represented during this
time. Part of this acceptance was the political leadership role o f the pontiff, archbishops,
bishops, and the parish priest.
Filipinos were subjects o f Spain and the Catholic Church, and as such leaders in
both realms were to be respected and obeyed. The priest, regardless o f his rank,
represented the historical Church, its customs, and inevitably God himself. Therefore,
when the bishops favored one set o f laws over another, or one ruler over another, the
people abided by their decisions. The Filipino gave consent to the Church and the
Spanish secular authority based not on the Spanish reputation, but because the Spanish
were allied with the Catholic Church. Such a close relationship allowed Spain to control
a numerically superior population with few soldiers and even fewer priests.
The Church’s traditional authority meant that it possessed considerable political
gravitas that it could parlay into real political influence even after the passing o f Spanish
4Nicholas Tracy, Manila Ransomed: The British Assault on Manila in the Seven
Years War (Exeter, UK: University o f Exeter Press, 1995), 33-34.
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hegemony. The Spanish Church became the Filipino Church, and its mantle of
traditional legitimacy passed from one to the other. The monarchy may have left the
archipelago to be replaced by Uncle Sam in 1898, but the Church remained active in
“crowning” local leadership and in a feudalistic position as head o f its barangays.
Traditional authority invested in the Church by custom and legacy continues to support
government officials and actions.
Characterizing the Charismatic element o f legitimacy requires a more specific
look at personalities within the Church that directly impacted Philippine politics. There
have been several leaders in the past and the present who, through the Church’s
leadership and their own personal charisma, have sought and achieved an important role
in Philippine politics. These individuals include Bishop Fray Domingo de Salazar, the
first bishop o f Manila who in 1581 led the Christianization o f the Philippines;
Archbishop Manuel Antonio Rojo del Rio y Vieyra, who was Governor General for a
time and led the defense o f Manila when the British lay siege in 1762; and Fathers Jose
Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora, who bravely fought to end Spanish control
of the Church and their country and were executed for their actions. Their deaths sparked
a revolution.
In the twentieth century there has been one charismatic priest who has stood out
among the rest for his involvement in politics and the legitimacy o f Philippine
governments. Indeed, some may argue that Jaime Cardinal Sin, the archbishop of
Manila, has become a mediating variable himself. His charismatic appeal can certainly
not be denied, for no ordinary man can command the allegiance o f the Philippine
Catholic Church, have a million people pour into the streets when he asks, and unseat two
constitutionally elected presidents. Indeed, he is much more than the archbishop o f
Manila, he may be the seminal political and social force in twentieth-century Philippine
politics.
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The very powerful and influential Jaime Sin came from very humble beginnings.
He was bom on August 21, 1928, the fourteenth o f sixteen children bom to Juan Sin and
Maxima Lachica. Like many large Filipino families, the Sins expected one o f their
children to enter Church service. Young Jaime di d, and he was ordained a priest at the
age o f twenty-six and went on to become a domestic prelate at thirty-one. He became a
bishop at thirty-eight, an archbishop at forty-four, and a cardinal at forty-eight. His rapid
rise to the heights o f Church power placed him in the position o f great importance in the
Philippine Catholic Church. As bishop o f Manila, he was the Church’s de facto leader.
He attained this post at the height o f Marcos’s marshal law, and chose to thrust himself
into the heart o f the political turmoil.
The Church had always been active in politics, but prior to Cardinal Sin’s
takeover o f Manila’s bishopric it had not fully confronted Marcos. Cardinal Sin rallied
his forces to change this situation and served as the uniting influence and the voice o f
opposition against Marco’s regime. He successfully drew upon his own charismatic
appeal and political acumen to position the Church’s immense popular support and
resources to render Marcos illegitimate.
After Marcos’s downfall in 1986, Cardinal Sin helped prop up the presidency o f
Corey Aquino, stabilizing the fragile Philippine democracy in the process. He was also
instrumental in the ratification o f the 1987 Constitution and subsequent efforts to keep
President Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada from tampering with the document. His role
in the EDSA II uprising against Estrada in 2001 was recounted in the last chapter. The
showdown between two charismatic leaders, Estrada and Sin, proved to be a titanic
political battle that would last for four months, from October 2000 to January 2001.
Unofficially, it can be traced back to the 1998 presidential elections and did not end until
the events that transpired in May 2001, which are discussed later in this chapter. In the
end, EDSA II might prove to be Sin’s last great political battle, but at least he went out on
top.
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Sin’s importance to Philippine politics cannot be understated. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo has lauded Cardinal Sin as a “prophet o f our times,” a “pillar o f the
Catholic Church,” and “one o f the greatest Filipinos” o f the last two centuries. Yet
Arroyo’s praise does not end there. During a special Thanksgiving Mass held at the
Manila Cathedral, Arroyo spoke at length about the work and legacy o f this charismatic
Catholic leader. Her speech appears in part below, and it deserves a place in this study for
its ability to highlight the importance o f Cardinal Sin to the president in particular and the
Philippines in general. Before a crowd o f political and theological dignitaries, Arroyo
affirmed:
His eminence has guided us to discern the right path through various moral and
ethical issues. He has strengthened our faith in miracles, in prayer, and in the
blessings that the Lord Almighty showers upon our country. . . He has been a true
example o f courage, facing up to the authoritarianisms and immorality in days
when very few dared to dream o f free speech or go against the tide o f mob
popularity. He has shown catholic and non-catholic Filipinos alike . . . we can
stand in the way o f armored tanks and propaganda machines and still prevail. . .
. . . Who can forget that it was His Eminence [who] called us to gather at
EDSA and make a stand for democracy? It as His Eminence . . . soothing
assurances that one’s presence at EDSA was a moral act and a free person’s right
that brought a million people to EDSA . . .
. . . Who can forget, too, that it was also His Eminence who invoked the
requirement o f moral ascendancy in government just a few months ago that
culminated in a peaceful change o f leadership by constitutional succession? His
Eminence’s wisdom has guided us . . . more than 25 years . . . proving over and
over again that, as in Proverbs, Chapter 24, Verse 5, “A wise man is more
powerful than a strong man, and a man o f knowledge is more powerful than a
man o f might.” Your Eminence, I speak for a grateful Filipino people, grateful to
you for leading us through years o f struggle for democracy, through long months
of searching for moral ascendancy, and through many moments o f individual
moral and religious decisions that Filipinos have to make in their daily lives.”5

5Speech of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, given during the Thanksgiving
Mass on the occasion o f the Silver Jubilee Anniversary o f Cardinal Sin as Cardinal o f the
Catholic Church (May 31, 2001) Manila Cathedral, Manila.
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It does not stretch the imagination to think that Cardinal Sin may one day be
given sainthood for the “miracles” that he and his Church performed in 1986 and 2001.
Still, he will not live forever and there are others within the Church waiting to assume the
role o f archbishop of Manila and the leadership o f the Church. The responsibilities they
will inherit are more than spiritual. Any future leader must realize that the Church, as the
premier mediating variable, may determine the very legitimacy o f the government and
the presidency itself. Politicians may understand this better than anyone. Many were in
attendance at the Thanksgiving Mass, and others appreciate the significance o f the
Church’s support, both real and symbolic, to any search for power they may entertain.
Outside o f Weber’s paradigm in the area o f Utilitarian legitimacy the Church
played an equally important role. For many centuries while the Philippines were under
Spanish control the Church facilitated the outlay o f goods and services, meager though
they were, to the population. The Church ensured not simply community defense or the
common good, but as was discussed in Chapter 2, the local parish organized every aspect
o f community life. So engrained was the relationship between the parish priest and the
community that when the Filipinos had the chance to throw off Spanish rule during the
British occupation o f Manila in 1762, they did not.6 The British found it impossible to
win the Filipinos’ hearts and minds. The Americans were able to do it only by re-staffing
parishes with friendly priests, doing away with the Catholic monopoly on education, and
building on simmering discontent within the Spanish Church. Yet the Church was never
fully removed from politics and reemerged in the wake o f World War II to reassert itself.

6Tracy, Manila Ransomed, 40.
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Finding a utility for the organization in the post-war Philippines challenged the
Church’s resourcefulness in many ways, and it responded accordingly. No longer
responsible for providing basic goods and services or even governmental services to the
population, the Church focused instead on helping the new independent republic and the
peasant population through the organization o f trade unions, peasant advocacy groups,
and anti-Communist cadres that sought to counter the ongoing Huk rebellion.
After the Vatican II liberalization and revitalization o f the Church in the early
1960s, Church elements became more active as advocates for the poor and the politically
disenfranchised. This advocacy role provided a utility for large segments o f the
population that could not hope to resist the repressive laws o f the authoritarian Marcos
regime, which was in full force by the end o f the decade. After Marcos declared martial
law in 1972, the Church provided one o f the strongest anti-Marcos and anti-martial law
voices in the Philippines. This led to the events o f the early 1980s and the first People
Power Revolution, the culmination o f the Church’s efforts and the epitome o f its political
utility for the masses. Since Marcos, the Church has continued its utilitarian function for
both the poor and the politically disenfranchised, taking an active role in elections and
caring for the needs of the less fortunate.
Though discounted by Weber and others in legitimacy theory, the Philippine
Catholic Church has proven its merit and worth in all four types o f legitimacy. It has
provided the government with a social order seen as validated by God and embedded
within a political culture that was itself shaped and often controlled by the Church.
Legitimacy in the Philippines has proven to be a phenomenon o f social order, and the
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type o f social order found in a Philippine society has not affected the Church’s ability to
manipulate it to its advantage.
The Church has thrived and dominated in a colonial government, matched wits
with an emerging superpower during a commonwealth period, and survived a Cold War.
It has fought off challenges from left-wing humanist movements, Protestant schisms,
Communist infiltration, and Muslim insurgency. It has survived martial law and the
imprisonment, abuse, torture, and murder o f its leaders and laity. It has endured and
outlived fascism and authoritarian regimes, and it has flourished in democracy. The
Philippine Catholic Church has been the great political and social survivor for almost
500 years and most likely will remain politically active.
In Weber’s theory oflegitimacy acceptance o f the Church’s role is found in the
three ideal types, along with utilitarianism. In David Easton’s theory the Church’s role
takes a different shape. Unlike Weber, Easton does not give a theory oflegitimacy, but
his ideas on the political system require one to already exist. In that sense, his ideas fit
well with helping expand the Weberian design oflegitimacy and the role o f the Church in
the state. For example, Easton tells us that in a political system, something needs to
n

“intervene in the name o f society... to decide how valued things are to be allocated."
This study has illustrated that in the Philippines, no other organization has intervened
more in political matters than the Catholic Church. The very nature o f its raison d ’etre
meant that it decided the value o f policies and politicians, and still does this today.
The Church is also inherently intertwined with the idea o f diffuse support.
Throughout Philippine history support for the Church has been based on traditional, legal,
n

David Easton., ed. Varieties o f Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1966), 136.
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charismatic, and utilitarian authority. Along with this has been the diffuse support
engendered in the population by the catholic institutions that make up the Church and the
Church itself. No organization or government has the impact on the young mind, the
family unit, and the adult population, as does the Church. Its support has been
institutionalized. Its specific support is found in the policies it promotes and the solid
backing it gets from the citizenry. The Church has realized what Easton wrote, that
governments, regimes, and individual politicians find it difficult to remain effective
without diffuse and specific support.
The Church has been successful in maintaining specific and diffuse support and
this can be proven by public opinion polls that confirm the Church’s trust rating and the
public’s concurrence on key issues. For example, in a country where overpopulation is a
problem and the Church frowns upon birth control, abortion is a hot issue. Politicians
have from time to time brought up the issue, and the Church has reacted vehemently
against it. The citizenry seem to agree with the Church. A full 70 percent believe
abortion is always wrong, making no exceptions for the life o f the mother or rape and
incest. Only 7 percent say that abortion is acceptable.8
Public opinion in the Philippines also illustrates that the Church has more trust
and confidence from the population than do the courts and the educational system.
Moreover, one finds a strong majority o f 55 percent believe the Church possesses and
utilizes the correct amount o f power, illustrating for the researcher that the Church among

8 Religion Module - Social Weather Station Report Survey, October 28 November 14, 1998, (Quezon City, Philippines: Social Weather Station, 1998), 181.
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all organizations has the institutional diffuse support needed as well as the specific
support to push forward their agenda in the Philippine democracy.9
The Eastonian idea o f diffuse and specific support is real and lasting for the
Church in the Philippines in part because it has utilized so well the tools o f politics, even
as the political currents have changed in Philippine history. The restoration of
democratic rule in the Philippines and the election o f President Aquino allowed the
Church a new position o f power. At the same time, it also created new challenges. A
democracy restored meant that the Church was now unable to simply impose its will as it
did during the Spanish era, or resort to open violence as it did against the British and
Americans. Unable to work through peasant groups as it did in the post-World War II
decade, the Church has had to adapt to and deal with this democracy. It has worked
successfully through the people because its very foundation is with the people.
As it had in the past, the Church utilized all aspects, including its gravitas, to
ensure that the politicians o f their choice--Aquino and now Arroyo—survived and those
they objected to did not. The Aquino presidency and subsequent administrations each
provide ideal material to observe the Church within a democratic milieu. Dictating
policies was much easier in a time when concern for parishioners was secondary to
Church policy, but parishioners were now the well from which the Church’s power was
drawn. Through the use o f People Power the Church has left an indelible mark on the
Philippine body politic. With the people’s help during the past twenty years, the Church
brought down one dictator and one morally corrupt president and helped install two
governments sympathetic to the Church’s cause.

9 Ibid., 190.
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It has been able to do this not by force o f arms or theological coup, but by
working through the democratic processes now existent and revitalized in the Philippines.
No matter how powerful or convincing the Church may be, without the people there
would have been no EDSA I or EDSA II. It was, after all, People Power. At lower levels
o f politics the Church continued to stump for candidates, openly expressing preferences
for or attempting to prematurely end the terms o f officials with which they did not agree.
In a way, the Church’s power has remained interwoven with the fortunes o f politicians
allied to its cause.
These questions remain: Where does the people’s authority expressed through the
power o f the vote and through the Church’s agenda fit into the legitimacy model outlined
in chapter 1? Should the people share paradigmatic space with other independent “x”
variables and, if so, does this preclude any action by the population in the other sectors o f
“x”? Do the “x” variables have a chance to interact with one another or are they mutually
exclusive? And where does the Church fit in the model with the inclusion o f people
expressed graphically? Is it still as important? How does the theories o f Weber or Easton
help explain this situation?
The answers are not complicated, because any study that examines the importance
o f mediating variables in legitimacy and uses for its case study a democratically elected
government cannot take the people out o f the equation. The population’s role has always
been assumed in each o f Weber’s categories and in utilitarianism, and in Easton’s ideas
o f diffuse and specific support. For example, a leader needs a population with which to
have a social contract under the Rational-Legal ideal oflegitimacy. Without a population,
the ruler’s contract would be null and void because he would be the only party to the
agreement. A ruler also needs the population o f his state to acknowledge his charismatic
appeal. Looking in the mirror at one’s reflection and admiring one’s own charisma is not
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going to keep one in office. Therefore, any ruler who survives on charismatic appeal
needs a population to recognize and reinforce it.
The people are o f lesser importance in the traditional style oflegitimacy, but they
are nonetheless needed because they accept and reinforce this norm. And should they
cease to accept it, it opens the way for an illegitimate ruler and an unstable nation-state.
The overthrow o f monarchies is certainly something that is part o f human history. The
utilitarian ideal oflegitimacy presupposes the presence o f a population that gives
authority to a government or individual in return for what that government or individual
can do for it. Indeed, without a population there can be no exchange o f goods and
services for authority.
Support o f any type, whether it is diffuse or specific, needs actors involved to give
such support. Measuring diffuse or specific support is mainly done through public
opinion polling. Without a public there could be no polls, without polls there can be no
effective measurement o f support. There would be no need for either diffuse or specific
support in totalitarian regimes, for they would exist in spite o f an Eastonian ideal. But
Easton’s ideas require a democracy to work, a democracy like the Philippines, and thus
the people a priori to the political system.
The bulk o f this study has dealt with the Church’s role as the champion, caretaker,
spokesman, and representative for the political will o f the Philippine population.
Therefore, in the legitimacy model the people cannot and should not be illustrated as a
separate variable acting independently. Instead, the people are an equal and integral part
o f each and every one o f the independent variables. In democracies like the Philippines,
the population is the foundation on which all independent variables o f legitimacy exist.
The inclusion and acknowledgment o f an important role for the people does not
pose any particular problems for the Church’s role. In fact, the last few chapters have
shown that these roles are necessary when one attempts to understand the Church’s
influence in Philippine politics. The Church has acted and continues to act as a political
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lens that focuses the people’s power and authority through the independent variables onto
the Philippine government. Democratization o f the Philippines has had consequences for
the Church’s role in legitimating governments, but it has adjusted.
Realization that nothing o f the magnitude o f deposing presidents can be
accomplished without the people, this study has shown how the Church and its leadership
have become masterful in manipulating the population to that end. Cardinal Sin and
others continue to fight their battles with politicians in the court o f public opinion, and
they do not fight fair. Mobilizing the Church’s immense resources, they can launch
propaganda barrages that very few single politicians can counter. They have their own
television, radio, and print media to transmit their ideas, opinions, and attacks. But even
this is not needed, for the Church gets ample coverage in the private media as was
illustrated in earlier chapters. What the Church does not get in free coverage it buys with
paid advertisements.
What the Church cannot accomplish in the media it can attempt to achieve in the
parishes. One thing that raises the ire o f Church critics on the op-ed pages o f Philippine
newspapers is the Church’s continued use o f pastoral letters and homilies extolling the
“virtuous” will o f the Church, while scandalizing and condemning the politicians it
opposes. Since 1986, going to a Catholic Church in the Philippines has often meant more
than simply hearing a sermon, receiving Mass, and confessing sins. It has come to
include important political messages written by Cardinal Sin or the CBCP and read by the
local parish priest. These messages simultaneously reaffirm God’s love, condemn
political foes, and seek to motivate the people to answer the Church’s call to action. Any
political enemy o f the Church can be assured that if they do not bow to the Church’s will,
they too will find their names and activities as part o f the sermon.
Becoming an enemy o f the Church has meant political destruction for many—
destruction brought about by the people. The previous chapters are full o f examples.
Once the Church’s resources are mobilized behind a cause and it has motivated the
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people, it is almost impossible to stop. Estrada had the best chance to fight and beat the
Church. He was not an ordinary politician or a cruel dictator. He was a former movie star
who appealed to the masses as both a cult hero and as a politician who championed the
poor’s cause.
Estrada was able to translate his charisma into political clout. As an actor and a
politician, he was able to convince the poorest o f society that he cared about their plight.
The poor, or the masa as they were known, were the source o f his political power and his
legitimacy. In Estrada’s eyes, the Church could be circumvented. He would accept its
endorsement if offered but he believed he did not need it to survive politically. It was a
calculated risk on Estrada’s part. The Church publicly opposed his candidacy, propped
up his opponents, and questioned his morality. The Church wanted anyone but Estrada to
win.
Not only was Estrada’s victory a defeat for the Church, but it also indicated that
the people mattered in the new Philippine democracy. If the Church wanted to affect
political change in the post-1998 world, it needed to mobilize the people. In the Estrada
case, enough people chose to ignore the Church’s mediating influence and elect Estrada.
As such, he had a right to feel invincible. As he relaxed into his new role as the most
powerful politician in the Philippines, the Church never stopped working against him.
Had this been pre-1898, it would have simply had him removed and sent him back to the
province from which he came, relegated to obscurity either in the Philippines or on the
Iberian peninsula. But this was 1998 and the Philippines is a democracy. To get rid o f
Estrada, the Church needed the people. It needed the masses, and it needed to find
something to turn sufficient numbers against Estrada to end the mandate that he had won
in a free and fair constitutional election. That is exactly what the Church did.
The events that led to Estrada’s downfall have already been chronicled, but o f
interest is how the Church worked through the people. As with all “z” variables in a
democracy, the people’s energies are usually focused on the government. Their will,
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anger, desires, authority, and voices are magnified by mediating variables to levels
unachievable without them. The political decibel level was deafening to Marcos in 1986,
loud enough for Ramos to stop his attempts to tamper with the constitution in 1997, and
boisterous enough in January 2001 to force the resignation o f the once very popular
Estrada.
Estrada believed that the masses could protect him. Unlike Marcos, his approval
ratings had remained high and he remained a hero to the poorest in the Philippines. In its
initial struggle against Estrada, the Church fielded fewer numbers than Estrada so his
confidence was warranted, at least on the surface. But as this study has shown, one must
look much deeper than the surface. The Church realized its place in modem democratic
politics and embraced it.
If one lesson is learned, it is that the Church articulates and protects norms and
legitimacy. Moreover, as Fleet and Smith point out, the Church has made a gradual,
though no less radical, transformation to become an ally to democracy. The Philippines
are an ideal place to witness this transformation. There the Church has become a kind o f
social loudspeaker, ensuring that the political will and desire o f the masses cannot be
discounted or overlooked by any politician seeking to remain legitimate and relevant.
Polls in the wake o f EDSA II confirm this position. If the Church had not
instigated a People Power movement against Estrada, 64 percent o f the population
believed Estrada’s government would not have listened to their complaints.10 In 1986,
after the first EDSA revolution, 66 percent believed that a popular struggle was necessary
to have their grievances heard.11 Furthermore, the triumph o f EDSA II was seen as the

10 Maha Mangahas, “From Juentenggate to People Power 2: The SWS Surveys o f
Public Opinion,” 76.

1■ibid.
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will o f God by 59 percent o f the population, and 61 percent believed that EDSA II was
necessary and just.12
Estrada tried but failed to marginalize the Church. During the early stages o f his
impeachment trial, he was able to organize upwards o f a million people to attend a rally
in support of his administration. In the end he was able to get nearly 1 million supporters
at his rally, and the Church managed only 100,000 at their counter demonstration, yet the
Church prevailed. Why? The only answer lies in the Church’s ability to magnify the
individual’s voice and power, energizing tens o f thousands from the electorate and
channeling their power into a mandate for the Church to call for the removal o f a duly
elected president who still maintained tremendous mass support. There has really been
nothing like it in all o f Southeast Asia, and perhaps the world.
Doubters need only look at the events o f EDSA II. Nowhere else in
contemporary politics is there so vivid an example o f the Church working unilaterally
through the people to accomplish its political agenda. Public opinion data now shows
that the Church’s actions were justified since the Filipino people have embraced the
results. The numbers at EDSA were in the hundreds o f thousands, but that still only
represented a small fraction o f the electorate. With the Church’s support, however,
EDSA II forced Estrada to resign. EDSA II was an expression and an illustration o f how
the Church serves as the mediating variable in legitimacy.
Public opinion data collected by the Social Weather Station (SWS) after the
events o f EDSA II reaffirmed the Church’s actions and its position o f power and
influence. Polls taken shortly after EDSA II revealed that 56 percent believed that the
“strength o f People Power” legitimized Arroyo’s presidency.13 The second and third
factors in her legitimacy were “the decision o f the Supreme Court” and “the support o f
12Ibid., 59-60.
13Ibid„ 87.
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the Catholic Church.” It should not be forgotten that although the Church is third on the
list o f factors, it played a leading role in helping organize the People Power and
pressuring the Supreme Court. The Church gave weight to both Estrada’s resignation and
Arroyo’s swearing in as the new president, and the people accepted it.
Another poll showed that nearly 70 percent o f the population believed EDSA II
represented the majority’s opinion. This reinforces the idea that the Church was in the
unique position to act on the behalf o f millions o f Filipinos.14 Yet another public opinion
poll showed that a full 64 percent o f the people believed that if the Church-led People
Power had not taken place, Estrada’s government would not have responded to the
people’s grievances. This is more evidence o f the Church’s continued role as the one
organization that can force a corrupt government to heed the people’s wishes. By its
actions, the Church ensured that there would be no mass disenfranchisement o f the
electorate by the actions o f Estrada and his eleven allies in the Philippine Senate.15
The Church’s overall effectiveness in the public’s eyes was boosted considerably
after its EDSA II success. When the SWS measured the “trust ratings” o f popular
personalities in February 2001, just two weeks after ESDAII, Cardinal Sin enjoyed a net
trust rating several points higher than former President Aquino, and more than fifteen
points higher than the popular Fidel Ramos. The only non-Church figure with
considerably more popularity was the new president.
Arroyo was and remains a popular figure, and like Cardinal Sin and others in the
Church, she had a strong sense o f her political destiny.16 She still portrays herself as a

14Mangahas,“From Juetenggate to People Power 2: The SWS Surveys o f Public
Opinion,”3 6.
15Ibid„ 40.
16Hookway, “Arroyo Makes Preparations For Possible Life After Estrada.
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woman o f the masses and her support may reflect that reality.17 Yet never far away from
Arroyo’s political life is the influence o f the Catholic Church and Cardinal Sin. Even
before Estrada’s troubles, Cardinal Sin was considered Arroyo’s close confidant. It was
Cardinal Sin who advised her to quit her cabinet job the same day the Church launched
its anti-Estrada campaign. Later, Arroyo relayed part o f their conversations, which
reflected a powerful cardinal guiding a very malleable Arroyo. She said Sin told her,
"We don't have to plan every detail. God will take care o f it."

1 ft

Of course, in the opinion

o f millions and maybe Arroyo herself, God worked through Cardinal Sin and the
Church.19
Arroyo’s story and the way the Church has influenced her administration follows
next in the discussion. Up to this point, the story o f the Church’s influence has been told
largely through historical narrative with analysis weaved into it. The events o f the
Spanish era, the American period, and the administrations of Marcos, Aquino, Ramos,
and Estrada have all been discussed in varying degrees o f detail to ensure a proper
understanding o f the Church’s role in the legitimacy process. The Church’s existence
within the democratic political milieu has also been covered in this chapter. What
remains is a discussion o f how the Church is performing in the Arroyo administration.
President Arroyo’s administration, now twenty-one months old, provides an
archetype final case study to understand how the Church remains a force o f legitimacy.
Having installed her into power, the Church has still not removed itself from its advisory
and support role in her administration.

17Ibid.
18Ibid.
19Raissa Robles, “Just the Woman for the Job,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] South China Morning Post (January 20, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
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In fact, it may be argued that since Arroyo has taken power the Church has acted
in a very public manner, becoming bolder and more powerful than it ever has been. The
Church’s importance to Arroyo has only become larger since her inauguration. Its role in
her presidency is easily measurable by simply looking at the Church’s actions since she
took her oath o f office under the statue o f the Virgin Mary at EDSA. Her first year in
office illustrates the Church’s key role in solidifying her legitimacy, which has been
questioned by some in the Philippines, especially Estrada’s supporters. The first months
o f the Arroyo administration are full o f political drama and Church involvement. Indeed,
the Church continued to remain active throughout her administration in its role as the
most influential mediating variable. What follows is a discussion o f a few o f the key
issues in which the Church injected itself into matters o f legitimacy and policy in the new
administration.
The first test for Arroyo and for the Church in its advisory role to the new
president was the question o f legitimacy itself. Although the polls clearly showed that the
people supported the results o f EDSA II, there were those in Estrada’s camp who tried to
create doubt in the people’s minds about the legality o f Arroyo’s legitimacy. The
criticisms were based on the Rational-Legal foundation found in the Weberian model.
Arroyo had not been elected to the presidency and in the pro-Estrada group’s eyes,
therefore, she should be seen only as an “acting” president until something legally
binding, such as a snap election, could be created.20
The argument had some weight, but it ignored Arroyo’s popularity and the
majority’s acceptance o f EDSA II as a form o f snap election. Moreover, the Churchsponsored protests had forced President Estrada to accept a Philippine Supreme Court
decree that stripped him o f his office. The court may have been creating law, but

90

“GMA Government Facing Constitutional Crisis,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Manila Standard (February 2, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
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nonetheless, his acceptance o f it and Arroyo’s swearing in by the chief justice made her
the new president o f the Philippines.

It was, therefore, constitutional.

The efforts to discredit her via a legal argument were fruitless. Furthermore,
Arroyo had followed the constitutional procedures in selecting a new vice president,
Teofisto Guingona, and both chambers o f the Philippine Congress had confirmed her
selection. The constitutional hurdles that needed clearing were so minor that they did not
even register in most people’s minds. Whether Estrada’s allies liked it or not, the fact
was that Estrada had resigned, the Chief Justice o f the Supreme Court had sworn in
Arroyo, and she had the full faith and support o f the Catholic Church, which “spoke” for
the people at EDSA II and had the public opinion polls backing up its claims.
In spite o f everything, it was still not enough for loyal Estrada cliques, and
Estrada still had legions o f supporters among the poor. A plan was hatched three months
after EDSA II to force Arroyo’s resignation. Throngs o f Estrada supporters began to
gather at the EDSA shrine. They were angry about their idol’s arrest, and they declared
that they would not disperse until Arroyo resigned and Estrada was returned to
Malacanang. It was a tense time in Manila, and the Church knew it had to react to this
counter-action or risk losing its president and its influence over Philippine politics.
The press dubbed the event the “poor People Power" because it was largely made
up o f Manila’s poor and unemployed, who had voted for and sympathized with Estrada.
There was also a very large contingent from the Inglesia ni Cristo, a powerful antiCatholic religious group that still supported the ousted president.22 The numbers soon

21

David W. Hendon and Donald E. Greco, “Notes on Church-state Affairs,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Journal o f Church & State (April 1, 2001;
accessed 5 October 2002).
22Ramon Tulfo, “Catholic vs. INC at EDSA,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 28, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
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swelled to tens o f thousands, but they discovered that numbers were not the key to
success. Even before EDSA II, Estrada had amassed more than a million supporters to
his cause in Manila to no avail. As those at this “EDSA III,” as it became to be called,
were about to learn, a People Power without the Church’s support had no power at all.
The Catholic Church not only did not support the efforts o f an EDSA III, but also
fought against them. The protestors gathered at the EDSA shrine had done so without the
Church’s permission. Once there, they began to deface what was officially Church
property. EDSA was more than simply Church property. It was officially “holy ground,”
a place where Christian pilgrims were granted plenary indulgences by the Roman
Catholic Church. It had been declared holy ground shortly after EDSA II by a decree
from Pope John Paul II. A church had existed on the site since 1987.23
Defacing holy ground and the parish did not sit well with Cardinal Sin. He took to
the airwaves and urged people to defend democracy and the new president. "As
Catholics, we must fully support, defend, and stand behind the present government and
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo," Sin said in a radio and television address. "Keep
watch, stay alert. [EDSA III] is immoral to grab power. It is immoral to support those
plotting against duly constituted authorities." The armed forces were also put on the
highest alert.24 Arroyo’s feelings on the issue were summed up by her husband, who said
she was ready to deal with any attempt to grab power. He quoted the president as saying
to Estrada’s supporters, "Come and take your best shot and I will crush you."
23Norman Bordadora and Andrea T. Echavez, “EDSA Shrine: Where man is Fully
Alive,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (February
23,2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
24Paul Alexander, “Philippines Cardinal Urges Protest,” [Wire Service OnlineDow Jones Interactive] Associated Press (April 29, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
“Estrada Followers Cancel March To Philippine Pres Palace,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Dow Jones International (April 29, 2001; accessed 5
October 2002).
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The pro-Estrada mob did nothing to endear themselves to the millions o f Arroyo’s
Catholic supporters. Their actions desecrated the EDSA shrine and left many dismayed.
Trash littered the site, and Estrada partisans even plastered pictures o f their hero on the
hem o f the Virgin Mary’s dress. They also positioned loudspeakers at the doors o f the
shrine’s church. The loudspeakers blasted “foul language” and “obscene songs” while
those inside were trying to hear the liturgy.26 "So many o f us are on the brink o f tears,"
Sin said over the situation. "We are grieving for the EDSA shrine, church o f the people,
temple o f God, monument to peace."27
The influential Catholic Bishops' Conference o f the Philippines also decried the
protestors as "immoral" and accused Estrada’s "rich and powerful" allies o f "exploiting
the poor" for their own interests.28 The CBCP’s Bishop Quevedo called the EDSA III
rally an "effectively planned and amply funded sinister destabilization scheme" staged by
Estrada's supporters. Both sides were poised for a new confrontation.
Estrada supporters threatened to storm the presidential palace. The police and the
military rolled out armored vehicles to secure the palace and several thousand people
responded to Cardinal Sin’s radio broadcast. President Arroyo visited and shook hands
with those who responded to the Church’s call and thanked them profusely.29 She also
made a special effort to meet with Cardinal Sin, military, and police officials to discuss

Blanche S. Rivera, Donna Pazzibugan, and Gerald G. Lacuarta, “Sin Urges
Flock: Wear Blue Today,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily
Inquirer (April 29, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
29“Strike Thwarts Power Grab by Estrada Supporters, says Arroyo,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Bangkok Post (May 1, 2001; accessed 3 October
2002 ).
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strategy on how to deal with the potential for deadly riots.

Sadly, violence was

inevitable.
On May 1,2001, elements o f the pro-Estrada rally attempted to storm the
Malacanang. President Arroyo declared a "state o f rebellion," sending heavily armed
police to arrest key opposition politicians and quell the protests. It was the worst wave o f
political violence in fifteen years, and Philippine democracy suffered because o f it.
Within hours, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who served as defense minister under dictator
Ferdinand Marcos, was arrested on sedition charges. He was one o f eleven politicians,
military officers, and policemen arrested that same day. Others included Senator
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan, the same man who led two coup attempts in the late 1980s
against President Corazon Aquino. When the smoke cleared, one policeman and two
rioters were dead. About 113 protestors were wounded and more than 100 rioters were
also arrested.
In the end Arroyo made good on her promise "to crush" the protests and end
Estrada’s hopes for a return to power. The blame for the violence lay not with Arroyo
but with Estrada, and the Church placed it on his shoulders.

Cardinal Sin condemned

allies o f the jailed Estrada for instigating the riot as he spoke before thousands o f progovernment supporters who had gathered at the defaced EDSA shrine to reclaim it for the
Church and clean up the filth left by Estrada’s mob. The fact that the pro-Estrada mob
chose EDSA as the place o f the protest also indicated that they opposed the Church’s
actions as well. However, the Church did not blame the poor, but instead laid the blame

30Ibid.
31
Marc Lemer, “President calls 'state o f rebellion' in Manila Police Arrest
Opposition Politicians,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Washington
Times (May 2, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
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at the feet o f Estrada’s political allies for abusing and manipulating the poor and
capitalizing on their weakness.
Nearly 25,000 people attended the Mass held at the end o f the “poor people”
power uprising. It was a day o f “reclamation” and reaffirmation o f the Arroyo
presidency. Standing before the trash-strewn shrine, Sin declared, "The people have
desecrated Holy ground, disrespected the image o f our Lady and offended Catholic
sensibilities. Obscene songs and contemptuous remarks were hurled even at the Church . .
. [but] we do not sow revenge, hatred, and rancor. We are saddened but not vengeful. We
are appalled by the desecration but we do not want to retaliate . . . We do not hold these
sins against the poor.”33 Cardinal Sin also used the mass to reiterate his support for
President Arroyo. He said, “She blended well justice and love, force and tolerance, law
and freedom.”34 Moreover, he vowed that the Church would "never again allow the
desecration" o f the EDSA shrine.35
Estrada’s hopes o f using People Power to regain his office were dashed, but
EDSA III opened the Church’s and the new administration’s eyes. It illustrated to both
the government and the Church that significant numbers o f the poor still supported
Estrada. The reasons were simple. He was their matinee idle and, at least in his rhetoric,

32“Philippine Catholic Church Leader Condemns Street Riots,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (May 1, 2001; accessed 4 March
2002 ).
Cathy Rose A. Garcia, “Politicians Who Manipulated Poor Face God's Wrath Sin,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (May 2, 2001;
accessed 3 March 2002).
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34Arturo Bariud, “Arroyo Blossoms Under Pressure,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (May 5, 2001; accessed 5 March 2002).
35“Choose Wisely, Voters Told (GMA Says Polls Not a Test o f Her Legitimacy),”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (May 14, 2001; accessed 5
October 2002).
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he attempted to identify with their issues. Regardless o f his own alleged embezzlement o f
funds, he still made them feel important.
Arroyo had not used her first few months in office to cater to the poor as Estrada
had. Concrete actions by the Church were slow, and the poorest segments o f society
continued to feel abandoned and overlooked by the new government. Certain segments
even called upon Arroyo and Cardinal Sin to end their social, economic, and political
"calvaries," daring them to “stand for the right o f the peasantry . . . above the interests of
the landed families who continue to amass wealth and property at the expense o f the
already impoverished peasants."36 Unfortunately, many felt that action was too slow, and
this is part o f the reason an EDSA III erupted.
When the author was in Manila during the summer o f 2001, the talk on the streets
was much the same. “Where is Arroyo? Where is Cardinal Sin? Erap was our guy, our
president and they took him from us,” said one gentleman in a Makati shopping mall.
“The Church should not have intervened. Let the trial go. Estrada is the one who should
be president,” said another in Manila.37 Indeed, many were still angry about the events o f
EDSA II well into the summer o f 2001, feeling that the Church had snatched away their
legitimate president in order to install one o f its own. Moreover, they felt that the Church
was an institution o f elite and middle class that cared little about the plight o f Manila’s
poor.
The editorial boards o f Manila’s newspapers concurred. They often criticized the
Church for not taking the plight o f the poor seriously. One criticism was that the Church
did not apply enough pressure on its rich and middle class parishioners, who seemed to

36“Farmers Seek Sin, GMA Help to End 'Calvary',” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 12, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
37Filipinos’ Opinion. Interview by author, 20 July 2001, Philippines. Transcribed.
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia.
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forget the gospel after Sunday sermons and failed to take care o f the “least” o f society. In
fact, these same “rich” parishioners often failed to pay their poor workers a “living”
wage. In one scathing editorial, the Philippine Daily Inquirer called upon the Church to
do “something significant to show for more than 400 years o f work in this ‘only Christian
country’ in Asia.”38 It was a dramatic indictment o f the Church’s performance in helping
the nation’s poorest.
Understanding this perspective, Cardinal Sin took the opportunity in the wake o f
EDSA III to publicly ask for forgiveness from the poor for both himself and the Church.
Sin apologized and acknowledged that the Church had neglected the poor and that this
had made them easy prey for “selfish” and “powerful” people. “We would like to ask the
poor for forgiveness," Sin said. "We should listen to the poor's complaints. We should not
wait for another crisis before we open our eyes.”39 The Church needed to reopen a dialog
with the poor, and the aftermath o f EDSA III was the perfect time.
The crisis o f the “poor people power” forced the Church to act as Arroyo’s
protector. It would soon have to meet another challenge to her legitimacy from a
different and much smaller segment o f society. In the summer o f 2002, a new threat to
her legitimacy came in the guise o f a political pressure group known as the Council for
Philippine Affairs (COPA). Ironically, COPA was launched at Cardinal Sin’s villa in
1999. It started out as a gathering o f political hacks interested in injecting themselves
into national politics. They morphed into a group eager to depose what they felt was a
weak Arroyo administration.

38Ramon T. Jimenez, “'EDSA III' Should Jolt Gov't, Labor, Church to Act Now,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (May 2, 2001;
accessed 3 April 2002).
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“Catholic Church Leader Apologizes to Poor for Neglecting Them,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associate Press Newswires (May 13, 2001;
accessed 4 May 2002).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

326

The COPA slogan had been "Be informed. Be concerned. Be involved,” and as
long as the group’s criticism was not directed towards Arroyo, the Church did not watch
COPA particularly closely.40 But when Arroyo became a target o f COPA, the Church
took notice and took action. Although COPA’s attacks were minor and hardly registered
in the Philippine press initially, they had to be met head on. Allowing them to fester in
the body politic was something the Church was not comfortable with.
Most o f COPA’s charges centered on the fact that Arroyo had abandoned the
“spirit” o f EDSA II in favor o f status quo politics. It was a baseless charge, and Arroyo
initially dismissed it, saying she was not bothered by COPA, nor did she owe her position
to anyone but “God.” To some God may have been a code word for Cardinal Sin, and
according to at least one incredulous reporter, Sin was “as close to God as anyone can get
in this country.”41 While not divine, Cardinal Sin was politically astute and wanted to
head off any COPA rallies that might use Church property as a rallying point. The
Cardinal banned political demonstrations on the premises of the EDSA shrine and refused
to give permission to allow COPA to use it for any actions against Arroyo.
The Church did not want anything to jeopardize the Arroyo administration.42
Consequently, the cardinal commanded the presidential advisor on media and
ecclesiastical affairs, Conrado "Dodi" Limcaoco, to release information to the press about

40Donna S. Cueto and Norman Bordadora, “Who's Afraid o f Copa?” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 27, 2002;
accessed 5 October 2002).
41Conrado De Quiros, “Theology 101,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 15, 2002; accessed 5 October 2002).
42Amando Doronila, “GMA - EDSA II Beneficiary Not Its Reincarnation,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 14, 2002;
accessed 5 October 2002).
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COPA’s activities.43 The strategy was simple. He wanted to expose the plotters to the
conservative press and to Arroyo’s supporters, and this preemptive move would force
COPA back into the shadows. He also had another reason. Members o f COPA had been
intentionally feeding erroneous information to the press that fostered the false assumption
that Cardinal Sin supported their efforts against Arroyo.
COPA Secretary General Pastor Saycon told one paper about a meeting with
Cardinal Sin. He said he went to see the cardinal to present COPA’s manifesto. "The
manifesto would be all about democracy and freedom from poverty. That's why we
wanted the Cardinal's blessing," Saycon said.44 The manifesto also contained a provision
by which COPA members would take over the government and form a ruling junta
should rumors o f a coup or an EDSA IV materialize. COPA’s manifesto was absurd on
many levels, because the group never had the support o f Cardinal Sin or the Church.45
Moreover COPA never had support from the masses. It was, in the words o f one
observer, a “small group” with media savvy 46
COPA was easily defeated without the Church’s support and after a meeting with
the Reverend Socrates Villegas, COPA’s Saycon offered a public apology to the nation,
the Church, and the president47 The entire COPA affair was small but indicative o f how
43Carlito Pablo and Dona Pazzibugan, “Palace Admits News Leak,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 25, 2002; accessed 5
October 2002).
44“'Freedom Force' not Anti-Gloria,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 23, 2002; accessed 4 October 2002).
45Christian V. Esquerra and Dona Z. Pazzibugan, “Copa to Seek Ceasefire,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 26, 2002;
accessed 5 October 2002).
46Armand N. Nocum and Normal Bordadora, “Saycon Says Sorry for Those He
Offended,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July
15,2002; accessed 4 October 2002).
47Ibid.
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political opposition sometimes worked. The Church helped keep it small, and that was a
good thing for Arroyo. In Philippine politics the most minor o f charges or the smallest
ripples o f discord can lead to severe consequences. Former Presidents Ramos and
Estrada can attest to that.
In less public and identifiable ways than COPA, the Church served Arroyo as less
o f a watchdog and more o f a cheering section and unofficial publicity machine. Its
message for all the discontented was simple— have patience. Patience was a theme
echoed over and over by the Church during the early months o f Arroyo’s administration.
Everyone must have patience with the new president, the Church believed, including the
masses and the Philippine Congress.
The Church was not above chiding the Philippine public and members o f
Congress for having what they deemed "unrealistic" expectations o f Arroyo. The Church
also criticized the "inane behavior" o f senators stifling her domestic agenda.

Moreover,

it was the Philippine Congress, the Church believed, which kept Arroyo’s war on poverty
from making progress. In a roundabout way, Congress’s inaction could be used to take
some of the heat off o f Arroyo and the Church.
Poverty and how to deal with it is always a pressing issue in the Philippines, and
sometimes the Church is even harsh on the president when it feels she is not acting in the
best manner and being proactive enough in responding to the needs o f the poor. In fact,
Cardinal Sin chastised Arroyo early in 2002 when he believed she cared more about
photo opportunities with the poor than actually helping them. Sin told the president that
the poor were “not for decoration and for romantic charity photographs," and exhorted

48

“Philippines: Catholic Bishops Ask for Arroyo Government to be Given More
Time,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (January
18, 2002; accessed 5 October, 2002).
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Arroyo to serve them "away from the flashing lights o f photographers." 49 Arroyo soon
got the message and stated publicly that she would “heed” Cardinal Sin’s advice.50
Over the past twenty-one months, these are issues that the Church has helped
Arroyo address when it is not defending itself against attacks from the press, such as on
the issue o f the poor, or actively buttressing Arroyo’s legitimacy. Less popular issues
were not less important to the Church. Indeed, it injected itself into many o f Arroyo’s
policies and the Philippines have also witnessed a convergence o f Arroyo’s policy
platform and the Church’s political agenda over other issues. Arroyo accepted virtually
the Church’s entire policy platform as the template for her own government's policies,
including the areas of reproductive health, divorce, the death penalty, and censorship o f
the media. The press even reported that Arroyo herself vowed with “lamb-like
meekness” to follow the Catholic Church’s dictates in matters o f policy, and would pay
particular deference to the advice o f Cardinal Sin and the Catholic Bishops Conference o f
the Philippines in certain policy matters.51
One area where the Church belonged was in the spiritual needs o f the
administration. For example, the president summoned the "prayer power" o f Cardinal
Sin to help her and her administration put an end to the hostage crises that afflicted the
Philippines in June 2001. The Abu Syaff, a terrorist group with ties to A1 Queda, was
kidnapping Filipinos and western tourists with impunity and causing her administration
considerable public relations problems. The cardinal arrived at the palace and set about

49“Philippines Leader Says She is in Charge After Turbulent Year,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agertce France-Presse (January 20, 2002; accessed 5
October 2002).
50Ibid.
51Norman Bordadora, “Gloria Toes Church Line,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (February 16, 2001; accessed 18 November
2002 ).
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leading a "prayer for the Cabinet."52 The fact that his visit was detailed in the press hints
at its importance. Whether the prayers worked or not is something debated by believers
and theologians, but no doubt the Church’s public presence added a sense o f authority
and punctuated the crisis’s importance to the Arroyo administration.
In a more mundane role, the Church injected itself into the nomination process o f
some o f Arroyo’s cabinet members. A prime example is the selection o f the health
secretary. Since this position was directly responsible for policies dealing with
reproduction and abortion-issues the Church had a keen interest in— it was interested in
who would take the seat. Arroyo recognized the Church’s interest in her administration’s
issues. She said she would “gladly listen” to the counsel of the Church and “the good
•

ST

Cardinal.” It came as no surprise that the Church approved the appointment o f Dr.
Manuel Dayrit, who favored its positions.54
Media reports also indicated that the Church was heavily involved in the
nomination and endorsements o f candidates to the Commission on Elections (COMLEC),
which is the governmental body in charge o f overseeing elections. Overseeing elections
was one way for the Church to solidify a powerful position in the government. Having
allies on COMLEC could ensure an election that it believed would favor its candidates.
The Church was also involved in more ominous endeavors, such as censorship o f
the media. The Arroyo administration did little to counter its actions. The Church had
always been the unofficial moral conscious o f the Filipino people, but under the new

Juliet L. Javellana and Carlio Pablo, “Gloria: Nani Can't Serve as Negotiator,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 20, 2001;
accessed 5 October 2002).
Arturo Bariuad, “Ban Shows Church's Influence on Arroyo,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (March 23, 2001; accessed 5 October
2002).
54Ibid.
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Arroyo administration it became more active, taking an “official” role as arbiter o f what
could and could not be seen in Philippine cinema. A prime example o f the Church’s new
empowered moral authority came after the release o f the motion picture Live Show.
The film, which won wide acclaim across the entertainment world, including the
Cannes Film Festival, was targeted by the Catholic Church and its leadership for its
graphic depictions o f the seedier side o f Manila’s nightclub life, including its depiction o f
live “sex shows.” The Church did not approve, and it pressured the president to remove
the film from theaters. When Arroyo acquiesced, it became the first instance o f open
censorship in her administration.
In another graphic representation o f the Church’s authority and influence on the
State, the chairman o f the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB) was summoned to a meeting with Cardinal Sin. Interestingly, he had to
answer to the cardinal and not to the president for his actions. After the meeting
Chairman Nicanor Tiongson, who had previously approved the film Live Show, stated to
the press that he had been “traumatized” by his meeting with Sin, who he said was
“reeking with arrogance.”55 Moreover, Tiongson said the cardinal had acted more like a
“political tactician” than a priest.
Regardless o f the criticism, Cardinal Sin proved politically effective in pressuring
President Arroyo to suppress the film. Did she have a choice? How could she say “no” to
the Church or Cardinal Sin in this matter? Arroyo recognized that she owed her position
as president in large part to the actions o f the Catholic Church and to Cardinal Sin.
Without EDSA II there would be no President Arroyo. Consequently, Arroyo forced
Tiongson to resign.

55Leah Salterio, Donna S. Cueto, and Norman Bordadora, “Chief Censor Quits;
Church Meddling Hit,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily
Inquirer (March 22, 2001; accessed 18 November 2002).
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The media was wary o f the Church’s actions in this particular case. By giving in
to the Church’s pressure, they believed that Arroyo had committed “a culpable violation
o f the constitutional principle separating Church and State.” The Philippine Daily
Inquirer called the Church a “moral posse o f pharisaic ayatollahs,” claiming that none o f
the Church leadership had even seen the film.56 Asked if this was a violation o f the
separation o f the Church and State, President Arroyo confidently replied that it was not.
cn

She said, “Anybody can recommend, and it's up to the President to make a decision."
So it seems the Church merely “recommended” that she do what it advised.
The Church also had Arroyo’s support regarding the death penalty. Catholic
doctrine from the Vatican on down opposes the death penalty in all cases. This often
contradicts with Catholic societies at large, including the Philippine public, which tends
to favor the death penalty for murder and other heinous crimes. Public opinion polls
show that the death penalty is favored by as much as 82 percent o f the Philippine
population. On this issue, the Church is out o f step with the majority.58
Arroyo’s own actions in dealing with the issue o f capital punishment show how
she is tom between doing the Church’s bidding and her own desire to follow the people’s
wishes. She has personally expressed displeasure for the death penalty, and she
continues to support the Church’s push for the repeal o f the death penalty law .59 She has
56Dean Jorge Bocob, “Joker, Say, Oh say It Ain't So,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (March 2,6, 2001; accessed 4 May 2002).
57Donna S. Cueto and Jerome Aning, “GMA: It’s Not Sin but His Spokesperson,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (March 31, 2001;
accessed 4 October 2002).
co

Mahar Mangahas, “Omnibus Social Survey-October 30, 1998,” [Online
database at http://www.sws.org.ph/] Social Weather Report Survey (October 30, 1998;
accessed 22 November 2002).
59Raissa Robles, “Arroyo 'Rules Out Executions on Her Watch',” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] South China Morning Post (April 5, 2001; accessed 5
October 2002).
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also commuted all death sentences to life imprisonment.60 However, a few months later
she altered her stance and said that death sentences should be carried out as long as the
law existed. It seems that she is playing politics on this issue.
Most recently, she granted a reprieve to three convicted rapists who were
coincidently scheduled to die on Cardinal Sin’s birthday.61 Arroyo would not allow the
executions on the birthday o f her most important benefactor. As the year 2002
progressed, the issue o f the death penalty was still unresolved, but if she followed public
opinion then capital punishment would continue unfettered. If she followed the Church,
she would continue to push for a law that prohibits the death penalty in all cases. The
outcome o f the death penalty issue remains uncertain.
The legality o f divorce is another issue confronting the president. But unlike the
death penalty, Arroyo and Cardinal Sin’s closeness on the issue is described as “solid”
and in “total agreement.”62 Both have attacked a measure before Congress that would
have made divorce legal, calling it "un-Filipino," "immoral," and “unconstitutional.”
Not one to mince words, Cardinal Sin said such a measure was “absurd” and “insane”
and said that no sensible or intelligent legislator would pursue it.63
Both Arroyo and Sin have consistently favored keeping the constitutional
provisions o f 1987 that “guarantee” the sanctity o f the family. Divorce violates these

60Leotes Marie T. Lugo, “GMA Commutes All in Death Row List to Life Terms,”
[Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Business World (April 4, 2001; accessed 4
March 2002).
61“Legal Effort To Halt 30 Philippine Executions Fails,” [Wire Service OnlineDow Jones Interactive] Dow Jones International News (September 23, 2002; accessed 5
October 2002).
62Gerald G. Lacuarta and Juliet L. Javellan, “GMA, Sin call Divorce Bill
Immoral, Un-Filipino,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily
Inquirer (July 7, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
63Ibid.
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provisions, in their opinion. Arroyo has been quoted as saying that the government
should not alter any section o f the constitution that would harm the “basic source o f our
national bond and fraternity."64 Arroyo also said measures to amend the constitution and
legalize divorce only served to distract from economic priorities and cause further
divisions within the government and society.65 For the foreseeable future, it seems that
divorce will remain illegal since the Church is unlikely to yield on this issue.
EDSA III, the Live Show debate, the death penalty, and divorce are just a few
examples o f how the Church has been integrally involved in the new administration.
Sometimes its activities have drawn criticism both domestically and internationally.
Even the Vatican was displeased with the Philippine Catholic Church’s overt political
activities. A case in point is found in a “leak” o f a Holy See edict soon after Arroyo took
office. In the edict, the Pope was critical o f Cardinal Sin and the Church’s continued
involvement in politics after EDSA II. The Church’s leadership did not like the criticism.
Cardinal Sin reportedly had the Philippine Ambassador to the Vatican, Tita De Villa,
recalled immediately.
It was an astonishing demonstration o f power, for here was a prelate forcing the
newly installed president o f the Philippines to recall am ambassador. It was yet another bit
o f evidence o f the Church’s lofty position in the Arroyo government. As the Manila
Standard later pointed out, the important lesson from this episode was not the “leak”
itself but that President Arroyo was so eager to accommodate the Church without giving
Ambassador De Villa a chance to explain her actions. The appointment o f ambassadors

64Ibid.
65Camela Cruz, “President Opposes Proposal to Allow Amendments,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Associated Press Newswires (July 6, 2001;
accessed 5 October 2002).
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is legally the sole prerogative o f the president, but she gave in to the cardinal’s demands.
This caused the Manila Standard to ask if Arroyo had own “Richelieu.”66
Having a “Richelieu” was not all bad, and it had positive affects for Arroyo. Not
only did Cardinal Sin lead the Church that helped install her as president and legitimize
her administration, but he also helped her gain a congressional voting block in the interim
elections o f May 2001. The Church made it its duty to campaign for candidates that
favored its agenda in the May elections.67 Together with Arroyo, it campaigned to get the
country's estimated thirty-six million eligible voters to choose a slate o f candidates that
would help Arroyo, and do so in an atmosphere not tainted by guns, goons, or gold as
Philippine elections often are.
The Church and Arroyo had high hopes for their slate o f candidates, thirteen in
all. They were all part o f the administration’s “People Power Coalition,” which was a
group o f candidates that the Church felt would support the president’s policy decisions.
As it had in the past, the Church watched the May balloting carefully. It wanted to
prevent cheating and hoped to calm any potential violence the election could engender.
Not only did COMELEC officiate, but the National Citizens Movement for Free
Elections (NAMFREL) was also present, as was the Parish Pastoral Council for
Responsible Voting (PPCRV), which had an impressive 462,000 volunteers covering
fifty-eight dioceses nationwide.68

66“Sin Had Ambassador to Vatican Recalled,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Manila Standard (February 4,2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
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“Philippine Church Leader Appeals for Calm Ahead o f Elections,” [Wire
Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Agence France-Presse (May 13, 2001, accessed 4
October 2002).
68Gerald G. Lacuarta, “Polls 'Generally Peaceful,' Turnout 85%,’’[Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (May 15, 2001; accessed 5
October 2002).
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When the election was over and the dust had settled, the Church was pleased. Its
presence had ensured relatively peaceful elections and eight o f its thirteen candidates had
won election. Politically, the Church had pulled o ff another victory for the Arroyo
government. She now had validation from the Church, from the EDSA II “parliament o f
the streets,” and from the ballot box. Challenges from pro-Estrada forces would now face
an impossible task in unseating Arroyo.
By the year 2002 Arroyo had, with the Church’s help, fought off challenges to her
legitimacy and secured her place as president. She made significant progress on her
policy agenda, and certain segments o f the international press took notice o f her efforts.
In their “report card” on her administration, she received high marks. They credited her
for having accomplished a great deal in her first year in office, despite the political and
economic turmoil that engulfed the Philippines at the time she took over for Estrada.
They gave her credit for restoring fiscal control, stabilizing the peso, and presiding over
the fastest growing economy in Southeast Asia for the fiscal year.69
Domestically, she enjoyed the solid backing o f the military, and public opinion
polls showed that her popularity remained steady. The Church continued to stand
squarely behind the president, and throughout her term it has been her most ardent
supporter.70 Sometimes it offered concrete policy advice and at other times spiritual
guidance and comfort, and it sometimes served as her protector. On rare occasions, the
Church could even be Arroyo’s toughest critic. The key point is that it was there in some
capacity through her first volatile months, keeping her focused on her message and the
reasons she was made the president to begin with.
69“Thrilla in Manila - II,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive]
Institutional Investor - International (June 1, 2002; accessed 5 October 2002).
70
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Cardinal Sin and the Church have remained powerful in Philippine politics, both
in an advisory role when necessary and a very vocal and public role when required. But
what about the future o f the Church in Philippine politics? Will it remain the mediating
variable in matters o f legitimacy? Cardinal Sin’s leadership certainly cannot last forever,
and with his passing the Church will have to fill a large “power vacuum.”
The author believes that Cardinal Sin’s absence in no way means the end o f
Church activism or influence. The model found in figure 17 does not contain the names
of any one person, but instead features an institution in the role o f the mediating variable
“z.” Yet history teaches one that the presence o f a charismatic and politically astute
leader helps assure the Church a preeminent position in matters o f secular politics and not
simply a marginal role as a mediating variable. Cardinal Sin’s own exploits have
illustrated that the Church is most powerful when it has a strong leader at the helm. As a
result, observers have wondered if anyone can and will fill Sin’s shoes and lead the
Church in the new millennium.
Whoever it may be, he will need to possess a combination o f empathy for the
oppressed, a dynamic personality, and a keen political instinct. Only a leader with keen
political instincts could navigate the immense social weight o f the Church through the
potentially troubling waters o f the Philippine political scene. He will need to practice
political moderation as well, so as not to involve the Church in petty political disputes but
save its power for battles that truly matter. Given all o f this, the question becomes: If not
Cardinal Sin, then who will it be? Is there any one man who will rise to take the
Church’s helm?
Until recently it was unclear if such an individual existed. But one man has risen
above the rest in the unofficial competition to be Sin’s spiritual successor. He has been
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previously mentioned briefly in this study. His name is Socrates “Soc” Villegas.
Although not a stranger to those who have visited the EDSA shrine in the past eleven
years, he has remained largely below the political radar screen o f most casual observers
o f Philippine politics. But Villegas is far from a new face to Philippine social and
political circles. Everyone from Philippine politicians to priests knows exactly who he is,
his history, and his potential.
Since being ordained by Cardinal Sin sixteen years ago, Villegas has been Sin’s
personal secretary and spokesman and has been in the forefront o f many o f the Church’s
political battles. In fact, Villegas was just months into the priesthood when he stood by
Cardinal Sin’s side during the four days o f the first People Power Revolution o f 1986.
For eleven years, he was the rector o f the EDSA shrine, and in January 2001, it was
Villegas who turned on the lights at EDSA to welcome the first wave o f protesters
against President Joseph Estrada.72
The faithful who have attended Mass at the shrine during the past decade know
Father “Soc” very well, having been “entranced by the homilies o f the baby-faced
•

7T

priest.”

•

Villegas has been called a “gifted sermon writer and orator, a charismatic,

principled leader who guides his faithful with steadfast, moral courage.” 74 In Manila’s
political circles, he is known for being a simple, well-spoken advocate o f conservative
Catholicism, making the Church’s doctrines palatable to all.

71Andrea Trinidad-Echavez, “Msgr. 'Soc' Now a Bishop,” [Wire Service OnlineDow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 27,2001; accessed 5 October
2002 ).
72“Barbed-wire Crest for New Bishop,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (September 1, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
73Kris Aquino, “A Modem Man o f the Church,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones
Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (September 3, 2001; accessed 5 October 2002).
74Ibid.
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Villegas has also accumulated some accolades. In the year 2000, he received the
Ten Outstanding Young Men (TOYM) award for community development given by the
Philippine Jaycees. He is also the author o f five books on homilies, prayers, and
reflections. Moreover, he was given the Catholic Authors Awards by the Asian Catholic
Publishers Inc. in 1994. He also serves as member o f the College o f Consultors, vicar
general o f the Archdiocese o f Manila, and the district head o f the Ecclesiastical District
o f Quezon City-South. He was also executive coordinator o f the Commission for the
World Youth Day 1995 in Manila.
But those offices and honors were mere baby steps to his ordination as a bishop o f
the Church on August 31,2001. The coronation was held in the historical Manila
Cathedral and performed by none other than Cardinal Sin. In fact, Sin chose his own
birthday as the perfect day to affirm the Church’s newest bishop. If the Cardinal’s
personal blessing was not enough, President Arroyo, former President Aquino, and Chief
Justice Hilario Davide were also there. They shared the audience with members o f the
Philippine Congress and some o f the most politically powerful Filipinos in the world. It
was no accident that they were in attendance. Their presence was a very real
acknowledgment o f the event’s significance. Perhaps it was also a tacit “nod” to the
future o f the Church itself.
Even before the ceremony, Villegas had the president’s ear. Arroyo publicly
stated during the COPA crisis that she received advice and counsel from Villegas. He had
also offered to mediate between the Arroyo administration and COPA during the mini
crisis discussed earlier.75 Moreover, he was also the one who pressured COPA’s
leadership to drop their anti-Arroyo rhetoric, convincing Pastor Saycon to publicly
apologize.

Armand N. Nocum, T. J. Burgonio, and Christine Avendano, “Bishop Offers to
Mediate in 'Civil' Unrest,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily
Inquirer (July 12, 2002; accessed 4 October 2002).
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The political elite’s attendance illustrated that in years to come, young Bishop
Villegas would most likely be leader o f the Church, and those who wished to secure and
legitimize their political power should become acquainted with the new bishop. On the
day o f his coronation, Villegas’s life and Cardinal Sin’s, and perhaps even the Church’s
role in the Arroyo administration, had come full circle. The Church o f today had
Cardinal Sin, its future lay in Villegas, and its political power rested with Arroyo.
In a way, the torch o f leadership was passed to Bishop Villegas on the day o f his
coronation. Cardinal Sin has since receded more into the background. The rest o f the
Church leadership has also vowed to disengage from the political scene. In a statement
issued by 119 bishops o f the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines, they vowed
to stay out of the country's politics and leave secular matters to ordinary Filipino
Catholics and lay organizations.76
However, the Church has vowed to do so in the past and has failed each time. It
is unlikely that the bishops will withdraw completely from politics. There remain too
many important issues to deal with in the Philippines, and the Church has something to
contribute to them all. As an essential power broker in the Philippines and the bedrock
on which the legitimacy o f the Arroyo government rests, do not expect the Church to fade
from the public spotlight.
The Church helped situate Arroyo in the unique position where she may have
been able to serve eight years as the president and bring real fundamental changes to the
Philippines. Yet Arroyo’s own waffling on political matters near and dear to the Church
produced rifts in their once close relationship. On one side was the powerful Church that
was looking for a strong and even subservient political ally as president to help push
through their social and political agenda, and on the other a politician being torn between
76Arturo Bariuad, “Manila Bishops Vow to Keep Out o f Politics,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] The Straits Times (July 17, 2001; accessed 5 October
2002 ).
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the need to satisfy the Church as well as political opposition in the Philippine Congress.
The result was stagnation, and nothing was being done.
Perhaps sensing the hopelessness o f the situation and realizing she was losing
support from all sectors Arroyo made a surprising decision. On December 30, 2002
President Arroyo announced to the nation that she would not seek reelection in 2004.
This sent shockwaves throughout Philippine political circles and even shocked the author
this study. On the surface there were no real indications that her situation was so
hopeless as to warrant pulling out o f politics. However, it did not take long before facts
emerged that gave a context to her decision.
Rumors soon surfaced that Arroyo lost the support o f the Church.77 These rumors
were not hard to believe. Her popularity has been falling in recent surveys and she
ranked a distant fourth in preferences for the 2004 presidential election.

78

Some urged

the President to “cast aside” the wishes o f the Catholic Church in order to tackle issues
such as population control that she has been less than assertive in dealing with while
under the Church’s thumb.79 The Church pushed her to be more in line with their wishes.
She could do neither. She decided to bow out.
Reaction to her decision was swift, for just a few days after her announcement the
Church praised Arroyo during a special Thanksgiving Mass. In front o f a crowd o f about
a thousand the heir-apparent o f Cardinal Sin, Bishop Socrates Villegas said that Arroyo
had set a “fine example o f pursuing peace and unity for the world and the nation.” He
77

“Philippines Risk: Economic, Political Worries Increase,” [Wire Service
Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Economist Intelligence Unit (January 9,2003; accessed
10 February 2003).
78 “Analysis-The Philippine Presidency: Jury Still Out on Wisdom o f Arroyo’s
Withdrawal,” [Wire Service Online-Dow Jones Interactive] Bangkok Post (January 7,
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went further to declare that the President “sought the guidance o f God and not politicians
in declaring her decision not to run in 2004."80 Such a quick and glowing response leads
this author to suspect that the Church knew and had a hand in her decision all along.
After her announcement candidates began lining up for the presidency and the
Church is already preparing their tactics for 2004. Who are the contenders and what do
the people think o f them? In a recent Social Weather Station poll Senator Raul Roco was
chosen by 24 percent o f those polled, followed by actor Fernando Poe Jr. at 21 percent,
Noli de Castro with 19 percent, and coming fourth was President Gloria MacapagalArroyo with 13 percent.

Q1

Out of this list, Femado Poe Jr. worries the Church the most. He not only is a
popular actor but also a friend and ally to deposed President Estrada. The Church does
not wish to see another Estrada debacle. Their reservoir o f “People Power” is not so deep
as to be able to call another in just a few years should Poe be elected and it become
necessary. Hoping to preempt Poe’s candidacy Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, president
o f the Catholic Bishops Conference o f the Philippines, praised Arroyo while at the same
time indirectly commenting on Poe when he said, "We must expect other political leaders
to follow her example o f self-sacrifice when it is for the common good o f all. We must
expect possible candidates for electoral office to examine themselves in the light o f the
R')
needs o f the country... winnability must not be taken as a criterion for candidacy.” It
would seem that the Church is gearing up for an offensive should Poe take on the mantle
o f Estrada and wish to challenge their authority. There are no current indications from
80 “GMA Admired, Applauded at Mass for Unity,” [Wire Service Online-Dow
Jones Interactive] Philippine Daily Inquirer (January 2, 2003: accessed 5 February
2003).
81 “Roco and De Castro Lead the 2004 Race, According to SWS December 7-15
Survey,” Special Media Release [http://www.sws.org.ph] (20 December 2002: accessed
3 January 2003).
82 Ibid.
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Poe’s side that he wishes such a political fight, and he may end up embracing the
Catholic Church, as 2004 grows closer.
Outside electoral politics the Church is also relevant to the Philippine
government. The recent spate o f terrorist attacks in Mindanao and in Manila also
highlights the dangers posed by Communist insurgencies and Muslim separatist
movements. The Church may be needed now more than ever as both an intelligence
gathering arm o f the government and for its ability to negotiate peace with enemies o f the
State. Many questions will certainly be posed and answered in the 2004 elections. Can
the Church ensure an election o f a candidate favorable to their agenda? Will the new
president embrace the Church as a political ally? And what role will the Church play
with the State in the next few years?
If one thing is certain about Philippine politics, it is that nothing is certain. The
Church will certainly have a major presence, but at times the relationship between the
Church and State—even between Cardinal Sin and Arroyo—can be a tumultuous union
with the electorate taking the part o f the suffering children. At other times the “marriage”
between the two is one o f the most beautiful political and social relationships found in the
family o f nation-states.
The closeness o f the relationship may trouble the hardened observer, but the sight
o f Arroyo surrounded by cardinals and bishops o f the Philippine Catholic Church is
anything but an ominous vision. In many ways, it is the continuation o f a tradition
spanning over 400 years, when the first political communities were organized around the
Catholic parish and the local leadership was hand-picked and advised by the parish priest.
Seeing Arroyo embraced by the Church both literally and figuratively may be just the
way it ought to be, and it is certainly nothing unusual or any reason to feel a sense o f
foreboding. Indeed, the fact that the new president shared the stage with the Philippine
Church may offer a bit of inner peace, if only for a moment, for it is better to see a head
of State surrounded by men o f peace instead o f the objects o f war.
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In the end, the future o f the Arroyo presidency beyond 2004 and Philippine
politics in general can be seen by examining a scene from the recent past. In fact, this
scene may be one o f the most telling and striking visuals to come out o f the Church-State
relationship in years. It happened on January 21, 2001, as members o f the Philippine
government joined with newly appointed President Arroyo on stage at the EDS A shrine
along with the Church’s leadership. The following account o f the event is from the
January 28, 2001, edition o f the San Francisco Chronicle:
Philippine President Gloria Macapaga- Arroyo walked solemnly toward the
serene-faced old man in a gold-colored vestment seated near the altar o f the
Manila Cathedral. Bowing before Cardinal Jaime Sin, she kissed the hand o f one
o f the world's most politically influential Roman Catholic leaders, who—for the
second time in 15 years—helped rally a million people in a popular revolt that
brought down a tainted government. . .
Bowing in respect and acknowledgment for what the Church had just done for her
and the Philippine nation, Arroyo recognized where her government’s legitimacy came
from. After she bowed, the cardinal spoke to her and to the nation: “Politics in the
Philippines must be baptized, evangelized and become a tool not for corruption but for
sanctification . . . we will help you for the good o f the nation. We will also criticize you
for the good o f the nation."83
Many may pray, wish, and even plead with the Church not to “meddle in the
affairs o f government,” but their prayers and pleas will most likely fall on deaf ears and
their wishes will come to no avail.84 The Church is now an integral part o f Philippine
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democracy and performs an indispensable role. It remains active when necessary and
vigilant when required.85
If God does exist, he may very well be working through the Church to stabilize
Philippine democracy, marginalize its enemies, and legitimize those who will best serve
the nation. Who is to say? It could be so. In the grand scheme o f things, whether the
Church performs exactly as a “z” variable should function or whether it outperforms any
social science model is o f less significance than the greater lesson found in more than 480
years o f Philippine Church history.
The lesson is clear. The Church matters, and it matters a great deal. Take it out
o f Philippine democracy and the democracy will be weakened. Take it out o f the society
and watch governmental corruption envelope it. Take it out o f the lives o f those who
believe and their moral compass goes astray. Take the Church out o f its oversight and
advisory role and the leadership may falter. Finally, take it out o f the legitimacy process
and the right to rule will be diminished. Like an old friend, father, mother, teacher,
comforter, defender, and ruler, the Church has played every role for the Philippine
people. No institution can claim a perfect track record, but given its dominance over the
Philippine nation-state, one can hope the Church will continue to guide administrations
and individuals for the betterment o f all under its care.

Of
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